As part of our efforts to monitor access to the COVID-19 vaccines for undocumented migrants in Europe, we’re speaking with national-level advocates about the situation in their countries. This interview was conducted in March 2021 with Christoph Krieger of Medibüro Kiel to discuss the situation in Germany. It is not meant to offer an exhaustive picture of the legal and practical context in Germany. Please get in touch at info@picum.org if you have information you’d like to share, and follow our Twitter page @PICUM_post to get more recent updates.

Does Germany include undocumented migrants in its vaccination campaign?

There is little information at this stage, but no federal plan currently explicitly mentions undocumented migrants as a target group of the German vaccination campaign. Some local authorities, including in Kiel, have shown a certain openness – in principle – to vaccinating undocumented migrants as long as they meet age or health-related eligibility requirements.

At the same time, federal regulations on the vaccination strategy state that you have to either provide a registered address or at least prove that you live in Germany “under normal circumstances”, which is meant to exclude those coming to Germany specifically to get their vaccine. Undocumented migrants in many cases can’t provide a registered address, but they might be able to provide a self-certification to prove that they live in Germany.

So undocumented migrants can get the vaccine through this self-certification?

This is where it gets tricky. In Germany, undocumented migrants risk immigration consequences if they try to get non-emergency health care because our federal residence law requires the governmental body they have to go through to report undocumented patients to immigration authorities. This means that they could risk detention and deportation if they register for their vaccine.

Let’s go step by step. How would it work in practice for an undocumented person who tries to access a vaccine?

First, they would get an appointment by internet or by phone. If they meet the eligibility requirements, they would be invited to the local vaccination centre.

Once there, they would need to show an identity card or passport, not necessarily German. So it would be possible to register with a Brazilian passport, for instance.

However, they would need to show a health insurance card too. If they don’t have a health insurance card, which is the case for undocumented migrants, they would need to go to the local social welfare office and get a paper confirming that the office will pay for the vaccination. This is how it works for homeless people, for instance. Some states don’t require a health insurance card – but need proof of residence in that state, which itself is a barrier for many.

But not for undocumented migrants?

No. If undocumented people go to the social welfare office, they risk being reported to immigration authorities because of art. 87 of the Residence Act.

Germany also has a large refugee population. Are there any differences in access to the vaccines for them?

Refugees can access health care almost on the same basis as German citizens. Those who live in refugee centres are actually prioritised in the vaccination campaign. The same goes for those asylum-seekers who’ve seen their asylum request rejected. In Germany, these people get a “tolerated status”, Duldung, whereby they can access certain health care for a period of time. This includes access to the COVID-19 vaccines.

Updates from April 2021:

Following a written request introduced by German MP Klein-Schmeink (Greens), the Ministry of Health clarified in a letter that undocumented people too are entitled to the COVID-19 vaccines, as long as they are habitually living in Germany. However, Doctors of the World note that concerns and practical issues remain, most notably around providing proof of habitual residence and around data sharing with immigration enforcement.

Since April 2021, people in Germany can get vaccinated at a doctor’s office. Here, one has to show proof of cost coverage for the 20€ that the doctor gets for administering the vaccination (health insurance or other source). Undocumented migrants cannot get a proof of cost coverage from the welfare office without being reported. In theory, they could pay the 20€ themselves/out-of-pocket. In this case, doctors are not obliged to report the undocumented patient to immigration authorities. Most cities’ administrations have stated that lack of proof of cost coverage (e.g. a health insurance card or the confirmation from the welfare office) should not keep anyone from getting vaccinated. In practice, however, doctors’ offices will be hesitant to vaccinate someone without proof of identity due to administrative difficulties.

Cover: Federico Orlandi – Paxels

This blog is the second in a two-part series looking at the intersection between racism and migration policy, and was authored by Abigail Cárdenas Mena, former Advocacy Trainee at PICUM.

On 25 May 2020, George Floyd, an African-American man, was killed by police in the US. The recording of his last moments and words travelled the world, sparking mass protests against police brutality and racial injustice around the globe. Four months later, on 18 September, the European Commission presented the EU’s first Anti-Racism Action Plan as a response to the ever-growing demands for racial equality and justice in Europe.

EU’s commitment to anti-racism: ambitious but still fragile

The new EU Anti-Racism Action Plan is meant to be the strategy for the next five years to step up action to counter racial discrimination and racism within the EU. It sets a clear goal: ensuring equal treatment and rights for all to “make a racism-free EU a reality”. The plan is ambitious in its scope and has been welcomed by anti-racist organisations in Europe. It is the first time structural, institutional and historical racism have been acknowledged by the EU. This is a key step towards recognising, understanding and tackling the different ways in which racism operates. Colonialism, slavery and the Holocaust are explicitly mentioned in the Action Plan when addressing the need to acknowledge and teach the historical roots of racism, as is the need to mainstream racial equality and anti-racism in EU and national policies, from digital technologies to migration. Consistent with the motivation behind its publication, the Commission specifically addresses discriminatory policing towards racialised communities in Europe, including racial or ethnic profiling, recognised as unlawful and damaging for reporting of crimes.

“Progress on fighting racism and hate is fragile – it is hard won but very easily lost”, said president Ursula von der Leyen during the State of the Union Address when announcing the Anti-Racism Action Plan. Unfortunately, she could not be more right. Only a few days later, the Commission released a new Pact on Migration and Asylum that has a strong focus on increasing the number of migrants to be returned and setting border procedures that will increase their detention. This document shows the EU’s focus on increasing its protection of borders as the key component of its new migration strategy.

The end of 2020 saw political reactions from European governments and the EU targeting migrants and the Muslim community in the wake of the attacks that took place between October and November 2020 in Austria and France. As highlighted by Statewatch, the statement adopted by the EU Justice and Home Affairs ministers on 13 November “single out migrants (explicitly) and Muslims (implicitly) as a problem”. Measures proposed to fight terrorism linked extremism to the failure of migrants to integrate, and to the need to strengthen protection of the EU’s external borders and increase policing, security and surveillance. Despite NGOs’ concerns about the conflation of counter-terrorism and integration, prevention of radicalisation and extremism finally made its way into the Action Plan on Integration and Inclusion of migrants and EU citizens with a migrant background, published on 24 November. Two weeks later, the EU Counter-Terrorism Agenda was published following the same narrative on Muslims and migrants. Human rights organisations have warned about the discriminatory impact of these policies and discourses and underlined that “Europe’s top-down counter-terrorism measures are reminiscent of a colonial approach to ‘managing’ Muslims often perceived as a problem in Europe, including through migration.”

The EU Migration and Asylum Pact: losing progress on fighting racism

“It’s very painful for me that in the 21st century, we the Black people are just like nothing. to matter, like seriously, it has to be in the Central Mediterranean, it has to matter in Libya. (…) For me, Europe has to do more to prove that Black life really matters”. These are the words of Souleman, a man from Cameroon rescued from the Central Mediterranean last summer after a long and harsh journey to Europe. The testimony of Souleman is a powerful cry for anti-racist demands to reach migrants, especially black Africans, and migration issues.

The Pact on Migration and Asylum came with five legislative proposals and four recommendations to be discussed by the European Parliament and the Council. The results of their agreements will have an immense impact on migrants trying to reach Europe and already present in Europe. Although the Pact stresses the need for a comprehensive European framework on migration that provides “decent conditions for the men, women and children arriving in the EU” and that “allow Europeans to trust that migration is managed in an effective and humane way”, it does not honour its own words. Instead, another sentence better summarises the Pact’s main motivation: “EU migration rules can be credible only if those who do not have the right to stay in the EU are effectively returned”. Around this idea, the Pact builds a whole system intended to identify who has the right to stay and who does not, and increase the deportation of those left without the right.

Furthering the race-making impact of migration policies

Bordering is always a way of race-making. It determines who is eligible for citizenship and political membership, maintaining historical hierarchies of belonging, but also creating new ones. “As people concerned with challenging racism and defending people’s right to move around, we have to be alert to how movement and controls on movement produce and reconfigure racial distinctions and hierarchies in the present (even if they are not named in racial terms)”, says researcher de Noronha.

The Pact is predominantly about preventing irregular migration, the type of migration that is left for people who cannot access regular pathways to Europe. Access to permits and regular pathways are not available for all migrants  and depend to a large extent on their country of origin. The racial impact is clarified by the UN Special Rapporteur (UNSR) on Contemporary forms of Racism: “States regularly engage in racial discrimination in access to citizenship, nationality or immigration status through policies and rhetoric that make no reference to race, ethnicity or national origin, and that are wrongly presumed to apply equally to all”. In Europe this is clear: “especially in former colonial territories, long-standing citizenship and nationality laws often discriminate against indigenous peoples or persons belonging to racial and ethnic minorities, in ways that reinforce ethno-nationalist conceptions of political membership.” The border procedures proposed in the Pact apply only to those who cross borders irregularly, setting the first filter and (racial) distinction. A further distinction based on nationality is also included here, as the border procedures only apply to people coming from a country with a rate of positive asylum decisions below 20%, which will lead to discrimination on the grounds of nationality.

After a pre-entry screening procedure where these migrants will be automatically detained, the Pact introduces a binary approach where everyone who does not apply for asylum should be forcefully returned, thus leaving no room for other pathways to regularisation and access to permits. The decision on asylum then determines the right to stay. But the asylum system is poorly adapted for addressing the many reasons people might seek protection, leaving some people outside, not to mention all the people who are not seeking protection but just decent labour opportunities.

People who are considered to pose a threat to national security or public order will be sent to the asylum border procedure – an accelerated procedure where people are likely to be returned and could be detained for up to three months. The construction of certain communities as a threat – to which counter-terrorism narratives have contributed – raises questions about the risk of discriminatory targeting of racialised communities.

Exacerbating discriminatory policing, racial profiling and police violence

The Pact foresees the pre-entry screening procedure to be applied also to people already in the EU when “there is no indication” that they crossed the border regularly. Thus, undocumented people will be apprehended inside the European countries where they are residing and might be detained for up to three days to be “screened” – identification, registration in databases, security checks and that will determine their status and their fate.

This poses serious concerns about increased discriminatory policing and racial profiling targeting communities of colour in Europe. Racial profiling is a widespread reality in Europe and works under the ethnonationalist conception that equates belonging to racial or ethnic minorities with being a foreigner. A FRA study from 2014 showed that 79% of surveyed border guards at airports rated ethnicity as a helpful indicator – alongside the way people behave when approaching a checkpoint and during the check (96% and 98%), destination (85%) and nationality (90%) – to identify people attempting to enter the country in an irregular manner before speaking to them. There is ever-growing evidence that discriminatory policing is accompanied by the excessive use of force and violence against racialised – including undocumented – people, including incidents leading to death.  The Pact’s proposed return sponsorship creates the possibility for EU member states to provide mutual support for the deportation of migrants, rather than for relocating them. To do so, member states can “choose the nationality of people to be supported for return, based on the readmission agreements signed and the highest possibility of expulsion”. Besides the inequalities this will create based on origin, this will contribute to discriminatory stops and searches and racial profiling according to nationality and will exacerbate existing practices of raids based on racial and ethnic criteria to fill charter flights for deportation to those countries.

Unequal external relations to ensure forced returns

At the time Spain was removing the razor wires from its fences with Morocco to make them more “humane”, Morocco was adding razor-wired fence on its side of the border with EU funds. The externalisation of borders has moved responsibility and accountability for the consequences of the EU’s own migration control policies away from the EU, culminating in the impunity of the system. “We have been crying over years that Libya is not a ground for people, but Europe pretends as if it’s not hearing”, said Souleman. “Tackling the issues we see today – the loss of life first and foremost, but also shortcomings in migration management – means working together so that everyone assumes their responsibilities”, states the Pact. It is hard to see how the EU is assuming its own.

And yet one area where there seems to be major consensus within the Commission and the Council is the external dimension of the Pact. The proposal gives a strong push to bilateral agreements and partnerships with third countries (though the main focus is on African countries, underlined over and over by different EU leaders) to cooperate on migration control, forced returns and readmission of migrants. These countries often have to be coerced or pressured into accepting “double win for Europe” partnerships where their interests on regularisation or mobility are excluded from the discussion, says the European Council on Refugees and Exiles. As a way to pressure them, the EU subordinates policy priorities related to visas, development aid, financial support, regular pathways and others, on collaboration on readmission – indispensable for the EU’s goal to enforce returns. Such conditionalities do not speak to the “mutually beneficial” relations that the Pact claims to pursue, but instead confirms once again that “EU migration policy is a one-way affair”.

International relations with the global South (former colonies) and its inhabitants are central to the fight for racial justice globally and to overcoming historical relationships of dominance. The EU’s insistence on setting top-down agendas with predefined objectives raises questions about the expansion of EU sovereignty over other territories, attempting to manage the mobility of people not only within its territory but far beyond. This has been evidenced by the expansion of the EU’s borders in Africa, which comes with a high cost for human rights and the lives of African people. Impediments to the free movement of Africans can only remind us of their forced mobility during slavery. Similarities like these are not unique to the African continent. How Europe controls the migration of people from the global South today is very much rooted in its colonial past. Not only the EU’s commitment to global justice and reparation is missing in the Pact, but solidarity is invoked between EU countries (to enforce deportations) and not with the global South and its people.

How to ensure rights for all, including migrants: building on the Anti-Racism Action Plan

Migration and (the fight against) racism cannot be compartmentalised. To live up to its commitments on racial justice, the EU cannot carry out two parallel agendas on migration and anti-racism, respectively; instead, it should bring both policy areas into dialogue so that decisions about migration contribute to the fight for racial justice and actions on anti-racism contribute to a fair system of migration for all. There are several steps that the EU can take, building on the new Anti-Racism Action Plan.

1. Mainstream anti-racism in migration policies, integrating the racial equality dimension throughout the legal and policy EU framework on migration. This will also involve looking at the specific ways structural, institutional and individual racism are faced by migrants in Europe (including at the borders) and devising concrete measures to fight against it.
2. Counter discriminatory policing and racial profiling. The EU must tackle police brutality and racist abuses by law enforcement to protect those who are most likely to experience it, regardless of migration status. “Everyone should feel safe in Europe” and migration and border controls cannot be put before the safety, rights and lives of people. Strong accountability measures and access to justice are key to address this problem and the EU should make them available within the EU, at its borders and beyond – wherever its migration policies are implemented.
3. Ensure “real mutually beneficial” partnerships with third countries. Moving forward, the EU’s relationship with the global South cannot replicate the unequal arrangements rooted in past colonial ties to impose its own agenda and goals – an agenda that harms the very people concerned. To avoid perpetuating neo-colonial dominance, the EU must mainstream anti-racism in its foreign policy (across all areas), instead of mainstreaming migration control, and work on global justice and reparation measures. Further recommendations on how to ensure “real mutually beneficial” partnerships with third countries have been put forward by migrant rights advocates.
4. Teach the past to understand the present. Acknowledge and teach the historical roots of racism to foster a better understanding of migration in the present and counter ahistorical and race-blind approaches to migration policies.
5. Promote narratives consistent with the dignity of all. In addition to combatting disinformation and racist and xenophobic messages in the media, EU institutions should promote the same regarding political discourse targeting migrant and racialised communities. This will help to fight against ethnonationalist rhetoric that fosters discrimination of such groups.

A real commitment to anti-racism implies ensuring rights for the whole community: from EU citizens from racial or ethnic minorities to migrants from the same minorities, regardless of their status and the way they cross borders. As stressed in the Anti-Racism Action Plan, “everyone in the EU should be able to enjoy their fundamental rights and freedoms”. But citizenship, nationality and immigration status remain the first formal – and racialised – barrier to the full enjoyment of human rights that states have at their disposal. For this reason, it is essential to understand how the EU is shaping irregularity, who is made “irregular” and the racial impact of this, and to continue to demand rights for all, irrespective of status, and regular and accessible pathways to Europe.

The statement was published three days after a mini-summit with key EU leaders to respond to the attacks where Islam was directly targeted. It also underwent several modifications to remove references to Islam and Muslims before the final version, but there is still a strong focus on religious extremism and the explicit mention of the so-called “islamist” attack in France.

People who do not apply for asylum are immediately deported or denied entry, while those who apply are sent to asylum (border or normal) procedures where, if their application is refused, will also be forcefully returned.

Cover image: Amy Elting- Unsplash

Undocumented children are part of our communities and share the hopes and dreams of any other child. But their lives and the lives of their families are characterized by uncertainty and instability due to their irregular residence status. PICUM’s new report, Navigating Irregularity: The Impact of Growing up Undocumented in Europe, looks at how their residence status affects six areas of their lives: housing, access to services, income and socio-economic status, residence procedures and immigration enforcement (including detention), school life, and family life.

Many undocumented children were born in or have lived for many years in Europe, most often with their parents. Sixty-eight percent of undocumented children whose parents were surveyed in Ireland, were born there, for instance. According to Eurostat, about one in ten people that were found to be irregularly present in the EU in the past decade were children.

Housing

Where children live affects their present and future. While undocumented parents do their utmost to provide stable, quality housing to their children, they are often unable to offer them the same housing conditions as other parents. They often lack income or face discrimination on the housing market. Similarly, where unaccompanied children are excluded from reception facilities, they end up homeless, in squats or temporary settlements.

Children’s risk of ill-health and disability increases by up to 25 percent during childhood and early adulthood when they experience multiple housing problems. Mental health problems are also more prevalent among homeless children who may have lower levels of academic achievement that cannot be explained by differences in ability.  An inadequate housing situation or homelessness also impacts their social life and their ability to make lasting friendships and maintain social networks.

Access to services

Although child rights are applicable to all children, irrespective of their residence status, undocumented children have limited access to social services, including education, health care, early childhood education and care and protection when they are a victim of crime. And when service providers report undocumented migrants’ personal data to immigration authorities, undocumented children and parents hesitate to reach out and seek help.

Income

Income is a key social determinant of health and inextricably linked to children’s well-being and life chances. Income affects the community in which children live, the quality of life, the food available to them, the type of housing they live in and the sense of security they experience. Although very few studies exist on the household income of undocumented migrants, it is safe to say that they face high levels of poverty as their irregular migration status relegates undocumented workers to the informal economy, where they are systematically underpaid and exploited. Many others are completely dependent on handouts and informal support networks, and the COVID-19 pandemic has only made their situation more precarious.

Undocumented children living in poverty often go hungry or eat a poor diet. Undocumented parents face challenges in offering their children decent shoes and clothing, necessary school supplies, internet at home, toys or even essentials like shower gel and shampoo. Yet unlike other families that live in poverty, undocumented parents are not eligible for support such as unemployment assistance or minimum income.

Residence procedures

Children across Europe – both accompanied and unaccompanied – are involved in residence procedures. Sometimes they are forced to step in to fill the gaps of our migration systems. For instance, when no interpreter is available and parents do not know the country’s language, children are tasked with translating letters for their parents or accompanying them during residence permit interviews, visits to the family’s lawyer or social and health services.

Going through residence procedures is a nerve-wracking experience, for adults and children alike, and telling one’s story over and over can retraumatize them. When the residence application is denied, the person’s mental health greatly deteriorates. Sometimes, children simply give up and go into an unresponsive state. Many children fear the police, detention and deportation.

School

In the face of these challenges, the school environment can function as a mediating factor in undocumented children’s lives. It provides a social safety net or ‘protective layer’ around them, while they navigate other challenges in their day-to-day life. Enabling undocumented children access to education, including early childhood education and care, extra-curricular activities and internships, is therefore key to nurturing a child’s resilience and a safe and secure future.

However, undocumented children are often not explicitly included in countries’ education laws. This means that they may not be able to enrol in school and classes, or not be able to participate fully. When raised in poverty, as many are, undocumented children are likely to have a disadvantage in the formal education system even before starting school.

Family life

Family life and family dynamics are impacted by residence status. When children grow up in a warm, loving family and develop a secure attachment to their primary caregiver, they receive a strong foundation for success and resilience later in life. Experiencing love and safety protects the child’s mental health. Reversely, long-term deprivation of a child from their primary caregiver (due to a caregiver being detained, for example) is likely to cause cognitive, emotional and social damage.

For undocumented parents, managing the day-to-day difficulties caused by irregular residence status and experiencing discrimination can force them to be less available for interaction with their children. Due to the accumulation of problems such as poverty, debt, social isolation and uncertainty about the future, many undocumented children and young people grow up under stress, which can lead to high risks of cardiovascular disease, cancers, asthma and depression when they are adults. In some families, children take up roles that are usually filled by parents. This ‘parentification’ of the child can adversely affect their socio-emotional development and mental health.

The need to find durable solutions

“I think about what it would be like to have a residence permit. I think about that every day,” says a 12-year-old boy who grew up in the Netherlands.

All children can reach their potential if they are given the resources and environment needed to thrive. A secure residence status is part and parcel of such an environment, and a precondition for undocumented children and young people to reach their full potential. This is why it is important for governments to develop best interests procedures that result in durable solutions for undocumented children, foresee in-country residence procedures based on child rights, ensure full access to services for undocumented children, and evaluate and reform policies and practices that might harm undocumented children and their families.The report is also available in French and Spanish.Cover image: Adobe Stock – Rawpixel.com

Every year, more than 100,000 people are put in immigration detention in Europe.

In immigration detention, people are uprooted from their communities, and they often don’t know whether and when they will be released or if they will be deported. Often, people in immigration detention don’t have access to adequate information and interpreters, legal aid and medical care. This has a severe impact on mental health. Studies indicate higher incidence of anxiety, depression and post-traumatic stress disorder than among the rest of the population, and an average of very high levels of depression in four out of every five detainees. In 2020, 51% of the immigration detainees in the Brook House centre (UK) were considered at risk of suicide.

Detention is always a harmful practice, which often has long-lasting consequences on peoples’ lives and self-perception. Sometimes, this harm adds to pre-existing situations of vulnerability, like poor physical or mental health, disabilities, past experiences of trauma, or age.

States have an obligation to protect people in situations of vulnerability. As detention severely exacerbates vulnerabilities, and creates new ones, people in situations of vulnerability should never be detained. In the EU, the 2008 Return Directive requires Member States to pay “particular attention” to these groups of people. But as of today, only few countries have mechanisms in place to assess people’s vulnerabilities before they are put in detention. Even when some mechanism is in place, like in Belgium and in the UK, people who are identified as vulnerable are frequently still detained as migration control purposes trump other considerations.

This lack of attention means that states regularly detain pregnant women, LGBTI people, people with mental health issues and even children.

In Belgium and Spain, for instance, people with mental health issues are sometimes placed in solitary confinement, which is otherwise considered a punitive measure. Isolation further deteriorates their mental health condition. Moreover, mental illnesses, despite being an important factor affecting individuals’ situations of vulnerability, are excluded by the definition of the Return Directive and several national legal frameworks.

Children are detained in most European countries, despite broad evidence of the negative impact of even short periods of detention on children health and psychosocial development, and despite consensus at the UN level that detaining children based on migration status is a violation of child rights.

In Greece, women can be held for long periods in police stations without access to basic hygiene products. In the UK, many women denounce pervasive sexual harassment, as health screenings and searches are often done by male medical professionals or guards. In Belgium, some women are held in mixed centres where they are outnumbered by the male population, thus creating discomfort among some.

Men in detention also face specific vulnerabilities, often linked to their young age, experiences of trauma and abuses, and their migratory journey. In some countries, detention centres for men are more densely populated, leading to higher risks of conflict with the staff and poorer conditions.

Transgender, intersex and gender non-conforming persons regularly experience discrimination in detention and are at risk of physical and sexual violence, solitary confinement as well as verbal and psychological abuse.

Detention creates its own vulnerabilities, which add to existing ones. This is why we need a clear legal obligation to assess people’s vulnerability, so they’re not detained in the first place.Definitions of vulnerability should be based on an open-ended list, which takes into consideration the intersectional nature of vulnerability as well as vulnerabilities caused by detention itself. This screening has to be independent, transparent and individualised. In some cases, factors of vulnerability can only be identified with time, and after a relationship of trust is established. As detention itself may exacerbate existing vulnerabilities or even create new ones, vulnerability should be reassessed regularly.

For undocumented migrants, justice is often illusory. The criminalisation of irregular migration makes people who are undocumented fearful of engaging with public authorities, and especially with the police, because they risk being detained and deported as a result.

This distrust is worsened by policing and surveillance of migrant and minority communities. The systematic failure of the state to acknowledge, investigate and remedy abuses committed against undocumented victims denies them recognition and accountability.

EU law does provide protections for undocumented people who have been victimised.

The 2012 EU Victims’ Rights Directive creates common standards across all EU member states for the rights of victims of crimes. The directive clearly places the priority on a person’s safety, security and protection ahead of enforcement measures based on residence status. While it doesn’t resolve the status of an undocumented person, it requires states to ensure that rights do not depend on the victim’s residence status or their citizenship or nationality. The directive entitles all victims to access free and confidential support services, even if they choose not to file a criminal complaint.

The EU’s Strategy on Victims’ Rights (2020-2025) encourages the creation of “safe environments for victims to report crime”. It recognises several categories of “vulnerable victims”, among them undocumented people who “may have difficulty to access justice” because of the risk of deportation if they report their mistreatment.

Examples of promising practices exist in Europe.

For instance, in Belgium, three sexual assault care centres were established in 2017 in the cities of Brussels, Ghent and Liege, to provide forensic, medical, and psychological care for survivors of sexual assault. In addition to providing necessary care, the centre personnel work with specialised police and judicial inspectors to assist victims who would like to file a complaint. However, the filing of a complaint is not required to be eligible for care, and services are provided regardless of the residence status of the victim.

Within the first year, the centres assisted 930 survivors, 41% of whom were referred by the police. While a number of migrant women reportedly used the service during the pilot, the absence of adequate protection measures for undocumented survivors, and assurances that they can safely report crime, hinder their ability to report abuse.

In 2016, the Netherlands adopted a policy known as “Free in, Free out”, which allows people in an irregular situation to enter a police station to report a crime and then to leave freely, without being arrested or facing possible expulsion, regardless of the type of crime reported. This policy, which started as an initiative of the Amsterdam police, became official national policy as part of the Netherland’s implementation of the Victims’ Directive.

Although a promising practice, Oxford University’s research found three important shortcomings: (1) the fragile nature of the firewall between police and immigration authorities, given systematic exchange of data about immigration status between police and immigration authorities; (2) the lack of access to services and protection for victims to accompany “free in, free out”; and (3) the inconsistent practice among local police and pervasive lack of trust. And the “free in, free out” does not cover other forms of victimisation that fall outside of criminal law (such as labour rights violations) or cases where it is not a victim entering police precinct but the police coming to an incident where it may be less clear who is a “victim”.

In Spain, the Civil Guard (“Guardia Civil”), one of the country’s two national police forces, has created a distinct team within its own ranks to serve the needs of migrants. These units (called “equipos de atención al inmigrante” or EDATI) were given the explicit mission of providing assistance to migrants, including undocumented migrants, by informing them of their rights, advising them on how to regularise their status and supporting them in lodging complaints against employers and others for mistreatment and exploitation. Unlike traditional Guardia Civil, these units don’t have the power to arrest or to issue deportation orders. In 2012, EDATI teams across Spain reportedly assisted 10,700 migrants, and took 12,000 actions.

While promising, these practices all come with their own shortcomings. In many other countries, no measure exists to support safe reporting and justice for undocumented victims. To achieve genuine safety, protection and justice for all, it is essential that authorities at the national and local levels take steps to:

1. Ensure that all undocumented victims of crime can access support services and protection, consistent with the Victims’ Directive’s definition of victim, and are not limited by additional conditions not foreseen by the directive, like having been the victim of a particular type of crime or being willing to cooperate with authorities in a criminal investigation;
2. Remove the risk ofundocumented victims facing deportation if theyinteract with law enforcement or other actorswithin the criminal justice system, including bycreating “firewalls” that restrict law enforcement’scollaboration with immigration enforcementauthorities in connection with victims, andpromoting ways for community-based nongovernmentalorganisations to act as mediators;
3. Adopt an overarching approach to access to justice that promotes accountability and recognition of harm, including through civil processes, equality bodies, restorative justice and community-based strategies that are centred on the interests of the person who has been victimised.

Our report is also available in French, Spanish, Dutch and Italian.

As well as our Executive Summary in French, Spanish, Dutch and Italian.

And our framework on safe reporting in French, Spanish, Dutch and Italian.

Last updated: July 2021

Are COVID-19 vaccines available for undocumented migrants in Europe? International and EU bodies have recommended addressing marginalised communities, including migrants in situations of vulnerability, in national vaccination strategies. In Europe, however, national approaches vary a lot.

For undocumented people, who are excluded from the health systems of most European countries, the pandemic and the lockdown measures have exacerbated pre-existing conditions of social exclusion and destitution. Several European countries, regions and cities adopted measures to support this population during the pandemic, including through targeted regularisation programmes. But what is being done with regards to the vaccination campaign, one of the most important tools we have to protect people against COVID-19?

We have been monitoring the news and exchanging with our members and followers, and we have compiled a map that looks at two critical factors affecting access to the COVID-19 vaccines in Europe for undocumented migrants: the absence of administrative barriers and protection from immigration control consequences of getting the vaccines.

As for administrative access, we consider in particular whether it is possible for undocumented migrants to register for or otherwise get their vaccination without the need to give proof of residence or identity or other documents that many undocumented people simply cannot provide (for instance, a social security number).

As for protection from immigration control, we consider whether there are clear safeguards (“firewalls”) against exposure to immigration control, through data protection and freedom from checks or arrest at vaccination centres.

This map focuses on delivery of the COVID-19 vaccines and doesn’t provide information about the accessibility of other health care more generally in a country, which in most parts of the EU remains very restricted for undocumented people. This map is a living document, which we’re updating as national policies and practices evolve, and as more information becomes available.This map is based on information we’ve been able to gather so far, and we’ll keep updating it as we know more. Here’s a quick rundown of what we’ve learned:

Belgium

In early January, Brussels health minister Alain Maron said that “It’s out of question to exclude undocumented people from the vaccination process”. After this very welcome statement from a regional (Brussels) leader, the federal health minister confirmed before the Parliament that the vaccines would be available to undocumented migrants too. The Minister discussed the possibility of vaccinating this group via mobile medical teams, who would also ensure the vaccination for homeless people.

Finland

At the start of March, the Finnish Ministry of Social Affairs and Health recommended municipalities to grant access to the COVID-19 vaccines to undocumented migrants, free of charge. Questions remain as to the practical implementation of this recommendation.

France

The French health ministry has declared that the vaccines will be available to all people living in France, regardless of residence status. In practice, the vaccines will be free for all and no health insurance card will be required.

Germany

Although some German states have shown a willingness in principle to include undocumented migrants in their vaccination plans, no federal plan has stated explicitly that this group would be included. Moreover, federal regulations exist which require proof of residence in Germany in order to receive the vaccine.

See our blog post for more information on access to the vaccines for undocumented migrants in Germany.

Hungary

The Hungarian vaccination strategy does not mention undocumented migrants. The vaccination booking system requires both a valid social security number, which is not available for undocumented people, and a registered home address, which can be very difficult for them to prove. Furthermore, civil society has warned of indications that the registration data will be checked against data held by the immigration authorities.

See our blog on the situation in Hungary for more detailed information.

Italy

The Italian vaccination strategy doesn’t mention undocumented migrants explicitly. But the Italian Immigration Act (Testo Unico sull’Immigrazione) explicitly guarantees access to the vaccines as part of preventive public health care campaigns to all people living in Italy, including irregular migrants, besides any other urgent or essential health care. And the Italian Medicines Agency (Agenzia Italiana del Farmaco, AIFA) released guidelines which make clear that undocumented people are entitled to the COVID-19 vaccines.

However, challenges remain with practical access to the online booking systems, which are managed by Italy’s 20 regions.

See our blog on the situation in Italy for more detailed information.

Netherlands

The Dutch strategy explicitly mentions undocumented migrants as a group to be vaccinated, but only after priority groups based on age and health conditions. Today, undocumented migrants can book a COVID-19 vaccine via the mainstream booking system, homeless shelters and, in some cases, GPs.

See our blog on the situation in the Netherlands for more detailed information.

Norway

Undocumented migrants are not mentioned explicitly in the Norwegian vaccination strategy. However, under the law on communicable diseases, all people regardless of residence status are entitled to vaccinations. In addition, in spring 2021, the Norwegian Directorate of Health addressed a letter to all local and regional health authorities calling on them to make the vaccines available for everyone. However, the letter does not detail how to organise access to the vaccines for undocumented migrants in practice. In fact, booking an appointment for the vaccine requires a valid personal identification number, and being registered with a GP. Both are broadly unavailable to undocumented migrants. In large part, the chance of undocumented migrants being vaccinated is determined by the local municipalities and their motivation to find ways around bureaucratic barriers. The risk of immigration consequences when accessing the vaccines is virtually non-existent, since it’s illegal for medical staff to report undocumented patients.

See our blog on the situation in Norway for more detailed information.

Poland

According to FAQs on the vaccines published on the Polish government’s website, “Foreigners with the right to stay are vaccinated on the same terms as Polish citizens”, which implies that people with irregular status wouldn’t be included. Polish officials have further confirmed this on TV interviews. However, the Ministry of Health later stated that access to the vaccines does not depend on health insurance, which would allow undocumented migrants to get their shot.

Read our blog on Poland to understand legal and practical barriers to the vaccines.

Portugal

The Portuguese government launched an online platform which undocumented people living in the country can use to register for their COVID-19 vaccination, without need of a social security number. Although a welcome development, grassroots organisations have denounced the delay in establishing such a platform and fear that the lack of trust towards public authorities will prevent many from registering.

See our blog on the situation in Portugal for more detailed information.

Spain

According to the Spanish strategy, undocumented people are guaranteed equal access to the vaccines. But questions remain as to how public authorities will be able to reach this population.

United Kingdom

Government guidance states that the vaccines will be available for free for undocumented migrants, and no immigration check will be carried out in the context of the vaccination. But migrants rights groups say that practical barriers remain, including fears over fees and data sharing with immigration enforcement, because of the UK’s longstanding “hostile environment” policy that has sown distrust and insecurity, as well as the refusal of some GPs to register patients because they can’t provide certain information like proof of address, which isn’t legally required.

See our blog on the situation in the UK for more detailed information.Including undocumented people in national vaccination campaigns is essential to ensuring their success, and ultimately getting the pandemic under control. But measures limited to opening up access to the vaccine are not enough. The underlying factors that exclude undocumented people from accessing primary health care must be addressed – like burdensome administrative procedures, ineligibility for free or covered care, and exposure to immigration consequences for trying to access services.

Undocumented people are members of our communities, they are our neighbours, our friends. The pandemic has shown more clearly than ever that many work in situations of high risk that are too often undervalued – in care work, cleaning, agriculture. They have an equal right to be protected from this devastating pandemic. Ensuring access to health care for all is not only public health common sense, it is also and foremost the right thing to do.

Cover image: Adobe Stock – daniilvolkov

This blog is the first in a two-part series looking at the intersection between racism and migration policy, and has been written by PICUM’s Advocacy Trainee Abigail Cárdenas Mena.

The Tarajal Massacre

Seven years ago, on the 6th February 2014, fourteen people died in the Mediterranean sea after the Guardia Civil (one of the Spanish police forces) shot rubber bullets, detonator blanks and smoke canisters (anti-riot materials) against them as they were trying to reach Spain. To understand how an incident like this could happen and how seven years after there has been no accountability and no justice for the victims, we should know who they were.

The victims were (at least) fourteen young black men from West and Central Africa, mainly from Cameroon, who were trying to cross the Moroccan-Spanish border by swimming through the Tarajal Beach, which is located in Ceuta. Ceuta together with Melilla are two Spanish cities on the African continent, separated from Morocco by fences. The brutal response of the Guardia Civil was intended to prevent them from crossing the border. Twenty-three other people who were able to reach the Spanish side were returned to Morocco as soon as they arrived at the beach but were not given any due process. Their return to Morocco is otherwise known as a pushback. Testimonies collected by the NGO Caminando Fronteras document, with pictures and medical reports, the use of violence by the police and the injuries caused to the survivors, who didn’t receive any assistance for their injuries.

Europe’s approach to managing borders perpetuates discrimination and violence

An incident like this, unfortunately, is not unique to the Spanish context. The EU’s aim to control irregular migration has led to a system of border management with few guarantees of human rights compliance for migrants. European borders – both external and internal – have been operating as spaces of impunity with little control and supervision over law enforcement agencies and their conduct, leading to situations of violence, mistreatment and abuse against migrants, asylum seekers and refugees. As the Danish Refugee Council has stated:

Tacitly accepting the trade-off between ensuring human rights compliance and limiting the number of irregular arrivals opens a wide space for multiple forms of abuse. (…) There is an ever-growing need to recognize that human rights violations are taking place at the borders, and particularly at the EU’s external (and internal) borders.

However, police violence against migrants not only happens at borders, but throughout the whole migration control system. This takes place in the context of identity checks, detention and deportations, on the EU territory and in other countries involved in protecting the EU’s borders through bilateral agreements and the externalisation of borders.

Episodes of police brutality against migrants in Europe have been extensively documented and denounced by different NGOs, activists and organisations. In 2018, an Afghan man who was being deported from Germany was restrained by six police officers who taped him to his seat in the plane and placed him in handcuffs, leg restraints and a helmet, and made him wear a mouth guard. One officer squeezed his genitals several times for prolonged periods and another choked him by pushing his arm against his neck to the point he struggled to breath. This happened during a charter flight monitored by the Committee for the Prevention of Torture of the Council of Europe, which reported the incident. Far from being isolated cases, violence against migrants is inherent to the migration enforcement system as a whole.

Spain’s migration enforcement especially targets people of colour  

The “accident of birth” – namely, where a person was born in the world – is a major factor in determining how freely they can travel to Europe. Citizens of 104 countries are required to obtain a visa before entering the EU. This includes every country on the African continent (only the islands Seychelles and Mauritius are exempted from this requirement). “Accessible and decent labour migration pathways across various occupations remain very limited, despite labour market demand”. As scholar Luke de Noronha wrote: “Race cannot be dispensed with so briskly when the principal target of immigration restrictions, the ‘global poor’, corresponds so closely with those ‘formerly colonised’ and those racialised as ‘non-white”. As analysed below, Spain provides an example of how racism underlies migration policies.

One year after the Tarajal massacre, Spain passed a law creating a special regime applicable in Ceuta and Melilla to allow the “rejection at borders” of people found crossing the border irregularly. The special rule aimed at legalising pushbacks. In doing so, Spain not only refused to acknowledge and redress the tragic consequences of Tarajal and pushbacks in general but furthered the exemption of rights and impunity in a place where the majority of migrants come from African countries without safe and regular pathways to come to Europe.

As a consequence of this law, Spain has the highest number of “refusal of entry” in Europe by far. Eurostat data shows that “in 2019, more than two thirds of the total number of non-EU citizens who were refused entry into the EU-27 were recorded in Spain“ with 493,500 refusals of entry (68.8% of the total). This was only followed by Poland with 65,400 and France with 56,600 refusals of entry, with a notable difference of more than 400,000 cases with Spain. According to the same source, “the overwhelming majority of non-EU citizens who were refused entry into Spain were Moroccan citizens (484,800; 98.3 % of all refusals in Spain)”.

While Moroccans are overwhelmingly refused at the border by the Spanish police, Sub-Saharan Africans are subjected to discriminatory and violent raids and forcibly displaced from the north to the south of the country by the Moroccan police in an attempt to prevent them from even approaching the border. This is part of Morocco’s agreement with Spain (Morocco has claimed to have stopped more than 70,000 people from crossing into Spain in 2019). This practice of forced displacement has been pointed out as one of the reasons behind the decrease in arrivals by sea to Spain in 2019 compared to 2018, as well as for the diversion of the route towards the Canary Islands in 2020, which led to the death of 1,851 people in what is known as the Atlantic route, currently the deadliest route in Europe.

Moroccan police has also been preventing black Africans from claiming asylum at the border crossing points, thus leaving no options for regular entry procedures, as proven by Forensic Architecture: “According to witness testimony, the consulate in Nador is not accessible to Black Sub-Saharan nationals and there were no applications by Sub-Saharan nationals at any Spanish embassies in Morocco between 2015 and 2018”. This reality was not taken into account in N.D. and N.T. v. Spain, a case concerning the pushback of two men from Mali and Ivory Coast, where the European Court of Human Rights recently found no violation of the prohibition against collective expulsion, placing the responsibility on the migrants for climbing the fences rather than using the allegedly available means to seek asylum. This judgement contrasts with the case M.K. and Others v. Poland where the same Court found a violation of the prohibition of collective expulsion of Chechens crossing from Belarus to Poland, suggesting racially discriminatory assumptions by the Court, depending on who is crossing the borders and how, to the detriment of African people. “The case of ND and NT reveals the mechanisms of structural racism embedded in Europe’s border policies.”

Once in Spain, migration enforcement continues to disproportionally target the African community, together with other racialised communities, who are more likely to be surveilled and feel the violence of the law enforcement. Incidents leading to the death of black Africans have occurred at every stage of the migration control system: Mame Mbaye (Senegal) in the context of an identity check, Samba Martine (Democratic Republic of Congo) in a detention centre, and Osamuyia Aikpitanyi (Nigeria) during deportation, are only some of the names representing the lethal effect of systematic violence targeting undocumented people originating from Africa. Each of them reveals one side of this system: the criminalisation and police harassment of manteros (street vendors from Senegal) and the constant fear and stress they live with for being undocumented; the lack of effective health care in detention centres and the neglect of the government through poor institutional reception and detection of vulnerability of people who just cross the borders; and police brutality to enforce a forced deportation by any means. Only in the case of Samba, the government (after nine years) acknowledged its responsibility, while there has been no accountability for Mame and Osamuyia.

Racial profiling plays a key role in the disproportionate impact of migration enforcement on such communities. For undocumented people, being subjected to an identity check for migration enforcement purposes (or, in fact, any other purpose) is one of the main gateways to detention and, eventually, to deportation. The fact that racial and ethnic profiling, although being illegal under European and international law, is a widespread practice in Europe, makes race an important factor correlated with the likelihood of ending up identified and detained.

This, consequently, leads to an overrepresentation of people of colour in immigration detention centres. One study revealed that, in 2016, 90% of the people in Spain’s detention centres (CIEs) were from Africa (55% from Sub-Saharan Africa, 35% from North Africa). According to the same study, this far exceeded the actual proportion of African people in the migrant population in Spain (Africans represented 20% of migrants and less than 10% of the estimated undocumented population in Spain). This share has been changing over the last years with a higher rate of detained people from North Africa, mainly Morocco and Algeria, representing up to 70% of total immigration detainees in 2018 and 2019. This can be explained to a large extent by the criminalisation of black and Arab men in particular, leading to racial profiling with a significant impact on this part of the population, as data show in Spain and across Europe.

The Tarajal massacre: What have we learned?

The Tarajal massacre led to a court challenge by civil society, without any success for the claimants. Although sixteen Guardia Civil officers were prosecuted, the case was filed and reopened three times in six years with different arguments and irregularities in the process, including the refusal to the parents’ victims to participate in the judicial process. The Minister for Home Affairs at the time never acknowledged any misconduct by law enforcement officers and instead defended their behaviour. The incident remains un-investigated and justice and reparation have not been granted for the victims and their families, pointing to the total impunity that operates at borders. To date, the families of the victims buried on the Spanish side of the border have not been able to identify their bodies because the Spanish government has not provided them with the required visas to enter Ceuta.

This year, as every year, “la Marcha por la Dignidad” (March for Dignity) took place in Ceuta and many other cities (in Spain and beyond) on the anniversary of the Tarajal tragedy to remember the victims and denounce the effects of a deadly migration policy that still does not offer safe and regular pathways for migration for many people.

Of the 2,170 people who died in the Euro-African Western Border while trying to reach Spain in 2020, 95,8% disappeared at sea and their bodies were never recovered. To achieve a “racism-free” and “united in diversity” Europe, the EU should take seriously and value equally all lives by ensuring the safety and access to justice for all people, regardless of racial or ethnic origin, religion, nationality, citizenship and migration status, including those on their journey to Europe. Effective measures must be taken to tackle racism in national and European migration systems and black lives should be at the centre of any action to reverse a system that systematically directs violence towards them and carries out a practice of laisser mourir (allowing people to die) at the borders.

Migrants, black and, more broadly, racialised voices must be heard. As Marra Junior, anti-racist and Pan-Africanist activist and one of the organisers of the Tarajal commemoration in Bilbao, says: “ça suffit” (it’s enough). Watch the video below to hear what the Tarajal massacre means for him as an African migrant in Spain.JTNDZGl2JTIwc3R5bGUlM0QlMjJiYWNrZ3JvdW5kLWNvbG9yJTNBJTIzZmZmZmZmJTNCJTIwcGFkZGluZyUzQTEwcHglM0IlMjIlMjBjbGFzcyUzRCUyMmNvb2tpZWNvbnNlbnQtb3B0b3V0LW1hcmtldGluZyUyMiUzRSUwQSUyMCUyMFBsZWFzZSUyMCUzQ2ElMjBocmVmJTNEJTIyamF2YXNjcmlwdCUzQUNvb2tpZWJvdC5yZW5ldyUyOCUyOSUyMiUzRWFjY2VwdCUyMG1hcmtldGluZy1jb29raWVzJTNDJTJGYSUzRSUyMHRvJTIwd2F0Y2glMjB0aGlzJTIwdmlkZW8uJTBBJTNDJTJGZGl2JTNF

The term pushback refers to the practice carried out by law enforcement “when a person is apprehended after an irregular border crossing and summarily returned to a neighbouring country without assessing their individual circumstances on a case-by-case basis.” Pushbacks are an increasing phenomenon at Europe’s borders and entails the violation of “the right to seek asylum and the protection against refoulement, which are at the core of international refugee and human rights law”.

PICUM (forthcoming), Designing labour migration policies to promote decent work.

The Euro-African Western Border includes the routes that migrants take from Africa to Spain, namely: Canary Islands or Atlantic route, “Estrecho” (the Strait of Gibraltar) route, Alboran route and Algeria route.

Cover image: MarcoAlla – Adobe Stock

PICUM is no longer a member of the Frontex Consultative Forum, a body which is meant for non-governmental, international organisations and EU agencies to assist the European Border and Coast Agency (Frontex) by providing independent advice in fundamental rights matters.

In May 2020, PICUM wrote a private letter to Frontex’s Executive Director Fabrice Leggeri to raise our concerns in relation to both media reports on the agency’s involvement in human rights violations, as well as concerning the Forum’s working methods.

After seven years of membership in the Consultative Forum (between 2012 and 2019), and after long discussions internally, PICUM came to the conclusion that the Consultative Forum’s working methods did not allow for our meaningful participation. As a membership organisation representing more than 160 NGOs, our ability to provide inputs within the Forum was strongly limited by a very strict confidentiality clause, which entailed risks of criminal liability if we shared sensitive or non-public information with our members. While the Consultative Forum has had some key achievements in the past years, we regret that the modalities of the Forum consultation often failed to provide us with the space for meaningful inputs. In some cases, the Consultative Forum was not consulted on human rights related matters, or was consulted only after key decisions were taken. We were often not given enough time to review and process information from the agency in a meaningful way. And Frontex often failed to acknowledge or consider the Consultative Forum’s comments.

We have also been increasingly concerned by increasing reports of Frontex’s involvement in illegal pushbacks, the lack of adequate investigation and follow-up, as well as the insufficiency of mechanisms to ensure accountability. In recent months, evidence of Frontex involvement in illegal pushbacks has been growing from the central Mediterranean to the Balkans and Greece. Another independent report published in July 2020 finds that Frontex still lacks an effective system for monitoring, investigating, addressing, and preventing fundamental rights violations at Europe’s external borders.

The new EU Pact on Migration and Asylum, which was proposed by the European Commission in September 2020, focuses on stepping up returns at all costs, while lowering fundamental safeguards for migrants, both adults and children. As the new EU Migration Pact foresees that Frontex will play a central role in stepping up returns, we fear that Frontex will engage in more activities which could lead to human rights violations at our borders in the coming years.

In July 2020, PICUM suddenly stopped receiving emails regarding the work of the Consultative Forum, and was removed from the list of Consultative Forum members on Frontex’s website. Frontex’s formal reply to our letter came in September 2020, and significantly fails to engage on the substance of our concerns, or mention why we were not receiving updates on the Consultative Forum work anymore.

We are concerned by the approach taken by Frontex to the role of civil society, including the recent harassment of two pro-transparency activists, and no longer see a role for our organisation in the Consultative Forum, from which we have formally withdrawn our membership. In the meantime, we will continue to advocate for truly humane European migration policies.

Image: IvanSemenovych – Adobe Stock

For undocumented people, the pandemic and related lockdown measures have exacerbated pre-existing conditions of social exclusion and deprivation.

Undocumented people are at high risk of getting COVID-19, especially if they are homeless or living in cramped, precarious conditions where physical distancing is hard to impossible. Some lost their jobs because of the pandemic, while many had to keep working – frequently in sectors that have become indispensable – often without adequate protection. Being undocumented means they are unlikely to qualify for non-emergency health care or for social or income protection schemes that are keeping others hit hard by the pandemic afloat.

As COVID-19 vaccination campaigns are starting to roll out across Europe, it is crucial that undocumented people are included.

In December 2020, the International Organisation on Migration issued a statement highlighting that, to be effective, COVID-19 vaccination plans must include migrants, and calling on governments to include all migrants present in their territories, regardless of their migration status, in their vaccine deployment plans.

At the end of 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control also released two reports that consider migrants in relation to the COVID-19 vaccination campaigns. The first classifies “migrants and refugees” as potential target groups for the vaccination campaigns; the second advises that consideration should be given to settings with “little ability to physical distance” including migrant centres, crowded housing and homeless shelters.

In October 2020, the European Commission issued a Communication on vaccine preparedness, which includes “communities unable to physically distance” (such as “refugee camps”) and “vulnerable socioeconomic groups and other groups at higher risk” (such as “socially deprived communities to be defined according to national circumstances”) as “possible priority groups” for vaccines deployment. According to the communication:

”Member States will need to make decisions on which groups should have priority access to the COVID-19 vaccines so as to save as many lives as possible. These decisions should be driven by two criteria: to protect the most vulnerable groups and individuals, and to slow down and eventually stop the spread of the disease.”

Besides making the vaccines available to undocumented people on paper, countries need to make sure they get the vaccines in practice. What does this mean? As the IOM’s Director of Migrant Health has noted: ”As frontline health workers are prioritised, let’s not forget the countless migrant frontline health workers. As the elderly are prioritised, so should elderly migrants.” Similarly, efforts to reach people who are homeless or who are uninsured must reach, within these groups, people who are undocumented. Outreach plans need to account for the fact that for undocumented people, like others in situations of social vulnerability, financial hardship and administrative hurdles present real barriers to accessing mainstream care. More than that, the criminalisation of undocumented status means that many will avoid contact with government bodies, even if they are unwell or think they are sick.

It is, then, critical that the deployment of any COVID-19 vaccine to groups that include people who are undocumented or have insecure status has to be done in close cooperation with trusted community-based organisations that have a history of working with and providing services to them, and with the collaboration and direct involvement of individuals from these communities themselves. There must be clear assurances that any information informally or formally obtained about a person’s residence status in the course of providing care will not be used against them, to prompt immigration proceedings. And the absence of formal documentation cannot be a barrier to signing up for or getting a vaccine (or testing, for that matter).

Including undocumented people in national vaccination campaigns is not a luxury: it is necessary to ensure the success of vaccination programs, and ultimately getting the pandemic under control. But measures limited to opening up access to the vaccine are not enough. To ensure society’s resilience to similar shocks in the future, and to address the glaring cracks in our health and social welfare systems that have been exposed, governments need to adopt measures to remove systemic barriers to primary health care for all their residents, regardless of status, and ensure they are not forgotten and left to struggle alone when the next pandemic hits.

The European Commission has urged a recovery that builds resilience, that does not happen at the cost of ”the poorest people” – that ”will have to be inclusive and fair.” For this, Europe’s social policies must be disconnected from its restrictive migration policies so that all children, workers, families, individuals can get the services they need, without discrimination – in the context of this wretched pandemic, and beyond. The pandemic has shown us that this is the right thing to do, and the smart thing to do, for everyone.

If you have any information about national vaccination campaigns and undocumented people, please write to info@picum.org

On 5 March 2020, the EU adopted its long-awaited gender equality strategy 2020-2025. Less than one week later, the World Health Organisation declared COVID-19 a global pandemic.

The pandemic has revealed in stark terms the gender-related dimensions of inequality. It has exposed and worsened systemic inequalities linked to: under-regulated and under-protected forms of work in our economy, where women are often overrepresented; porous social safety nets that fail to protect all those in need; and structural racism that is driving disparate health outcomes for people of colour. It has underscored the need for an inclusive and intersectional approach to gender equality that reaches across policy domains to ensure and protect women’s safety, social and economic rights, while engaging with them as critical agents of change.

In the case of migrant women, the pandemic has exposed the profound undervaluing of their work in areas like health care, education, cleaning, food services, farm work, child and elder care. Confinement and physical distancing measures have cut off their access to vital sources of support and exposed some to a greater risk of violence in their homes or workplaces.

Underpinning this reality are migration systems that entrench structural asymmetries of power and opportunity. Access to decent work permits in Europe is largely restricted to highly qualified people who can secure high incomes, excluding people of all genders with lower socio-economic status. Racism – on personal, institutional and structural levels – is also a major barrier to access high-income employment. Women, transgender and gender non-binary also face gender-based discrimination throughout the migration process. This results in numerous barriers to getting the jobs that would grant them decent and stable work permits and the incomes needed to bring their families with them. They are at particular risk of high levels of sexual and other violence when they travel in an irregular manner. Women are also more likely to be on spouse-dependent visas than men. If the relationship on which their status depends breaks down – for instance, because of domestic violence – they risk becoming undocumented.

Once undocumented, measures aiming to reduce irregular migration through border, control, criminalisation, detention and deportation, have specific and discriminatory effects on safety, security and rights. Women, transgender and gender non-binary people face restrictions on services and justice when they are undocumented, which can have gender-specific impacts, and heighten their risk of living in situations of economic and social precarity. As they are often women of colour with a low income, undocumented women experience specific, intersecting forms of discrimination.

PICUM welcomes the EU’s commitment to developing and implementing a gender strategy and urges the implementation of a forward-thinking and inclusive program of work that strives to achieve real change in the lives of all women, without discrimination.

Part of this must include specific and concrete efforts to develop a gender-responsive approach to EU migration and asylum, so that policies integrate and address the rights and interests of women and girls, particularly in areas of regular migration, international protection, detention and return. EU migration and asylum policies should be re-oriented towards sustainable, humane, non-criminalising approaches to both regular and irregular migration.Cover: jhudel baguio on Unsplash

Children enjoy special rights under the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, regardless of their residence status. However, the transition of undocumented children into adulthood often comes abruptly: rights and basic services are no longer guaranteed and measures are not taken to support undocumented young adults in their new reality.

The European Commission is currently developing the EU Child Rights Strategy as part of its agenda for 2019-2024. The strategy aims to protect and promote children’s rights in the EU and to mainstream child rights in all relevant EU policy areas. It will serve as a policy framework that will cover all existing and future child rights policies under one umbrella. As President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen emphasized in her mission letter to Vice-President Šuica: “We need to invest more in the future of our children. ensuring that children have access to the services they need and are supported through to their adult lives”.

One of the policies proposed to reach this goal, which will receive funding as part of the EU Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) for 2021-2027, is the Child Guarantee. This instrument is led by the Commission and backed by the Parliament, and will result in a non-binding Council Recommendation asking Member States to ensure “affordability, accessibility and availability of inclusive quality services for children in need.” By urging Member States to provide children and their parents access to essential services, such as healthcare, education and housing, the Commission aims to tackle poverty among children in need and improve their wellbeing and development.

If the aim of both the Strategy and the Guarantee is to establish a solid foundation for children that will provide life-long benefits, they should also address children’s transition into adulthood.

This is necessary because a clear binary approach can be observed in and practice at EU and Member State level upon a child’s 18^th birthday, when they no longer receive the protection and assistance they received until that moment. This approach is especially detrimental to undocumented children, children in migration and other children who are particularly vulnerable to poverty and marginalization and who need additional support and care from birth to ensure their development and wellbeing.

This can be seen in Belgium, where unaccompanied children can obtain a residence permit if the authorities find that residence in Belgium is in their best interests. However, if the Immigration Office has not determined the durable solution before the child turns 18, the procedure stops. A durable solution can be either integration in the host country, transfer to a third country (for example for reasons of family reunification) or return to the country of origin. From the moment the child turns 18, the now-young adult needs to prove that they fulfill the requirements (art. 61/24) for one of the regular pathways to residence, while they also lose their right to essential services and assistance such as education, healthcare, housing and financial support. In practice, these regularization pathways are further limited due to complex and ambiguous procedures and high application fees and costs for legal assistance.

This precarious transitioning of migrant children into adulthood is also referred to as “ageing out.” The term comes from the child protection context and generally refers to the situation where children lose rights and protections when they turn 18.

The Commission rightly acknowledges in its 2017 Communication on the protection of children in migration that children in state care should receive support to prepare for the transition to adulthood (i.e. thereby having to leave the state care facilities). However, both unaccompanied children and children living with their families – whether they are living in state care or not – age out as they lose the various rights and protections they were granted as children, including access to certain residence procedures. A systematic coaching mechanism is therefore essential, to ensure that all children (whether accompanied or unaccompanied) are supported during a transitory period, to prepare them for adulthood.

To ensure that the Commission’s Strategy on the Rights of the Child supports undocumented children in a sustainable way, PICUM calls on the Commission to:

1. Guarantee that the Child Rights Strategy and related policies and actions will benefit all children irrespective of residence status, to enable them to have the best possible start in life. As with other children, this includes preparing them for their transition to adulthood.
2. Ensure that both the Child Guarantee and the Youth Guarantee allow undocumented children who are about to age out to have continued access to extended services, including education, housing, healthcare and psychosocial support. Ensuring continued access to essential services will facilitate further social inclusion and help prevent them from becoming marginalized and exploited. During a transitory period, which should start before and continue after a child reaches the age of majority, all undocumented children should receive coaching to support them during their transition into adulthood.
3. Use EU funding for projects that support and coach children with a temporary or irregular residence status during a transitory period, to prepare them for adulthood. An example of this is the current call for proposals from the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, which includes a specific line on “migrant children’s transition to adulthood”.

PICUM has joined 27 international child rights organisations and Unicef in signing a joint position and addressing key recommendations to EU institutions and member states for the upcoming Child Rights Strategy, focusing amongst others on children in migration. You can read the full position paper here.

Image: Adobe Stock – Jacob Lund

After the launch of the New Pact on on Migration and Asylum, the European Commission has announced a new Action Plan on Integration and Inclusion for 2021 – 2024, to be published in the last quarter of this year.

The document, which follows the previous Action Plan on the Integration of Third Country Nationals (2016) is meant to provide strategic guidance and set concrete actions to foster inclusion of refugees, migrants and their families. It will draw on all relevant policies and tools in key areas such as social inclusion, employment, education, health, equality, culture and sport, setting out how migrant integration should be part of efforts to achieve the EU’s goals on each one of these areas.

The forthcoming Action Plan is a significant opportunity to develop a coordinated integration policy, ensuring that all people arriving and residing in the EU have the opportunity to build a dignified life and to actively participate in society. Its focus on both integration and inclusion strengthens the understanding of integration as a “two-way process”, which remains to be adequately reflected in current policy approaches.

Ahead of its release, we have taken stock of existing analyses on the social inclusion of migrants and refugees, as carried out by ECRE, PICUM and their member organisations. We’ve also provided specific policy recommendations on coordinated governance, on coherence with existing EU funds, and on mainstreaming integration outcomes across migration and asylum policies.

Click below to find out more in our policy paper.Cover image credit: Copyright – End Child Detention, Artwork by Monann De Jong