On Monday 14 June 2021, the EPSCO Council unanimously adopted the Council Recommendation establishing a European Child Guarantee. In a clear signal to both children and governments, the Council’s text states that all children in need must be able to benefit from the Child Guarantee actions, irrespective of their migration status. This momentous step forward cannot be underestimated, as activities supporting undocumented people have long been excluded from EU funding in the past. But with member states now tasked with developing national Child Guarantee action plans, national governments and civil society must make sure that undocumented children in need can and will benefit in practice.

Opening up access to key services

According to the Council Recommendation, undocumented children and children in migration who are “at risk of poverty or social exclusion” should have effective and free access to high-quality early childhood education and care (ECEC), education and school-based activities, at least one healthy meal each school day and healthcare. They should also have effective access to healthy nutrition and adequate housing.

As shown in PICUM research, all of these areas of life are rife with difficulties and exclusion for undocumented children and families. Undocumented children and families often live in cramped, unhealthy housing, need to overcome financial or administrative barriers to go to school, are excluded from early childhood education and care, may not be eating healthy because of a tight family budget and, depending on where they live, may only be able to benefit from emergency health care.

The Council Recommendation sets a precedent because with it, member states commit to prioritising children’s needs over their residence status. For children in migration, and especially undocumented children, this recognition is hard-won and far from self-evident. As was made clear in the child guarantee feasibility study, undocumented children face more barriers than other migrant children when accessing the services targeted by the Child Guarantee.

The Child Guarantee could also open the door for undocumented children and families to receive benefits connected to accessing ECEC, education, school-based activities, healthcare and one healthy meal per school day because ‘free access’ is to be understood as services being “provided free of charge, either by organising and providing such services or by adequate benefits to cover the costs or the charges of the services, or in such a way that financial circumstances will not pose an obstacle to equal access.”   

Prioritising children’s needs over their residence status

The European Child Guarantee is part of a broader trend by the EU institutions to prioritise people’s needs over residence status in its social policies. For instance, the EU Strategy on the Rights of the Child (2021-2025) clarifies that all children are targets of the strategy and Commission representatives have confirmed that that includes undocumented children. The EU Action Plan on Integration and Inclusion (2021-2027), too, differs from its predecessor, the 2016 Action Plan on the integration of third-country nationals, by not limiting its scope to regularly-residing people. The European Pillar of Social Rights Action Plan, of which the EU Child Guarantee is a deliverable, also sets the goal of lifting at least 5 million children out of poverty by 2030. This recent trend of inclusive policies is very positive, and we hope it will continue.

However, we see a very different trend in Europe’s approach towards migration. Both at member state and EU-level, the trend towards more detention and fewer safeguards for children and adults continues to gather support. Most concerningly, the 2020 Migration and Asylum Pact does not adequately safeguard or protect children even though key European and global institutions have recognized that migrant children are highly vulnerable members of our society and their best interests overrides migration management considerations.

This contradiction of recognizing a child’s needs and rights over their residence status in one policy field while not doing so in another is not sustainable. Especially when we know that undocumented children’s vulnerability and social exclusion is partly caused by their residence status, restrictive migration policies and the lack of options to regularise their stay. If the proposed Migration and Asylum Pact will prevent migrants from accessing in-country residence procedures, set up a return sponsorship scheme that rips undocumented families from their support networks to drop them in an unknown country, or cause trauma and additional vulnerability through the widespread use of detention – children will not be set up for success. Nor will the proposed Migration and Asylum Pact create the necessary preconditions for a successful integration policy because it erodes migrants’ resilience and trust in the system.

Leveraging EU funds to tackle child poverty and exclusion

Because the Child Guarantee activities would complement existing national-level actions and funding, several EU funds will be financing its implementation. After months of negotiations, the European Parliament, Council and Commission, agreed that member states will earmark an “appropriate amount” of the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) to tackle child poverty and exclusion, and member states with an above-average number of children living at risk of poverty or social exclusion earmarking at least 5%. For the 2021-2027 financing period, these countries are Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malta, Romania, Spain and Sweden.

It will soon become clear how committed member states are to lifting children out of poverty. A clear indicator will be seeing what member states consider an “appropriate amount” and whether they target more difficult-to-reach populations, like undocumented children and families.

Going beyond the recommended actions

Member states should understand the recommended activities listed in the Council Recommendation as a first step. For instance, regarding access to healthcare, the Council only recommends to member states that they facilitate early detection and treatment of diseases and developmental problems; implement accessible health promotion and disease prevention programmes targeting children in need and their families; and provide targeted rehabilitation and habilitation services for children with disabilities. It is evident that these do not, alone, equate to effective and free access to health care for children in need. That is why member states must go beyond what is recommended by the Commission or the Council and consider the effective needs of children and what hampers them from enjoying these services.

Member states should immediately appoint a national Child Guarantee Coordinator. Member states now have until March 2022 to present national actions plans that are adapted to national, regional and local circumstances, and identify children in need and the barriers they face in accessing and taking-up the services above.

Member states cannot do this alone, however. Because they are often invisible, there is a lack of understanding of the barriers undocumented children and families face, what they need and even how many undocumented children are living in specific country. It is up to civil society, specialists and migrant-led organisations to assist member states in developing national action plans that target and effectively benefit undocumented children. And it is up to member states to ensure they are consulted and involved in the drafting of the plans.

As PICUM, we are glad to see the route taken by this Commission and the Council with their recognition that children’s interests are primordial – including when children have irregular migration status. We hope that the national action plans will reflect the intent of the Parliament, the Commission and the EPSCO council and ensure that undocumented children can fulfil their potential.

Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs Council (EPSCO)

A.o. by the European Court of Human Rights in Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v. Belgium and Tarakhel v. Switzerland.

The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, underlined that “non rights-based arguments such as, those relating to general migration control, cannot override best interests considerations.” in General Comment no. 6, Treatment of unaccompanied and separated children outside their country of origin

Cover: Unsplash – Mi Pham 

As part of our efforts to monitor access to the COVID-19 vaccines for undocumented migrants in Europe, we’re speaking with national-level advocates about the situation in their countries. This interview was conducted in April 2021 with Janine Wildschut of Dokters van de Wereld to discuss the situation in the Netherlands. It is not meant to offer an exhaustive picture of the legal and practical context in the Netherlands. Please get in touch at info@picum.org if you have information you’d like to share, and follow our Twitter page @PICUM_post to get more recent updates.

What does the Dutch vaccination strategy say about undocumented migrants?

The strategy explicitly mentions undocumented migrants as one target group for the vaccination campaign. In terms of priority, they come after age, medical and professional categories, and are included in the group of homeless people.

What do you make of this?

It’s good that the strategy mentions undocumented migrants explicitly, and this was the result of advocacy early-on carried out by civil society organisations. But we also pointed out that undocumented migrants should also be prioritised based on their age and medical conditions, and not come after age and medical categories, as if those didn’t apply to them. In addition, not all undocumented people are homeless, and so they wouldn’t be reached through outreach in the shelters for homeless people.

So how can undocumented migrants get their COVID-19 vaccine in the Netherlands practically?

There are three main avenues. The first one is the one outlined in the vaccination strategy, that is in the shelters for homeless people. The Ministry of Health, in cooperation with civil society, has organised vans with medical teams who administer the jabs in the shelters, or other facilities managed by civil society. This process started at the beginning of June.

At Doctors of the World, we’ve been able to administer the vaccines to some undocumented migrants before this process started. But this only happened because we were able to convince local doctors, on a case-by-case basis, that these people were old enough or sick enough to be vaccinated according to the age and medical priority groups. And then only because spare doses were available.

What about the other two avenues for undocumented migrants to get vaccinated?

The second avenue is by phone. Anyone can call a public number to book their vaccination, when they are part of the priority group whose turn it is. If you don’t have a national registration number, the operator will just insert a string of 9s. Not all operators are aware of this policy, but this is what’s in the regulations.

The third avenue is through the GPs, who can help patients with a medical condition to book their vaccination. To register with a GP, you’d normally need health insurance, which includes your national registration number: this is not available to undocumented migrants, but the GP can still accept them as patients and later be reimbursed through the national health service. Because this process is quite bureaucratic, though, it really depends on the individual GP and whether or not they’ll accept an undocumented person.

Are there any risks of immigration checks when undocumented migrants try to get the vaccine?

In the Netherlands, there’s a clear duty of confidentiality for all medical staff, and privacy regulations would apply too. We haven’t heard of any case of data sharing, but fears over immigration enforcement are obviously still present among the undocumented community.

Cover: Michal Soukup – Unsplash

EU countries should do better to protect undocumented migrant workers’ rights under existing EU rules. This is what the EU Fundamental Rights Agency found in their latest report. The research finds major gaps in the implementation of the Employers Sanctions’ Directive when it comes to enabling exploited workers to get justice, nearly ten years since it came into force on 20 July 2011. It highlights the need to improve complaints systems, access to compensation and residence permits, and ensure labour inspectorates focus on protecting workers and not immigration law. This research echoes the experiences of our members.

This issue is not new. The European Commission’s (EC) own website summarises two main findings from its first evaluation report of the Employers’ Sanctions Directive from 2014: there are differences in the severity of the punishment in different EU countries, and there is room for improvement in all areas offering protection to irregular migrants.

Nonetheless, the EU has done little to encourage such improvements so far, and rather has pursued policies focused on stepping up detention and deportation that run at odds with fundamental rights. Only one evaluation report of the Employers’ Sanctions Directive was published in 2014, and the European Commission has since remained silent regarding undocumented workers’ labour rights.

Later this year, an evaluation report from the European Commission is finally expected, together with a political direction regarding the future of the policy.

While organisations representing workers have, and continue to, express concerns around the Directive, PICUM recognises and regularly uses its provisions that explicitly reaffirm undocumented workers’ labour rights.

A major focus has been the provisions in the Directive that require EU Member States to ensure there are effective mechanisms and procedures through which third-country nationals working irregularly may lodge complaints against their employers, introduce a claim and eventually enforce a judgement for any outstanding remuneration. Effective complaints mechanisms enable the exercise of a full range of rights of undocumented workers – as persons, workers or as victims of crime – stemming from various legislation.

Crucially, in order for the complaints mechanisms and legal procedures to be effective, they have to be accessible without risk of immigration enforcement.

However, labour inspection authorities have for the most part been tasked with checking work permits of workers, in order for sanctions to be imposed on employers in the case of irregular employment – in line with the ‘Employers Sanctions Directive’. While there are a number of important examples where it is not the case, in most European countries, undocumented workers risk immigration enforcement as a result of these checks. The FRA found that labour inspectorates share irregular migrants’ personal data with police or immigration authorities in 20 out of 25 EU countries bound by the Directive. There is a lack of safeguards to ensure this data is not used for immigration enforcement. Labour inspectors also frequently carry out inspections accompanied by police who directly carry out immigration checks.

This completely undermines the purpose of labour inspections (and the ILO Labour Inspection Convention), and access to labour rights for undocumented workers. The risk of deportation for most people with precarious or irregular status is equivalent to losing everything, being uprooted from your life, repeat victimisation and exposure to significant hardship and risk of harm.

This situation also enables the immigration system to be used as a tool for exploitation. Workers threatened with deportation are liable to accept poor pay and conditions. Deported undocumented workers can easily be replaced by others and the gains made through systematically under-paying workers and not declaring work make it financially worth the risk of sanctions. Authorities also face significant barriers to imposing sanctions without the evidence and engagement of workers.

As one of our members said: “While the Labour Inspectorate struggles with sanctions against employers, the Foreign Police is very effective and quick with sanctions against workers.”

By holding employers accountable for due wages, taxes and social security, the financial implications for them would be much more significant. And fundamentally, the complaints mechanisms would serve the state, public purse and social security system, the labour market and workers.

A crucial issue at stake is whether or not the EU will recognise this in its forthcoming report. We hope the European Commission will finally take a stand and clarify to member state authorities that the Employers’ Sanctions Directive requires complaints mechanisms and procedures to be effective, and therefore due safeguards must be put in place to enable engagement and access to remedy for workers, who should not face immigration enforcement as a result.

Information gathered or otherwise obtained by labour inspection authorities should be used to initiate procedures against employers for due social security, taxes, wages and sanctions, and where applicable to support workers to access relevant residence permit procedures, but not used to initiate immigration enforcement against workers.

Find out more in our submission to the European Commission’s consultation on Directive (June 2021).

According to the law, a report on its implementation is due every three years.

Likewise our analysis from April 2015, found extremely limited implementation of any of the protective elements in four EU countries. In 2017, we looked deeper into the situation in Belgium and the Czech Republic and found worker complaints mechanisms inadequate, inaccessible and ineffective, with only one known case across the two countries in which a worker had been able to claim unpaid wages in line with the provisions of the Directive.

This directive does not apply to all EU countries – Denmark and Ireland opted out.

Cover: Unsplash – Zhipeng Ya

As part of our efforts to monitor access to the COVID-19 vaccines for undocumented migrants in Europe, we’re speaking with national-level advocates about the situation in their countries. This interview was conducted in June 2021 with Maria Lapa of Amnesty International Portugal to discuss the situation in Portugal. It is not meant to offer an exhaustive picture of the legal and practical context in the Portugal. Please get in touch at info@picum.org if you have information you’d like to share, and follow our Twitter page @PICUM_post to get more recent updates.

What does the Portuguese vaccination strategy say about undocumented migrants?

The Portuguese vaccination strategy doesn’t really mention undocumented migrants, but it does say that access to the vaccines is “universal”, meaning that it will be available to anyone who lives in Portugal. Access to health care is anyways possible for undocumented migrants under national law.

Public officials also announced that they’re working on a specific plan to identify and vaccinate undocumented migrants. In addition, the Ministry of Health created a dedicated registration platform to let undocumented people book their vaccine.

Can you tell us more about this platform?

Sure. Essentially, it’s a website where undocumented people can book their vaccination against COVID-19. The website, in Portuguese and in English, is adapted to them in terms of the data that they’re required to provide. On this website, people only need to provide their address, birth date, phone number and nationality. Civil society organizations seem to be playing an important role in helping migrants sign up to the platform.

According to official figures from June 2021, more than 19000 undocumented migrants have signed up.

Who manages the data provided in the platform?

The data is managed by the National Health Authority, which oversees the vaccination process. In the platform, they state that the data will be shared with the relevant entities and only for the purpose of the vaccination.

Where are undocumented migrants vaccinated? And are they required any specific documents at the vaccination point?

Undocumented migrants can go to the same vaccination centres as everyone else. It’s unclear what documents they’d need to provide, but since all vaccinations are pre-scheduled, my guess is that there would be a list for this population.

Are there any practical barriers for undocumented people to get the vaccine?

Yes, the coordinator of the vaccination task force has admitted that it’s been hard to identify migrants for the vaccination process. He also said that as long as the person is identified “they have every right to be vaccinated” because “the pandemic doesn’t choose nationality, race or age”. So it’s good to see these kind of positive statements from the coordinator, but I think that the success of this initiative will depend a lot on the ability of civil society organisations to reach out to migrant communities and convince them to trust the process enough to agree to sign up for vaccination

Cover: Unsplash – André Lergier

As part of our efforts to monitor access to the COVID-19 vaccines for undocumented migrants in Europe, we’re speaking with national-level advocates about the situation in their countries. This interview was conducted in May 2021 with Linnea Näsholm of Oslo Health Centre for Undocumented Migrants and Katrine Meisfjord from the Bergen Health Centre for Undocumented Migrants to discuss the situation in Norway. It is not meant to offer an exhaustive picture of the legal and practical context in Norway. Please get in touch at info@picum.org if you have information you’d like to share, and follow our Twitter page @PICUM_post to get more recent updates.

What does the Norwegian vaccination strategy say about undocumented people?

Undocumented migrants are not mentioned explicitly in the Norwegian vaccination strategy. The strategy rather focuses on age and medical conditions as criteria to prioritise groups of people in the vaccination campaign.

Are there any other relevant policies that indicate undocumented people are included in the vaccination campaign?

Yes. The law on communicable disease entitles everyone, regardless of residence status, to health care related to communicable diseases, including treatment and preventative care, like vaccinations.

In addition, in early spring 2021, the Norwegian Directorate of Health published guidance on COVID-19-related care for undocumented people. It addressed a letter to all local and regional health authorities, both primary and specialist healthcare services, calling on them to make the vaccines available for everyone. However, the letter did not detail how undocumented people could practically get their shot. It really passed the buck to the municipalities in terms of how to organise this.

Do you mean that undocumented people can’t just book their vaccine like everyone else?

Indeed. In Norway, as a rule, undocumented people can only access emergency health care and “health care that is totally necessary and cannot be deferred”. For other types of care, except when related to children and pregnant women, you need to have a valid personal identification number and be registered with a GP, which is by law not possible for undocumented migrants. Informal access to a GP may still be possible, but then the doctor has to bear all the costs of the care they provide. The letter from the Directorate of Health stated access to the vaccines for all but didn’t say how undocumented migrants could practically get their appointment and then their shot.

Let’s look at the booking system. How does that work in Norway, and what does that mean for undocumented people?

It depends on the local health authority’s approach. In some localities, you are contacted by the local health authority to get an appointment for your vaccine after your GP sends your contacts to the local vaccination centre. Some other health authorities provide the vaccine at the GP clinic. In both cases, you need to be registered with a GP. And for that, you need a valid identification number, which means you have a valid residence permit.

In Oslo, the Health Centre for Undocumented Migrants, in collaboration with the municipality, arranged for a local GP to come once a week to write referrals for people based on their medical and socio-economic conditions. With these referrals, undocumented people can be called to get their vaccine without the need of a personal number or a valid ID document: only the name, date of birth, phone number and preferred language are noted. We have very good cooperation with one of the local vaccination centres in Oslo, we work together to make sure people get appointments and access to interpretation. They even suggested coming to our health centre or having a specific day just for referred patients in case this could be helpful.

It looks like everything is left to the goodwill of the municipalities. Are there other good practices from local authorities?

Yes, in Bergen, for instance, the municipality is employing a GP who works with grassroots organisations to make sure vulnerable groups are vaccinated. Vaccinations for undocumented people are in practice organised by the Health Centre for Undocumented migrants in Bergen.

Are there any concerns regarding the sharing of personal data with immigration authorities?

In Norway, there’s a very clear firewall and medical staff have a strong duty of confidentiality. We’ve had few cases where immigration authorities called a doctor about patients to be deported, to check when they’d be fit to fly. When that happens, medical staff have a duty to keep confidentiality. It’s illegal for medical staff to report undocumented patients.

Cover: Avonne Stalling – Pexels

As part of our efforts to monitor access to the COVID-19 vaccines for undocumented migrants in Europe, we’re speaking with national-level advocates about the situation in their countries. This interview was conducted in April 2021 with Vivien Vadasi of Menedék to discuss the situation in Hungary. It is not meant to offer an exhaustive picture of the legal and practical context in Hungary. Please get in touch at info@picum.org if you have information you’d like to share, and follow our Twitter page @PICUM_post to get more recent updates.

What does the Hungarian vaccination strategy say about undocumented migrants?

The Hungarian strategy is a very short document that describes the order of vaccination, in terms of priority groups, but doesn’t mention at all undocumented migrants, or foreigners for that matter. Last February, we asked the government to clarify who’s eligible for the vaccination and what are the plans to reach out and provide vaccinations to foreigners in Hungary. They replied that they’ll propose legislation on this, but it hasn’t happened yet.

Would undocumented migrants still be able to access the vaccines in practice? How does the registration work?

Registering for the vaccines can be done online. The website, which is only in Hungarian, requires a home address, which can be hard to impossible for undocumented migrants to prove.

As of May 4, foreigners living in Hungary without a social security number (TAJ) can register for their vaccines too. But details of residence papers and identity documents are also asked, but it doesn’t look mandatory to fill in those fields. We do know however, from official sources, that the registration data would be checked against the data in the immigration register. This obviously poses great risks for undocumented migrants.

OK, let’s start with the home address. How does that work?

Well, you could theoretically type a fake address online and get your appointment, but at the vaccination centre they’ll ask for a proof of address. Homeless people can get a “territorial address” card, which indicates what district they usually live in, and produce this at the vaccination point. But this card isn’t accessible for all migrants, let alone undocumented migrants. It is also not possible to use an NGO address as a replacement.

So home address is a huge barrier already. What about the social security number?

In Hungary, a social security number is issued for Hungarian nationals, EU nationals and their family members, permanent residents and beneficiaries of international protection. People with work-related residence permits, thus contributing to social security, can also get one. But their family members, or students paying their own fees can only get a social security number if they’re contributing ten times as much as the mainstream population for 25 months. So most of them end up buying private health care insurance. Undocumented people do not qualify for a social security card either as one of the conditions is the (legal) residence in Hungary.

Recent legislation introduced even stricter rules to access social security. Now, if you don’t pay social security contributions for the equivalent of six months, your social security number becomes invalid. The government has clarified that people with an invalid social security number can still access the vaccines, but the question remains for those who don’t have any such number.

Again, when trying to register for your vaccine online, in theory, you could insert a string of 0s in the social security number case as a workaround. You’d be able to book your appointment, but at the vaccination centre you’ll be asked for your social security number, nonetheless.

Right. So undocumented migrants wouldn’t be able to provide either a home address or a social security number.

Indeed. By design, undocumented migrants aren’t able to get the vaccines. In addition, at the vaccination point, you would also be asked for an identification document, that is an ID card for Hungarians and a residence permit for non-national residents, which is one more obstacle for undocumented migrants.

Is immigration enforcement involved at any point when trying to access the vaccines?

In general, health professionals aren’t required to inform immigration enforcement authorities of the migration status of patients. But in practice, the social security number and card remain a pre-condition to receive medical treatment, beyond urgent life-saving care.

1. The Hungarian strategy provides for a priority list (that is in practice not respected) of people who should receive the vaccination:
   1.Healthcare workers (including students at medical universities and all of those who work in the sector, i.e. cleaners as well)
   2. Professionals in the social care sector and beneficiaries of social care (while this category seems to be very inclusive, in practice, the government focused on social and care workers working in homes of the elderly and also those elderly who are placed in these homes. Nevertheless, also workers and inhabitants of homeless shelters received vaccination in some cases.)
   3. People aged 60 years or older who fall in the high-risk group due to their health condition
   4. Staff of the law-enforcement and government authorities (police, including border police and the immigration authority, administrative officials, etc.) who are in direct contact with the population
   5. People aged 16/18-59 living falling in the high-risk group due to their health condition
   6. Professionals working in the critical infrastructure (there was not much information about what sectors fall in that category)
   7. The rest of the population who do not fall in the categories above
   The priority list also lays down that the vaccination of people falling in category 2 and 4 should not depend on their registration on the official website but should be organized separately (on the contrary, my social worker colleagues had to register on the official website in order to be able to receive the vaccination). Category 1 also received vaccination independently from the official online registration system.

Cover: Abode Stock – EdNurg

On 27 April 2021, the EU Commission published its first EU Strategy on voluntary return and reintegration. The strategy is envisaged by the New Pact on Migration and Asylum as an integral policy for a common EU system for returns. It conceives actions in seven areas with the aim of increasing the number of voluntary returns. If, on paper, the text recognizes voluntary return as being more efficient, cost-effective and preferable to forced return, in practice this is contradicted by several ongoing legislative proposals which make access to voluntary return more difficult. The text highlights the role of “swift and efficient return border procedures” to encourage migrants to take up voluntary returns, including for people in administrative detention and those whose asylum application is still pending. The Strategy increases the role of Frontex in promoting voluntary returns, despite the growing scrutiny into the lack of accountability and the potential involvement of the agency in human rights violations.

 “Voluntary” returns?

Increasing the rate of returns is one of the main objectives of the European Pact on Migration and Asylum. The term “return” appears nearly 100 times in the Commission Communication on the Pact alone – while the term “rights” only 14. While forced return remains a central component of the EU return system, the objective of this strategy is to develop a more uniform and coordinated approach that acknowledges the potential of voluntariness within the return process. Even though the number of returnees is still considered a strong indicator for the effectiveness of any return policy, this strategy recognizes that “it is important to not only consider the return rates but also the situation of the individuals concerned, enabling their return in a dignified manner and taking into account their reintegration prospects once they return to their country of origin”.

On paper, the strategy – a non-binding instrument – prioritises voluntary over forced return, but in practice this is contradicted by several binding legislative proposals which make access to voluntary return more difficult. For instance, the Commission proposal for a Recast Return Directive prohibits EU Member States from granting a period for voluntary departure in a broad number of circumstances which legitimise a risk of absconding. Moreover, migrants are openly encouraged to return from the very moment they arrive in the EU through return counselling – which can be provided by Frontex – even during their asylum application, and by the constant threat of swift and efficient return procedures, including at borders, for those who do not agree to return voluntarily. Encouraging voluntary returns through “swift and efficient return border procedures” confirms the EU “carrot and stick” approach, for which “an efficient return border procedure will also facilitate and encourage voluntary returns since people will be available and more willing to cooperate with the authorities” (EU Strategy on voluntary return and reintegration,p.7).

Frontex will have an increasing role in voluntary returns

With its reinforced mandate, Frontex will play a crucial role in the activities of return and reintegration assistance to returnees. In mid-2022, Frontex will take over the activities of the European Return and Reintegration Network (ERRIN). The full operationalisation of the Agency’s mandate is a gradual process that started in May 2021 with a first Frontex pilot for individual joint reintegration support to returnees from the EU. In collaboration with ICMPD, the Agency will also be involved in the development of a common curriculum for return counsellors, which aims at providing practitioners with teaching modules on all aspects of return policy and practice. Frontex will support Member States by deploying return experts trained in return counselling as part of the standing corps. In addition, it will have an increased role in “pre-return counselling (e.g. outreach campaigns to migrants), post-arrival support and monitoring the effectiveness of reintegration assistance.

Further technical support and the new roles on return foreseen by the Pact

The strategy indicates that additional technical support will be guaranteed by the Return Coordinator and the High Level Network for Return, including representatives from Member States. They will assist the coordination of national authorities on voluntary return and reintegration strategies and programmes, to promote uniformity between national actions and this strategy, and to promote the exchange of best practices among Member States. This support aims at achieving a comprehensive governance framework as set out in the proposal for a Regulation on Asylum and Migration Management.

Prioritising voluntary over forced returns is a welcome step, but it is not sufficient

On the Roadmap published on 15 December 2020, the European Commission describes “shaping returns to respond to the needs of the individual” as one of the main objectives for the EU and EU agencies and the Member States. If, on the one hand, this strategy recognizes voluntary return as being more efficient and preferable to forced return, the EU Commission commitment to respond to the needs of the individual remains on many levels unclear in the document published in April 2021.

Firstly, it is crucial to acknowledge that return is not the best option for all. Secondly, when voluntary return is possible, EU policies should ensure that people and their choices come first. Human choices are not pre-packaged products, but rather the result of accurate evaluations that require time and services to allow people to explore all different options, including the possibility to remain regularly in the EU. While the Commission’s efforts to prioritise voluntary over forced returns are a welcome step, encouraging people to return by all possible means and from the very moment they arrive at borders is far from being a strategy that meets migrants’ freedom of choice nor their needs.

Present data on voluntary returns are not clear. According to the EU Commission, “the share of voluntary returns is currently 27% of all departures from the EU”. Frontex Risk analysis 2020, instead, reported that 49 % of returns are voluntary (table 13, p. 67).

Cover: Unsplash – Nathan Dumlao

The EU budget provides opportunities for supporting migrants’ inclusion through different funding instruments, although each fund has a specific scope that allows for specific activities for a specific target group. Some of these funds allow EU member states to fund measures for newly arrived third country nationals, as well as to foster migrants’ access to social services and integration in employment.

Undocumented migrants are generally cut off from such resources in EU funding schemes. Consequently, organisations supporting the integration of undocumented migrants are usually unable to access EU funding schemes to fund projects involving undocumented migrants.

PICUM has consistently challenged this limitation and has called for the inclusion of undocumented migrants among the beneficiaries of EU funding instruments that target the social inclusion of third country nationals. In the past two years, PICUM has worked together with ECRE to advocate for inclusive priorities for migrants, asylum seekers and refugees within the new EU Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 2021 – 2027, which defines allocations to different EU budget lines for the coming seven years.

In addition to the MFF, an unprecedented economic stimulus was set up through the Next Generation EU to support EU member states in the recovery from the Covid-19 pandemic. As these resources are managed at the member states’ level and represent a unique support to finance reforms and economic recovery, it is difficult to determine to what extent migrants will directly benefit from them.
The following analysis summarises the state of the achievements in the funding instruments in the MFF that can support migrants’ inclusion, and highlights what actions are still needed. It doesn’t cover the ongoing debate over the National Recovery and Resilience Plans (NRRP) of Next Generation EU, as there are no explicit requirements to investing part of these in inclusion.

European Social Fund Plus (ESF+)

The ESF+ will replace the current European Social Fund, the main EU instrument financing programmes for employment, social inclusion and skills. The ESF+ will include the current Fund for European Aid to the Most Deprived (FEAD), the Youth Employment Initiative (YEI) and the Employment and Social Innovation instrument.

Involving undocumented migrants in programmes funded through ESF has proved challenging, considering that the ESF aims at promoting employability and enhancing skills for employment. Social inclusion projects that have been funded through ESF usually require users to be able to regularly access the labour market. Past experiences of funding to irregular migrants through the ESF are limited, and almost inexistent in recent years. This is also due to the reporting obligations that generally force beneficiary organisations to report details of service users, including social security numbers, which may not be available for undocumented migrants.

The new ESF+ will no longer focus uniquely on supporting employability but will also include broader social inclusion objectives, despite keeping a treaty-based mission to promote employment and training across the EU.

The specific objectives of the ESF+ agreed by EU co-legislators are divided into three pillars: education, employment and social inclusion. ESF+ actions implemented under the social inclusion pillar could be provided regardless of residence status and access to the labour market.

The ESF+ also includes a full objective on promoting the socio-economic integration of third country nationals, including migrants (residence status is not mentioned in the definition). Despite a more inclusive regulation, the allocation of resources will highly depend on national choices, including EU member states’ interpretation of their reporting obligations. There is a high risk that EU member states will resist this possible change and the administrative adjustments that it would require, and continue to follow more restrictive rules, including in the reporting duties, that guided the implementation of previous funds.

Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF)

In line with the EU approach on migration enforcement, the main fund supporting integration of third country nationals is strictly linked to regularly residing migrants, with a specific focus on asylum seekers and recognised beneficiaries of international and humanitarian protection. Undocumented migrants are targeted through AMIF’s objective to “counter irregular migration, and ensure effective, safe and dignified return and readmission, as well as to contribute to and to promote effective initial reintegration in third countries”. AMIF can support alternatives to detention, including the promotion of community-based case management, and countering labour exploitation.

Regarding labour exploitation, the regulation allows for funding the establishment and implementation of mechanisms through which irregular migrants can claim back payments and lodge complaints against their employers, as well as information and awareness‑raising campaigns to inform employers and irregular migrants about their rights and obligations pursuant to Directive 2009/52/EC. If member states would actually choose to implement such actions in their national programmes, it is not specified what institution would be responsible for such actions: the involvement of the migration authorities, for instance could undermine the effectiveness of the complaint mechanisms.

There are limited but promising developments regarding the AMIF resources that are managed directly at the EU level, and that tend to be more flexible in reporting requirements. The European Commission clarified, in an explanatory note to a recent call for proposals, that while not being the main target group of the fund, irregularly residing third country nationals are not excluded. The increase of the share of AMIF funding that will be be managed directly by the Commission in the next 7 years might lead to more flexibility in transnational calls for proposals on integration.

Fund for European Aid to the most Deprived (FEAD)

Through its inclusion in the ESF+, the FEAD will continue deliver on poverty reduction for the next two years thanks to the extension included in the Recovery Assistance for Cohesion and the Territories of Europe (React-EU initiative). This initiative, part of the EU recovery plan ‘Next Generation EU’, will extend the EU’s cohesion policy for the past multiannual financial framework (2014 – 2020) until 2022 and will provide new resources to support recovery from the socio-economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic.

FEAD is the only EU funding programme that tackles social exclusion and material deprivation, and does not exclude undocumented migrants from its potential beneficiaries, especially when linked to food and material support. Nevertheless, as it is managed by national governments in cooperation with local authorities, large social service organisations and food banks, the nature of the support varies considerably.

In many EU member states, FEAD is used to support in-kind basic social assistance, including basic material and food aid. Obstacles may arise depending on the mechanisms chosen to provide such services, as for instance paper or electronic vouchers for grocery products. In the case of voucher mechanisms, several member states require beneficiaries to have a social security number and/or to be included in specific lists of people with little to no income. This is obviously a huge barrier for undocumented migrants, who are not able to provide such documents or to prove their income. For this reason, and despite the lack of specific limitations in the EU legislation, undocumented migrants can generally access distribution of food packages and hot meals provided by charities and soup kitchens through FEAD, but are often unable to benefit from more systematic support that the fund offers to families or individuals experiencing extreme social exclusion.

The EU Action Plan on Integration and Inclusion: integration spending at the EU level

With an increased number of funding instrument supporting integration, it is crucial for the EU and member states to ensure effective synergies among different funds and set up a strategy with clear goals that coordinates the use of these resources. The Action Plan on Integration and Inclusion (released in November 2020) aims at guiding EU actions on inclusion, and allocates EU funding to social services for third country nationals.

While integration policy is an exclusive competence of EU member states, the EU can address the socio-economic inclusion of third country nationals through its own funding, complementing national policies and resources. The new Action Plan refers to the various EU funds which will allow member states to support integration, including the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF); European Social Fund Plus (ESF+); the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF); the Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD); and Erasmus+. The duration of the Action Plan, which will cover the seven years of the new MFF (2020-2027), will ensure consistency in the management of the funds.

The Action Plan reflects a strategy of the European Commission and can recommend actions to member states, but cannot provide mechanisms for enforcing these recommendations. The actions that it proposes focus mainly on refugees, asylum seekers and regular migrants; however, it does not explicitly exclude irregular migrants. This is a marked improvement from the previous Action Plan, which dates back to 2016, and which was limited to ‘regularly residing third country nationals’. Moreover, the new Action Plan includes a number of openings for specific target groups, by recognising for instance that access to health services varies considerably depending on people’s migration status, and by making it explicit that the upcoming EU Comprehensive Strategy on the Rights of the Child should enable all children, regardless of residence status, to have equal access to the same set of rights and protection. Additionally, the Commission’s proposal on the Child Guarantee, that is meant to be implemented through the ESF+, clearly defines children with a migrant background ‘irrespective of their migration status’. In this sense, it may be possible to see more flexibility in EU-managed funding for policies on children’s inclusion, as well as for policies aiming at ensuring access to healthcare for all.

The programming phase at member states’ level

To ensure that EU resources can support the social inclusion of migrants regardless of their residence status, it is important that the preparation of national programmes of EU funds, which started in late 2020 and will continue for most of 2021, recognises the existing barriers and the arising opportunities to overcome them: current reporting and eligibility requirements prevent the extension of EU-funded services to an important number of people who should qualify as part of ‘vulnerable groups’, and could benefit from EU-funded programmes.

The texts approved by the European institutions for ESF+ refer extensively to ‘most vulnerable’ and ‘excluded’ groups: for instance, they recommend that the ESF+ is used for “promoting the access to healthcare for people in vulnerable situations”. Despite these positive developments, there is a concrete risk that resistance to change in public administrations and lack of clear instructions from the European level will undermine an extension of funded actions to undocumented migrants.

To ensure that such measures will not exclude undocumented migrants, actions need to take place at the member states level, within the managing authorities responsible for ESF and FEAD. It is important to ensure that the right information on the scope of EU funds, including especially the ESF+, reaches out to managing authorities. The upcoming months of 2021 are particularly strategic to reach out to managing authorities with clear recommendations on those vulnerable groups that should be prioritised in social inclusion measures.

This definition is meant to refer to all people outside the EU including both migrants and beneficiaries and applicants for international protection. Among the wording chosen by the European institutions, that often tend to use the word ‘migrants’ referring only to refugees, it represents the most inclusive definition.

Since the signature of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2007, European institutions have the mandate to ‘provide incentives and support for the action of member sates with a view to promoting the integration of third-country nationals (Art. 79 of Treaty on functioning of the European Union).

Cover: Unsplash – Christian Lue

This article has been written by Aaron Gates-Lincoln who is a correspondent for the Immigration Advice Service.

The UK government has not been shy about its use of hostile environment policies to deter people from entering the UK over the past decade. These policies are a set of legislative measures designed to make staying in the UK as difficult as possible without ‘leave to remain’ status, in the hopes it will make migrants ‘voluntarily leave’. However, it is becoming clear that now more than ever, these policies are having a direct, negative impact upon the lives of migrant children in the UK.

It is being estimated that thousands of children of EU nationals who are now in the UK care system are going to be put at risk by flaws in the EU Settlement Scheme. The scheme, introduced after Brexit, allows EU citizens to apply to receive indefinite leave to remain status within the UK. For children in care, applications for the scheme must be submitted and paid for by the local authority in which they are situated in. It was expected that this process would be the easiest and most effective method in ensuring all children are accounted for under the EU Settlement Scheme.

However, a Freedom of Information request by the Children’s Society has found that so far, fewer than 40% of the 3,700 or so known eligible children in care have had their applications submitted. Numbers may be significantly higher than this, as many local authorities do not keep nationality data for children in care. These low numbers can be attributed to the failures of local authorities, as they are responsible for ensuring the applications are completed and submitted. Furthermore, with care leavers and other children not directly in the care system, they are required to offer support and guidance in submitting applications which in many cases they are not doing. Care leavers and some children do have the power to submit their own applications, but for some, the application process may be complex and require professional guidance, which should be the responsibility of the local authorities to offer. With the deadline for applications now less than 3 months away, this is extremely worrying for the stability, safety and well-being of this group of children.

Concerns are being raised that the issue could mirror that of the Windrush scandal of 2018, in which thousands of Commonwealth citizens were wrongly detained and deported due to problems surrounding documentation. With this in mind, it could be estimated that the group may apply for housing or employment in the future and only then discover their irregular status. This could seriously put them at the risk of unjust detainment and deportation, exploitation and abject poverty.

The EU Settlement Scheme has emerged and exposed itself as a covert element of the UK government’s hostile environment policies. It is unethical for children in care to be robbed of their secure residence status due to the failures of local authorities to act on their behalf, and support their best interests. The government itself has ignored calls from MPs to fast-track children in care through the process, instead opting to place the responsibility on struggling local authorities. Most of their struggle’s stem from underfunding, which leads to overstretched staff with high workloads, contributing to children in care not receiving as much support as they should be.

It is also unjust that local authorities have been encouraged by the government to place children in care on this immigration track. Evidence has shown that for children of EU nationals in care, most, if not all, could have the rights to citizenship. Instead, the children who actually have applications submitted are placed on a scheme that would offer them nowhere near the same number of rights and entitlements.

It is vital that this group of children are given the opportunity to gain the citizenship that they are entitled to. Children born in the UK, who have parents with settled status, or have lived the first 10 years of their life there, have the right to register to be a citizen. The Home Secretary also has a discretionary power to grant any child UK citizenship when it is evident that their future lies in the UK.

In most cases, children in care are not taken down these pathways due to extortionate citizenship fees. For each application, local authorities have to pay £1,000, £640 of which is direct profit to the Home Office (respectively approximately EUR 1,160 and EUR 745). These fees were recently found unlawful in a judgment by the High Court, requiring the Home Office to rethink the need for the fees. However, they have still not been reduced, prompting petitions and other pressures to be applied against the Home Office to suggest that they do so. Due to current laws, if children in care are not put on the citizenship pathway before they turn 18, they will lose their right to citizenship when they reach this age.

Migrant children are being subjected to a system that is rigged against their favour, and exposed to hostile policies that are cruel and unethical. It is clear that the UK government has not learned anything from the injustices the Windrush generation had to face, and are setting themselves up for a repetition. It is vital that the UK government changes the structural causes of the issues discussed here, by making applications for such schemes easier for children, care leavers and their guardians. This would remove pressures on local authorities to submit applications and give power back to the children, their guardians, families and surrounding professionals to obtain a secure residence status. It is also essential that the UK government lowers the costs of citizenship fees, to ensure that children in care are placed on the citizenship pathway more often, to grant them the stability and security in the UK they need.

Cover: Adobe Stock – Mongkolchon

As part of our efforts to monitor access to the COVID-19 vaccines for undocumented migrants in Europe, we’re speaking with national-level advocates about the situation in their countries. This interview was conducted in April 2021 with Anna Miller of Doctors of the World UK to discuss the situation in the UK. It is not meant to offer an exhaustive picture of the legal and practical context in the UK. Please get in touch at info@picum.org if you have information you’d like to share, and follow our Twitter page @PICUM_post to get more recent updates.

What does the UK vaccination strategy say about undocumented people?

The government says that the COVID-19 vaccines are accessible to everyone, including undocumented migrants, for free and without immigration checks. This is reflected in official guidance too.

So, all good?

Not really. There are still a number of challenges for undocumented people to actually get vaccinated against COVID-19. Starting with getting registered with a GP.

How do you register with a GP?

To get a vaccine, you need to book an appointment. You can do this either online or by calling your GP. The problem with the online registration is that you need an NHS (National Health Service) number, which lots of undocumented migrants don’t have.

How do you get one?

There are different ways. In some cases, you can get one automatically, for instance if you’re born in the UK, irrespective of your migration status. Or if you come to the UK on a visa for 6 months, you’ll have to pay a contribution to the NHS (the “immigration health charge”) and you’ll get an NHS number.

But most undocumented migrants don’t fall under these groups, and the only way they can get the number is through a GP.

What does that involve?

When you first go to the GP, and you don’t have an NHS number, the GP will request one for you, which you should be able to get in 14 days. But GPs routinely ask for proof of address or identity or immigration status, which can be hard if not impossible for undocumented migrants to produce. Government guidelines do say that the lack of those documents can’t be a ground for refusal, but in practice some GPs refuse to register people without those proofs. This is a huge issue.

What does this mean for access to the COVID-19 vaccines?

It means that if the GP refuses to register you, you won’t get your NHS number and you won’t be able to book an appointment for your COVID-19 vaccine.

How can this be solved?

We’ve been asking the government and the healthcare service to raise awareness among GPs about the paper requirements for registration, but most communications campaigns instead focuses on the patients. In England, for instance, NHS England has produced a card with the NHS logo for GP registration, which says that no document is required. Basically, it’s a self-advocacy tool. But it has limited impact, as the process for registering with a GP mostly happens online these days. And the online registration system still requires you to provide proof of address or identity.

Several Filipino care workers, who would be eligible for the COVID-19 vaccines because of the work they do, told us they tried to register with a GP online but didn’t manage to because of those requirements.

There are good practices, though, among doctors and clinics. Some local primary care networks are proactively doing outreach to people who haven’t come forward for vaccination and are eligible. Sometimes it’s outreach in asylum accommodation centres, or hotels used for confinement during lockdown for homeless people. But all of this work is driven locally, rather than coming from the government, so there is variation from region to region.

Let’s say an undocumented person was lucky enough to encounter an enlightened GP and get an NHS number, and an appointment for the vaccine. Will they need to show anything else at the vaccination centre?

Your booking reference number should be enough. But we’ve heard of cases where the vaccination centres asked for some proof of identity. The feeling is that this is due to sheer lack of awareness from the administration, we haven’t heard of cases where people were refused vaccination at the centre because they didn’t have those documents.

Since 2012, the UK government introduced a set of policies, known as “hostile environment”, that aim to make life unbearably difficult in the UK for those who cannot show the right paperwork.  How does this play into access to the vaccines?

This is a key point. The policy on access to the vaccines may be quite progressive on paper, but it’s implemented against the backdrop of years of policies that have eroded the trust of migrant communities in public authorities including the healthcare system. This includes the practice of sharing patient’s personal information with the Home Office, which is then used to carry out immigration enforcement activities.

Do health care providers share patients’ information with immigration authorities?

Patient data collected by primary care services used to be shared with the Home Office, because of a mechanism that existed between 2017 and 2018. The policy stopped but the fear around that is still very much there.

Secondary care services routinely share information about migrants with insecure immigration status with the Home Office. This results in people from migrant communities not trusting any type of healthcare services, including primary care ones.

We’ve long been asking the government to make all health care services safe and confidential for migrants and to communicate clearly about the prohibition of data sharing with immigration enforcement. So far, our calls have largely been ignored.

Cover: Ugur Akdemir – Unsplash

As part of our efforts to monitor access to the COVID-19 vaccines for undocumented migrants in Europe, we’re speaking with national-level advocates about the situation in their countries. This interview was conducted in April 2021 with Katarzyna Słubik of Stowarzyszenie Interwencji Prawnej (Association for Legal Intervention) to discuss the situation in Poland. It is not meant to offer an exhaustive picture of the legal and practical context in Poland. Please get in touch at info@picum.org if you have information you’d like to share, and follow our Twitter page @PICUM_post to get more recent updates.

Are undocumented migrants mentioned in Poland’s vaccination strategy?

The Polish vaccination programme is very vague, and doesn’t mention undocumented migrants. Official guidance does seem to limit access to the vaccinations to people who are regularly residing, which would de facto prevent undocumented migrants from accessing the vaccines.

So undocumented people can’t get vaccinated against COVID-19 in Poland?

It’s complicated. While the vaccination strategy seems to exclude undocumented people, our law on infectious diseases opens up to everyone in Poland health care related to infectious diseases. Under this law, you don’t need to have a national registration number, or be insured, to access health care related to the infectious disease. The law would apply to COVID-19 too, as it’s an infectious disease. But as for vaccinations, the law only mentions compulsory ones (i.e. childhood vaccines), while COVID-19 vaccines are not compulsory.

At the same time, the Ministry of Health has stated that the vaccines would be available for people who aren’t covered by health insurance. This would theoretically include undocumented people.

So it’s all very unclear. The Polish Ombudsman actually sent a letter to the government asking to clarify entitlements for migrants, but they haven’t got any response yet.

Have you heard of any undocumented people trying to get a COVID-19 vaccine?

We haven’t heard of any such cases. On the contrary, the feeling is that undocumented migrants are quite hesitant about the vaccines. On the one hand, there’s a major problem with health-related misinformation on vaccines among several communities, including the Ukrainian communities, Roma communities, asylum-seekers and undocumented migrants. On the other, there’s also an underlying fear of contacting doctors or authorities more generally.

How do you explain this fear among undocumented migrants?

In Poland, public institutions are obliged to cooperate with border police. What this means in practice for health authorities is quite unclear, in fact there’s a lot of confusion among medical staff.

While the law only regulates cases where border police can reach out to health providers for specific information, medical staff sometimes interprets it as an obligation to proactively report undocumented migrants. For instance, we’ve heard of hospitals reporting undocumented patients when they weren’t able to pay for the care they received.

Cover: Pexels- Julia Vol

Last September, the European Commission published the new European Pact on Migration and Asylum to reform the EU migration and asylum system. The Pact, which consists of five legislative proposals and four recommendations, heavily focuses on restricting access to Europe and on stepping up returns of people who are unable to get international protection.

To achieve these goals, the proposals reduce safeguards, set unrealistic timeframes to have fair procedures, and increase detention, including for children – with little or no consideration for human rights, well-being or inclusion. We believe Europe can do better – both for our societies and for the children and adults who are migrating – and have identified key issues that need to change in the different Pact proposals.

The ‘Screening Regulation’ introduces a ‘pre-entry’ procedure to identify people who crossed an external border without authorisation or who disembarked after a search and rescue operation. In short, this means detaining everyone, including children of any age, unaccompanied or with their families, for up to five days (ten in situations of crisis), during which the border personnel (read Frontex or national border guards) will decide whether people should undergo a vulnerability and health screening or not. What’s more, undocumented people who are already on the EU territory could also be apprehended and detained for three days while they undergo the screening procedure – independent of how long they have been living on the territory and with no right to see a lawyer, appeal their detention or even inform their families.

The ‘Asylum Procedures Regulation’ introduces mandatory asylum and return procedures at borders – despite broad evidence of the harmful impact of these procedures and that they lead to de facto detention. As border procedures will also apply to children, the proposal stands at odds with global commitments and repeated calls by the European Parliament (in 2018, 2019, 2020 and 2021) to end child detention in light of the extremely harmful impact it has on children health and development. Moreover, the Regulation proposes to link the asylum and return procedures – a controversial reform already proposed, but not agreed yet, in the context of the ongoing negotiations on the Recast Return Directive. If adopted, this would narrow or even close access to residence procedures on other grounds under national and EU legislation.The ‘Asylum and Migration Management Regulation (RAMM)’ sets out a common framework for the management of asylum and migration in the European Union, clarifies which Member State is responsible for reviewing an asylum application, and proposes a complex and inadequate solidarity mechanism. A key tenet of this mechanism is the controversial possibility for Member States to contribute to returning people, rather than relocating them. In case the return isn’t carried out within 4 to 8 months from the Member State of departure, people will be transferred to the sponsoring Member State. Through this mechanism, people, including families and children, will be uprooted from the country in which they have been living potentially for years. This is in clear contrast with the Regulation’s claim that the best interests of the child will always be a primary consideration.

The ‘Crisis Regulation’ provides specific derogations to the timelines and safeguards set by the other three instruments in situations of crisis, risk of crisis or force majeure. Amongst others, people will be detained for longer periods of time, creating grave concerns around well-being and safeguards.

Although the Pact touts being child-rights-compliant, children will suffer if the proposals are adopted as they are now. It is difficult to see when and how children will have their best interests assessed or their well-being safeguarded when they may not have access to legal assistance, unaccompanied children may not be appointed a guardian, when children will automatically be detained at the border, and will not have access to a documented best interests procedure before a return decision is issued. For each instrument, we identified changes that are necessary to safeguard children.In addition, the proposals contribute to dividing people between those who are deserving of stay and those who are not; between those who may be able to receive international protection and those whose cases are not so clear and are automatically turned down and forced away. This strict division erases any possibility for accessing residence procedures based on children’s rghts, as workers, on medical grounds or as victims of trafficking or crime, to name a few. It also removes important safeguards related to non-refoulement, child rights, the protection of family and private life and the right to fair trial.

Lastly, if these proposals are adopted without change, the space for civil society to provide key services to migrants and asylum seekers will continue to shrink, creating a situation in which migrants and asylum seekers alike are misinformed, risk having their fundamental rights violated without oversight, and a Europe in which solidarity is increasingly criminalised and policed. We can do better.

For an overview of our concerns, read More detention, fewer safeguards: How the new EU Pact on Migration and Asylum creates new loopholes to ignore human rights obligations.

Cover: methaphum – Adobe Stock