As two civil society networks representing together more than 330 organisations across Europe, the Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants (PICUM) and the European Network Against Racism (ENAR) aim to ensure that everyone can fully enjoy their human rights, regardless of migration status. Addressing structural racism and discrimination, including the role of migration policies in perpetuating them, is central to this mission.

We commend the initiative of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) and the
Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (CMW) to issue a joint General Comment/Recommendation on State Parties Obligations on Public Policies for Addressing and Eradicating Xenophobia and its impact on the rights of migrants, their families, and other non-citizens affected by racial discrimination. We have been closely engaged in the process leading to its adoption, sharing our collective expertise¹ and co-organising the Europe Expert Consultation which took place in Brussels on 30-31 October 2024.

The adoption of this Joint General Recommendation/Comment is now more important than ever. Since the launch of this process in late 2023, we have seen a wave of both proposed and negotiated legislative changes at the EU level that stand in direct contradiction to international human rights standards, including those enshrined in the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination and the Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families. Key examples include:

• November 2023 – The proposed revision of the EU Facilitators’ Package further criminalises migration and human rights defenders;²
• February 2024 – The adoption of the Schengen Border Code reform, which legitimises racial profiling in border checks, embedding discrimination in border enforcement.³
• May 2024 – The adoption of the Pact on Migration and Asylum, which:⁴
  • Normalises the arbitrary use of immigration detention, including for children and families.
  • Increases racial profiling.
  • Introduces “crisis” procedures that enable pushbacks.
  • Expands returns to so-called “safe third countries,” where individuals risk violence, torture, and
    arbitrary imprisonment.
• March 2025 – The European Commission’s proposal for a new EU regulation on return, which:⁵
  • Establishes deportation as the default option for people in an irregular migration situation.
  • Massively expands immigration detention, including of children (despite international human rights standards as well as global level commitment to work to end immigration detention).⁶
  • Introduces specific derogations from fundamental rights for migrants deemed a “risk” to national security and public order, further blurring the lines between criminal law and migration.

These policies are unfolding in a broader context of shrinking space for civil society, where organisations
working to uphold fundamental rights face growing restrictions and reduced funding, as well as judicial and other forms of harassment towards migrants and those providing them humanitarian assistance.⁷

At this critical juncture, CERD and CMW have a crucial role in holding states accountable. We urge you to:

• Prioritise the finalisation and adoption of the Joint General Recommendation/Comment to provide clear and binding guidance on addressing xenophobia in migration governance.
• Ensure strong language on state obligations to prevent racial discrimination in migration policies, in line with international human rights standards.
• Monitor state compliance and issue follow-up recommendations to prevent further erosion of migrant rights under the guise of security and border control.

We remain fully committed to supporting this process in any way necessary. Your leadership on this issue is critical in sending a strong global message that xenophobia and racial discrimination in migration governance cannot be tolerated.

Signatories:

• Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants (PICUM)
• European Network Against Racism (ENAR)

1. Our initial contributions are available on the website of the United National Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner. A direct link is available here: PICUM and ENAR. ↩︎
2. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament of the Council laying down minimum rules to prevent and counter the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and stay in the Union, and replacing Council Directive 2002/90/EC and Council Framework Decision 2002/946 JHA; PICUM, 2024, How the New EU Facilitation Directive Furthers the Criminalisation of Migrants and Human Rights Defenders ↩︎
3. Regulation (EU) 2024/1717 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 amending
   Regulation (EU) 2016/399 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders; PICUM Press Release of 7 February 2024 Racial profiling key element in the new deal on the Schengen Borders Code; PICUM, 2024, PICUM Analysis How will the new Schengen Borders Code affect undocumented migrants? ↩︎
4. Regulation (EU) 2024/1717 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 amending
   Regulation (EU) 2016/399 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders; Regulation (EU) 2024/1356 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 introducing the screening of third-country nationals at the external borders and amending Regulations (EC) No 767/2008, (EU) 2017/2226, (EU) 2018/1240 and (EU) 2019/817; Regulation (EU) 2024/1349 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 establishing a return border procedure, and amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1148; Regulation (EU) 2024/1358 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on the establishment of ‘Eurodac’ for the comparison of biometric data in order to effectively apply Regulations (EU) 2024/1351 and
   (EU) 2024/1350 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Directive 2001/55/EC and to identify illegally staying third-country nationals and stateless persons and on requests for the comparison with Eurodac data by Member States’ law enforcement authorities and Europol for law enforcement purposes, amending Regulations (EU) 2018/1240 and (EU) 2019/818 of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Regulation (EU) No 603/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council; Regulation (EU) 2024/1359 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 addressing situations of crisis and force majeure in the field of migration and asylum and amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1147; PICUM has developed a series of publications analysing the different parts of the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum, with a focus on their impact on detention, return, access to regular pathways and the rights of undocumented adults and children.
   See: Analysis of the Asylum Procedure Regulation and Return Border Procedure Regulation, Analysis of the Screening Regulation, Children’s rights in the 2024 Migration and Asylum Pact. See also, ENAR’s analysis on the racialisation of migration in the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum. ↩︎
5. Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a common system for the return of third-country nationals staying illegally in the Union, and repealing Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and the Council, Council Directive 2001/40/EC and Council Decision 2004/191/EC; PICUM Press release 11 March 2025 New Returns Regulation ushers in dystopian detention and deportation regime ↩︎
6. Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families and Committee on the Rights of the Child, 2017, Joint General Comment No. 3 of the CMW and No. 22 of the CRC in the context of International Migration: General principles; Global Compact on migration, 2018, Global Compact for safe, orderly and regular migration ↩︎
7. PICUM, 2024, Cases of criminalisation of migration and solidarity in the EU in 2023 ↩︎

Today marks three years since the EU activated the Temporary Protection Directive (TPD), which provided a safe pathway to protection for millions¹ of people fleeing the war in Ukraine. It was a powerful demonstration of the EU’s unity and solidarity in the face of a humanitarian crisis, and proved to be an effective emergency mechanism for responding to large arrivals of people in a humane and orderly way. It alleviated pressure on national asylum systems and provided displaced people with immediate and collective protection, including the right to reside, work, study, and access health care and social support in the EU.

The temporary protection regime is due to expire in March 2026, just one year away. Of the many challenges faced by people displaced from Ukraine, uncertainty about their legal status in the EU is among the most pressing. This lack of clarity impacts nearly every aspect of life: from securing stable employment and arranging long-term housing, to planning children’s education. Predictability is necessary for people to rebuild their lives with dignity and stability. It is promising to see that post-TPD solutions are a priority for the Commission and the Polish Presidency of the Council of the EU. Three years on, it is essential that the EU’s response to the needs of people displaced from Ukraine shifts from emergency measures to longer-term strategies and solutions.

In the meantime, some Member States – including Poland, the Czech Republic and Italy – have started developing pathways for people to transition out of temporary protection. However, many of these exit plans primarily rely on labour-based residence permits. Labour-based permits alone cannot be the answer, as many people covered by the TPD will not be able to meet the requirements. Not only does the proportion of temporary protection-holders who are employed vary greatly across Europe (from 8% in Hungary to 55% in the Netherlands), but it will leave many people in a vulnerable situation behind, including some people with disabilities, students, the elderly, third-country nationals and stateless persons granted refugee or complementary protection in Ukraine, people who experience discrimination in the labour market (for example, people who have been racialised), and those who cannot work full-time because they are caring for children or infirm family members.

The ad-hoc solutions proposed by Member States also risk overlooking the status of individuals who may be displaced from Ukraine after March 2026, as they may not fall within the scope of any post-TPD measures, including family members of those already in the EU.

Unless these gaps are addressed, Member States’ asylum systems could be overburdened once temporary protection ends, even though the TPD’s express purpose is to prevent this. The fact that some Member States have frozen asylum applications from people who fall under the TPD increases this risk. An EU-wide and coordinated approach would be beneficial not only for people displaced from Ukraine, but also for the countries and communities where they live – limiting the financial and administrative burdens associated with individually determining the status of the more than 4.3 million people who currently benefit from temporary protection.

• We are calling on the EU to go beyond repeatedly renewing temporary protection and propose a coordinated and collective solution that would offer a more durable status and pathway to long-term residence. An EU-wide approach with strong EU leadership and coordination is vital to prevent a fragmented approach and people falling into irregularity, with vulnerable groups being disproportionately affected.

Post-TPD solutions are long overdue. A collective of more than 130 civil society organisations welcomed the EU’s previous extension of the temporary protection regime through to March 2026 to provide time for policymakers to define durable solutions while ensuring short-term stability for displaced people. However, unless work starts now to make tangible progress in implementing a coordinated transition out of temporary protection, another one-year extension may be the only option.

• Another one-year extension of the temporary protection regime beyond March 2026 must be considered as an exceptional and interim measure to ensure the continuation of protection and to prevent displaced individuals from becoming undocumented, or falling into uncertainty and losing their jobs, education, housing, or healthcare. If this interim arrangement is necessary, we urge the European Commission to propose as soon as possible a Council Implementation Decision extending the TPD until March 2027, while offering clarity on the future protection and residence status of people displaced from Ukraine.

Despite recent diplomatic discussions on the potential for renewed peace talks, the humanitarian situation in Ukraine remains dire. There are daily reports of shelling and airstrikes, even in cities and villages hundreds of kilometers from the frontline. Should the ceasefire be achieved any time soon, the damage to Ukraine’s critical and civilian infrastructure and widespread contamination from explosive ordnance will take years to repair, restore, and clear before the situation permits safe, truly voluntary, and durable returns. In this context, it is worrying to see that some host countries have begun or are
considering scaling back their support to people displaced from Ukraine – for example, by limiting the duration of government-sponsored housing support, or by restricting its scope to people who come from specific regions in Ukraine.

• We call on Member States not to roll back support to people displaced from Ukraine, and to fully implement the provisions enshrined in the TPD. This includes ensuring full access to the rights and basic services it guarantees. It is essential that Member States respect their obligations regarding non-refoulement and avoid any measures that could directly or indirectly result in premature returns, jeopardising the safety and well-being of those in need.

Signatories:

• All-Ukrainian NGO Coalition for People with Intellectual Disabilities
• Amnesty International
• Animus Association Foundation
• Anti-Discrimination Center “Memorial-Brussels”
• ARSIS Association for the Social Support of Youth
• Association for Integration and Migration
• ASTI Luxembourg
• ASTRA-Anti trafficking action
• Blue Door Education
• Bridges over Borders e.V.
• Caritas Bulgaria
• Caritas Española
• Caritas Europa
• Caritas Hellas
• Center for Legal Aid Voice in Bulgaria
• Centre for Peace Studies
• Centrum pro integraci cizinců, o. p. s.
• Churches´Commission for Migrants in Europe CCME
• Clare Immigrant Support Centre
• COFACE Families Europe
• Cohort
• CoMensha
• Consortium of Migrants Assisting Organizations in the Czech Republic
• Cultúr Migrant Centre
• CUSBU
• Danish Refugee Council
• Defence for Children In. Greece (DCI Greece)
• Diakonie ČCE – středisko Západní Čechy
• Diakonie Deutschland im Evangelischen Werk für Diakonie und Entwicklung e.V.
• Dutch Council for Refugees
• Ecumanical Council of finland
• ELIL – European Lawyers in Lesvos
• ENSIE
• Eurodiaconia
• EuroMed Rights
• European Association of Service Providers for Persons with Disabilities (EASPD)
• European Federation of National Organisations Working with the Homeless (FEANTSA)
• European Network on Statelessness
• FairWork
• Fenix – Humanitarian Legal Aid
• Finnish Refugee Advice Centre
• Forum réfugiés
• Foundation for the Ukrainian Community of Malta
• Greek Council for Refugees (GCR)
• Greek Forum of Migrants
• HIAS Europe
• Hook Peninsula Friends of Ukraine
• ICMC Europe – Share Network
• Immigrant Council of Ireland
• Iniciativa Hlavak
• Inter Alia
• International Rescue Committee
• Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS) Europe
• Jesuit Refugee Service Germany | Jesuiten-Flüchtlingsdienst Deutschland
• Jesuit Refugee Service Malta
• JRS France
• JRS Portugal
• JRS Romania
• Kerk in Actie
• La Cimade
• La Strada International
• LDH (Ligue des droits de l’Homme)
• LGBT Ireland
• Médecins du Monde International Network
• Migrant Voice
• Migration Consortium
• Migration Policy Group
• Migrationsrat Berlin
• Missing Children Europe
• Monde des Possibles ASBL
• Mujeres Supervivientes
• NESEHNUTÍ
• Neue Richtervereinigung – Zusammenschluss von Richterinnen und Richtern,
• Staatsanwältinnen und Staatsanwälten e.V.
• NewBees
• Nordic Ukraine Forum
• Nowegian Refugee Council
• OpenEmbassy
• OPORA Foundation
• ORBIT
• Oxfam
• PATCHWORK, Association for immigrant families of persons with disabilities
• Payoke
• People in Need
• PICUM – Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants
• Podilsky Centr Genderna Rada Khmelnytska Oblasna
• PRO ASYL
• Red Cross EU Office
• Refugees Welcome, Denmark
• Right to Protection Charitable Fund
• Romodrom, o.p.s.
• Save the Children
• Scholars At Risk Europe
• Slovene Philanthropy
• Social Platform
• SOFT tulip Foundation
• SOLIDAR
• SolidarityNow
• SOS Children’s Villages International
• South Tipperary Development Clg
• Stichting LOS
• Stichting voor Vluchteling-Studenten UAF
• Terre des Hommes Deutschland e.V.
• The Council of African and Caribbean Churches
• The Open Doors Initiative
• Ukraine Civil Society Forum (Ireland)
• Vatra Psycho-Social Centre
• West Limerick Resources CLG
• Yoga and Sport with Refugees
• Громадська Организация ” Жіночій центр ” Підтримка Захист та Турбота”

1. According to the European Commission, as of December 2024, slightly more than 4.3 million
   non-EU citizens, who fled Ukraine as a consequence of the war were under temporary protection in
   the EU. ↩︎

Joint CSO Statement

We unite today to put forward our shared vision for the future of gender equality in the European Union (EU). We call on the EU to work over the next five years towards the practical realisation of a Union where everyone can live in safety, free from discrimination and violence, and where gender equality is not just an aspiration but a lived reality for all – regardless of their gender, ethnicity, race, gender identity and expression, sexual orientation, sex characteristics, disability, residence status, social class, age, among others.

The last mandate saw notable initiatives to advance gender equality. However, despite these achievements, striking inequalities remain. As the new European Commission is taking office, we request the EU institutions and Member States to redouble their efforts and to ensure that advancing gender equality remains a key priority mainstreamed throughout EU laws and policies for the next 5 years, with the necessary resources allocated.

In particular, we call on the EU to ensure the highest level of ambition is reflected in the upcoming Roadmap for Women’s Rights and the Gender Equality Strategy post-2025, particularly geared towards achieving the following objectives:

Realising the full range of women’s rights

We urge the EU to promote the highest standards of women’s rights across all Member States. In particular, increased action at EU-level is necessary on the following issues:

Upholding sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR): Despite SRHR being integral to EU values of fundamental rights and gender equality, serious disparities remain in ensuring equal access across the EU. These gaps arise from a lack of robust EU standards, despite Member States’ binding international human rights obligations and substantial political commitments to SRHR. We call on the EU to:

• Fully utilise its existing competences to advance SRHR in EU law and policy and issue clear guidelines to Member States on SRHR in line with international standards;
• Strengthen EU actions and funding to improve access to sexual and reproductive healthcare and reduce health inequalities in and across EU Member States;
• Heed calls from the European Parliament to enshrine the rights to abortion and bodily autonomy in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, and SRHR in the Treaties;
• Ensure any rollbacks of existing entitlements and threats thereof be swiftly addressed and vehemently opposed as contrary to EU values.

Combating the backlash against gender equality: The growing opposition to gender equality risks rolling back existing entitlements, directly contradicting the EU’s founding values. To counter this, the EU must:

• Take robust action to combat anti-rights narratives and actors;
• Issue strong political condemnation and adopt sanctions against Member States that undermine gender equality, as well as women’s, LGBTIQ people’s and reproductive rights.

Protecting Women Human Rights Defenders and their organisations: Across Europe, human rights defenders are increasingly at risk. Among them are women human rights defenders (WHRDs), who play a vital role as frontline advocates for gender equality and equal rights across the EU. Both because of who they are and because of what they stand for, WHRDs face heightened levels of attacks, harassment and threats, online and offline, smear campaigns, judicial harassment, and the defunding of their organisations. The EU must:

• Take decisive action to ensure that human right defenders – in particular WHRDs – receive robust political support and comprehensive protection in the EU; and that their organisations receive adequate funding.

Ending sexual and gender-based violence

The EU’s accession to the Istanbul Convention and the adoption of the EU Directive on combating violence against women and domestic violence (VAW) were important steps forward to ensure the prevention, support and protection of victims of sexual and gender-based violence. It is imperative we now focus on its practical implementation.

Implementing the Directive on VAW: The European Commission must provide clear guidelines, and Member States must integrate the expertise of CSOs to:

• Strengthen primary prevention: Prevention must go beyond awareness-raising campaigns to actively stop gender-based violence (GBV) from occurring. A comprehensive approach to primary prevention should include peer education, feminist self-defence, school-based programs; the provision of training to transform societal norms that perpetuate violence; and foster bystander intervention. These measures are essential for building a future free of GBV.
• Provide comprehensive sexuality education: Mandatory comprehensive sexuality education (CSE) is a cornerstone of primary prevention. In line with international standards and the Directive, Member States must ensure the provision of CSE, which includes education on consent.
• Secure the rights of victims and survivors. Member States must guarantee the rights and respond to the needs of all victims and survivors, especially those facing intersecting oppressions, including LBTIQ women, racialized women, women with dependent residence permit, undocumented migrant women, women sex workers, women in exploitative or trafficking situations, women with disabilities and other marginalised groups. Victims of sexual violence in particular must be guaranteed full access to support services, including comprehensive sexual and reproductive healthcare.

Going beyond the Directive on VAW: To address the full spectrum of GBV and ensure no one is left behind, the EU and its Member States must also:

• Include gender-based violence (GBV) as a crime in the EU Treaties.
• Recognise that sex without consent is rape and establish EU-wide consent-based definitions of rape and other sexual violence crimes.
• Address all violations of SRHR, such as obstetric and gynaecological violence, intersex genital mutilation and the denial of abortion and post-abortion care, including through formulating clear recommendations on these harmful practices to member states, in line with international guidelines.
• Establish safeguards to ensure the rights of women who are undocumented, or have precarious residence status. More likely to experience violence and abuse precisely because their status puts them in a situation of vulnerability, it is of utmost importance that they are able to safely report violence and abuse and file complaints.
• Address the disproportionate impact of the criminal justice system on marginalized communities: While criminal law plays an important role in ensuring accountability, systemic biases in law enforcement and justice disproportionately police and criminalize groups like undocumented people, sex workers, LGBTIQ individuals, and racialized communities, worsening their vulnerabilities and denying them access to justice. We encourage the EU to prioritize community-led solutions and focus on healthcare, housing, education, and welfare.

Responding to intersectional discrimination and oppression

The upcoming Roadmap for Women’s Rights and the Gender Equality Strategy must adopt a robust intersectional approach to tackle the structural systems of oppression perpetuating gender inequality. Achieving gender equality requires addressing overlapping forms of discrimination that affect different groups, in particular LGBTIQ people (including LBTIQ women), racialized women, women with dependent residence permit, undocumented migrant women, women sex workers, women in exploitative or trafficking situations, women with disabilities, and other marginalised groups.

A feminist and intersectional perspective must be integrated across all EU policy areas, including those within the Union of Equality Agenda (e.g. LGBTIQ, Anti-Racism, Child Rights, Disability, Roma Rights), as well as areas such as migration, victims’ rights, social inclusion, health, long-term care, early childhood education, digital rights, employment, education, disinformation, and foreign policy.

Ensuring sufficient funding for these objectives

Sufficient, sustainable, and long-term funding is essential to ensure that the policies and initiatives needed to achieve gender equality are fully implemented, and that civil society organisations (CSOs) working towards gender equality remain resilient in the face of political and societal backlash. As the EU begins negotiations on the next Multiannual Financial Framework next year, we call for:

• Gender budgeting throughout the entire budgetary process, with targeted budget lines for gender equality and anti-discrimination initiatives, with an intersectional perspective.
• Continued support to CSOs, particularly those working in hostile environments, through funds under direct management by the European Commission.
• Increased accessibility of EU funding for grassroots and community-based organisations; notably through regranting schemes that alleviate financial and administrative burdens on smaller organisations.
• Safeguards to ensure that no EU funds are ever provided to Member States or groups that violate the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.

Our Call to Action

We urge the EU institutions and Member States to join us in building a more just and equal society. Gender equality must remain a top priority in all EU policy processes over the next five years. Let us work together to ensure that women and girls in all their diversity in the EU can live free from violence, discrimination, and oppression.

Note: Our organisations work on a diverse range of women’s rights issues. In the drafting of this document, we have been led by the expertise of women’s rights organisations and women human rights defenders from communities most impacted by the specific forms of violence described in each section. Our commitment to the text above represents our coming together as a collective with shared values, even though not every organisation has its own policy or programme of work dedicated to each issue.

Signatories

• AGE Platform Europe
• Amnesty International
• Center for Reproductive Rights
• EL*C – Eurocentralasian Lesbian* Community
• End FGM European Network
• European Sex Workers Rights Alliance
• IGLYO
• ILGA-Europe
• International Planned Parenthood Federation European Network (IPPF EN)
• La Strada International – European NGO Platform against Human Trafficking
• Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants (PICUM)
• Protection International
• Organisation Intersex International Europe – OII Europe

On 13 June, the Council of the European Union adopted its position on the Commission’s proposal for a revision of the Victims’ Rights Directive. The European Parliament already published its negotiating mandate in April. More than twelve years after the adoption of the Victims’ Rights Directive, this was an opportunity for governments to stand in solidarity with all victims of crime and to strengthen their rights and treatment. 

Regrettably, with this Council position, States have shown little willingness to commit to enhancing victim rights. They have largely rejected or diluted the EU Commission’s proposals, turning obligations into mere options. This undermines the scope of the Victims’ Rights Directive, leaving diverse crime victims inadequately protected and potentially harmed by the systems meant to protect them and deliver justice. 

For example, specific rights have been removed or weakened, including those relating to safe reporting of crime, court-based support services, access to medical care services, privacy protections, information and participation rights, offender compensation, legal remedies and review decisions. Additionally, the role of NGOs has been diminished by removing commitments to coordinate services – which are largely delivered by civil society – to one of mere consultation. This increases the risk of further stigma, discrimination, or prejudice. Therefore, clear and binding obligations for EU Member States are essential.

This position of the Council contrasts with the European Parliament’s report, which has adopted proposals that build an effective legislative framework for coordinated support, protection and justice. Thus, the European Parliament recognises that the actions and costs involved in this process are investments in our future. 

Every Euro spent on victims’ rights and services reduces the cost of crime and its emotional impact, and it also increases the ability of individuals to return to work, next to the efficiency and effectiveness of criminal proceedings. The European Parliament’s proposals commit to a thriving, safer, more resilient and more just society that upholds EU values, including fundamental rights. 

Member States have recently adopted the Directive on Violence against Women and Domestic Violence, the recast EU Directive on Combating and Preventing Trafficking in Human Beings and they are currently negotiating the Regulation laying down rules to prevent and combat Child Sexual Abuse. This shows a willingness to seek the advancement of the rights of specific victim groups, with a particular focus on children, women and victims of human trafficking. 

Member States should now affirm their commitment to all victims of crime regardless of their sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression, sex characteristics, age, disability, ethnicity, residence status,, and type of exploitation by enhancing minimum standards for all in the Victims’ Rights Directive Revision. There should be equal treatment of all victims of crime; no victim should be left behind. 

With a new Parliament and renewed vigour, we call on all EU Member States and the European Parliament to stand together – united for every victim in the EU. We call on them to genuinely explore solutions proposed by the European Commission and Parliament that will finally make victims’ rights a reality. We call on them to honour commitments to victims of crime; by adopting a strong Victims’ Rights Directive as the cornerstone legislation for all victims of crime, Member States can demonstrate their commitment to valuing fundamental human rights, human dignity and the European Union’s foundational values.

Signatories

1. AGE Platform Europe
2. Center for Reproductive Rights 
3. Child Helpline International
4. End FGM European Network
5. Eurochild
6. European Disability Forum (EDF)
7. European Forum for Restorative Justice (EFRJ)
8. European Sex Workers Alliance (ESWA)
9. ILGA Europe (the European region of the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association)
10. La Strada International
11. Missing Children Europe
12. Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants (PICUM)
13. Validity Foundation
14. Trans Europe and Central Asia (TGEU)
15. Women Against Violence Europe (WAVE Network)
16. Advocates for Victims of Homicide (AdVIC) Ireland
17. A Associação Portuguesa de Apoio à Vítima (APAV Portugal)
18. Association for the Prevention and Handling of Violence in the Family (APHVF/ SPAVO) Cyprus
19. Associazione Italiana di Supporto Vittimologico 
20. Associazione Libra
21. ATENIN Spain
22. Bijeli Krug Croatia 
23. Bily Kruh Bezpeci (Czech Republic)
24. Brottsofferjouren Sverige (The Crime Victims’ Center Sweden)
25. Child Rights Centre Albania
26. DROGA Poland
27. Federation for Victim Assistance Ireland
28. France Victimes
29. Irish Road Victims Association (IRVA); International Road Victims Partnership
30. Klaipeda Social and Psychological Support Center
31. Law and Internet Foundation (Bulgaria)
32. Opferhilfe Berlin e.V.
33. Rete Dafne Italia 
34. Slachtofferhulp Netherlands
35. Skalbes Latvia
36. The Smile of the Child – Greece
37. Victim and Witness Support Service Croatia
38. Victim Support at Court (Ireland)
39. Victim Support Denmark 
40. Victim Support Europe
41. Victim Support Finland (RIKU)
42. Victim Support Flanders, CAW (Belgium)
43. Victim Support Malta 
44. Victim Support Sweden
45. Victim Support UK
46. Vilnius Institute for Advanced Studies (VILIAS)
47. Woman’s Room – Center for Sexual Rights Croatia 
48. Weisser Ring Austria
49. Weisser Ring Germany
50. Victimology Society of Serbia
51. Vilnius Institute of Advanced Studies (VILIAS)
52. White Circle Croatia

Today, the Council of the EU officially adopted the EU Directive on combating violence against women and domestic violence.¹ As 13 civil society organisations² which advocate for human rights, gender equality, and the right for all to live free from violence, we welcome this first ever binding EU legislation on this issue as a groundbreaking step.

The Directive adopts a holistic approach to combat violence against women and domestic violence, incorporating measures relating to prevention, protection, support for victims, access to justice and prosecution of perpetrators. This achievement is the result of long-term advocacy by feminist movements and Members of the European Parliament championing the European Commission’s ambitious proposal. We extend our gratitude to everyone involved in making this Directive as strong as possible.

We applaud the fact that the Directive recognizes the perpetration of female genital mutilation, forced marriage and certain forms of online violence as crimes. Unfortunately, other forms of violence were ultimately not criminalised, including intersex genital mutilation and forced sterilisation. We deeply regret that some Member States managed to derail the unprecedented opportunity to criminalise rape with a consent-based definition at the EU level. Sexual violence against women is endemic across the EU, with widespread impunity. Consent-based definitions of rape allow for all cases of rape to be included and strengthen protection and access to justice for victims of rape. We continue to call on all Member States who have not yet done so, to move towards adopting consent-based laws.

Crucially, the Directive will require Member States to do more to prevent rape, by raising public awareness of the fact that sex without consent is a crime, through awareness raising programmes and educational materials. We encourage Member States to embrace the comprehensive prevention approach outlined in the Directive, in particular primary prevention initiatives, and to provide mandatory comprehensive sexuality education, which includes consent education and challenges harmful gender norms.

The Directive further guarantees comprehensive support to victims of violence against women and girls and domestic violence and access to both general and specialist support services, shelters, support for child victims, as well as access to comprehensive medical care including sexual and reproductive health services. This is the first time that EU law imposes explicit obligations on Member States to provide access to this essential medical care for victims of sexual violence. Member States will also have to provide training for professionals likely to come into contact with victims, on how to provide this support.

The Directive recognises that victims of violence against women and domestic violence who experience intersectional discrimination are at a heightened risk of violence, and obliges Member States to meet their specific needs. Targeting a public figure, a human rights defender, or someone for their personal characteristics will constitute an aggravating circumstance. In the implementation of the Directive, Member States must ensure that all victims and survivors of gender-based violence are protected, no matter their sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression or sex characteristics.

However, EU lawmakers yet again silenced women impacted by EU migration policies. The only concrete step forward for migrant women is that the text requires Member States to make shelters available to all women experiencing domestic abuse, regardless of their residence status. Nonetheless we condemn that the final text does not retain provisions on protecting undocumented women’s personal data from being transmitted to immigration authorities (neither in the context of accessing shelters, nor in terms of accessing justice). Member States must ensure that women are not deterred from going to the police because of their residence status, by including access to safe reporting in the ongoing revision of the Victims’ Rights Directive³.

We call on the European Commission to provide guidelines and training to Member States, based on international standards and in consultation with civil society organisations. We urge Member States to fully implement the Directive as soon as possible. Recalling that the Directive sets minimum standards, we call on Member States to go beyond these and to realise the highest standards across the EU.

We call on the European Commission to review the Directive in the next five years and to work towards comprehensive and inclusive measures to address all forms of sexual and gender-based violence without discrimination.

We, together with our members across Europe, are committed to providing our expertise, and look forward to supporting a strong implementation of the Directive, to progress towards a Europe where everyone is safe from gender-based violence.

Signatories

• Amnesty International
• Center for Reproductive Rights
• EL*C – Eurocentralasian Lesbian* Community
• End FGM European Network
• European Sex Workers Rights Alliance
• Human Rights Watch
• ILGA-Europe (The European region of the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association)
• International Planned Parenthood Federation European Network (IPPF EN)
• La Strada International
• Organisation Intersex International Europe (OII Europe)
• Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants (PICUM)
• TGEU (Trans Europe and Central Asia)
• Women Against Violence Europe (WAVE)

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¹ Throughout this statement, the term “women” should be understood as including “women and girls”, as in the definition of “violence against women” proposed by the European Commission in the Directive, which encompasses “violence directed against a woman or a girl”.

² Amnesty International, Center for Reproductive Rights, EuroCentralAsian Lesbian* Community (EL*C), End FGM European Network, European Sex Workers’ Rights Alliance (ESWA), Human Rights Watch, ILGA-Europe (The European region of the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association), International Planned Parenthood Federation European Network (IPPF EN), La Strada International, Organisation Intersex International Europe (OII Europe), Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants (PICUM), TGEU (Trans Europe and Central Asia), Women Against Violence Europe (WAVE).

Our organisations work on a diverse range of women’s rights issues. In the drafting of this document, we have been led by the expertise of women’s rights organisations and women human rights defenders from communities most impacted by the specific forms of violence described in each section. Our commitment to the text below represents our coming together as a collective with shared values, even though not every organisation has its own policy or programme of work dedicated to each issue.

³ For more information, see a joint civil society statement on the revision of the Victims’ Rights Directive, signed by some of our organisations who are advocating for victims’ rights.

Despite repeated warnings from civil society organisations, EU lawmakers have reached an agreement on the Schengen Borders Code reform which will be voted on in the LIBE Committee next week. The legislative file that has emerged from negotiations between the Belgian Presidency of the Council of the EU, the European Parliament and Commission will have devastating consequences for people in migration and racialised communities.

We call on MEPs in the Plenary vote to reject the Schengen Borders Code reform and give a clear signal against legislation that undermines fundamental rights.

The vote will include several concerning amendments that, taken together, will create a dangerous new system for ‘managing migration’ at Schengen borders, contribute to shrinking civic space, in particular increasing criminalisation of movement and solidarity:

• While the revision of the Schengen Borders’ Code is hailed as the solution to stop the constant reintroduction of temporary internal border controls, the proposal generalises police checks with the explicit aim to prevent irregular migration. Stopping individuals who are suspected of being undocumented relies heavily on racial profiling. Research from the EU Fundamental Rights Agency has shown that racialised communities are subject to discriminatory and arbitrary checks, regardless of citizenship or residence status. In fact, over half of people of African descent surveyed felt that their most recent police stop was a result of racial profiling. This practice is in clear violation of EU and international anti-discrimination law, and contradicts the spirit of the EU Action Plan Against Racism. While the recitals of the reform state that all actions should be carried out in full respect of the principle of non-discrimination, there is no indication of how this will be monitored or ensured, or how Member States will be sanctioned if they do act in violation.

• Article 23a allows for internal pushbacks between Member States as safeguards to mitigate its consequences on fundamental rights introduced by the Parliament are removed. This article provides for the immediate “transfer” (removal) of third country nationals apprehended “in border areas” to the country that they crossed from. Whilst there are provisions that state the individual can appeal this “transfer” decision, the appeal will not have a suspensive effect, meaning the person will be returned regardless. There are no exemptions to this procedure for unaccompanied children, families with children, or individuals in a state of vulnerability. Whilst it is written that asylum seekers will not be subject to such internal readmission procedures, how this exemption will be respected in practice remains to be seen. Such “transfers” would violate well-established jurisprudence by courts in Italy, Slovenia and Austria, which have all ruled against chain pushbacks between Member States.

Case Study: Italy

Summary returns or readmission practices at the Italian borders have been taking place for years and vividly exemplify the implications on the human rights of people on the move. In fact, in January 2021 and again in 2023 the Civil Court in Rome ruled that numerous cases of readmissions to Slovenia from Trieste and Gorizia implemented under a 1996 Readmission Agreement were in fact unlawful as they violated the right to non-refoulement, the right to apply for asylum, and the procedural rights to individual assessment and effective remedy. At the Adriatic border, Italy was sanctioned by the ECtHR in 2014 for a readmission to Greece in which the Court found a violation of the prohibition of collective expulsion and of ill-treatment. Communications sent to the Committee of Ministers under the supervision procedure for the supervision of the execution of judgement relating to Sharifi case and a recent ruling by the Court of Rome on the readmission of an Afghan unaccompanied minor to Greece show how violations continue. At the Italo-French border, the CJEU and Council of State found that returns between the two countries were in direct contradiction to guarantees laid out in the Returns Directive.

On the other hand, practices of racial profiling are already significantly widespread at Italian internal borders. As pointed out by ASGI in its submission to CERD (Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination), the Ventimiglia train station, a major transit point for people moving to France, is characterised by police checks that almost exclusively and systematically target people of African descent. Consequently, the Committee has made specific recommendations to the Italian government to tackle profiling, highlighting the complete lack of appropriate mechanisms within the national system to combat it.

• The concept of ‘instrumentalisation’ is carried over from the New Pact’s Crisis Regulation despite being removed from the Parliament’s initial position on the Schengen Borders Code reform. In practice, this means that Member States could derogate at will from fundamental rights frameworks whenever a third country or non-state actor is accused of ‘instrumentalising migrants’ to destabilise the EU or its Member States. We have seen this play out in the attacks against people crossing borders by Greek authorities in 2020, the numerous deaths recorded at the Spanish, Polish, Latvian and Lithuanian borders, and the closure of all entry points into Finland in 2023. The Schengen Borders Code reform takes this a step further by including a disturbing Council amendment which allows for Member States to take “any necessary measures” to preserve “security, law and order” if a large number of individuals attempt to enter a country irregularly “en masse and using force”. This is transposed improperly from the N.D. and N.T. v. Spain case and could have devastating consequences; in effect the text allows for unlimited derogations from the EU asylum and fundamental rights acquis.

• The reform also repeatedly refers to the increased usage of surveillance and monitoring technologies at both internal and external borders. Technologies such as drones, motion sensors, thermal imaging cameras, and others ease the identification of people crossing borders prior to arrival and have been shown to facilitate pushbacks. In fact, the Border Violence Monitoring Network (BVMN) has recorded 38 testimonies, impacting over 1,000 people, where the respondent reported to have heard or seen a drone prior to their pushback. The use of technologies to track and monitor the movement of people could therefore enhance the ease with which they are readmitted between Schengen Member States.

We, the undersigned, call on MEPs to reject the Schengen Borders Code reform at both the LIBE and Plenary votes. This file expands the harmful concept of ‘instrumentalisation’, legalises internal pushbacks, risks widespread racial profiling, and enhances the use of border surveillance technologies that have been proven to facilitate fundamental rights violations.

The Parliament position on the file sought to remove the most problematic aspects and include safeguards for the rights of people in migration and racialised communities. That position has since been abandoned, and the one that has replaced it is untenable when it comes to the protection of fundamental rights.

Signatories:

• Abolish Frontex
• Accem
• Access Now
• ActionAid International
• African Children and Youth Development Network (ACYDN)
• AlgoRace
• AMANE
• Amnesty International
• Amnesty Luxembourg
• ARACEM
• Are You Syrious (AYS)
• ASGI
• Asociacion Geum Dodou
• Asociación Pro Derechos Humanos de Andalucía – APDHA
• Asociación Por Ti Mujer
• Asociación Rumiñahui
• Asociación Salud Y Familia
• Association des Travailleurs Maghrébins de France -ATMF
• Association pour la promotion des droits humains APDH
• Association Marocaine des Droits Humains
• Be Aware and Share (BAAS)
• Better Days Greece
• Blindspots e.V.
• Boat Refugee Foundation
• borderline-europe – Menschenrechte ohne Grenzen e.V.
• Center for Legal Aid, Voice in Bulgaria
• Centre for Peace Studies
• CNCD-11.11.11
• Collective Aid
• Comunità Papa Giovanni XXIII
• Convenzione per i diritti nel Mediterraneo ETS
• CONVIVE- Fundación Cepaim
• Convivir sin Racismo
• CSC ACV Brussels
• Cultural Center Danilo Kiš
• Danes je nov dan / Today is a new day
• Danish Refugee Council
• Digital Society, Switzerland
• Diotima Centre for Gender Rights & Equality
• Dråpen i Havet / Stagona
• Draseis sth geitonia
• E.L. Foundation
• ECCHR – European Centre for Constitutional and Human Rights
• ECHO100PLUS
• EmpowerVan!
• Entreculturas
• Epicenter.works
• Equal Legal Aid
• Equinox Initiative for Racial Justice
• Equipo Decenio Afrodescendiente- España
• EuroMed Rights
• Europe Cares e.V. / Paréa Lesvos
• European Center for Non-Profit Law
• European Civic Forum
• European Digital Rights (EDRi)
• European Network Against Racism (ENAR)
• European Sex Workers Rights Alliance (ESWA)
• Fenix Humanitarian Legal Aid
• forRefugees
• From the Sea to the City – FSTC
• Fundación Alboan
• Greek Council for Refugees (GCR)
• Greek Forum of Migrants
• Greek Forum of Refugees
• Gruppo Melitea
• Habibi Works (Soup and Socks e.V.)
• Hermes Center
• HIAS Europe
• Homo Digitalis
• Hope and Humanity Poland
• Humanitas – Centre for Global Learning and Cooperation
• HumanRights360
• I Have Rights
• IDAY Liberia Coalition Inc
• Infokolpa
• Institute Circle
• Inter Alia
• InterEuropean Humanitarian Aid Association Germany e.V. (IHA)
• International Rescue Committee (IRC)
• Irida Women’s Center
• Iridia. Centro por la Defensa de Derechos Humanos
• Jesuit Refugee Service Greece
• KAST (Khora Asylum Support Team)
• KOK – German Network against Trafficking in Human Beings
• Komitee für Grundrechte und Demokratie e.V.
• La Cimade
• La Coordinadora de Organizaciones para el Desarrollo
• Legal Centre Lesvos
• Lighthouse Relief
• Ligue des Droits Humains
• Mec de la Rue
• Migreurop
• Mobile Info Team
• Network for Children’s Rights
• Northern Lights Aid
• NOVACT
• No Name Kitchen
• Oxfam
• PICUM (Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants)
• POPH
• Privacy International
• Project Play
• PRO ASYL
• Quaker Council for European Affairs
• Red Umbrella Sweden
• Refugees in Libya
• Refugee Legal Support (RLS)
• Refugee Literacy Project
• Refugees International
• Revibra Europe
• S.P.E.A.K.
• Safe Place Greece
• Salud por Derecho
• Salvamento Marítimo Humanitario
• Samos Volunteers
• Sea-Eye e.V.
• Sea-Watch e.V.
• Second Tree
• Seebrücke Schweiz
• Seios Grupe
• Slovene Philanthropy
• Society Kljuc – Centre for Fight against Trafficking in Human Beings
• SOLIDAR
• Statewatch
• Stichting LOS
• TAMPEP – European Network for the Promotion of Rights and Health among Migrant Sex Workers
• The Human Rights Legal Project
• Yoga and Sport with Refugees
• Zeitschrift Bürgerrechte & Polizei/ CILIP (Germany)

On 10 April 2024, the European Parliament adopted the New Pact on Migration and Asylum, a package of reforms expanding the criminalisation and digital surveillance of migrants. 

Despite civil society organisations’ repeated warnings, the Pact “will normalise the arbitrary use of immigration detention, including for children and families, increase racial profiling, use ‘crisis’ procedures to enable pushbacks, and return individuals to so called ‘safe third countries’ where they are at risk of violence, torture, and arbitrary imprisonment”.

The New Pact on Migration and Asylum ushers in a deadly new era of digital surveillance, expanding the digital infrastructure for an EU border regime based on the criminalisation and punishment of migrants and racialised people. 

This statement outlines how the Migration Pact framework will enable and in some cases mandate the deployment of harmful surveillance technologies and practices against migrants. We also highlight some grey zones where the Pact leaves open the possibility for further harmful developments involving intrusive and violent surveillance and data processing practices in the future. 

Migration Pact enables the digital surveillance of migrants 

As more intrusive technology will be deployed at borders and in detention centres,  people’s personal data will be collected in bulk and exchanged between police forces across the EU, and biometric identification systems will be used to track people’s movements and increase policing of undocumented migrants. The New Pact on Migration will mandate a whole range of technological systems to identify, filter, track, assess and control people entering or already in Europe. 

These systems will reinforce an already cruel status quo. European policymakers have opted for years to treat the movement of people into Europe mainly as a security issue. The result is very limited safe and regular pathways to come to Europe, the widespread criminalisation of many who make the journey, and systematic exploitation and discrimination against those already living here. Investing in technology to serve this already harmful system will mainly benefit the tech and security firms who reap the financial rewards of this agenda – while pushing people into more dangerous routes and giving more licence for racial profiling at our borders and in our communities. 

Here are the main ways the Migration Pact creates a dangerous system of migrant surveillance:

• Migrants as suspects: A vast regime of digital monitoring

The Migration Pact expands a wide system of data collection and automatic exchange, leading to a regime of mass surveillance of migrants. The  changes in the Eurodac Regulation will mandate the systematic collection of migrants’ biometric data (now also including facial images), which will be retained in massive databases up to 10 years, exchanged at every step of the migration process and made accessible to police forces across the European Union for tracking and identity checks purposes. The minimum age for data collection was lowered from fourteen to six, with the possibility to use coercion should ‘child friendly’ methods fail.

Further, newly created screening procedures and border procedures (Screening Regulation) will mandate various security checks and assessments of all people entering Europe irregularly, including to seek asylum, with a potential for automated and AI-based decision making. These procedures will require the personal and biometric data of every person who enters the EU to be cross-checked against multiple national and European policing and immigration databases, as well as systems operated by Europol and Interpol, increasing the possibility of transnational repression of human rights defenders. People identified as posing a “risk to national security or public order” will be pushed into accelerated border procedures with fewer safeguards for the processing of the asylum application (Asylum Procedures Regulation and Return Border Procedure Regulation). Not only are concepts of national security and public order dangerously vague and undefined terms leaving wide discretion for Member States, they also pave the way for potentially discriminatory practices in screening procedures, using nationality as a proxy for race and ethnicity in these assessments. Further, even families with children and unaccompanied children could be held in border procedures, with a high risk of being de facto detained.

In the context of asylum procedures, the Pact will enable intrusive technological practices in various stages of asylum processing. The Asylum Procedures Regulation provides for increased searches of personal items, paving the way for invasive practices like the extraction of mobile phone data, which involves seizing and mining personal electronic devices (such as phone or laptop) to extract data that may be used to find evidence to  assess the truthfulness of their claims (for instance, in an asylum proceeding) or check their identity, age or country of origin. Such invasive practices have been successfully challenged in Germany and in the UK but continue to be used in several European countries. Moreover, the Asylum Procedures Regulation also allows for the use of remote interviews and videoconferencing for people in detention and during the appeal procedure. This not only raises privacy and data protection concerns, it heightens the isolation of people who are already in a vulnerable situation and risks negatively affecting the quality and the fairness of the procedures.

• Technological management of prison facilities for migrants

The newly introduced screening and border procedures will lead to more people, including children and families, being held in prison-like detention facilities modelled on the “Closed Controlled Access Centres” already operating in Greece. These centres are characterised by motion-sensors, cameras and fingerprint-access, modelling a system of digital management of immigration facilities that relies on high-tech surveillance to monitor and control people.  Under the Pact, a minimum of 30,000 people are expected to be in “border procedures” at any one time, likely involving  detention or restrictions on movement. Far from treating detention as a “last resort”, chillingly, the Pact foresees the expansion of detention across Europe. 

• Tech-enabled racial profiling at the EU’s internal borders 

Alongside the Migration Pact are other legislative changes to EU migration policy. The Schengen Borders Code Reform, set to be adopted on 24 April 2024, will generalise police checks for the purpose of immigration enforcement, facilitating the practice of racial profiling within EU territory.

This new law encourages the increased use of surveillance and monitoring technologies at both internal and external borders. Technologies such as drones, motion sensors, thermal imaging cameras, and others are used for the identification of people crossing borders prior to arrival and have been shown to facilitate pushbacks. 

Opening the door to future expansion of the border surveillance complex 

The Migration Pact sits upon existing frameworks governing the use of digital surveillance in migration. The EU Artificial Intelligence Act introduces a lenient framework for the use of AI by law enforcement, migration control and national security agencies, provides loopholes and even encourages the use of dangerous surveillance systems on the most marginalised in society. 

In this framework, combined with the Migration Pact and new existing developments in surveillance technology, we can expect:

• Automated profiling and risk assessments for security and vulnerability checks in order to allegedly facilitate decisions related to asylum procedures, security assessments, detention, and deportation of migrants. The Pact alludes to numerous instances in which AI-based decision making may be used, such as during the screening procedure to assess if someone represents a “national security risk” or a threat to the “public security”, or to assess the level of vulnerability of an asylum applicant. Not only may this lead to numerous violations of data protection obligations and infringements of privacy, but by nature violate the right to non-discrimination in the insofar as they codify assumptions about the link between personal data and characteristics with particular risks. The introduction of automated assessment in asylum procedures will mean fewer protections and safeguards, and further divergence from a principle of case-by-case, individualised and needs- based assessments in the access to international protection. 
• The use of forecasting tools that build on biassed statistical data collected on irregular entries and asylum applications to attempt to predict large-scale movements of people, and that can be used to inform actions on the ground to deter or interdict those movements. A similar tool has been tested in the Horizon 2020 project ITFlows. 
• Lie-detectors that claim to tell if someone is being truthful by analysing facial movements, which are dangerous and unreliable enough to be banned under the EU’s AI Act – except in the border and policing contexts.
• Dialect recognition systems and other intrusive technologies used in the context of asylum or visa applications, to assess the veracity of applicants’ claims. This technology, in addition to reinforcing a generalised framework of suspicion towards people seeking asylum, is based on unscientific and often biassed, discriminatory assumptions that inform real-world decisions that have a huge and detrimental impact on people’s lives.
• Border surveillance technologies such as remote biometric identification in border areas, drones and thermal cameras to prevent border crossings into and within the European Union. While some surveillance technologies are already in use, a wide range of systems are heavily tested in EU-funded projects like FOLDOUT Solution, ROBORDER, BorderUAS, Nestor. Their use at internal borders is encouraged by the Schengen Borders Code. 

What’s next?

In its final version, the Pact represents the further embedding of surveillance technologies in the EU, and beyond, as an increasingly key part of its arsenal to sustain Fortress Europe. It therefore represents a further erosion of fundamental rights, and the normalisation of digital surveillance at, and within, borders, justified by an approach to migration policy based on repression rather than rights.  

As the #ProtectNotSurveil coalition, we will continue to challenge the use of digital technologies at different levels of EU policies and practice and advocate for the ability of people to move and to seek safety and opportunity without risking harm, surveillance or discrimination. The coalition will release a more detailed analysis of the digital impacts of the Migration Pact in due course. 

To learn more about the coalition’s work or join our efforts to challenge digital policing in migration, get in touch: info@protectnotsurveil.eu

The #ProtectNotSurveil coalition

Access Now, Equinox Initiative for Racial Justice, European Digital Rights (EDRi), Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants (PICUM), Refugee Law Lab, AlgorithmWatch, Amnesty International, Border Violence Monitoring Network (BVMN), EuroMed Rights, European Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ECNL), European Network Against Racism (ENAR), Homo Digitalis, Privacy International, Statewatch, Dr Derya Ozkul, Dr. Jan Tobias Muehlberg, and  Dr Niovi Vavoula.

On 13th March 2024, the EU Artificial Intelligence Act (AI Act) was adopted by the European Parliament. Whilst the legislation is widely celebrated as a world-first, the EU AI Act falls short in the vital area of migration, failing to prevent harm and provide protection for people on the move.

In its final version, the EU AI Act sets a dangerous precedent. The legislation develops a separate legal framework for the use of AI by law enforcement, migration control and national security authorities, provides unjustified loopholes and even encourages the use of dangerous systems for discriminatory surveillance on the most marginalised in society. This statement outlines the main gaps in protection with respect to AI in migration.

Why the EU AI Act fails migration

The EU AI Act seeks to provide a regulatory framework for the development and use of the most ‘risky’ AI within the European Union. The legislation outlines prohibitions for ‘unacceptable’ uses of AI, and sets out a framework of technical, oversight and accountability requirements for ‘high-risk’ AI when deployed or placed on the EU market.

Whilst the AI Act takes positive steps in other areas, the legislation is weak and even enables dangerous systems in the migration sphere.

• Prohibitions on AI systems do not extend to the migration context. The legislation introduces (limited) prohibitions for harmful AI uses. EU lawmakers refused to ban harmful systems such as discriminatory risk assessment systems in migration and predictive analytics when used to facilitate pushbacks. Further, the prohibition on emotion recognition does not apply in the migration context, therefore excluding documented cases of AI lie detectors at borders.
• The list of high-risk systems fails to capture the many AI systems used in the migration context and which, eventually, will not be subjected to the obligations of this Regulation. The list excludes dangerous systems such as biometric identification systems, fingerprint scanners, or forecasting tools used to predict, interdict and curtail migration.
• AI used as part of EU large-scale databases in migration, such as Eurodac, the Schengen Information System, and ETIAS will not have to be compliant with the Regulation until 2030.
• Export of harmful surveillance technology: the AI Act did not address how AI systems developed by EU-based companies impact people outside the EU, despite existing evidence of human rights violations facilitated by surveillance technologies developed in the EU in third countries (e.g., China, Occupied Palestinian Territories). Therefore, it will not be prohibited to export a system banned in Europe outside of the EU.

A dangerous precedent: enabling harmful surveillance by police and migration authorities

Perhaps the most harmful aspect of the EU AI Act is the creation of a parallel legal framework when AI is deployed by law enforcement, migration and national security authorities. As a result of pressure exerted by Member States, law enforcement and security industry lobbies, these authorities are explicitly exempted from the most important rules and safeguards within the AI Act:

• Exemptions to transparency and oversight safeguards for law enforcement authorities. The Act introduces transparency safeguards requiring public authorities using high-risk AI systems to register information about the system onto a publicly accessible database. The AI Act introduces an exemption to this requirement for law enforcement and migration authorities, instilling secrecy for some of the most harmful AI uses. This will make it impossible for affected people, civil society and journalists to know where AI systems are deployed.
• The exemption on national security will allow member states to exempt themselves from the rules for any activity they deem relevant for “national security”, in essence a blanket exemption to the rules of the AI Act which could in theory be used in any matters of migration, policing and security.

These exemptions effectively codify impunity for the unfettered use of surveillance technology, setting a dangerous precedent for the use of surveillance technology in the future. In effect, AI Act lawmakers have vastly limited crucial scrutiny of law enforcement authorities and have enabled more and more use of racialised and discriminatory surveillance. First and foremost, these loopholes will harm migrants, racialised and other marginalised communities who already bear the brunt of targeting and over-surveillance by authorities.

Fundamental rights, surveillance tech and migration: what’s next?

The EU AI Act will take between 2-5 years to enter into force. In the meantime, harmful AI systems will continue to be tested, developed and deployed in many areas of public life. Furthermore, the EU AI Act is only one legal context in which the EU is enabling surveillance technology. From the Screening Regulation, Eurodac, to many others, we see an expanding legal framework that surveils, discriminates against and criminalises migrants.

The #ProtectNotSurveil coalition started in February 2023 to advocate for the AI Act to protect people on the move and racialised people from harms emanating from the use of AI systems. This coalition will continue to monitor, advocate and organise against harmful uses of surveillance technology. Crucial next steps will be:

• For EU and national level bodies to document and respond to harms stemming from the use of AI in migration and policing contexts, ensuring protection against the violation of peoples’ rights.
• For civil society to contest further expansion of the surveillance framework, reversing and refusing trends that criminalise, target and discriminate against migrants, racialised and marginalised groups.
• For all to re-evaluate the investment of resources in technologies that punish, target and harm people as opposed to affirming rights and providing protection.

The #ProtectNotSurveil coalition

Access Now, European Digital Rights (EDRi), Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants (PICUM), Equinox Initiative for Racial Justice, Refugee Law Lab, AlgorithmWatch, Amnesty International, Border Violence Monitoring Network (BVMN), Digitalcourage, EuroMed Rights, European Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ECNL), European Network Against Racism (ENAR), Homo Digitalis, Privacy International, Statewatch, Dr Derya Ozkul, Dr. Jan Tobias, and Dr Niovi Vavoula.

With temporary protection set to expire on 4 March 2025, EU leadership is urgently needed to ensure millions of people displaced from Ukraine have continued access to rights and inclusion in Europe. As 131 civil society organisations, we call on the EU to propose timely, coordinated, collective and future-proof options for the transition out of temporary protection. Without a common European approach, millions of people risk becoming undocumented and losing access to rights, protection and other essential services, national authorities will likely be overwhelmed, and much of the inclusion work of governments, municipalities, NGOs and volunteers risks being undone. 

Act now to prevent hardship later 

With less than one year of protection remaining, people are now left with the practical and emotional impacts of an uncertain future. Some face the prospect of registering children for school without knowing if they can complete the school year, others struggle to secure work or housing as their permits expire in March 2025. This uncertainty may trigger premature returns to Ukraine – where many people lack access to essential services and face daily safety risks. It could also result in mass applications for asylum and other residence permits, leading to backlogs and delayed access to protection. 

• The EU must ACT NOW to plan and coordinate the transition out of temporary protection, in order to prevent unsafe returns, loss of residence status, or unnecessary pressure on migration systems, and to allow authorities, civil society and displaced people to prepare.
• Displaced people must be informed and consulted on the options available to them.

Pursue a united EU response 

If temporary protection ends without a collective European response, access to rights for people who fled Ukraine may vary drastically across Member States. Migration ministers noted in January that “adopting 27 different national legislations on this topic would be counterproductive, result in secondary movements, and cause uncertainty.” Without common standards, there is a risk of a race to the bottom on rights and services. In many countries there are no or few appropriate permits available. This could particularly disadvantage individuals in vulnerable situations – such as stateless persons, refugees and asylum seekers who fled Ukraine, Roma, people with care-giving responsibilities, and older people – who risk losing their current access to rights, being redirected to ill-fitting residence permits, or becoming undocumented.

• The EU should prioritise a COMMON and COORDINATED approach to prevent people from becoming undocumented or switching to permits with fewer or different rights.
• In parallel, Member states should ensure access to residence permits on various grounds, including asylum, work, the principle of non-refoulement and private life.

Look to the future

If the above measures cannot be taken in time, a further extension of temporary protection – as is currently under discussion – would be a vital stopgap to ensure continued access to residence status and rights. However, piecemeal, yearly extensions of temporary protection risk perpetuating a state of insecurity that hinders displaced people from planning for their future, whether in Ukraine or in the EU. The EU has a range of options for more durable solutions that should be explored in parallel to any extension. 

• The EU should pursue FUTURE-PROOF solutions that offer at least the same standard of rights as temporary protection, and which protect at least the same groups of people.
• Solutions should be developed that can benefit other temporary protection holders in future. 
• These solutions should be informed by the needs and experiences of displaced people as well as civil society and other stakeholders assisting them.

List of signatories:

European and international organisations

• ADRA Europe
• AMERA International
• Amnesty International
• Asociatia Sprijin Pentru Comunitatea Ucraineana
• CARE International
• Caritas Europa
• Child Circle
• Churches’ Commission for Migrants in Europe (CCME)
• Danish Refugee Council
• EASPD
• EuroMed Rights
• European Evangelical Alliance
• European Lawyers in Lesvos (ELIL)
• European Network Against Racism (ENAR)
• European Network on Statelessness
• HIAS Europe
• Housing Europe
• International Rescue Committee
• La Strada International
• Médecins Du Monde – International Network
• Methoria
• Migration Policy Group
• Missing Children Europe
• OpenEmbassy
• Oxfam
• PICUM – Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants
• Social Platform
• SOLIDAR
• SOS Children’s Villages International
• The European region of the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association (ILGA-Europe)
• Vitsche e.V.

National organisations

• Aditus Foundation
• ADPARE
• ANAIS Association
• ARSIS Association for the Social Support of Youth
• Association for Integration and Migration, SIMI
• Association for intercultural work
• Association for Legal Intervention
• Better Days Greece
• CARUSEL Romania
• Centre for Peace Studies
• Centrum pro integraci cizinců, o. p. s.
• Clare Immigrant Support Centre
• CoMensha
• Community Law & Mediation
• Consortium of Migrants Assisting Organizations in the Czech Republic
• CSO “La Strada-Ukraine”
• Defence for Children – The Netherlands
• Diakonie ČCE-SCPS
• Doras
• Dutch Council for Refugees
• Equilibrium NGO (Громадська організація “Точка рівноваги”)
• EQUITA
• FairWork
• Feminist Lodge
• Finnish Refugee Advice Centre
• Forum réfugiés
• Fundatia Inima de Copil
• Foundation for Access to Rights – FAR
• Foundation for Migrants “Dobry Start” in Memory of A. G. Farah
• Fundacja HelpNowHub ГО Позитивні жінки Херсон
• Fundacja Imago
• Greek Council for Refugees
• Greek Forum of Migrants
• Helping Irish Hosts
• Humanitarna organizacija Jesuit Refugee Service
• Immigrant Council of Ireland
• Initiative for Social Change ARSIS
• Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS) Malta
• Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS) Romania
• Jewish Representative Council of Ireland (Ukraine Support Programme)
• Kalyna – Komunitní uprchlické centrum, z. s.
• Kerk in Actie
• KISA (Cyprus)
• Kopin (Malta)
• Kuchnia Konfliktu / Conflict Kitchen
• LGBT Ireland
• MigAid (A Segítők Egyesület)
• Migrant Rights Centre Ireland
• Migration Consortium
• Most pro o.p.s.
• Movimiento por la Paz (MPDL)
• NewBees
• NGO Bilozerka center for regional development (Ukraine)
• NGO Zhiva-Ya
• Nordic Ukraine Forum
• OPORA Foundation
• ORBIT
• Organization for Aid to Refugees (OPU)
• PA International Center “La Strada” Moldova
• PATCHWORK Association for Immigrant Families of Persons with Disabilities
• People in Need
• Right to Protection
• SOFT tulip Foundation
• SolidarityNow
• Spark 15
• Stichting voor Vluchtelingen-Studenten UAF
• Swedish Refugee Law Center
• The Federation of Nongovernmental Organisations for Social Services – FONSS
• The Human Rights League
• The Open Doors Initiative
• United For Changes
• Vatra Psycho Social Center
• WA Sphere (ГО “ХЖО “Сфера”)
• Willi Eichler Akademie e.V.
• Women in Media NGO
• ГО “Зв’язок ”
• ГС “ІМД “Відкрите суспільство”
• Жіночий Центр “Підтримка, Захист та Трубота”
• Когорта
• Національна Рада Жінок України
• Хмельницька обласна ГО Подільський центр “Гендерна рада”
• Школа Рівних Можливостей

Local and community groups

• ABBA Student Association
• BIPoC Ukraine and friends in Germany
• Blue Door Education
• Cairde
• Chief Rabbinate of Poland
• Cultur Migrant Centre
• CUSBU: CommUnities Support for BIPoC Refugees from Ukraine
• Diakonie ČCE – středisko Západní Čechy
• Jewish Community of Łódź
• Migrant Women Associations Malta
• Migrationsrat Berlin e.V.
• NestingPlay
• Romodrom, o.p.s.
• South Kerry Development Partnership CLG
• Waterford Area Partnership
• Women for Integration and Wellbeing
• Yoga and Sport with Refugees

Joint Statement on the Revision of the EU Victims’ Rights Directive

The European Union (EU) has long recognised the need to protect all victims of crime without discrimination.

The EU Victim Rights Directive (VRD)¹ articulates this commitment in law, stating that victim rights cannot be denied based on residence status (Article 1). It applies to criminal offences within the Union and extraterritorial offences, including those occurring in immigration detention and at the EU’s borders.² The EU Strategy on Victims’ Rights (2020-2025) further recognises undocumented people among the categories of “vulnerable victims”.³

However, a paradox emerges when victim rights are juxtaposed with the EU’s migration policy: immigration control is prioritised over a person’s rights and needs.

Being undocumented, or having an insecure residence status, makes people susceptible to mistreatment, abuse and severe forms of exploitation, including human trafficking and forced labour.

When migration status intersects with other forms of discrimination, including gender, ethnic or social origin, sexual orientation or gender identity and disability, abuse is exacerbated. The abuse may also result from actions from public authorities (e.g. police, border guards, staff in immigration detention centres).

Migrants with irregular status face potential abuse not only when arriving at the EU’s borders (e.g. pushbacks⁴) but also when living within the EU. This abuse may occur in the workplace, in personal relationships, but also in other settings (e.g. immigration detention).

The EU Pact on Migration and Asylum⁵, coupled with other initiatives seeking to further criminalise migration across the EU⁶, raises alarming concerns for the future.⁷ Far from upholding justice and protection, these policies are expected to escalate human rights violations and perpetuate discriminatory practices within the very structures meant to safeguard all individuals.

The EU must reinforce its legal tools to ensure universal access to justice, unconditional support, and protection without discrimination.

The ongoing revision of the VRD⁸ is a pivotal opportunity to strengthen the rights and protection granted to victims, irrespective of their residence status.

However, there exist significant obstacles and ambiguities in the proposed revision, potentially obstructing the full realisation of rights for marginalised victims of crime, in particular those with an insecure residence status or that are undocumented victims.⁹

In response, the undersigned organisations call on the EU negotiators to incorporate the following recommendations:

Safe reporting of crime

Undocumented victims rarely report abuse, as they fear engaging with authorities, due to the risk of detention and deportation: this means that they are not identified as victims of crime and do not receive the support and protection they need and are entitled to.¹⁰ This distrust is compounded by the increased policing and surveillance of migrant and marginalised communities, worsening feelings of insecurity and concerns about discriminatory profiling.

Safe reporting mechanisms for undocumented migrants are generally lacking all over Europe. They are almost non-existent for victims of abuse in immigration detention, with only few reports ever reaching the criminal justice system.¹¹

It is essential that Article 5a(1) of the revised VRD requires Member States to offer a variety of complaints/reporting mechanisms, accessible free of charge¹², to cater to the multiple needs and circumstances of victims, including those in immigration detention. This should include third-party reporting, crucial for victims that do not trust law enforcement.¹³

Article 5a(2) should also create safe environments for victims, third parties, and people who suspect that criminal offences have been committed, or are expected, to be able to report a crime without any reprisals, including in relation to their migration status. This concept of non-punishment, embedded in the EU’s Anti-Trafficking Directive¹⁴ and Anti-Trafficking Strategy¹⁵, should be streamlined across the EU VRD, notably under Article 5a.

Moreover, we call on negotiators to ensure safe and confidential mechanisms in place for criminal offences committed by public officials (e.g. violence by police and border guards) to be reported to the appropriate independent competent authorities.

Data protection

Protection of personal data is necessary to ensure that safe reporting is a reality for every victim of crime, regardless of residence status. It is a precondition to the enjoyment of rights under the Victims’ Directive, essential to promoting trust in public institutions, and the basic democratic principle that everyone is equally protected under the law.

While welcoming the Commission’s effort to limit personal information transfer to migration authorities when crimes are reported, this safeguard should not apply only temporarily until the first individual needs assessment has been completed.

We urge negotiators to ensure under Article 5a(5) of the revised VRD that a victim’s residence status is not shared with migration authorities. It is essential that the Victim Rights Directive introduces this strong safeguard, particularly given failure of EU negotiators to include it in the new Directive on violence against women and domestic violence despite the EU’s¹⁶ obligations to uphold privacy rights laid out in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).¹⁷

Unconditional access to support services

Victims of crime should have access to available support services, regardless of their residence status or willingness to participate in criminal proceedings. Yet, for many undocumented victims of crime, justice and support remain elusory.

We support Article 9(1)(c) of the revised VRD, which would ensure access to psychological support. We further support targeted and integrated support for victims with specific needs, as articulated under amended Article 9(3)(b). These services should include comprehensive medical care services, including sexual and reproductive healthcare services.

Shelters are also an essential service in offering safety and refuge, free from harm. However, there are serious shortages of shelters across the EU and undocumented migrants, in particular women, may face even greater hurdles in accessing these services. It follows that the revised VRD should ensure access to shelters and other appropriate forms of accommodation.

Although not formally considered a victim support service, legal aid is also a precondition for victims to assert their rights effectively and promptly. We recommend that Article 13¹⁸ is revised to ensure victims have access to free legal aid.

All support should be provided without delay. We thus further support Article 8(2) of the revised VRD which notably requires that victims are contacted by the relevant generic or specialised support services.

Undocumented children

Children are particularly vulnerable and require adequate responses. We support Article 9a of the revised VRD making available support services for children who are victims of crime in dedicated, safe and child-friendly locations, and Article 9a(2) which sets out the list of services which this should include.

Children in migration are particularly vulnerable to exploitation, violence, crime, and of going missing, because of their social isolation, being undocumented and/or having a precarious residence status. Having specialists on their side to understand and navigate the legal and administrative aspects, including residence procedures if applicable, is both part of the government’s duty of care and basic children’s safeguards. We therefore recommend that Article 9a(2) also includes administrative and legal (free and specialised) support under the list of services.

Individual assessment of victims to identify specific support and protection needs

We generally welcome the proposal to strengthen the individual needs assessments as articulated in Article 22 of the revised VRD, including proposals to ensure the individual needs assessment is carried out on a regular basis and lasts as long as necessary based on each victim’s needs.

We are concerned that the current draft suggests that only police authorities will be relied on to carry out a single support needs assessment to determine whether victims are referred to support services. Requiring police authorities, rather than organisations specialised in supporting victims, to carry out such assessments not only risks overburdening them but may result in inadequate assessments. We suggest including language to engage generic and specialised support services in this assessment.

It is crucial to ensure that the official duration of the assessment does not violate fundamental rights to assistance, support, and information, nor be linked to return procedures.

Additionally, we urge negotiators to include residence status and nationality among the personal characteristics of the victim that should be taken into account in the needs assessment (Article 22(2)(a)) and that undocumented and stateless victims should be considered as a group that would require particular attention (Article 22(3)).

Immigration detention

Immigration detention is the deprivation of liberty for reasons related to a person’s residence status.¹⁹ When crimes occur in detention centres people are already placed in a situation of vulnerability and dependency.²⁰

Article 26a should therefore require member states to clearly set out the responsibilities of detention staff and detention administration in securing the rights of victims of violent crimes, as well as ensuring that victims in detention receive access to free legal support.

Residence permits

One important way to ensure undocumented victims can access justice and support, and prevent further victimisation, is to issue residence permits to victims.²¹ This solution already exists in different EU member states, which have permits for individuals who have been trafficked, who have been victims of racist violence, domestic violence and labour exploitation.²² Moreover, several EU directives make provision for residence permits for certain victims of crime.²³ In fact, the Return Directive leaves member states free to grant a residence permit “at any moment” to someone in an irregular situation for compassionate or humanitarian reasons.²⁴

We urge negotiators to ensure the revised VRD includes a provision on the issuance of residence permits on personal or humanitarian grounds, not requiring their cooperation in criminal proceedings, and not conditioned on the start or outcome of criminal procedures.

Compensation

Compensation serves as a crucial tool for restorative and preventive purposes, particularly for victims who have endured physical, mental, economic, or sexual abuse. We support proposed revisions of the VRD under Article 16 seeking to enhance access to compensation by strengthening victims’ rights during criminal proceedings, making state payment of the offender’s compensation binding and timely, with the possibility for the state to recover it from the offender later.

We urge negotiators to ensure under Article 16 that a lack of residence status does not impede the right to compensation. It follows that undocumented victims should not be denied compensation based on their irregular immigration status but are instead encouraged and (legally) supported to introduce their claims for remedies and given the possibility to participate in legal proceedings.

Now, more than ever, the EU must stand firmly against discrimination, ensuring justice, support, and protection for all victims of crime.

We stand ready to collaborate with the EU institutions to create a future where victim rights are inviolable, no matter who they are or whatever residence status they have.

Signatories

International and European organisations

• Access Now
• Amnesty International
• Centre for Youths Integrated Development
• Dynamo International
• European Anti-Poverty Network (EAPN)
• European Digital Rights Network (EDRi)
• European Network Against Racism (ENAR)
• European Network Against Statelessness (ENS)
• European Sex Workers Rights Alliance (ESWA)
• Global Alliance against Traffic in Women (GAATW)
• International Planned Parenthood Federation European Network (IPPF EN)
• La Strada International – European NGO Platform Against Trafficking in Human Beings
• Kids in Need of Defense (KIND)
• Methoria
• Missing Children Europe
• Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants (PICUM)
• Quaker Council for European Affairs
• Revibra Europe
• Social Platform
• Transgender Europe (TGEU)
• The Africa Human Trafficking Taskforce (AHTTF)
• The European region of the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association (ILGA-Europe)
• The Women Against Violence Europe (WAVE) Network
• Victim Support Europe

National organisations

• ADPARE, Romania
• Andalucia Acoge, Spain
• Animus Association Foundation, Bulgaria
• ARSIS Association for the Social Support of Youth, Greece
• Association for Integration and Migration, SIMI, Czech Republic
• Asociacion en Prevencion y Asistencia de la Violencia (APAV), Spain
• ASTRA-Anti trafficking action, Serbia
• Ban Ying, Germany
• CoMensha, Netherlands
• CSC ACV Brussels, Belgium
• Fairwork, Belgium
• FairWork, Netherlands
• Fundación Cepaim, Spain
• Fundación de Solidaridad Amaranta, Spain
• Greek Council for Refugees (GCR), Greece
• Group 484, Serbia
• HIAS Greece, Greece
• HopeNow, Denmark
• KOK – German NGO Network against Trafficking in Human Beings, Germany
• Latin American Women’s Rights Service (LAWRS), United Kingdom
• Migrant Voice, United Kingdom
• Mission d’intervention et de sensibilisation contre la traite des êtres humains (Mist), France
• On the Road Società Cooperativa Sociale, Italy
• Open Gate/La Strada, North Macedonia
• PA International Center “LA STRADA” Moldova, Republic of Moldova
• Payoke, Belgium
• Plateforme Sans-Papiers Suisse, Switzerland
• Red Acoge, Spain
• Sans-Papiers Anlaufstelle Zürich SPAZ, Switzerland
• Siempre, Belgium
• S.P.E.A.K, Netherlands
• Stichting LOS, Netherlands
• Stowarzyszenie Interwencji Prawnej (Association for Legal Intervention), Poland
• UEE-Union des étudiants exiles, France
• UTSOPI, Belgium
• Vatra psycho social center, Albania

Total signatories: 60

Contact

• Louise Bonneau, PICUM (louise.bonneau@picum.org)
• Suzanne Hoff, La Strada International (sh@lastradainternational.org)

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Footnotes

1. Directive 2012/29/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA ↩︎
2. See PICUM, 2015, Guide to the EU Victims’ Directive: advancing access to protection, services and justice for undocumented migrants ↩︎
3. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: EU Strategy on victims’ rights (2020-2025) ↩︎
4. In the absence of an internationally agreed upon definition of “pushbacks”, the Special Rapporteur on Migrants has described “pushbacks” as “various measures taken by States which result in migrants, including asylum seekers, being summarily forced back to the country from where they attempted to cross or have crossed an international border without access to international protection or asylum procedures or denied of any individual assessment on their protection needs which may lead to a violation of the principle of non-refoulement.” ↩︎
5. For a brief assessment, see the editorial of PICUM’s December 2023 newsletter ‘EU Migration Pact: a historic deal against human rights’. ↩︎
6. On 28 November 2023, the European Commission announced a series of initiatives to ‘Counter migrant smuggling’, including a revision of the Facilitators Package. ↩︎
7. Prior to the final negotiations of the EU Pact on Migration, PICUM joined 18 other leading human rights organisations in calling on EU lawmakers to reject this Pact and submitted an open letter calling out the human rights risks in the Migration Pact. ↩︎
8. European Commission, 2023, Proposal for a Directive amending Directive 2012/29/EU establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA ↩︎
9. PICUM, 2023, First assessment of the proposed revisions to the Victim Rights Directive ↩︎
10. PICUM, 2021, Preventing harm, promoting rights: achieving safety, protection and justice for people with insecure residence status in the EU; PICUM, 2022, Unconditional access to services for undocumented victims of crime ↩︎
11. Fair Trials, 2019, Rights behind bars Access to justice for victims of violent crime suffered in pre-trial or immigration detention ↩︎
12. Greece’s on-going revision of the draft law amending the Criminal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure includes provisions which would see victims have to pay a fee in order to report a crime and to make appeals. ↩︎
13. Fundamental Rights Agency, 2023, Underpinning victims’ rights: support services, reporting and protection ↩︎
14. Directive 2011 combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA ↩︎
15. Communication from the commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the regions on the EU strategy on combatting trafficking in human beings 2021- 2025, COM/2021/171 final ↩︎
16. In the political agreement reached on 6 February 2024 on the new Directive on violence against women and domestic violence, negotiators failed to sufficiently protect undocumented women from immigration enforcement should they report violence and abuse to police. ↩︎
17. PICUM, 2020, Data protection and the firewall: advancing safe reporting for people in an irregular situation ↩︎
18. The provisions in article 13 (not opened for revision by the European Commission) are insufficient, as they do not include administrative support and limit legal aid to victims who are a party in criminal proceedings. ↩︎
19. PICUM, 2022, Immigration detention and de facto detention: What does the law say? ↩︎
20. Fair Trials, 2019, Rights behind bars Access to justice for victims of violent crime suffered in pre-trial or immigration detention ↩︎
21. PICUM, 2022, Unconditional access to services for undocumented victims of crime ↩︎
22. PICUM, 2020, Insecure Justice? Residence Permits for victims of crime in Europe; PICUM, 2022, Labour migration policies Case study series Finland ↩︎
23. PICUM, 2020, Insecure Justice? Residence Permits for victims of crime in Europe ↩︎
24. Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals ↩︎

We, the undersigned organisations, express our deep concern regarding the continuing and escalating harassment and attacks against KISA, a leading non-governmental organisation fighting for human rights and equality for all in Cyprus. KISA’s work promotes a society free of racism and discrimination, also by defending the rights of migrants, refugees and victims of human trafficking.

During the early morning of 5 January 2024, KISA experienced a targeted bombing attack. An explosive device was planted outside its offices, destroying all windows and causing extensive damage to the photocopier, computers, and part of the organisation’s archives. The organisation suspects that the bombing was carried out by individuals within racist and nationalist circles, considering that KISA and its members have been the object of repeated threats. Despite the seriousness of the bombing, the Cypriot authorities have yet to issue an official response. While the police are investigating, they did not issue an information note, contrary to the standard practice in case of such incidents.

The lack of official and public communication regarding the assault and the investigation, and support for KISA and civil society organisations in general, indicates a worrying disregard by the authorities. Indeed, we are deeply concerned about the reported failure of the authorities and police to take any steps to protect KISA as well as the inadequate response to the numerous threats, and actual acts of physical and verbal violence, harassment and smear campaigns formally reported to the police.

Furthermore, this attack is not an isolated incident, but the result of a long campaign to discredit and silence independent voices in Cyprus, in particular KISA. In 2021, 38 organisations denounced the ongoing harassment against KISA, and the restrictions imposed on the organisation including its de-registration as a non-governmental organisation. Although KISA has since then a new formal legal status as a non-profit company and the deregistration is under appeal, the government – in particular the Ministry of the Interior – continues to block several of KISA’s essential activities in support of migrants and refugees.

The undersigned organisations are also deeply concerned that KISA members and volunteers, in particular former Executive Director Doros Polykarpou, continue to face criminalisation that appears to be linked with their activities as human rights defenders. Mr. Polykarpou was convicted on 21 December 2023 and, just ten days after the bomb attack, sentenced to pay a fine for supposedly ‘interfering’ with police work in 2019, after exercising his right to observe a police officer’s interaction with a young motorcyclist (a minor, stopped for possible traffic offences) and to provide basic information to the child regarding his rights.

Another trial related to the criminalisation of Mr Polykarpou in his work as a human rights defender is on-going and concerns a visit to the Pournara reception centre to investigate claims of inhuman conditions by unaccompanied children. Mr Polykarpou reported his physical assault by private security guards in March 2022 but was later prosecuted for various charges (case 16767/22). These cases follow decades of criminal charges levelled against Mr Polykarpou which according to KISA are part of a pattern of cases aiming to intimidate, discredit and interfere with the work of KISA as a human rights defender. Before this latest ruling, Mr Polykarpou had been acquitted in all legal cases against him.

Our concerns extend beyond the immediate impact on KISA to encompass broader issues of civic space in Cyprus. In particular, the rise of anti-migrant, racist rhetoric and racist violence in the country is alarming and requires attention and action to change.

In order to promote an enabling environment for independent civil society and solidarity with migrants and refugees and remove restrictions to civil society’s space in Cyprus and in Europe as a whole, the undersigned organisations call upon the following authorities to:

The Cypriot authorities:

• Publicly condemn the recent bombing attack against KISA, and ensure a thorough, independent, impartial and prompt investigation into and appropriate response to the January 5th bombing including the prioritizing of the hypothesis that the attack was related to KISA’s human rights and anti-racist work.
• Ensure a thorough, independent, impartial and prompt investigation of previous complaints presented by KISA and its members regarding harassment, attacks, smear campaigns, and threats. Implement effective measures to ensure the safety of KISA’s employees, members and service users.
• Protect KISA’s freedom of association and end the criminalisation of KISA and its members.
• Take steps to enable KISA to continue its activities, including granting KISA full access to reception and detention centres where migrants and refugees are held.
• Take concrete measures to end any legislation or policy which encourages racism, hate speech, xenophobia and intolerance against migrants, refugees and racialised people in Cyprus. Take action to combat extremist narratives and racist rhetoric in the media and public discourse.
• Comply with international and regional standards on the right to freedom of association and the protection of human rights defenders, and in particular the joint OSCE/ODIHR and Venice Commission Guidelines on Freedom of Association, the OSCE Guidelines on the Protection of Human Rights Defenders , the UN Declaration on Human Rights Defenders and the recommendations of the Council of Europe NGO Expert Group.

The European Union:

• Condemn the attack that took place on 5 January 2024 and other pending complaints, and call on the Cypriot authorities to ensure an adequate response and to end the ongoing harassment against KISA and interference in its work, in line with the 2023 European Commission recommendations on promoting the engagement and effective participation of citizens and civil society organisations in public policy-making processes and the Council conclusions on civic space.
• Closely monitor the situation in Cyprus, especially the climate of violence and xenophobia, addressing the hostility against migrants, refugees and anti-racist and migrants’ rights organisations.
• Address these attacks against human rights defenders and their organisations in the Annual Rule of Law Cycle and make a targeted recommendation to Cyprus to ensure a safe space for rights defenders and put an end to the ongoing attacks and to the restrictions on KISA’s freedom of association and the criminalisation of KISA and its members.
• Call on the Cypriot authorities to respect and uphold the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights, the rule of law principles, and the right to freedom of association.
• Develop an early warning system to detect harassment of individuals and civic organizations, including those advocating for migrant rights and racial justice, to prevent their criminalisation. This system should prompt swift EU-level responses such as recommendations, dialogue, sanctions, and emergency funding. Additionally, collaborate with civil society to establish a ‘Rapid Response System’ (building on the existing EU’s external human rights defenders mechanism) offering helplines, legal aid, and temporary relocation to protect civil society since the first signs of attacks.

Signatories:

International and European organisations:

• AMERA International
• Amnesty International
• Borderline-europe Human Rights without Borders
• European Civic Forum
• European Network Against Racism (ENAR)
• EuroMed Rights
• FIDH (International Federation for Human Rights), in the framework of the Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders
• Front Line Defenders
• Greek Helsinki Monitor
• Human Rights Cities Network            
• Institute of Race Relations
• International Service for Human Rights (ISHR)
• La Strada International
• Migreurop
• Minority Rights Group
• Netherlands Helsinki Committee
• Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants (PICUM)
• PRO ASYL
• Protection International
• Statewatch
• World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT), in the framework of the Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders

National organisations:

• Aditus Foundation, Malta
• ASGI, Italy
• Association Tunisienne des Femmes Démocrates (ATFD), Tunisia
• Associazione Ricreativa e Culturale Italiana (ARCI), Italy
• Cairo Institute for Human Rights (CIHRS), Egypt
• Center for Peace Studies, Croatia
• Center for Public Innovation, Romania
• Damascus Center for Human Rights Studies (DCHRS), Syria
• Finnish League for Human Rights, Finland
• Focus on Labour Exploitation (FLEX), UK
• Gentium, Spain
• Greek Council for Refugees (GCR), Greece
• Hellenic League for Human Rights, Greece
• Human Rights Association (IHD), Turkey
• Hungarian Helsinki Committee, Hungary
• Irídia, Spain
• Irish Council for Civil Liberties, Ireland
• Legal Center for the Protection of Human Rights and the Environment – PIC, Slovenia
• Ligue des droits de l’Homme (LDH), France
• Network for Children’s Rights, Greece
• PA International Center “LA STRADA”, Moldova
• Tamkeen for Legal Aid and Human Rights, Jordan
• Vatra Psycho Social Center, Albania

The undersigned civil society organisations would like to express their concerns with regard to several aspects of the Commission’s proposal amending the Schengen Borders Code.

Overall, the proposal embraces a very harmful narrative which assumes that people crossing borders irregularly are a threat to the EU and proposes to address it by increasing policing and curtailing safeguards. At the same time, the proposal fails to recognise the lack of regular pathways for asylum seekers, who are often forced to turn to irregular border crossings in order to seek international protection within the EU, and further complicates access to asylum. The measures put forward by the Commission would have a detrimental impact on the right to freedom of movement within the EU, the principle of non-discrimination, access to asylum and the harmonisation of procedures under EU law. Furthermore, the proposal would increase the use of monitoring and surveillance technologies, without any adequate safeguards.

Freedom of movement within the EU and violation of the principle of non-discrimination

Several provisions of the proposed amended Schengen Borders Code would encroach the right to freedom of movement within the EU (art. 3(2) TEU, art. 21 and 77 TFEU) by expanding the possibility to reintroduce internal border controls and facilitating the application of so-called “alternative measures” which in practice amount to discriminatory border controls. The discretionary nature of these border checks is very likely to disproportionately target racialised communities, and practically legitimise ethnic and racial profiling and expose people to institutional and police abuse.

While the amended Schengen Borders Code reiterates that internal border controls are prohibited in the Schengen area, it also introduces the possibility to carry out police checks in the internal border areas with the explicit aim to prevent irregular migration, when these are based on “general information and experience of the competent authorities” (rec. 18 and 21 and art. 23). In addition, the proposal clarifies the meaning of “serious threat” which justifies the temporary reintroduction of border controls (which was already possible under art. 25 of the 2016 SBC). Problematically, the proposed definition of “serious threat” also includes “a situation characterised by large scale unauthorised movements of third country nationals between member states, putting at risk the overall functioning of the area without internal border control” (art. 25).-1-

Such provisions, together with the new procedure set by article 23a and analysed below, will in practice legalise systematic border controls which target people based on their racial, ethnic, national, or religious characteristics. This practice is in clear violation of European and international anti-discrimination law and a breach to migrants’ fundamental rights.

Research from the EU Fundamental Rights Agency in 2021 shows that people from an ‘ethnic minority, Muslim, or not heterosexual’ are disproportionately affected by police stops, both when they are walking and when in a vehicle. In addition, another study from 2014 showed that 79% of surveyed border guards at airports rated ethnicity as a helpful indicator to identify people attempting to enter the country in an irregular manner before speaking to them.

The new provisions introduced in the amended Schengen Borders Code are likely to further increase the discriminatory and illegal practice of ethnic and racial profiling and put migrant communities at risk of institutional violence, which undermines the right to non-discrimination and stands at odds with the European Commission’s commitments under the recent Anti-Racism Action Plan.

 

Lack of individual assessment and increased detention

The proposed revisions to the Schengen Borders Code set a new procedure to “transfer people apprehended at the internal borders”. According to the proposed new rules, if a third country national without a residence permit or right to remain crosses the internal borders in an irregular way (e.g., from Germany to Belgium, or from Italy to France) and if they are apprehended “in the vicinity of the border area,” they could be directly transferred back to the competent authorities in the EU country where it is assumed they just came from, without undergoing an individual assessment (art. 23a and Annex XII). This provision is very broad and can potentially include people apprehended at train or bus stations, or even in cities close to the internal borders, if they are apprehended as part of cross-border police cooperation (e.g. joint police patrols) and if there is an indication that they have just crossed the border (for instance through documents they may carry on themselves, their own statements, or information taken from migration or other databases).

The person will be then transferred within 24 hours.-2- During these 24 hours, Annex XII sets that the authorities might “take appropriate measures” to prevent the person from entering on the territory – which constitutes, in practice, a blanket detention provision, without any safeguards nor judicial overview. While the transfer decision could be subject to appeal, this would not have a suspensive effect. The Return Directive would also be amended, by introducing an obligation for the receiving member state to issue a return decision without the exceptions currently listed in article 6 (e.g., the possibility to issue a residence permit for humanitarian or compassionate reasons). As a consequence, transferred people would be automatically caught up in arbitrary and lengthy detention and return procedures.-3-

Courts in Italy, Slovenia and Austria have recently ruled against readmissions taking place under informal or formal agreements, recognising them as systematic human rights violations with the potential to trigger so-called chain pushbacks. The courts found the plaintiffs were routinely returned from Italy or Austria through Slovenia to Croatia, from where they had been illegally pushed back to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In practice, this provision would legalise the extremely violent practice of “internal pushbacks” which have been broadly criticised by civil society organisations across the EU and condemned by higher courts. The new procedure, including the possibility to detain people for up to 24 hours, would also apply to children, even though this has been deemed illegal by courts and despite international consensus that child detention constitutes a human rights violation.

Access to asylum

The new Code introduces measures which member states can apply in cases of “instrumentalisation of migrants”, which is defined as “a situation where a third country instigates irregular migratory flows into the Union by actively encouraging or facilitating the movement of third country nationals to the external borders” (art. 2). In such cases, member states can limit the number of border crossing points and their opening hours, and intensify border surveillance including through drones, motion sensors and border patrols (art. 5(4) and 13(5)). The definition of instrumentalisation of migrants should also be read in conjunction with the Commission’s proposal for a Regulation addressing situations of instrumentalisation in the field of migration and asylum, which provides member states with numerous derogations to the asylum acquis.

These measures unjustifiably penalise asylum seekers by limiting access to the territory and de facto undermining art. 31 of the Refugee Convention which prohibits States from imposing penalties on refugees on account of their entry or presence in their territory without authorization, and are therefore in violation of international law. 

 

Harmonisation of procedures under EU law and asylum acquis

The proposal lifts the standstill clause introduced by the 2008 Return Directive (art. 6(3)) which prohibits member states from negotiating new bilateral readmission agreements. When negotiating the 2008 Return Directive, both the Commission and the European Parliament had clarified that bilateral readmission agreements should remain an exception, as they undermine the objective of harmonising procedures under EU law.

By incentivising states to adopt new bilateral agreements, and proposing a new internal transfer procedure, the Commission’s proposal promotes the proliferation of exceptional procedures, which are outside the framework set by the Return Directive and the asylum acquis, and circumvents the procedural safeguards included in the Dublin Regulation.

The proposed provisions undermine the substantive and procedural guarantees for third country nationals, such as the right to request asylum, the respect of the principle of non-refoulement, and the right to an effective remedy.

As mentioned above, several national-level courts have ruled on the unlawfulness of readmissions carried out under formal and informal agreements, which often led to instances of chain-refoulement. There is a serious risk that readmission agreements, if they remain a part of the current legislative proposal, could be further abused to perpetrate chain refoulement and collective expulsions, which are in violation of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 to the European Convention on Human Rights and Article 19 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

Use of monitoring and surveillance technologies

Lastly, the proposal also facilitates a more extensive use of monitoring and surveillance technologies, by clarifying that these are part of member states’ responsibility to patrol borders (art. 2). In addition, article 23, analysed above, clarifies that internal checks, including to prevent irregular migration, can be carried out “where appropriate, on the basis of monitoring and surveillance technologies generally used in the territory”.

By removing obstacles for a more extensive use of monitoring and surveillance technologies, these provisions would create a loophole to introduce technologies which would otherwise be discouraged by pre-existing EU legislation such as the General Data Protection Regulation.-4-

Artificial Intelligence (AI) and other automated decision-making systems, including profiling, are increasingly used in border control and management for generalised and indiscriminate surveillance. Insofar as such systems are used to ‘detect human presence’ for the purpose of ‘combating irregular migration’, there is serious concern that such systems can facilitate illegal interdiction, violence at border crossings, and further limit access to asylum and other forms of protection.

Furthermore, these technologies disproportionately target racialised people, thus further exacerbating the risks of increased racial and ethnic profiling. Indeed, monitoring and surveillance technologies which make use of artificial intelligence by nature violate the right to non-discrimination insofar as they are trained on past data and decision-making, and therefore codify assumptions on the basis of nationality and other personal characteristics, which is prohibited by international racial discrimination law.-5-

Recommendations

In light of the concerns discussed above, the undersigned civil society organisations:

• Express their concerns on the harmful impact of narratives which consider people crossing borders irregularly as a threat, and recommend the European Parliament and the Council to delete such references from recital 29, article 23 and article 25(1)(c);
• Call on the EU institutions to uphold the right to freedom of movement and the principle of non-discrimination, including by prohibiting the use of technologies which make use of artificial intelligence and other automated decision-making systems. In this regard, we recommend the European Parliament and the Council to amend article 23, paragraph (a) by deleting the reference to “combat irregular residence or stay, linked to irregular migration” in point (ii) and deleting point (iv) on monitoring and surveillance technologies;
• Urge the EU institutions to uphold the right to apply for asylum, and recommend deleting the definition of ‘instrumentalisation of migration’ in article 2, paragraph 27 and all the ensuing provisions which would apply in this circumstance;
• Condemn the proliferation of exceptional procedures which undermine the right to an individual assessment, and recommend deleting article 23a, annex XII, and the proposed amendment to art. 6(3) of the Return Directive;
• Express their concerns at the glaring inconsistency between some of the proposed provisions and the European Commission’s commitments under the EU Action Plan against Racism, i.e. with respect to ending racial profiling, and call on the EU institutions to uphold their commitment to address and to combat structural and institutional discrimination and include explicit references to the Action Plan against Racism in the text of the Schengen Borders Code.

Signatories:

European/ international networks and organisations

• Access Now
• Action Aid International
• Border Violence Monitoring Network
• Caritas Europa
• Centre for Youths Integrated Development (CYID)
• Danish Refugee Council
• European Network Against Racism (ENAR)
• Equinox Initiative for Racial Justice
• EuroMed Rights
• Fair Trials
• FEANTSA – European Federation of National Organisations Working with the Homeless
• MiGreat – Belgium
• La Strada International
• Oxfam International
• Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants (PICUM)
• Sea-Watch e.V.
• Quaker Council for European Affairs

National level networks and organisations

• 11.11 – Belgium
• Artha project – Belgium
• Association for the Social Support of Youth (ARSIS) – Greece
• Associazione per gli Studi Giuridici sull’Immigrazione (ASGI) – Italy
• ASTI – Association de soutien aux travailleurs immigrés – Luxembourg
• Caritas International – Belgium
• Centre for Peace Studies – Croatia
• Digitale Gesellschaft – Switzerland
• FAIRWORK Belgium – Belgium
• Fundacion Cepaim – Spain
• Human Rights Defenders e.V. – Germany 
• Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI) – Italy
• KISA – Action for Equality, Support, Antiracism – Cyprus
• Mujeres Supervivientes – Spain
• NGO Legis – North Macedonia
• Platform minors in exile – Belgium
• Progress Lawyers Network – Belgium
• Red Acoge – Spain
• Refugees Welcome – Denmark
• Red Solidaria de Acogida – Spain
• Servicio Jesuita a Migrantes (SJM) – Spain
• Stap Verder –The Netherlands
• Stichting LOS (Landelijk Ongedocumenteerden Steunpunt) – The Netherlands

-1- In this regard, it is relevant to highlight that, while temporary reintroduction of internal border controls should only be a measure of “last resort”, this has been done in more than 300 cases since 2006.

-2- Third country nationals “transferred” from one EU member state to another would be handed to the police in the receiving member state. The only requirement to carry out this procedure is to fill out a simple form which states the person’s identity, the way the person’s identity was established, the grounds for refusal and the date of the transfer. If the third country national refuses to sign, it will be enough for the authorities to indicate this in the comments section.

-3- These risks are exacerbated by the lack of harmonisation of protection standards for stateless persons.

-4- See, for instance, Article 22, which states that “data subject shall have the right not to be subject to a decision based solely on automated processing, including profiling, which produces legal effects concerning him or her or similarly significantly affects him or her”, or Article 9, which imposes specific rules regarding the collection and use of sensitive data.

-5- UN Convention for the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, 1965; EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, Article 21; UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Article 5.