As the world marks the 80th anniversary of the founding of the United Nations in 2025, we see no starker contrast to the ideals of the international law framework than the genocide that has unfolded in Gaza for more than two years. After eight decades of international commitments to protect human dignity, the EU’s silence stands in contrast to the international law framework and associated EU obligations and commitments to upholding it. Such backsliding is further exemplified by EU member states’ antagonistic responses towards Palestinians fleeing as well as towards individuals in Europe carrying out acts of solidarity with the Palestinian people.

As a human rights organisation defending the rights of people with irregular migration status, PICUM notes that Palestinians face similar challenges to undocumented migrants: being denied freedom of movement access to work, and civil and political rights. Their very legal existence is precarious due to Israel’s control over the population and borders in the West Bank and Gaza. The ongoing denial of rights is part of a decades-long process of systematic exclusion and statelessness.

Encouraged by the recent declarations from European and other countries recognizing Palestinian statehood as well as the ceasefire that was declared in October 2025, we call on the EU and Member States to immediately implement protection and assistance measures for Palestinians and those that stand in solidarity with them.

The EU should uphold its humanitarian obligations including by resolving the administrative situation of Palestinians who are present in the EU and enabling safe and regular pathways for Palestinians. Palestinian passports should be recognized as valid travel documents, enabling individuals to travel and seek protection. Visa deliveries should be facilitated and processed with flexibility and urgency. States should urgently issue residence permits to Palestinians and allow them to renew their permits or visas without undue obstruction. Asylum applications from Palestinians should be processed speedily, and refugee status should be granted broadly and without delay, ensuring that those in need are quickly granted a residence status. Member States should put an immediate end to the abusive practice of withdrawing nationality and ensure that children of Palestinians born in the EU not be revoked of their nationality under any circumstances.

The restrictions to Palestinian solidarity movements with repeated attacks on the right to freedom of association, peaceful assembly and expression exemplifies the shrinking of civic space we have been witnessing already for many years. Governments across the EU have introduced unwarranted measures to curtail and punish the expression of solidarity with Palestinians. We are very concerned about the severity of violations taking place in different member states, which includes widespread and arbitrary detention and excessive and/or unnecessary use of force. What we are witnessing today shows a very worrying trend towards the undermining of the rule of law.

We urge EU institutions and member states to uphold and protect the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly, association and expression, including for those showing solidarity with Palestinians.

As the world celebrates the entry into force of the UN Charter in 1945 on 24 October, the founding document of the United Nations, we call on the EU and Member States to act now and stand by international law and human rights.

On 11 March 2025, the European Commission presented a new proposal for a Return Regulation to replace the current Return Directive. Behind the euphemistic name, the proposal outlines coercive, traumatising, and rights-violating measures premised on an imperative of increasing deportation rates. Instead of focusing on protection, housing, healthcare and education, the Regulation is premised on punitive policies, detention centres, deportation and enforcement.  

The “Deportation Regulation,” as it would be more aptly called, is part of a broader shift in EU migration policy to characterise human movement as a threat to justify derogations from fundamental rights guarantees. EU institutions and Member States have increasingly made criminalisation, surveillance, and discrimination the default tools of migration governance – as opposed to protection, safety, social inclusion measures, the expansion of safe and regular routes and rights based residence permits. 

Our organisations are unequivocal: this Regulation must be rejected. It is driven by detention, deportation, externalisation, and punishment, particularly of racialised people, and will result in more people being pushed into legal limbo and dangerous conditions. We call on the European Commission to withdraw the proposal and urge the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union to reject it in its current form.  

The Regulation must be rejected for the following reasons:   

1. DEPORTATIONS TO COUNTRIES WITH NO PRIOR TIES AND OFFSHORE DEPORTATION CENTRES (Arts. 4, 17)  

This proposal – together with proposed changes to the Asylum Procedures Regulation – would make it possible, for the first time, to deport a person against their will to a non-EU country to which they have no personal connection, either through which they have only briefly transited, or in which they have never set foot.  

Sending someone against their will to a country to which they have no link can in no way be considered reasonable, just, or sustainable. Such measures would tear apart families and communities across Europe, undermining the fabric of solidarity that people rely on to live with dignity. Expanding the options for “return” raises serious concerns about fundamental rights, including the risk of people being stranded in third countries, the safety and dignity of removal, the sustainability of inclusion and reintegration, and access to support, rights, and services. Such measures also apply to families and children, with limited exceptions. 

The proposed Regulation also enables the establishment of so-called “return hubs”; highly likely to become prison-like detention centres hosting those awaiting deportations, outside of EU territory. This is an egregious departure from international law and human rights standards. These are likely to result in a range of rights violations, including automatic arbitrary detention, direct and indirect refoulement (in return hubs or through onward deportations), and denial of access to legal and procedural safeguards. At the same time, they would reinforce discriminatory practices as well as raising substantial challenges in monitoring human rights conditions and determining legal responsibility and jurisdiction. The current provisions in the Regulation are, moreover, alarmingly vague and set no binding standards, exacerbating these concerns. In line with past attempts to offshore or externalise asylum responsibilities, such as those by Australia, the UK, or Italy, such proposals are likely to be exorbitant in cost, carry significant diplomatic and reputational risks, and widen the gaps and divergences between EU countries’ asylum and migration policies. They would divert resources to punitive modes of migration governance instead of policies prioritising protection, care and safety.  

2. NEW OBLIGATIONS ON STATES TO ‘DETECT’ AND SURVEIL (Art. 6)   

The proposal requires States to put in place measures to detect people staying irregularly in their territory. Over 80 organisations warned that similar provisions in the 2024 Screening Regulation would result in increased racial profiling and discriminatory treatment. Such provisions pave the way for the expansion of racist policing practices and immigration raids that foster fear in racialised and migrant communities. Moreover, detection measures tied to immigration enforcement create serious human rights risks, including those related to the right to health, labour rights, and human dignity, as fear of authorities discourages undocumented people from seeking healthcare, reporting abuse, or accessing protection. Such measures could raise ethical conflicts for professionals and undermine trust in public services. Finally, they risk threatening privacy rights through the unsafe sharing of sensitive personal data, including health data, breaching EU data protection standards and eroding the freedoms of society as a whole. 

3. MORE PEOPLE PUSHED INTO IRREGULARITY AND LEGAL LIMBO (Arts. 7, 14)  

The proposal requires states to issue deportation orders alongside any decision ending regular stay, without prior consideration of other national-level status options (such as permits for humanitarian, best interests of the child, medical or family reasons, as well as during statelessness determination procedures or in other cases where deportation is not possible). Combined with similar rules in the Pact on Migration and Asylum that link negative asylum and deportation decisions, this would raise further barriers to accessing national residence permits. Alarmingly, it even foresees issuing deportation orders listing multiple potential countries of return when a country of return cannot be identified. 

The proposal also weakens protections for those who cannot be deported – often through no fault of their own. Although it allows for postponement of “removal” in cases where there is a risk of refoulement, it removes the current requirement to identify and assess other individual circumstances, ignoring that in many cases “return” may not be appropriate or even possible, such as if a person is stateless, or for other human rights reasons. 

This highlights the inconsistency of a proposal developed with the flawed objective of “increasing return rates”, but which at the same time artificially inflates the number of people issued a deportation order. As a result, many more people will be pushed into irregularity and legal limbo, denied basic rights like healthcare, and exposed to destitution, homelessness, exploitation, or prolonged detention. These policies do not only harm individuals: they destabilise and create further fear and insecurity, particularly for migrant and racialised people, as well as the wider communities they are part of. 

4. SEVERE EXPANSION OF DETENTION (Arts. 29-35)  

The proposal promotes the systematic use of detention by states. It significantly extends the maximum length of detention, from 18 to 24 months. This extension is disproportionate and ineffective, and would only deepen harm to people’s rights, dignity and health. It also expands the grounds for detention, including criteria that, in effect, cover most people who have entered Europe irregularly or who are in an undocumented situation, against the principle of proportionality and necessity. For instance, a lack of documents or experiencing homelessness would be sufficient grounds for detention. The proposal allows for the detention of children, despite international human rights law and standards indicating that it is always a child rights violation and never in a child’s best interests, and global commitment by governments to work to end the practice. Other vulnerable groups, as well as people who cannot be deported, would also be subject to detention. The proposal appears to allow for indefinite detention of individuals deemed to pose “security risks”, by judicial decision. It also allows Member States to deviate from basic guarantees around detention if systems face a vaguely defined “unforeseen heavy burden.” The expansion of detention capacity will create lucrative opportunities for private contractors running detention centres, incentivising the growth of a detention industry at the expense of people’s rights and dignity. 

The “alternatives to detention”, or non-custodial measures, as proposed by the Commission would not serve their purpose as genuine alternatives, and would not need to be considered before applying detention. Rather, they could now be used in addition to detention and after its time limits have been exceeded. Together, these developments amount to a significant expansion of immigration detention, whereby it would no longer even be treated as a measure of last resort or imposed for the shortest possible time, in clear tension with international law requirements. 

5. PUNITIVE AND COERCIVE MEASURES (Arts. 10, 12, 13, 16, 22, 29)  

The proposal introduces extensive, disproportionate and unrealistic cooperation requirements on people issued a deportation order, such as having to provide identity documents they may not possess, having their bodies and belongings searched, or cooperating with third countries to obtain travel documents. These are coupled with punitive and heavy sanctions in cases of ‘non-compliance’, including financial penalties, entry bans, restrictions on voluntary departure, as well as refusal of benefits, allowances or work permits. With no effective way to challenge the determination that they are not cooperating sufficiently or to ensure that people are not penalised for circumstances beyond their control – such as statelessness, digital or literacy barriers, age, health or trauma – these measures risk being applied arbitrarily and disproportionately punishing people in vulnerable socio-economic situations.  

The proposal introduces a further shift from “voluntary departure” to “removals”, making deportation the default option. Even though the notion of voluntariness in such circumstances remains questionable, the proposal restricts people’s options and agency further. It does so by introducing broad grounds on which forced “returns” would be mandatory and by removing even the current minimum period of seven days for voluntary departure, or compliance with a deportation order.   

Specific derogations are foreseen for people who “pose a threat to public policy, to public security or to national security” – grounds that are vaguely defined and may be applied abusively. Any cases posing a security risk or concerning a criminal conviction should be dealt with in the context of criminal justice proceedings with the fair trial safeguards required. 

6. EROSION OF APPEAL RIGHTS (Art. 28)  

In continuity with the erosion of these rights under the Pact, the proposal removes the automatic suspensive effect of appeals against the enforcement of a deportation decision. The suspensive effect will have to be requested together with the appeal, or granted ex-officio. This creates an additional layer of complexity for people at risk of being deported as well as judicial authorities, and removes an essential safeguard to the right to an effective remedy. With no mandatory minimum time for appeals (the proposal specifies only that the deadline shall not exceed 14 days), Member States could make it impossible for people to effectively challenge deportation orders in practice, against the established jurisprudence of European courts.  

7. EXPANDED DIGITAL SURVEILLANCE AND DATA PROTECTION VIOLATIONS (Arts. 6-9, 23, 38-41)  

The proposal expands the digital surveillance of people in deportation procedures, denounced by digital rights experts and the European Data Protection Supervisor. This includes the broad collection and sharing of personal data, including sensitive health and criminal records, between EU Member States and with third countries which may be lacking adequate data protection. It also enables the use of intrusive surveillance technologies in detention centres, and the use of digital “alternatives to detention”, such as GPS tracking and mobile phone surveillance, which, while supposedly considered an alternative to detention, remain highly intrusive and can amount to de facto detention. Such technologies also create profitable new markets for surveillance companies. 

The creation of a ‘European Return Order’, stored in the Schengen Information System (SIS), further conflates migration management and policing, with foreseen data sharing with law enforcement. There are documented patterns of data abuse and non-compliance with legal standards on privacy and protection of personal data by authorities under SIS, increasing the likelihood of data breaches and misuse.   

8. LACK OF IMPACT ASSESSMENT AND CONSULTATIONS  

Like other recent legislative proposals on migration, this European Commission proposal was issued without a human rights impact assessment or formal consultations, including social partners, in an area in which evidence-based policymaking is especially crucial. This is contrary to the Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making and the Commission’s own Better Regulation Guidelines when a legislative proposal has significant social impacts and where a choice of policy options exists. A prior fundamental rights impact assessment is essential to ensure compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights, non-refoulement, the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, personal liberty, the rights of the child, effective remedy, private and family life, privacy and data protection, and non-discrimination.  

9. OVERLOOKING ALTERNATIVES TO PUNITIVE MIGRATION CONTROL   

The proposal reflects a false assumption that deportation should be the only option for people whose asylum application has been rejected or whose residence permits have expired or been revoked. To reduce the number of people trapped in irregularity, EU states should uphold access to existing human-rights-related permits, and expand avenues to a broad range of residence permits that allow people to plan their lives, engage in regular work, study, and fully participate in all the economic, social, and cultural facets of the societies in which they live.  

—  

We call on the EU to stop catering to racist and xenophobic sentiments and corporate interests and reverse the punitive and discriminatory shift in its migration policy, and instead direct resources towards policies rooted in safety, protection and inclusion, that strengthen communities, uphold dignity, and ensure that all people can live safely regardless of status. 

EU institutions and Member States should reject deportation measures that are based on a punitive and coercive approach, lower human rights standards, and disproportionately affect racialised people. In light of the concerns outlined above, we call on the European Commission to withdraw this proposal and urge the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union to reject this proposal. 

Organisations signing on:

EU/International

1. #DiasporaVote! 
2. 11.11.11 
3. Abolish Frontex 
4. Acli – Associazioni cristiane lavoratori italiani 
5. Academics for Peace-Germany 
6. Access Now 
7. ActionAid International 
8. Africa Advocacy Foundation 
9. AlgoRace 
10. All Included 
11. Alternatif Bilisim 
12. Amnesty International 
13. Apna Haq 
14. ASAM Greece 
15. Aspiration 
16. Avocats Sans Frontières (ASF) 
17. Border Violence Monitoring Network 
18. borderline-europe – Menschenrechte ohne Grenzen e.V. 
19. Bridge EU 
20. Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies (CIHRS) 
21. CCFD-Terre Solidaire 
22. Changemakers Lab 
23. Civil Rights Defenders 
24. Collective Aid 
25. COFACE Families Europe 
26. Correlation-European Harm Reduction Network 
27. COSPE 
28. CPT – Aegean Migrant Solidarity 
29. de:border // migration justice collective 
30. DeZIM, German Centre for Migration and Integration Research 
31. EAPN European Anti-Poverty Network 
32. ECCHR European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights 
33. ELC – Eurocentralasian Lesbian Community 
34. EmpowerVan 
35. EPSU 
36. Equinox Initiative for Racial Justice 
37. EuroMed Rights 
38. European Alternatives 
39. European Movement 
40. European Network Against Racism (ENAR) 
41. European Network on Religion & Belief 
42. European Network on Religion and Belief 
43. European Network on Statelessness 
44. Famiglie Accoglienti 
45. FEANTSA 
46. Fenix Humanitarian Legal Aid 
47. Forum per Cambiare l’Ordine delle Cose 
48. Global Alliance Against Traffic in Women (GAATW) 
49. Global Asylum Seeker Human Rights Defenders Committee (GASHDC) 
50. Hoffnung leben e.V. 
51. Human Rights Watch 
52. Humanity Diaspo 
53. I Have Rights. 
54. Inter Alia 
55. InterEuropean Human Aid Association Germany e.V. 
56. International Planned Parenthood Federation – European Network (IPPF EN) 
57. International Women* Space e.V 
58. iuventa 
59. Kerk in Actie 
60. La Strada International 
61. Lifelong Learning Platform – European Civil Society for Education 
62. Liga Española de la Educación y la Cultura Popular 
63. Madera Creation 
64. Médecins du Monde International Network 
65. Médecins Sans Frontières 
66. Mediterranea Bruxelles 
67. Mediterranea Saving Humans 
68. Migreurop 
69. Migration Policy Group (MPG) 
70. Missing Voices (REER) 
71. Mission Lifeline International eV 
72. Movimiento por la Paz (MPDL) 
73. Mujeres Supervivientes 
74. Mundo en Movimiento 
75. Network Against Migrant Detention 
76. New Horizons Project 
77. New Women Connectors 
78. No Name Kitchen 
79. Northern Ireland Council for Racial Equality 
80. Oxfam 
81. Oxfam Italia 
82. Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants – PICUM 
83. Protestantse Kerk Nederland 
84. Quaker Council for European Affairs (QCEA) 
85. Recosol 
86. Rete delle Comunità Solidali (Re.co.sol.) 
87. Roma Feminist Collective 
88. Romnja Feminist Library 
89. SCI Catalunya 
90. Sea-Watch e.V. 
91. Service Civil Internation Austria 
92. Service Civil International 
93. SOLIDAR 
94. SOS Humanity 
95. SOS Racism Denmark 
96. Spectrum 
97. Statewatch 
98. Symbiosis-Council of Europe School of Political Studies in Greece 
99. Syrian Justice and Accountability Centre 
100. Transnational Institute 
101. UNESCO Inclusive Policy Lab – People of African Descent & SDGs E-Team 
102. Validity Foundation – Mental Disability Advocacy Centre 
103. VOICIFY – The European Forum for Youth with Lived Migration Experience 
104. WeMove Europe 
105. Women Against Violence Europe (WAVE) Network 
106. Yoga and Sport with Refugees 

National

107. AMUINCA-Asociación de mujeres migrantes 
108. Anafé (association nationale d’assistance aux frontières pour les personnes étrangères) 
109. Arbeitsgemeinschaft Migrationsrecht des Deutschen Anwaltvereins 
110. Ariadni AMKE 
111. ARSIS Association for the Social Support of Youth 
112. ASGI 
113. ASKV 
114. Asociación Por Ti Mujer 
115. Asociación Pro Derechos Humanos de Andalucía 
116. Asociación SDEOAC 
117. Association for Integration and Migration (SIMI) 
118. Associazione Amici di Glocandia OdV – progetto “Fratelli oltre il mare” 
119. Associazione Arturo 
120. Associazione Progetto Accoglienza 
121. AWO Bundesverband 
122. Ban Ying e.V. coordination and counseling center against trafficking in human beings 
123. Boat Refugee Foundation 
124. Brot für die Welt 
125. Casa di Amadou odv 
126. CEAR – Comisión Española de Ayuda al Refugiado 
127. Center for legal aid – Voice in Bulgaria 
128. Centre Avec 
129. Centre for Information Technology and Development (CITAD) 
130. Centre for Labour Rights, CLR 
131. Channel Monitoring Project 
132. CIEs NO MADRID 
133. CIRÉ 
134. CNCA – Coordinamento Nazionale Comunità di Accoglienza 
135. CNCD-11.11.11 
136. Community Rights in Greece 
137. Congolese Anti-Poverty Network 
138. CONVIVE Fundación Cepaim 
139. coop. soc. APE06 – AlterProjectEmpowerment2006 
140. Coordinadora CIE No Cádiz 
141. Coordinadora Obrim Fronteres 
142. Council of Churches Amsterdam 
143. Danes je nov dan, Inštitut za druga vprašanja 
144. Diaconaal Centrum De Bakkerij 
145. Diakonie Flüchtlingsdienst 
146. Diakonie Österreich 
147. Diakonie Deutschland 
148. DIKUNTU ODV 
149. Diásporas Association 
150. ECHO100PLUS 
151. Equal Legal Aid 
152. Europasilo 
153. FairWork 
154. Famiglie accoglienti Bologna e Torino 
155. FEDERACIÓN ANDALUCIA ACOGE 
156. Federación SOS Racismo 
157. Feministas en Holanda 
158. Finnish Refugee Advice Centre 
159. FLUCHTpunkt – Innsbruck 
160. Flüchtlingsrat NRW e.V. 
161. Flüchtlingsrat Schleswig-Holstein e.V. 
162. ForRefugees 
163. Fórum Refúgio Portugal 
164. GAT – Grupo de Ativistas em Tratamentos 
165. Greek Council for Refugees (GCR) 
166. Greek Forum of Migrants 
167. Greek Forum of Refugees 
168. Greek Housing Network 
169. Hermes Center 
170. HOTM 
171. Huize Agnes 
172. Human Rights Initiatives 
173. ICS (Italian Consortium of Solidarity) 
174. IHA – Intereuropean Human Aid Association 
175. INTERSOS HELLAS 
176. Irídia – Centre per la Defensa dels Drets Humans 
177. Italy Must Act 
178. Jesuit Refugee Service Belgium 
179. Jesuit Refugee Service Greece 
180. JRS Malta 
181. KISA – Action for Equality, Support, Antiracism 
182. KOK – German NGO Network against Trafficking in Human Beings 
183. Kopanang Africa Against Xenophobia (KAAX) 
184. La Cimade 
185. LDH (Ligue des droits de l’Homme) 
186. Legal Centre Lesvos 
187. MAlen Etxea mujeres inmigrantes 
188. M.oV.I Caltanissetta 
189. Mediterranea Berlin eV 
190. Meldpunt Vreemdelingendetentie 
191. Migrant Rights Centre Ireland 
192. Migrant Tales 
193. Migrant Voice UK 
194. Mobile Info Team 
195. MOC 
196. Move Coalition 
197. Movimento Italiani Senza Cittadinanza 
198. Mujeres Pa’lante 
199. Naga Odv 
200. Nazione Umana 
201. Network for Children’s Rights (Greece) 
202. NOF 
203. Nomada Association 
204. ONE PEOPLE 
205. Pauluskerk Rotterdam 
206. POUR LA SOLIDARITE 
207. PRO ASYL, National Working Group for Refugees 
208. Project Armonia 
209. Racism and Technology Center 
210. RADIO BULLETS APS 
211. Red Acoge 
212. RED AMINVI, SPAIN 
213. RED ESPAÑOLA DE INMIGRACION Y AYUDA AL REFUGIADO 
214. Red Interlavapies 
215. RED de Mujeres Latinoamericanas y del Caribe 
216. RECIPROCA ODV 
217. Refugee Council of Lower Saxony 
218. Refugee Legal Support (RLS) 
219. Refugees Platform In Egypt-RPE 
220. Refugees Welcome Italia 
221. Rete femminista No muri No recinti 
222. Rotterdams Ongedocumenteerden Steunpunt 
223. S.P.E.A.K (moslim woman collectif) 
224. SAAMO Antwerpen 
225. Salud por Derecho 
226. SCI Italia 
227. SCI Switzerland 
228. SNDVU Seguro 
229. Siempre 
230. Sienos Grupe 
231. SolidarityNow 
232. Solidary Wheels 
233. Stap Verder 
234. Stem in de Stad 
235. Steunpunt Ongedocumenteerden Pauluskerk 
236. Stichting Jeannette Noëlhuis 
237. Stichting LOS (NL) 
238. Stichting ShivA 
239. Stichting Vluchteling Kansen 
240. Stichting Vluchtelingen in de Knel 
241. STIL Utrecht 
242. Stowarzyszenie Interwencji Prawnej (Association for Legal Intervention) 
243. The Norwegian Centre Against Racism 
244. The Swedish Network of Refugee Support Groups 
245. Tierramatria mujeres migrantes y Refugiadas en Andalucía 
246. Toevlucht Utrecht 
247. Turun Valkonauha ry, Finland 
248. União de Refugiados em Portugal – UREP 
249. URGG 
250. Villa Vrede 
251. Vluchteling Onder Dak 
252. Vluchtelingenwerk Nederland (Dutch Council for Refugees) 
253. VTU Amsterdam 
254. Waterford Integration Services, Ireland 
255. Wereldhuis – World House (STEK) 
256. Wereldvrouwenhuis Mariam van Nijmegen 

On March 11, 2025, the European Commission published a new legislative proposal for a ‘Return Regulation’ which is set to expand the detention and deportation of migrant people, including children, in the EU (hereinafter referred to as Deportation Regulation).

The Deportation Regulation constitutes yet another offensive against migrants, reinforcing their criminalisation, contributing to far-right and security-oriented narratives and applying a punitive approach to all persons in an irregular situation and others who can be targeted with deportation. The proposal further expands the digital surveillance infrastructure underpinning the EU’s draconian data-driven policies in the areas of migration and policing. It builds on existing legislation that already allows for the indiscriminate use of harmful technologies, such as the EU Artificial Intelligence Act and the Pact on Migration and Asylum. 

The proposed regulation aims to increase deportation rates without addressing the complex factors that lead to people being threatened with deportation. In spite of its ‘Better Regulation’ principles, the Commission’s proposal is not accompanied by an impact assessment, following a now well established trend of maladministration in the area of migration policy-making. This also makes it extremely difficult to assess the proportionality of the measures proposed, as acknowledged by the European Data Protection Supervisor. 

The #ProtectNotSurveil coalition challenges the use of digital surveillance technologies, advocates for the rights of people to move and to seek safety and opportunities without risking harm, surveillance, criminalisation, or discrimination. 

For this reason we demand the end of the deportation regime and its digitalisation and call on the European Commission to withdraw its proposal and on the European Parliament and the Council to reject it. This should instead be an opportunity to work towards a meaningful alternative to current EU migration policies, which remains illegal, immoral, and unworkable.

How the Deportation Regulation expands the digital surveillance infrastructure  

• Bulk data collection and unlawful data sharing (Arts. 38-41) : Personal data collected for deportation purposes – including sensitive personal data (health data, criminal records) – could be accessed and repurposed by law enforcement agencies or other officials, and vice-versa. This undermines the principle of purpose limitation and erodes the already-thin firewall between administrative and policing functions.
• Unlawful data transfers to third countries outside of adequacy frameworks (Arts. 39-41):  the Regulation permits the sharing of personal and biometric data with countries that lack adequate data protection frameworks, with no effective oversight or redress mechanisms for the individuals concerned. It also allows for the sharing of sensitive data (health, criminal records) of people facing deportation.
• Technological management of detention facilities for migrants, on European territory and beyond: the expansion of the EU’s detention regime is at the heart of the new Regulation. This will lead to more people, including children and families, being held in prison-like facilities likely modelled on the EU-funded “Closed and Controlled Access Centers” already operating in Greece, characterised by phone surveillance, motion-sensors, cameras and fingerprint-access models. 
• Inclusion of people subjected to ‘European Return Orders’ in an opaque and mismanaged police database (Arts. 7-9) : the Regulation creates an ‘European Return Order’ (ERO), namely an harmonised form which will contain information related to deportation decisions valid throughout the whole EU territory. The Regulation will require national migration authorities to make the ERO available via the Schengen Information System (SIS II), which will make people’s personal data accessible to thousands of police officers across the EU and vulnerable to breaches and data leaks. SIS II is known for repeateddata abuse and non-compliance by police and immigration authorities, weak safeguards and systematic denial of people’s data protection rights.
• Expansion of control over people in an irregular situation (Arts. 23, 31-32): The proposed regulation not only foresees a major expansion of detention from 18 to to 24 months (Art. 32); it also foresees the possibility to ‘extend’ this time limit through the use of so-called ‘alternatives to detention’ (Art.31),  including electronic monitoring and GPS tagging, which have been widely criticised as being forms of de facto detention as highly stigmatising and invasive of privacy and freedom of movement.  In addition to this, the proposal introduces an obligation for all people in the deportation procedures to be allocated to a geographic area and/or reside at a specific address and/or comply with reporting obligations (Art. 23). While not specified in the text, this could also be implemented through the use of invasive surveillance and monitoring technologies.
• Tech-enabled racial profiling at the EU’s internal borders and within our communities (Art. 6):  the Regulation introduces a new obligation to step up the detection of undocumented people to enforce their deportation. This new provision incentivises mass racial profiling of anyone perceived to be undocumented, with race and ethnicity used as proxies for nationality or migration status. Such racial profiling would likely rely on increased use of surveillance technologies, such as mobile devices to conduct biometric identification.
• Arbitrary and inaccurate ‘security risk’ assessment used to enforce deportations (Art. 6): The Regulation expands “security risk” as a legal ground to enforce deportations. This broad and ill-defined categorisation creates a legal basis for authorities to use opaque and automated risk assessments — often powered by biased algorithms. The number of unlawful deportations would dramatically surge.

EU co-legislators: reject the proposal

We urge both the European Parliament and the Council to reject this proposal in its entirety. 

Evidence has shown, time and again, that expanding deportations does not increase safety, and only reinforces the harms of an already malfunctioning system. The inclusion of surveillance technology will only lead to more violence, marginalisation, and human rights abuses. The only people who will benefit are the agencies that inflate their budgets, and wealthy CEOs of private companies who fill their pockets off the back of lucrative contracts for border surveillance equipment.  

We also urge the European Commission to withdraw this proposal and immediately halt its punitive approach to migration, which only serves the economic interests of the technology and defence sectors, and the agendas of far-right groups. Once again, we urge the Commission to create policies that actually respond to the realities and needs of all people. 

What’s next

Later in 2025, the European Commission is also expected to publish a corollary legislation introducing new rules on the digital case-management of deportation procedures that will  strengthen a digital panopticon in the European Union.

As the #ProtectNotSurveil coalition, we will continue to challenge the use of digital technologies at different levels of EU policies and practices, and advocate for the ability of people to move to seek safety and opportunity without risking harm, surveillance or discrimination. The coalition will release a more detailed analysis of the digital impacts of the Migration Pact in due course. 

Signatories of the #ProtectNotSurveil coalition

• Access Now
• Equinox Initiative for Racial Justice 
• European Digital Rights (EDRi)
• AlgorithmWatch
• Border Violence Monitoring Network (BVMN)
• EuroMed Rights
• European Network Against Racism (ENAR)
• Hermes Center
• Homo Digitalis
• Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants (PICUM)
• Share Foundation
• Statewatch

On the occasion of Labour Day, 1 May 2025, we issue the Sevilla Manifesto to draw attention to – and inspiration from – the experiences of struggle and resistance of migrant workers across Europe and in Andalucia in particular. The Manifesto builds on key conclusions and recommendations from the meeting “Learnings on the Organization of Migrant Workers”, which took place in Seville in 2024, and brought together 12 migrant-led associations working in Andalucia, with 15 other migrants’ rights organisations from 10 countries (Belgium, Bulgaria, Malta, Greece, Poland, UK, Germany, Spain, Cyprus, and the Netherlands)..Organised by PICUM, Mujeres Supervivientes and Andalucia Acoge, the workshop focused on the multiple experiences of struggle and resistance of migrant workers in different sectors in Andalucia – such as domestic work and care, agriculture, and hospitality – , and considered how these experiences are mirrored and differ across the EU. We highlight how mutual support networks are being woven by people in neighbourhoods and villages, and how all these experiences, which are born from living in hostile contexts, manage to bring dignity and advances in rights to their members.

This manifesto reflects inputs from all participants, setting on key conclusions and recommendations.

Multiple obstacles to access rights and associated services: On a daily basis, migrants face barriers to access information, civil registration, services and regularisation that violate their fundamental rights. The lack of an intersectional perspective ignores how various oppressions and/or situations interact, creating further exclusion.

These barriers are compounded by racial discrimination and structural violence, both social and institutional, which perpetuate inequalities and lead to rights violations such as lack of labour contracts, access to justice, and decent housing, where systematic rejections of rental applications are common. In this context, one of the most severe situations is the precarious conditions in settlements where agricultural workers live, reflecting a reality of structural violence in Andalusia. In education, migrant children face bullying, while the qualifications and knowledge of professionals are delegitimized, relegating them to low-paying and exploitative jobs.

Exploitation in the workplace: The exploitation is alarming: extremely long working hours, wages below minimum standards and frequently withheld and stolen by employers, lack of contracts, and the absence of safety measures are all common. Migrant women, in particular, are vulnerable to sexual abuse and threats. This is further complicated by language barriers, which hinder communication in essential services, and a lack of information about rights and available resources, leaving many in situations of extreme vulnerability. The fear of retaliation and/or deportation paralyzes those who wish to report abuses and seek remedy through formal mechanisms. It also further renders their specific realities invisible, such as those of LGBTQIA+ migrants.

The strength of resistance and alliances: Despite this bleak picture, the strength of the collective emerges as a possibility for political and human alliances full of hope, the kind of hope that sustains and drives struggle. Community networks and alliances have shown that collective work allows resistance and demands for change. The so-called “juntanzas” (gatherings) are empowerment spaces where stories are shared, strategies are built, and inclusive leadership is strengthened. Collaboration between migrants and native communities fosters fairer and more representative narratives. Furthermore, it is essential to increase training and information spaces to promote informed activism, necessary to combat these injustices.

The future requires structural change: We need to rethink the language and rhetoric used to show more respect to migrants, who are holders of dignity, and to strengthen community and support organizations’ capacities in achieving political emancipation. It is crucial to develop collective strategies

such as media campaigns, alliances with trade unions, and safe spaces for mobilization and political activism. Migrant youth must also be enabled to actively participate in these spaces and actions, being the protagonists and voices of their own legitimate demands. Community organization and the visibility of these realities not only promotes basic rights but also reinforces the affections and political strength of the associative fabric that benefits us all in building a diverse, more just, and egalitarian society.

Necessary changes: It is essential to create participatory processes for establishing networks among migrant people. These processes should also foster horizontal and democratic political alliances with a range of organizations to walk together in building a society that celebrates diversity, and fights against racism. We aspire to a future of the common good, where everyone, including migrants, can belong. A future based on rights, without invisibilizing, discriminating, or instrumentalizing anyone. Accepting cultural and social diversity for respectful, kind, and care-based coexistence. This unity will allow us to address exploitation, and other labour and human rights violations when committed by employers in the workplace.

A central aspect is the need for safe and effective mechanisms for reporting and remedy, ensuring that victims of these situations are not at risk of being deported, and are protected. In this, there is a role for research and external observers and actors who can support in information provision, detection, identification and filing complaints. The role of trade unions and labour authorities is key.

For all these reasons, the undersigned entities demand that public institutions in Spain and in Europe more generally fulfill their functions and urge them to:

• Ensure victims of labour rights violations and violence have safe and effective mechanisms to report and access remedy and reparations , protecting migrants from potential retaliation and deportation, and including external support.

• Strengthen and expand regularization pathways, simplifying the procedures and eliminating bureaucratic barriers that are impossible to fulfill for many people working in precarious sectors.

• Ensure access to basic rights such as healthcare, education and housing, in law and in practice. In Spain, the effective implementation of the right to register in all municipalities. is crucial to ensuring that migrants are not discriminated against and can access basic rights and regularisation.

• Promote accessible funding avenues for grassroots organizations and spaces for community education and activism that foster collective empowerment and the fight against discrimination.

We resist, we sustain, and we walk together with strength toward the future.

Signatories

• AMIA
• Arbeit und Leben Berlin Brandenburg e.V.
• Asociación de Mujeres Migrantes por la Igualdad
• Asociación Nueva ciudadanía por la Interculturalidad ASNUCI
• Asociación Senegal Onubense
• Asociación Sevilla Negra
• Asociacion Tierra Matria
• Association for Legal Intervention
• Centre for Legal Aid Voice in Bulgaria
• CONVIVE Fundación Cepaim
• FairWork
• FAIRWORK Belgium
• FLEX
• Generation 2.0 for Rights, Equality and Diversity
• Grupo Artemisa Migrante y refugiada
• Ivorian community of Greece
• Jornaleras en asentamientos de Huelva
• JRS Malta
• KISA
• Le Monde des Possibles
• Maternidades negroafricanas
• Migrants’ Rights Network
• Mujeres cuidadoras sin papeles de Igualeja
• Mujeres Supervivientes
• Ocalenie Foundation
• PICUM
• Siriri + Asociación Nosotras Granada
• SolidarityNow

As two civil society networks representing together more than 330 organisations across Europe, the Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants (PICUM) and the European Network Against Racism (ENAR) aim to ensure that everyone can fully enjoy their human rights, regardless of migration status. Addressing structural racism and discrimination, including the role of migration policies in perpetuating them, is central to this mission.

We commend the initiative of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) and the
Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (CMW) to issue a joint General Comment/Recommendation on State Parties Obligations on Public Policies for Addressing and Eradicating Xenophobia and its impact on the rights of migrants, their families, and other non-citizens affected by racial discrimination. We have been closely engaged in the process leading to its adoption, sharing our collective expertise¹ and co-organising the Europe Expert Consultation which took place in Brussels on 30-31 October 2024.

The adoption of this Joint General Recommendation/Comment is now more important than ever. Since the launch of this process in late 2023, we have seen a wave of both proposed and negotiated legislative changes at the EU level that stand in direct contradiction to international human rights standards, including those enshrined in the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination and the Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families. Key examples include:

• November 2023 – The proposed revision of the EU Facilitators’ Package further criminalises migration and human rights defenders;²
• February 2024 – The adoption of the Schengen Border Code reform, which legitimises racial profiling in border checks, embedding discrimination in border enforcement.³
• May 2024 – The adoption of the Pact on Migration and Asylum, which:⁴
  • Normalises the arbitrary use of immigration detention, including for children and families.
  • Increases racial profiling.
  • Introduces “crisis” procedures that enable pushbacks.
  • Expands returns to so-called “safe third countries,” where individuals risk violence, torture, and
    arbitrary imprisonment.
• March 2025 – The European Commission’s proposal for a new EU regulation on return, which:⁵
  • Establishes deportation as the default option for people in an irregular migration situation.
  • Massively expands immigration detention, including of children (despite international human rights standards as well as global level commitment to work to end immigration detention).⁶
  • Introduces specific derogations from fundamental rights for migrants deemed a “risk” to national security and public order, further blurring the lines between criminal law and migration.

These policies are unfolding in a broader context of shrinking space for civil society, where organisations
working to uphold fundamental rights face growing restrictions and reduced funding, as well as judicial and other forms of harassment towards migrants and those providing them humanitarian assistance.⁷

At this critical juncture, CERD and CMW have a crucial role in holding states accountable. We urge you to:

• Prioritise the finalisation and adoption of the Joint General Recommendation/Comment to provide clear and binding guidance on addressing xenophobia in migration governance.
• Ensure strong language on state obligations to prevent racial discrimination in migration policies, in line with international human rights standards.
• Monitor state compliance and issue follow-up recommendations to prevent further erosion of migrant rights under the guise of security and border control.

We remain fully committed to supporting this process in any way necessary. Your leadership on this issue is critical in sending a strong global message that xenophobia and racial discrimination in migration governance cannot be tolerated.

Signatories:

• Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants (PICUM)
• European Network Against Racism (ENAR)

1. Our initial contributions are available on the website of the United National Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner. A direct link is available here: PICUM and ENAR. ↩︎
2. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament of the Council laying down minimum rules to prevent and counter the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and stay in the Union, and replacing Council Directive 2002/90/EC and Council Framework Decision 2002/946 JHA; PICUM, 2024, How the New EU Facilitation Directive Furthers the Criminalisation of Migrants and Human Rights Defenders ↩︎
3. Regulation (EU) 2024/1717 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 amending
   Regulation (EU) 2016/399 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders; PICUM Press Release of 7 February 2024 Racial profiling key element in the new deal on the Schengen Borders Code; PICUM, 2024, PICUM Analysis How will the new Schengen Borders Code affect undocumented migrants? ↩︎
4. Regulation (EU) 2024/1717 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 amending
   Regulation (EU) 2016/399 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders; Regulation (EU) 2024/1356 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 introducing the screening of third-country nationals at the external borders and amending Regulations (EC) No 767/2008, (EU) 2017/2226, (EU) 2018/1240 and (EU) 2019/817; Regulation (EU) 2024/1349 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 establishing a return border procedure, and amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1148; Regulation (EU) 2024/1358 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on the establishment of ‘Eurodac’ for the comparison of biometric data in order to effectively apply Regulations (EU) 2024/1351 and
   (EU) 2024/1350 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Directive 2001/55/EC and to identify illegally staying third-country nationals and stateless persons and on requests for the comparison with Eurodac data by Member States’ law enforcement authorities and Europol for law enforcement purposes, amending Regulations (EU) 2018/1240 and (EU) 2019/818 of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Regulation (EU) No 603/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council; Regulation (EU) 2024/1359 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 addressing situations of crisis and force majeure in the field of migration and asylum and amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1147; PICUM has developed a series of publications analysing the different parts of the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum, with a focus on their impact on detention, return, access to regular pathways and the rights of undocumented adults and children.
   See: Analysis of the Asylum Procedure Regulation and Return Border Procedure Regulation, Analysis of the Screening Regulation, Children’s rights in the 2024 Migration and Asylum Pact. See also, ENAR’s analysis on the racialisation of migration in the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum. ↩︎
5. Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a common system for the return of third-country nationals staying illegally in the Union, and repealing Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and the Council, Council Directive 2001/40/EC and Council Decision 2004/191/EC; PICUM Press release 11 March 2025 New Returns Regulation ushers in dystopian detention and deportation regime ↩︎
6. Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families and Committee on the Rights of the Child, 2017, Joint General Comment No. 3 of the CMW and No. 22 of the CRC in the context of International Migration: General principles; Global Compact on migration, 2018, Global Compact for safe, orderly and regular migration ↩︎
7. PICUM, 2024, Cases of criminalisation of migration and solidarity in the EU in 2023 ↩︎

Today marks three years since the EU activated the Temporary Protection Directive (TPD), which provided a safe pathway to protection for millions¹ of people fleeing the war in Ukraine. It was a powerful demonstration of the EU’s unity and solidarity in the face of a humanitarian crisis, and proved to be an effective emergency mechanism for responding to large arrivals of people in a humane and orderly way. It alleviated pressure on national asylum systems and provided displaced people with immediate and collective protection, including the right to reside, work, study, and access health care and social support in the EU.

The temporary protection regime is due to expire in March 2026, just one year away. Of the many challenges faced by people displaced from Ukraine, uncertainty about their legal status in the EU is among the most pressing. This lack of clarity impacts nearly every aspect of life: from securing stable employment and arranging long-term housing, to planning children’s education. Predictability is necessary for people to rebuild their lives with dignity and stability. It is promising to see that post-TPD solutions are a priority for the Commission and the Polish Presidency of the Council of the EU. Three years on, it is essential that the EU’s response to the needs of people displaced from Ukraine shifts from emergency measures to longer-term strategies and solutions.

In the meantime, some Member States – including Poland, the Czech Republic and Italy – have started developing pathways for people to transition out of temporary protection. However, many of these exit plans primarily rely on labour-based residence permits. Labour-based permits alone cannot be the answer, as many people covered by the TPD will not be able to meet the requirements. Not only does the proportion of temporary protection-holders who are employed vary greatly across Europe (from 8% in Hungary to 55% in the Netherlands), but it will leave many people in a vulnerable situation behind, including some people with disabilities, students, the elderly, third-country nationals and stateless persons granted refugee or complementary protection in Ukraine, people who experience discrimination in the labour market (for example, people who have been racialised), and those who cannot work full-time because they are caring for children or infirm family members.

The ad-hoc solutions proposed by Member States also risk overlooking the status of individuals who may be displaced from Ukraine after March 2026, as they may not fall within the scope of any post-TPD measures, including family members of those already in the EU.

Unless these gaps are addressed, Member States’ asylum systems could be overburdened once temporary protection ends, even though the TPD’s express purpose is to prevent this. The fact that some Member States have frozen asylum applications from people who fall under the TPD increases this risk. An EU-wide and coordinated approach would be beneficial not only for people displaced from Ukraine, but also for the countries and communities where they live – limiting the financial and administrative burdens associated with individually determining the status of the more than 4.3 million people who currently benefit from temporary protection.

• We are calling on the EU to go beyond repeatedly renewing temporary protection and propose a coordinated and collective solution that would offer a more durable status and pathway to long-term residence. An EU-wide approach with strong EU leadership and coordination is vital to prevent a fragmented approach and people falling into irregularity, with vulnerable groups being disproportionately affected.

Post-TPD solutions are long overdue. A collective of more than 130 civil society organisations welcomed the EU’s previous extension of the temporary protection regime through to March 2026 to provide time for policymakers to define durable solutions while ensuring short-term stability for displaced people. However, unless work starts now to make tangible progress in implementing a coordinated transition out of temporary protection, another one-year extension may be the only option.

• Another one-year extension of the temporary protection regime beyond March 2026 must be considered as an exceptional and interim measure to ensure the continuation of protection and to prevent displaced individuals from becoming undocumented, or falling into uncertainty and losing their jobs, education, housing, or healthcare. If this interim arrangement is necessary, we urge the European Commission to propose as soon as possible a Council Implementation Decision extending the TPD until March 2027, while offering clarity on the future protection and residence status of people displaced from Ukraine.

Despite recent diplomatic discussions on the potential for renewed peace talks, the humanitarian situation in Ukraine remains dire. There are daily reports of shelling and airstrikes, even in cities and villages hundreds of kilometers from the frontline. Should the ceasefire be achieved any time soon, the damage to Ukraine’s critical and civilian infrastructure and widespread contamination from explosive ordnance will take years to repair, restore, and clear before the situation permits safe, truly voluntary, and durable returns. In this context, it is worrying to see that some host countries have begun or are
considering scaling back their support to people displaced from Ukraine – for example, by limiting the duration of government-sponsored housing support, or by restricting its scope to people who come from specific regions in Ukraine.

• We call on Member States not to roll back support to people displaced from Ukraine, and to fully implement the provisions enshrined in the TPD. This includes ensuring full access to the rights and basic services it guarantees. It is essential that Member States respect their obligations regarding non-refoulement and avoid any measures that could directly or indirectly result in premature returns, jeopardising the safety and well-being of those in need.

Signatories:

• All-Ukrainian NGO Coalition for People with Intellectual Disabilities
• Amnesty International
• Animus Association Foundation
• Anti-Discrimination Center “Memorial-Brussels”
• ARSIS Association for the Social Support of Youth
• Association for Integration and Migration
• ASTI Luxembourg
• ASTRA-Anti trafficking action
• Blue Door Education
• Bridges over Borders e.V.
• Caritas Bulgaria
• Caritas Española
• Caritas Europa
• Caritas Hellas
• Center for Legal Aid Voice in Bulgaria
• Centre for Peace Studies
• Centrum pro integraci cizinců, o. p. s.
• Churches´Commission for Migrants in Europe CCME
• Clare Immigrant Support Centre
• COFACE Families Europe
• Cohort
• CoMensha
• Consortium of Migrants Assisting Organizations in the Czech Republic
• Cultúr Migrant Centre
• CUSBU
• Danish Refugee Council
• Defence for Children In. Greece (DCI Greece)
• Diakonie ČCE – středisko Západní Čechy
• Diakonie Deutschland im Evangelischen Werk für Diakonie und Entwicklung e.V.
• Dutch Council for Refugees
• Ecumanical Council of finland
• ELIL – European Lawyers in Lesvos
• ENSIE
• Eurodiaconia
• EuroMed Rights
• European Association of Service Providers for Persons with Disabilities (EASPD)
• European Federation of National Organisations Working with the Homeless (FEANTSA)
• European Network on Statelessness
• FairWork
• Fenix – Humanitarian Legal Aid
• Finnish Refugee Advice Centre
• Forum réfugiés
• Foundation for the Ukrainian Community of Malta
• Greek Council for Refugees (GCR)
• Greek Forum of Migrants
• HIAS Europe
• Hook Peninsula Friends of Ukraine
• ICMC Europe – Share Network
• Immigrant Council of Ireland
• Iniciativa Hlavak
• Inter Alia
• International Rescue Committee
• Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS) Europe
• Jesuit Refugee Service Germany | Jesuiten-Flüchtlingsdienst Deutschland
• Jesuit Refugee Service Malta
• JRS France
• JRS Portugal
• JRS Romania
• Kerk in Actie
• La Cimade
• La Strada International
• LDH (Ligue des droits de l’Homme)
• LGBT Ireland
• Médecins du Monde International Network
• Migrant Voice
• Migration Consortium
• Migration Policy Group
• Migrationsrat Berlin
• Missing Children Europe
• Monde des Possibles ASBL
• Mujeres Supervivientes
• NESEHNUTÍ
• Neue Richtervereinigung – Zusammenschluss von Richterinnen und Richtern,
• Staatsanwältinnen und Staatsanwälten e.V.
• NewBees
• Nordic Ukraine Forum
• Nowegian Refugee Council
• OpenEmbassy
• OPORA Foundation
• ORBIT
• Oxfam
• PATCHWORK, Association for immigrant families of persons with disabilities
• Payoke
• People in Need
• PICUM – Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants
• Podilsky Centr Genderna Rada Khmelnytska Oblasna
• PRO ASYL
• Red Cross EU Office
• Refugees Welcome, Denmark
• Right to Protection Charitable Fund
• Romodrom, o.p.s.
• Save the Children
• Scholars At Risk Europe
• Slovene Philanthropy
• Social Platform
• SOFT tulip Foundation
• SOLIDAR
• SolidarityNow
• SOS Children’s Villages International
• South Tipperary Development Clg
• Stichting LOS
• Stichting voor Vluchteling-Studenten UAF
• Terre des Hommes Deutschland e.V.
• The Council of African and Caribbean Churches
• The Open Doors Initiative
• Ukraine Civil Society Forum (Ireland)
• Vatra Psycho-Social Centre
• West Limerick Resources CLG
• Yoga and Sport with Refugees
• Громадська Организация ” Жіночій центр ” Підтримка Захист та Турбота”

1. According to the European Commission, as of December 2024, slightly more than 4.3 million
   non-EU citizens, who fled Ukraine as a consequence of the war were under temporary protection in
   the EU. ↩︎

Joint CSO Statement

We unite today to put forward our shared vision for the future of gender equality in the European Union (EU). We call on the EU to work over the next five years towards the practical realisation of a Union where everyone can live in safety, free from discrimination and violence, and where gender equality is not just an aspiration but a lived reality for all – regardless of their gender, ethnicity, race, gender identity and expression, sexual orientation, sex characteristics, disability, residence status, social class, age, among others.

The last mandate saw notable initiatives to advance gender equality. However, despite these achievements, striking inequalities remain. As the new European Commission is taking office, we request the EU institutions and Member States to redouble their efforts and to ensure that advancing gender equality remains a key priority mainstreamed throughout EU laws and policies for the next 5 years, with the necessary resources allocated.

In particular, we call on the EU to ensure the highest level of ambition is reflected in the upcoming Roadmap for Women’s Rights and the Gender Equality Strategy post-2025, particularly geared towards achieving the following objectives:

Realising the full range of women’s rights

We urge the EU to promote the highest standards of women’s rights across all Member States. In particular, increased action at EU-level is necessary on the following issues:

Upholding sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR): Despite SRHR being integral to EU values of fundamental rights and gender equality, serious disparities remain in ensuring equal access across the EU. These gaps arise from a lack of robust EU standards, despite Member States’ binding international human rights obligations and substantial political commitments to SRHR. We call on the EU to:

• Fully utilise its existing competences to advance SRHR in EU law and policy and issue clear guidelines to Member States on SRHR in line with international standards;
• Strengthen EU actions and funding to improve access to sexual and reproductive healthcare and reduce health inequalities in and across EU Member States;
• Heed calls from the European Parliament to enshrine the rights to abortion and bodily autonomy in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, and SRHR in the Treaties;
• Ensure any rollbacks of existing entitlements and threats thereof be swiftly addressed and vehemently opposed as contrary to EU values.

Combating the backlash against gender equality: The growing opposition to gender equality risks rolling back existing entitlements, directly contradicting the EU’s founding values. To counter this, the EU must:

• Take robust action to combat anti-rights narratives and actors;
• Issue strong political condemnation and adopt sanctions against Member States that undermine gender equality, as well as women’s, LGBTIQ people’s and reproductive rights.

Protecting Women Human Rights Defenders and their organisations: Across Europe, human rights defenders are increasingly at risk. Among them are women human rights defenders (WHRDs), who play a vital role as frontline advocates for gender equality and equal rights across the EU. Both because of who they are and because of what they stand for, WHRDs face heightened levels of attacks, harassment and threats, online and offline, smear campaigns, judicial harassment, and the defunding of their organisations. The EU must:

• Take decisive action to ensure that human right defenders – in particular WHRDs – receive robust political support and comprehensive protection in the EU; and that their organisations receive adequate funding.

Ending sexual and gender-based violence

The EU’s accession to the Istanbul Convention and the adoption of the EU Directive on combating violence against women and domestic violence (VAW) were important steps forward to ensure the prevention, support and protection of victims of sexual and gender-based violence. It is imperative we now focus on its practical implementation.

Implementing the Directive on VAW: The European Commission must provide clear guidelines, and Member States must integrate the expertise of CSOs to:

• Strengthen primary prevention: Prevention must go beyond awareness-raising campaigns to actively stop gender-based violence (GBV) from occurring. A comprehensive approach to primary prevention should include peer education, feminist self-defence, school-based programs; the provision of training to transform societal norms that perpetuate violence; and foster bystander intervention. These measures are essential for building a future free of GBV.
• Provide comprehensive sexuality education: Mandatory comprehensive sexuality education (CSE) is a cornerstone of primary prevention. In line with international standards and the Directive, Member States must ensure the provision of CSE, which includes education on consent.
• Secure the rights of victims and survivors. Member States must guarantee the rights and respond to the needs of all victims and survivors, especially those facing intersecting oppressions, including LBTIQ women, racialized women, women with dependent residence permit, undocumented migrant women, women sex workers, women in exploitative or trafficking situations, women with disabilities and other marginalised groups. Victims of sexual violence in particular must be guaranteed full access to support services, including comprehensive sexual and reproductive healthcare.

Going beyond the Directive on VAW: To address the full spectrum of GBV and ensure no one is left behind, the EU and its Member States must also:

• Include gender-based violence (GBV) as a crime in the EU Treaties.
• Recognise that sex without consent is rape and establish EU-wide consent-based definitions of rape and other sexual violence crimes.
• Address all violations of SRHR, such as obstetric and gynaecological violence, intersex genital mutilation and the denial of abortion and post-abortion care, including through formulating clear recommendations on these harmful practices to member states, in line with international guidelines.
• Establish safeguards to ensure the rights of women who are undocumented, or have precarious residence status. More likely to experience violence and abuse precisely because their status puts them in a situation of vulnerability, it is of utmost importance that they are able to safely report violence and abuse and file complaints.
• Address the disproportionate impact of the criminal justice system on marginalized communities: While criminal law plays an important role in ensuring accountability, systemic biases in law enforcement and justice disproportionately police and criminalize groups like undocumented people, sex workers, LGBTIQ individuals, and racialized communities, worsening their vulnerabilities and denying them access to justice. We encourage the EU to prioritize community-led solutions and focus on healthcare, housing, education, and welfare.

Responding to intersectional discrimination and oppression

The upcoming Roadmap for Women’s Rights and the Gender Equality Strategy must adopt a robust intersectional approach to tackle the structural systems of oppression perpetuating gender inequality. Achieving gender equality requires addressing overlapping forms of discrimination that affect different groups, in particular LGBTIQ people (including LBTIQ women), racialized women, women with dependent residence permit, undocumented migrant women, women sex workers, women in exploitative or trafficking situations, women with disabilities, and other marginalised groups.

A feminist and intersectional perspective must be integrated across all EU policy areas, including those within the Union of Equality Agenda (e.g. LGBTIQ, Anti-Racism, Child Rights, Disability, Roma Rights), as well as areas such as migration, victims’ rights, social inclusion, health, long-term care, early childhood education, digital rights, employment, education, disinformation, and foreign policy.

Ensuring sufficient funding for these objectives

Sufficient, sustainable, and long-term funding is essential to ensure that the policies and initiatives needed to achieve gender equality are fully implemented, and that civil society organisations (CSOs) working towards gender equality remain resilient in the face of political and societal backlash. As the EU begins negotiations on the next Multiannual Financial Framework next year, we call for:

• Gender budgeting throughout the entire budgetary process, with targeted budget lines for gender equality and anti-discrimination initiatives, with an intersectional perspective.
• Continued support to CSOs, particularly those working in hostile environments, through funds under direct management by the European Commission.
• Increased accessibility of EU funding for grassroots and community-based organisations; notably through regranting schemes that alleviate financial and administrative burdens on smaller organisations.
• Safeguards to ensure that no EU funds are ever provided to Member States or groups that violate the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.

Our Call to Action

We urge the EU institutions and Member States to join us in building a more just and equal society. Gender equality must remain a top priority in all EU policy processes over the next five years. Let us work together to ensure that women and girls in all their diversity in the EU can live free from violence, discrimination, and oppression.

Note: Our organisations work on a diverse range of women’s rights issues. In the drafting of this document, we have been led by the expertise of women’s rights organisations and women human rights defenders from communities most impacted by the specific forms of violence described in each section. Our commitment to the text above represents our coming together as a collective with shared values, even though not every organisation has its own policy or programme of work dedicated to each issue.

Signatories

• AGE Platform Europe
• Amnesty International
• Center for Reproductive Rights
• EL*C – Eurocentralasian Lesbian* Community
• End FGM European Network
• European Sex Workers Rights Alliance
• IGLYO
• ILGA-Europe
• International Planned Parenthood Federation European Network (IPPF EN)
• La Strada International – European NGO Platform against Human Trafficking
• Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants (PICUM)
• Protection International
• Organisation Intersex International Europe – OII Europe

On 13 June, the Council of the European Union adopted its position on the Commission’s proposal for a revision of the Victims’ Rights Directive. The European Parliament already published its negotiating mandate in April. More than twelve years after the adoption of the Victims’ Rights Directive, this was an opportunity for governments to stand in solidarity with all victims of crime and to strengthen their rights and treatment. 

Regrettably, with this Council position, States have shown little willingness to commit to enhancing victim rights. They have largely rejected or diluted the EU Commission’s proposals, turning obligations into mere options. This undermines the scope of the Victims’ Rights Directive, leaving diverse crime victims inadequately protected and potentially harmed by the systems meant to protect them and deliver justice. 

For example, specific rights have been removed or weakened, including those relating to safe reporting of crime, court-based support services, access to medical care services, privacy protections, information and participation rights, offender compensation, legal remedies and review decisions. Additionally, the role of NGOs has been diminished by removing commitments to coordinate services – which are largely delivered by civil society – to one of mere consultation. This increases the risk of further stigma, discrimination, or prejudice. Therefore, clear and binding obligations for EU Member States are essential.

This position of the Council contrasts with the European Parliament’s report, which has adopted proposals that build an effective legislative framework for coordinated support, protection and justice. Thus, the European Parliament recognises that the actions and costs involved in this process are investments in our future. 

Every Euro spent on victims’ rights and services reduces the cost of crime and its emotional impact, and it also increases the ability of individuals to return to work, next to the efficiency and effectiveness of criminal proceedings. The European Parliament’s proposals commit to a thriving, safer, more resilient and more just society that upholds EU values, including fundamental rights. 

Member States have recently adopted the Directive on Violence against Women and Domestic Violence, the recast EU Directive on Combating and Preventing Trafficking in Human Beings and they are currently negotiating the Regulation laying down rules to prevent and combat Child Sexual Abuse. This shows a willingness to seek the advancement of the rights of specific victim groups, with a particular focus on children, women and victims of human trafficking. 

Member States should now affirm their commitment to all victims of crime regardless of their sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression, sex characteristics, age, disability, ethnicity, residence status,, and type of exploitation by enhancing minimum standards for all in the Victims’ Rights Directive Revision. There should be equal treatment of all victims of crime; no victim should be left behind. 

With a new Parliament and renewed vigour, we call on all EU Member States and the European Parliament to stand together – united for every victim in the EU. We call on them to genuinely explore solutions proposed by the European Commission and Parliament that will finally make victims’ rights a reality. We call on them to honour commitments to victims of crime; by adopting a strong Victims’ Rights Directive as the cornerstone legislation for all victims of crime, Member States can demonstrate their commitment to valuing fundamental human rights, human dignity and the European Union’s foundational values.

Signatories

1. AGE Platform Europe
2. Center for Reproductive Rights 
3. Child Helpline International
4. End FGM European Network
5. Eurochild
6. European Disability Forum (EDF)
7. European Forum for Restorative Justice (EFRJ)
8. European Sex Workers Alliance (ESWA)
9. ILGA Europe (the European region of the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association)
10. La Strada International
11. Missing Children Europe
12. Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants (PICUM)
13. Validity Foundation
14. Trans Europe and Central Asia (TGEU)
15. Women Against Violence Europe (WAVE Network)
16. Advocates for Victims of Homicide (AdVIC) Ireland
17. A Associação Portuguesa de Apoio à Vítima (APAV Portugal)
18. Association for the Prevention and Handling of Violence in the Family (APHVF/ SPAVO) Cyprus
19. Associazione Italiana di Supporto Vittimologico 
20. Associazione Libra
21. ATENIN Spain
22. Bijeli Krug Croatia 
23. Bily Kruh Bezpeci (Czech Republic)
24. Brottsofferjouren Sverige (The Crime Victims’ Center Sweden)
25. Child Rights Centre Albania
26. DROGA Poland
27. Federation for Victim Assistance Ireland
28. France Victimes
29. Irish Road Victims Association (IRVA); International Road Victims Partnership
30. Klaipeda Social and Psychological Support Center
31. Law and Internet Foundation (Bulgaria)
32. Opferhilfe Berlin e.V.
33. Rete Dafne Italia 
34. Slachtofferhulp Netherlands
35. Skalbes Latvia
36. The Smile of the Child – Greece
37. Victim and Witness Support Service Croatia
38. Victim Support at Court (Ireland)
39. Victim Support Denmark 
40. Victim Support Europe
41. Victim Support Finland (RIKU)
42. Victim Support Flanders, CAW (Belgium)
43. Victim Support Malta 
44. Victim Support Sweden
45. Victim Support UK
46. Vilnius Institute for Advanced Studies (VILIAS)
47. Woman’s Room – Center for Sexual Rights Croatia 
48. Weisser Ring Austria
49. Weisser Ring Germany
50. Victimology Society of Serbia
51. Vilnius Institute of Advanced Studies (VILIAS)
52. White Circle Croatia

Today, the Council of the EU officially adopted the EU Directive on combating violence against women and domestic violence.¹ As 13 civil society organisations² which advocate for human rights, gender equality, and the right for all to live free from violence, we welcome this first ever binding EU legislation on this issue as a groundbreaking step.

The Directive adopts a holistic approach to combat violence against women and domestic violence, incorporating measures relating to prevention, protection, support for victims, access to justice and prosecution of perpetrators. This achievement is the result of long-term advocacy by feminist movements and Members of the European Parliament championing the European Commission’s ambitious proposal. We extend our gratitude to everyone involved in making this Directive as strong as possible.

We applaud the fact that the Directive recognizes the perpetration of female genital mutilation, forced marriage and certain forms of online violence as crimes. Unfortunately, other forms of violence were ultimately not criminalised, including intersex genital mutilation and forced sterilisation. We deeply regret that some Member States managed to derail the unprecedented opportunity to criminalise rape with a consent-based definition at the EU level. Sexual violence against women is endemic across the EU, with widespread impunity. Consent-based definitions of rape allow for all cases of rape to be included and strengthen protection and access to justice for victims of rape. We continue to call on all Member States who have not yet done so, to move towards adopting consent-based laws.

Crucially, the Directive will require Member States to do more to prevent rape, by raising public awareness of the fact that sex without consent is a crime, through awareness raising programmes and educational materials. We encourage Member States to embrace the comprehensive prevention approach outlined in the Directive, in particular primary prevention initiatives, and to provide mandatory comprehensive sexuality education, which includes consent education and challenges harmful gender norms.

The Directive further guarantees comprehensive support to victims of violence against women and girls and domestic violence and access to both general and specialist support services, shelters, support for child victims, as well as access to comprehensive medical care including sexual and reproductive health services. This is the first time that EU law imposes explicit obligations on Member States to provide access to this essential medical care for victims of sexual violence. Member States will also have to provide training for professionals likely to come into contact with victims, on how to provide this support.

The Directive recognises that victims of violence against women and domestic violence who experience intersectional discrimination are at a heightened risk of violence, and obliges Member States to meet their specific needs. Targeting a public figure, a human rights defender, or someone for their personal characteristics will constitute an aggravating circumstance. In the implementation of the Directive, Member States must ensure that all victims and survivors of gender-based violence are protected, no matter their sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression or sex characteristics.

However, EU lawmakers yet again silenced women impacted by EU migration policies. The only concrete step forward for migrant women is that the text requires Member States to make shelters available to all women experiencing domestic abuse, regardless of their residence status. Nonetheless we condemn that the final text does not retain provisions on protecting undocumented women’s personal data from being transmitted to immigration authorities (neither in the context of accessing shelters, nor in terms of accessing justice). Member States must ensure that women are not deterred from going to the police because of their residence status, by including access to safe reporting in the ongoing revision of the Victims’ Rights Directive³.

We call on the European Commission to provide guidelines and training to Member States, based on international standards and in consultation with civil society organisations. We urge Member States to fully implement the Directive as soon as possible. Recalling that the Directive sets minimum standards, we call on Member States to go beyond these and to realise the highest standards across the EU.

We call on the European Commission to review the Directive in the next five years and to work towards comprehensive and inclusive measures to address all forms of sexual and gender-based violence without discrimination.

We, together with our members across Europe, are committed to providing our expertise, and look forward to supporting a strong implementation of the Directive, to progress towards a Europe where everyone is safe from gender-based violence.

Signatories

• Amnesty International
• Center for Reproductive Rights
• EL*C – Eurocentralasian Lesbian* Community
• End FGM European Network
• European Sex Workers Rights Alliance
• Human Rights Watch
• ILGA-Europe (The European region of the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association)
• International Planned Parenthood Federation European Network (IPPF EN)
• La Strada International
• Organisation Intersex International Europe (OII Europe)
• Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants (PICUM)
• TGEU (Trans Europe and Central Asia)
• Women Against Violence Europe (WAVE)

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¹ Throughout this statement, the term “women” should be understood as including “women and girls”, as in the definition of “violence against women” proposed by the European Commission in the Directive, which encompasses “violence directed against a woman or a girl”.

² Amnesty International, Center for Reproductive Rights, EuroCentralAsian Lesbian* Community (EL*C), End FGM European Network, European Sex Workers’ Rights Alliance (ESWA), Human Rights Watch, ILGA-Europe (The European region of the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association), International Planned Parenthood Federation European Network (IPPF EN), La Strada International, Organisation Intersex International Europe (OII Europe), Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants (PICUM), TGEU (Trans Europe and Central Asia), Women Against Violence Europe (WAVE).

Our organisations work on a diverse range of women’s rights issues. In the drafting of this document, we have been led by the expertise of women’s rights organisations and women human rights defenders from communities most impacted by the specific forms of violence described in each section. Our commitment to the text below represents our coming together as a collective with shared values, even though not every organisation has its own policy or programme of work dedicated to each issue.

³ For more information, see a joint civil society statement on the revision of the Victims’ Rights Directive, signed by some of our organisations who are advocating for victims’ rights.

Despite repeated warnings from civil society organisations, EU lawmakers have reached an agreement on the Schengen Borders Code reform which will be voted on in the LIBE Committee next week. The legislative file that has emerged from negotiations between the Belgian Presidency of the Council of the EU, the European Parliament and Commission will have devastating consequences for people in migration and racialised communities.

We call on MEPs in the Plenary vote to reject the Schengen Borders Code reform and give a clear signal against legislation that undermines fundamental rights.

The vote will include several concerning amendments that, taken together, will create a dangerous new system for ‘managing migration’ at Schengen borders, contribute to shrinking civic space, in particular increasing criminalisation of movement and solidarity:

• While the revision of the Schengen Borders’ Code is hailed as the solution to stop the constant reintroduction of temporary internal border controls, the proposal generalises police checks with the explicit aim to prevent irregular migration. Stopping individuals who are suspected of being undocumented relies heavily on racial profiling. Research from the EU Fundamental Rights Agency has shown that racialised communities are subject to discriminatory and arbitrary checks, regardless of citizenship or residence status. In fact, over half of people of African descent surveyed felt that their most recent police stop was a result of racial profiling. This practice is in clear violation of EU and international anti-discrimination law, and contradicts the spirit of the EU Action Plan Against Racism. While the recitals of the reform state that all actions should be carried out in full respect of the principle of non-discrimination, there is no indication of how this will be monitored or ensured, or how Member States will be sanctioned if they do act in violation.

• Article 23a allows for internal pushbacks between Member States as safeguards to mitigate its consequences on fundamental rights introduced by the Parliament are removed. This article provides for the immediate “transfer” (removal) of third country nationals apprehended “in border areas” to the country that they crossed from. Whilst there are provisions that state the individual can appeal this “transfer” decision, the appeal will not have a suspensive effect, meaning the person will be returned regardless. There are no exemptions to this procedure for unaccompanied children, families with children, or individuals in a state of vulnerability. Whilst it is written that asylum seekers will not be subject to such internal readmission procedures, how this exemption will be respected in practice remains to be seen. Such “transfers” would violate well-established jurisprudence by courts in Italy, Slovenia and Austria, which have all ruled against chain pushbacks between Member States.

Case Study: Italy

Summary returns or readmission practices at the Italian borders have been taking place for years and vividly exemplify the implications on the human rights of people on the move. In fact, in January 2021 and again in 2023 the Civil Court in Rome ruled that numerous cases of readmissions to Slovenia from Trieste and Gorizia implemented under a 1996 Readmission Agreement were in fact unlawful as they violated the right to non-refoulement, the right to apply for asylum, and the procedural rights to individual assessment and effective remedy. At the Adriatic border, Italy was sanctioned by the ECtHR in 2014 for a readmission to Greece in which the Court found a violation of the prohibition of collective expulsion and of ill-treatment. Communications sent to the Committee of Ministers under the supervision procedure for the supervision of the execution of judgement relating to Sharifi case and a recent ruling by the Court of Rome on the readmission of an Afghan unaccompanied minor to Greece show how violations continue. At the Italo-French border, the CJEU and Council of State found that returns between the two countries were in direct contradiction to guarantees laid out in the Returns Directive.

On the other hand, practices of racial profiling are already significantly widespread at Italian internal borders. As pointed out by ASGI in its submission to CERD (Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination), the Ventimiglia train station, a major transit point for people moving to France, is characterised by police checks that almost exclusively and systematically target people of African descent. Consequently, the Committee has made specific recommendations to the Italian government to tackle profiling, highlighting the complete lack of appropriate mechanisms within the national system to combat it.

• The concept of ‘instrumentalisation’ is carried over from the New Pact’s Crisis Regulation despite being removed from the Parliament’s initial position on the Schengen Borders Code reform. In practice, this means that Member States could derogate at will from fundamental rights frameworks whenever a third country or non-state actor is accused of ‘instrumentalising migrants’ to destabilise the EU or its Member States. We have seen this play out in the attacks against people crossing borders by Greek authorities in 2020, the numerous deaths recorded at the Spanish, Polish, Latvian and Lithuanian borders, and the closure of all entry points into Finland in 2023. The Schengen Borders Code reform takes this a step further by including a disturbing Council amendment which allows for Member States to take “any necessary measures” to preserve “security, law and order” if a large number of individuals attempt to enter a country irregularly “en masse and using force”. This is transposed improperly from the N.D. and N.T. v. Spain case and could have devastating consequences; in effect the text allows for unlimited derogations from the EU asylum and fundamental rights acquis.

• The reform also repeatedly refers to the increased usage of surveillance and monitoring technologies at both internal and external borders. Technologies such as drones, motion sensors, thermal imaging cameras, and others ease the identification of people crossing borders prior to arrival and have been shown to facilitate pushbacks. In fact, the Border Violence Monitoring Network (BVMN) has recorded 38 testimonies, impacting over 1,000 people, where the respondent reported to have heard or seen a drone prior to their pushback. The use of technologies to track and monitor the movement of people could therefore enhance the ease with which they are readmitted between Schengen Member States.

We, the undersigned, call on MEPs to reject the Schengen Borders Code reform at both the LIBE and Plenary votes. This file expands the harmful concept of ‘instrumentalisation’, legalises internal pushbacks, risks widespread racial profiling, and enhances the use of border surveillance technologies that have been proven to facilitate fundamental rights violations.

The Parliament position on the file sought to remove the most problematic aspects and include safeguards for the rights of people in migration and racialised communities. That position has since been abandoned, and the one that has replaced it is untenable when it comes to the protection of fundamental rights.

Signatories:

• Abolish Frontex
• Accem
• Access Now
• ActionAid International
• African Children and Youth Development Network (ACYDN)
• AlgoRace
• AMANE
• Amnesty International
• Amnesty Luxembourg
• ARACEM
• Are You Syrious (AYS)
• ASGI
• Asociacion Geum Dodou
• Asociación Pro Derechos Humanos de Andalucía – APDHA
• Asociación Por Ti Mujer
• Asociación Rumiñahui
• Asociación Salud Y Familia
• Association des Travailleurs Maghrébins de France -ATMF
• Association pour la promotion des droits humains APDH
• Association Marocaine des Droits Humains
• Be Aware and Share (BAAS)
• Better Days Greece
• Blindspots e.V.
• Boat Refugee Foundation
• borderline-europe – Menschenrechte ohne Grenzen e.V.
• Center for Legal Aid, Voice in Bulgaria
• Centre for Peace Studies
• CNCD-11.11.11
• Collective Aid
• Comunità Papa Giovanni XXIII
• Convenzione per i diritti nel Mediterraneo ETS
• CONVIVE- Fundación Cepaim
• Convivir sin Racismo
• CSC ACV Brussels
• Cultural Center Danilo Kiš
• Danes je nov dan / Today is a new day
• Danish Refugee Council
• Digital Society, Switzerland
• Diotima Centre for Gender Rights & Equality
• Dråpen i Havet / Stagona
• Draseis sth geitonia
• E.L. Foundation
• ECCHR – European Centre for Constitutional and Human Rights
• ECHO100PLUS
• EmpowerVan!
• Entreculturas
• Epicenter.works
• Equal Legal Aid
• Equinox Initiative for Racial Justice
• Equipo Decenio Afrodescendiente- España
• EuroMed Rights
• Europe Cares e.V. / Paréa Lesvos
• European Center for Non-Profit Law
• European Civic Forum
• European Digital Rights (EDRi)
• European Network Against Racism (ENAR)
• European Sex Workers Rights Alliance (ESWA)
• Fenix Humanitarian Legal Aid
• forRefugees
• From the Sea to the City – FSTC
• Fundación Alboan
• Greek Council for Refugees (GCR)
• Greek Forum of Migrants
• Greek Forum of Refugees
• Gruppo Melitea
• Habibi Works (Soup and Socks e.V.)
• Hermes Center
• HIAS Europe
• Homo Digitalis
• Hope and Humanity Poland
• Humanitas – Centre for Global Learning and Cooperation
• HumanRights360
• I Have Rights
• IDAY Liberia Coalition Inc
• Infokolpa
• Institute Circle
• Inter Alia
• InterEuropean Humanitarian Aid Association Germany e.V. (IHA)
• International Rescue Committee (IRC)
• Irida Women’s Center
• Iridia. Centro por la Defensa de Derechos Humanos
• Jesuit Refugee Service Greece
• KAST (Khora Asylum Support Team)
• KOK – German Network against Trafficking in Human Beings
• Komitee für Grundrechte und Demokratie e.V.
• La Cimade
• La Coordinadora de Organizaciones para el Desarrollo
• Legal Centre Lesvos
• Lighthouse Relief
• Ligue des Droits Humains
• Mec de la Rue
• Migreurop
• Mobile Info Team
• Network for Children’s Rights
• Northern Lights Aid
• NOVACT
• No Name Kitchen
• Oxfam
• PICUM (Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants)
• POPH
• Privacy International
• Project Play
• PRO ASYL
• Quaker Council for European Affairs
• Red Umbrella Sweden
• Refugees in Libya
• Refugee Legal Support (RLS)
• Refugee Literacy Project
• Refugees International
• Revibra Europe
• S.P.E.A.K.
• Safe Place Greece
• Salud por Derecho
• Salvamento Marítimo Humanitario
• Samos Volunteers
• Sea-Eye e.V.
• Sea-Watch e.V.
• Second Tree
• Seebrücke Schweiz
• Seios Grupe
• Slovene Philanthropy
• Society Kljuc – Centre for Fight against Trafficking in Human Beings
• SOLIDAR
• Statewatch
• Stichting LOS
• TAMPEP – European Network for the Promotion of Rights and Health among Migrant Sex Workers
• The Human Rights Legal Project
• Yoga and Sport with Refugees
• Zeitschrift Bürgerrechte & Polizei/ CILIP (Germany)

On 10 April 2024, the European Parliament adopted the New Pact on Migration and Asylum, a package of reforms expanding the criminalisation and digital surveillance of migrants. 

Despite civil society organisations’ repeated warnings, the Pact “will normalise the arbitrary use of immigration detention, including for children and families, increase racial profiling, use ‘crisis’ procedures to enable pushbacks, and return individuals to so called ‘safe third countries’ where they are at risk of violence, torture, and arbitrary imprisonment”.

The New Pact on Migration and Asylum ushers in a deadly new era of digital surveillance, expanding the digital infrastructure for an EU border regime based on the criminalisation and punishment of migrants and racialised people. 

This statement outlines how the Migration Pact framework will enable and in some cases mandate the deployment of harmful surveillance technologies and practices against migrants. We also highlight some grey zones where the Pact leaves open the possibility for further harmful developments involving intrusive and violent surveillance and data processing practices in the future. 

Migration Pact enables the digital surveillance of migrants 

As more intrusive technology will be deployed at borders and in detention centres,  people’s personal data will be collected in bulk and exchanged between police forces across the EU, and biometric identification systems will be used to track people’s movements and increase policing of undocumented migrants. The New Pact on Migration will mandate a whole range of technological systems to identify, filter, track, assess and control people entering or already in Europe. 

These systems will reinforce an already cruel status quo. European policymakers have opted for years to treat the movement of people into Europe mainly as a security issue. The result is very limited safe and regular pathways to come to Europe, the widespread criminalisation of many who make the journey, and systematic exploitation and discrimination against those already living here. Investing in technology to serve this already harmful system will mainly benefit the tech and security firms who reap the financial rewards of this agenda – while pushing people into more dangerous routes and giving more licence for racial profiling at our borders and in our communities. 

Here are the main ways the Migration Pact creates a dangerous system of migrant surveillance:

• Migrants as suspects: A vast regime of digital monitoring

The Migration Pact expands a wide system of data collection and automatic exchange, leading to a regime of mass surveillance of migrants. The  changes in the Eurodac Regulation will mandate the systematic collection of migrants’ biometric data (now also including facial images), which will be retained in massive databases up to 10 years, exchanged at every step of the migration process and made accessible to police forces across the European Union for tracking and identity checks purposes. The minimum age for data collection was lowered from fourteen to six, with the possibility to use coercion should ‘child friendly’ methods fail.

Further, newly created screening procedures and border procedures (Screening Regulation) will mandate various security checks and assessments of all people entering Europe irregularly, including to seek asylum, with a potential for automated and AI-based decision making. These procedures will require the personal and biometric data of every person who enters the EU to be cross-checked against multiple national and European policing and immigration databases, as well as systems operated by Europol and Interpol, increasing the possibility of transnational repression of human rights defenders. People identified as posing a “risk to national security or public order” will be pushed into accelerated border procedures with fewer safeguards for the processing of the asylum application (Asylum Procedures Regulation and Return Border Procedure Regulation). Not only are concepts of national security and public order dangerously vague and undefined terms leaving wide discretion for Member States, they also pave the way for potentially discriminatory practices in screening procedures, using nationality as a proxy for race and ethnicity in these assessments. Further, even families with children and unaccompanied children could be held in border procedures, with a high risk of being de facto detained.

In the context of asylum procedures, the Pact will enable intrusive technological practices in various stages of asylum processing. The Asylum Procedures Regulation provides for increased searches of personal items, paving the way for invasive practices like the extraction of mobile phone data, which involves seizing and mining personal electronic devices (such as phone or laptop) to extract data that may be used to find evidence to  assess the truthfulness of their claims (for instance, in an asylum proceeding) or check their identity, age or country of origin. Such invasive practices have been successfully challenged in Germany and in the UK but continue to be used in several European countries. Moreover, the Asylum Procedures Regulation also allows for the use of remote interviews and videoconferencing for people in detention and during the appeal procedure. This not only raises privacy and data protection concerns, it heightens the isolation of people who are already in a vulnerable situation and risks negatively affecting the quality and the fairness of the procedures.

• Technological management of prison facilities for migrants

The newly introduced screening and border procedures will lead to more people, including children and families, being held in prison-like detention facilities modelled on the “Closed Controlled Access Centres” already operating in Greece. These centres are characterised by motion-sensors, cameras and fingerprint-access, modelling a system of digital management of immigration facilities that relies on high-tech surveillance to monitor and control people.  Under the Pact, a minimum of 30,000 people are expected to be in “border procedures” at any one time, likely involving  detention or restrictions on movement. Far from treating detention as a “last resort”, chillingly, the Pact foresees the expansion of detention across Europe. 

• Tech-enabled racial profiling at the EU’s internal borders 

Alongside the Migration Pact are other legislative changes to EU migration policy. The Schengen Borders Code Reform, set to be adopted on 24 April 2024, will generalise police checks for the purpose of immigration enforcement, facilitating the practice of racial profiling within EU territory.

This new law encourages the increased use of surveillance and monitoring technologies at both internal and external borders. Technologies such as drones, motion sensors, thermal imaging cameras, and others are used for the identification of people crossing borders prior to arrival and have been shown to facilitate pushbacks. 

Opening the door to future expansion of the border surveillance complex 

The Migration Pact sits upon existing frameworks governing the use of digital surveillance in migration. The EU Artificial Intelligence Act introduces a lenient framework for the use of AI by law enforcement, migration control and national security agencies, provides loopholes and even encourages the use of dangerous surveillance systems on the most marginalised in society. 

In this framework, combined with the Migration Pact and new existing developments in surveillance technology, we can expect:

• Automated profiling and risk assessments for security and vulnerability checks in order to allegedly facilitate decisions related to asylum procedures, security assessments, detention, and deportation of migrants. The Pact alludes to numerous instances in which AI-based decision making may be used, such as during the screening procedure to assess if someone represents a “national security risk” or a threat to the “public security”, or to assess the level of vulnerability of an asylum applicant. Not only may this lead to numerous violations of data protection obligations and infringements of privacy, but by nature violate the right to non-discrimination in the insofar as they codify assumptions about the link between personal data and characteristics with particular risks. The introduction of automated assessment in asylum procedures will mean fewer protections and safeguards, and further divergence from a principle of case-by-case, individualised and needs- based assessments in the access to international protection. 
• The use of forecasting tools that build on biassed statistical data collected on irregular entries and asylum applications to attempt to predict large-scale movements of people, and that can be used to inform actions on the ground to deter or interdict those movements. A similar tool has been tested in the Horizon 2020 project ITFlows. 
• Lie-detectors that claim to tell if someone is being truthful by analysing facial movements, which are dangerous and unreliable enough to be banned under the EU’s AI Act – except in the border and policing contexts.
• Dialect recognition systems and other intrusive technologies used in the context of asylum or visa applications, to assess the veracity of applicants’ claims. This technology, in addition to reinforcing a generalised framework of suspicion towards people seeking asylum, is based on unscientific and often biassed, discriminatory assumptions that inform real-world decisions that have a huge and detrimental impact on people’s lives.
• Border surveillance technologies such as remote biometric identification in border areas, drones and thermal cameras to prevent border crossings into and within the European Union. While some surveillance technologies are already in use, a wide range of systems are heavily tested in EU-funded projects like FOLDOUT Solution, ROBORDER, BorderUAS, Nestor. Their use at internal borders is encouraged by the Schengen Borders Code. 

What’s next?

In its final version, the Pact represents the further embedding of surveillance technologies in the EU, and beyond, as an increasingly key part of its arsenal to sustain Fortress Europe. It therefore represents a further erosion of fundamental rights, and the normalisation of digital surveillance at, and within, borders, justified by an approach to migration policy based on repression rather than rights.  

As the #ProtectNotSurveil coalition, we will continue to challenge the use of digital technologies at different levels of EU policies and practice and advocate for the ability of people to move and to seek safety and opportunity without risking harm, surveillance or discrimination. The coalition will release a more detailed analysis of the digital impacts of the Migration Pact in due course. 

To learn more about the coalition’s work or join our efforts to challenge digital policing in migration, get in touch: info@protectnotsurveil.eu

The #ProtectNotSurveil coalition

Access Now, Equinox Initiative for Racial Justice, European Digital Rights (EDRi), Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants (PICUM), Refugee Law Lab, AlgorithmWatch, Amnesty International, Border Violence Monitoring Network (BVMN), EuroMed Rights, European Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ECNL), European Network Against Racism (ENAR), Homo Digitalis, Privacy International, Statewatch, Dr Derya Ozkul, Dr. Jan Tobias Muehlberg, and  Dr Niovi Vavoula.

On 13th March 2024, the EU Artificial Intelligence Act (AI Act) was adopted by the European Parliament. Whilst the legislation is widely celebrated as a world-first, the EU AI Act falls short in the vital area of migration, failing to prevent harm and provide protection for people on the move.

In its final version, the EU AI Act sets a dangerous precedent. The legislation develops a separate legal framework for the use of AI by law enforcement, migration control and national security authorities, provides unjustified loopholes and even encourages the use of dangerous systems for discriminatory surveillance on the most marginalised in society. This statement outlines the main gaps in protection with respect to AI in migration.

Why the EU AI Act fails migration

The EU AI Act seeks to provide a regulatory framework for the development and use of the most ‘risky’ AI within the European Union. The legislation outlines prohibitions for ‘unacceptable’ uses of AI, and sets out a framework of technical, oversight and accountability requirements for ‘high-risk’ AI when deployed or placed on the EU market.

Whilst the AI Act takes positive steps in other areas, the legislation is weak and even enables dangerous systems in the migration sphere.

• Prohibitions on AI systems do not extend to the migration context. The legislation introduces (limited) prohibitions for harmful AI uses. EU lawmakers refused to ban harmful systems such as discriminatory risk assessment systems in migration and predictive analytics when used to facilitate pushbacks. Further, the prohibition on emotion recognition does not apply in the migration context, therefore excluding documented cases of AI lie detectors at borders.
• The list of high-risk systems fails to capture the many AI systems used in the migration context and which, eventually, will not be subjected to the obligations of this Regulation. The list excludes dangerous systems such as biometric identification systems, fingerprint scanners, or forecasting tools used to predict, interdict and curtail migration.
• AI used as part of EU large-scale databases in migration, such as Eurodac, the Schengen Information System, and ETIAS will not have to be compliant with the Regulation until 2030.
• Export of harmful surveillance technology: the AI Act did not address how AI systems developed by EU-based companies impact people outside the EU, despite existing evidence of human rights violations facilitated by surveillance technologies developed in the EU in third countries (e.g., China, Occupied Palestinian Territories). Therefore, it will not be prohibited to export a system banned in Europe outside of the EU.

A dangerous precedent: enabling harmful surveillance by police and migration authorities

Perhaps the most harmful aspect of the EU AI Act is the creation of a parallel legal framework when AI is deployed by law enforcement, migration and national security authorities. As a result of pressure exerted by Member States, law enforcement and security industry lobbies, these authorities are explicitly exempted from the most important rules and safeguards within the AI Act:

• Exemptions to transparency and oversight safeguards for law enforcement authorities. The Act introduces transparency safeguards requiring public authorities using high-risk AI systems to register information about the system onto a publicly accessible database. The AI Act introduces an exemption to this requirement for law enforcement and migration authorities, instilling secrecy for some of the most harmful AI uses. This will make it impossible for affected people, civil society and journalists to know where AI systems are deployed.
• The exemption on national security will allow member states to exempt themselves from the rules for any activity they deem relevant for “national security”, in essence a blanket exemption to the rules of the AI Act which could in theory be used in any matters of migration, policing and security.

These exemptions effectively codify impunity for the unfettered use of surveillance technology, setting a dangerous precedent for the use of surveillance technology in the future. In effect, AI Act lawmakers have vastly limited crucial scrutiny of law enforcement authorities and have enabled more and more use of racialised and discriminatory surveillance. First and foremost, these loopholes will harm migrants, racialised and other marginalised communities who already bear the brunt of targeting and over-surveillance by authorities.

Fundamental rights, surveillance tech and migration: what’s next?

The EU AI Act will take between 2-5 years to enter into force. In the meantime, harmful AI systems will continue to be tested, developed and deployed in many areas of public life. Furthermore, the EU AI Act is only one legal context in which the EU is enabling surveillance technology. From the Screening Regulation, Eurodac, to many others, we see an expanding legal framework that surveils, discriminates against and criminalises migrants.

The #ProtectNotSurveil coalition started in February 2023 to advocate for the AI Act to protect people on the move and racialised people from harms emanating from the use of AI systems. This coalition will continue to monitor, advocate and organise against harmful uses of surveillance technology. Crucial next steps will be:

• For EU and national level bodies to document and respond to harms stemming from the use of AI in migration and policing contexts, ensuring protection against the violation of peoples’ rights.
• For civil society to contest further expansion of the surveillance framework, reversing and refusing trends that criminalise, target and discriminate against migrants, racialised and marginalised groups.
• For all to re-evaluate the investment of resources in technologies that punish, target and harm people as opposed to affirming rights and providing protection.

The #ProtectNotSurveil coalition

Access Now, European Digital Rights (EDRi), Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants (PICUM), Equinox Initiative for Racial Justice, Refugee Law Lab, AlgorithmWatch, Amnesty International, Border Violence Monitoring Network (BVMN), Digitalcourage, EuroMed Rights, European Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ECNL), European Network Against Racism (ENAR), Homo Digitalis, Privacy International, Statewatch, Dr Derya Ozkul, Dr. Jan Tobias, and Dr Niovi Vavoula.