As part of our efforts to monitor access to the COVID-19 vaccines for undocumented migrants in Europe, we’re speaking with national-level advocates about the situation in their countries. This interview was conducted in May 2021 with Linnea Näsholm of Oslo Health Centre for Undocumented Migrants and Katrine Meisfjord from the Bergen Health Centre for Undocumented Migrants to discuss the situation in Norway. It is not meant to offer an exhaustive picture of the legal and practical context in Norway. Please get in touch at info@picum.org if you have information you’d like to share, and follow our Twitter page @PICUM_post to get more recent updates.

What does the Norwegian vaccination strategy say about undocumented people?

Undocumented migrants are not mentioned explicitly in the Norwegian vaccination strategy. The strategy rather focuses on age and medical conditions as criteria to prioritise groups of people in the vaccination campaign.

Are there any other relevant policies that indicate undocumented people are included in the vaccination campaign?

Yes. The law on communicable disease entitles everyone, regardless of residence status, to health care related to communicable diseases, including treatment and preventative care, like vaccinations.

In addition, in early spring 2021, the Norwegian Directorate of Health published guidance on COVID-19-related care for undocumented people. It addressed a letter to all local and regional health authorities, both primary and specialist healthcare services, calling on them to make the vaccines available for everyone. However, the letter did not detail how undocumented people could practically get their shot. It really passed the buck to the municipalities in terms of how to organise this.

Do you mean that undocumented people can’t just book their vaccine like everyone else?

Indeed. In Norway, as a rule, undocumented people can only access emergency health care and “health care that is totally necessary and cannot be deferred”. For other types of care, except when related to children and pregnant women, you need to have a valid personal identification number and be registered with a GP, which is by law not possible for undocumented migrants. Informal access to a GP may still be possible, but then the doctor has to bear all the costs of the care they provide. The letter from the Directorate of Health stated access to the vaccines for all but didn’t say how undocumented migrants could practically get their appointment and then their shot.

Let’s look at the booking system. How does that work in Norway, and what does that mean for undocumented people?

It depends on the local health authority’s approach. In some localities, you are contacted by the local health authority to get an appointment for your vaccine after your GP sends your contacts to the local vaccination centre. Some other health authorities provide the vaccine at the GP clinic. In both cases, you need to be registered with a GP. And for that, you need a valid identification number, which means you have a valid residence permit.

In Oslo, the Health Centre for Undocumented Migrants, in collaboration with the municipality, arranged for a local GP to come once a week to write referrals for people based on their medical and socio-economic conditions. With these referrals, undocumented people can be called to get their vaccine without the need of a personal number or a valid ID document: only the name, date of birth, phone number and preferred language are noted. We have very good cooperation with one of the local vaccination centres in Oslo, we work together to make sure people get appointments and access to interpretation. They even suggested coming to our health centre or having a specific day just for referred patients in case this could be helpful.

It looks like everything is left to the goodwill of the municipalities. Are there other good practices from local authorities?

Yes, in Bergen, for instance, the municipality is employing a GP who works with grassroots organisations to make sure vulnerable groups are vaccinated. Vaccinations for undocumented people are in practice organised by the Health Centre for Undocumented migrants in Bergen.

Are there any concerns regarding the sharing of personal data with immigration authorities?

In Norway, there’s a very clear firewall and medical staff have a strong duty of confidentiality. We’ve had few cases where immigration authorities called a doctor about patients to be deported, to check when they’d be fit to fly. When that happens, medical staff have a duty to keep confidentiality. It’s illegal for medical staff to report undocumented patients.

Cover: Avonne Stalling – Pexels

As part of our efforts to monitor access to the COVID-19 vaccines for undocumented migrants in Europe, we’re speaking with national-level advocates about the situation in their countries. This interview was conducted in April 2021 with Vivien Vadasi of Menedék to discuss the situation in Hungary. It is not meant to offer an exhaustive picture of the legal and practical context in Hungary. Please get in touch at info@picum.org if you have information you’d like to share, and follow our Twitter page @PICUM_post to get more recent updates.

What does the Hungarian vaccination strategy say about undocumented migrants?

The Hungarian strategy is a very short document that describes the order of vaccination, in terms of priority groups, but doesn’t mention at all undocumented migrants, or foreigners for that matter. Last February, we asked the government to clarify who’s eligible for the vaccination and what are the plans to reach out and provide vaccinations to foreigners in Hungary. They replied that they’ll propose legislation on this, but it hasn’t happened yet.

Would undocumented migrants still be able to access the vaccines in practice? How does the registration work?

Registering for the vaccines can be done online. The website, which is only in Hungarian, requires a home address, which can be hard to impossible for undocumented migrants to prove.

As of May 4, foreigners living in Hungary without a social security number (TAJ) can register for their vaccines too. But details of residence papers and identity documents are also asked, but it doesn’t look mandatory to fill in those fields. We do know however, from official sources, that the registration data would be checked against the data in the immigration register. This obviously poses great risks for undocumented migrants.

OK, let’s start with the home address. How does that work?

Well, you could theoretically type a fake address online and get your appointment, but at the vaccination centre they’ll ask for a proof of address. Homeless people can get a “territorial address” card, which indicates what district they usually live in, and produce this at the vaccination point. But this card isn’t accessible for all migrants, let alone undocumented migrants. It is also not possible to use an NGO address as a replacement.

So home address is a huge barrier already. What about the social security number?

In Hungary, a social security number is issued for Hungarian nationals, EU nationals and their family members, permanent residents and beneficiaries of international protection. People with work-related residence permits, thus contributing to social security, can also get one. But their family members, or students paying their own fees can only get a social security number if they’re contributing ten times as much as the mainstream population for 25 months. So most of them end up buying private health care insurance. Undocumented people do not qualify for a social security card either as one of the conditions is the (legal) residence in Hungary.

Recent legislation introduced even stricter rules to access social security. Now, if you don’t pay social security contributions for the equivalent of six months, your social security number becomes invalid. The government has clarified that people with an invalid social security number can still access the vaccines, but the question remains for those who don’t have any such number.

Again, when trying to register for your vaccine online, in theory, you could insert a string of 0s in the social security number case as a workaround. You’d be able to book your appointment, but at the vaccination centre you’ll be asked for your social security number, nonetheless.

Right. So undocumented migrants wouldn’t be able to provide either a home address or a social security number.

Indeed. By design, undocumented migrants aren’t able to get the vaccines. In addition, at the vaccination point, you would also be asked for an identification document, that is an ID card for Hungarians and a residence permit for non-national residents, which is one more obstacle for undocumented migrants.

Is immigration enforcement involved at any point when trying to access the vaccines?

In general, health professionals aren’t required to inform immigration enforcement authorities of the migration status of patients. But in practice, the social security number and card remain a pre-condition to receive medical treatment, beyond urgent life-saving care.

1. The Hungarian strategy provides for a priority list (that is in practice not respected) of people who should receive the vaccination:
   1.Healthcare workers (including students at medical universities and all of those who work in the sector, i.e. cleaners as well)
   2. Professionals in the social care sector and beneficiaries of social care (while this category seems to be very inclusive, in practice, the government focused on social and care workers working in homes of the elderly and also those elderly who are placed in these homes. Nevertheless, also workers and inhabitants of homeless shelters received vaccination in some cases.)
   3. People aged 60 years or older who fall in the high-risk group due to their health condition
   4. Staff of the law-enforcement and government authorities (police, including border police and the immigration authority, administrative officials, etc.) who are in direct contact with the population
   5. People aged 16/18-59 living falling in the high-risk group due to their health condition
   6. Professionals working in the critical infrastructure (there was not much information about what sectors fall in that category)
   7. The rest of the population who do not fall in the categories above
   The priority list also lays down that the vaccination of people falling in category 2 and 4 should not depend on their registration on the official website but should be organized separately (on the contrary, my social worker colleagues had to register on the official website in order to be able to receive the vaccination). Category 1 also received vaccination independently from the official online registration system.

Cover: Abode Stock – EdNurg

On 27 April 2021, the EU Commission published its first EU Strategy on voluntary return and reintegration. The strategy is envisaged by the New Pact on Migration and Asylum as an integral policy for a common EU system for returns. It conceives actions in seven areas with the aim of increasing the number of voluntary returns. If, on paper, the text recognizes voluntary return as being more efficient, cost-effective and preferable to forced return, in practice this is contradicted by several ongoing legislative proposals which make access to voluntary return more difficult. The text highlights the role of “swift and efficient return border procedures” to encourage migrants to take up voluntary returns, including for people in administrative detention and those whose asylum application is still pending. The Strategy increases the role of Frontex in promoting voluntary returns, despite the growing scrutiny into the lack of accountability and the potential involvement of the agency in human rights violations.

 “Voluntary” returns?

Increasing the rate of returns is one of the main objectives of the European Pact on Migration and Asylum. The term “return” appears nearly 100 times in the Commission Communication on the Pact alone – while the term “rights” only 14. While forced return remains a central component of the EU return system, the objective of this strategy is to develop a more uniform and coordinated approach that acknowledges the potential of voluntariness within the return process. Even though the number of returnees is still considered a strong indicator for the effectiveness of any return policy, this strategy recognizes that “it is important to not only consider the return rates but also the situation of the individuals concerned, enabling their return in a dignified manner and taking into account their reintegration prospects once they return to their country of origin”.

On paper, the strategy – a non-binding instrument – prioritises voluntary over forced return, but in practice this is contradicted by several binding legislative proposals which make access to voluntary return more difficult. For instance, the Commission proposal for a Recast Return Directive prohibits EU Member States from granting a period for voluntary departure in a broad number of circumstances which legitimise a risk of absconding. Moreover, migrants are openly encouraged to return from the very moment they arrive in the EU through return counselling – which can be provided by Frontex – even during their asylum application, and by the constant threat of swift and efficient return procedures, including at borders, for those who do not agree to return voluntarily. Encouraging voluntary returns through “swift and efficient return border procedures” confirms the EU “carrot and stick” approach, for which “an efficient return border procedure will also facilitate and encourage voluntary returns since people will be available and more willing to cooperate with the authorities” (EU Strategy on voluntary return and reintegration,p.7).

Frontex will have an increasing role in voluntary returns

With its reinforced mandate, Frontex will play a crucial role in the activities of return and reintegration assistance to returnees. In mid-2022, Frontex will take over the activities of the European Return and Reintegration Network (ERRIN). The full operationalisation of the Agency’s mandate is a gradual process that started in May 2021 with a first Frontex pilot for individual joint reintegration support to returnees from the EU. In collaboration with ICMPD, the Agency will also be involved in the development of a common curriculum for return counsellors, which aims at providing practitioners with teaching modules on all aspects of return policy and practice. Frontex will support Member States by deploying return experts trained in return counselling as part of the standing corps. In addition, it will have an increased role in “pre-return counselling (e.g. outreach campaigns to migrants), post-arrival support and monitoring the effectiveness of reintegration assistance.

Further technical support and the new roles on return foreseen by the Pact

The strategy indicates that additional technical support will be guaranteed by the Return Coordinator and the High Level Network for Return, including representatives from Member States. They will assist the coordination of national authorities on voluntary return and reintegration strategies and programmes, to promote uniformity between national actions and this strategy, and to promote the exchange of best practices among Member States. This support aims at achieving a comprehensive governance framework as set out in the proposal for a Regulation on Asylum and Migration Management.

Prioritising voluntary over forced returns is a welcome step, but it is not sufficient

On the Roadmap published on 15 December 2020, the European Commission describes “shaping returns to respond to the needs of the individual” as one of the main objectives for the EU and EU agencies and the Member States. If, on the one hand, this strategy recognizes voluntary return as being more efficient and preferable to forced return, the EU Commission commitment to respond to the needs of the individual remains on many levels unclear in the document published in April 2021.

Firstly, it is crucial to acknowledge that return is not the best option for all. Secondly, when voluntary return is possible, EU policies should ensure that people and their choices come first. Human choices are not pre-packaged products, but rather the result of accurate evaluations that require time and services to allow people to explore all different options, including the possibility to remain regularly in the EU. While the Commission’s efforts to prioritise voluntary over forced returns are a welcome step, encouraging people to return by all possible means and from the very moment they arrive at borders is far from being a strategy that meets migrants’ freedom of choice nor their needs.

Present data on voluntary returns are not clear. According to the EU Commission, “the share of voluntary returns is currently 27% of all departures from the EU”. Frontex Risk analysis 2020, instead, reported that 49 % of returns are voluntary (table 13, p. 67).

Cover: Unsplash – Nathan Dumlao

The EU budget provides opportunities for supporting migrants’ inclusion through different funding instruments, although each fund has a specific scope that allows for specific activities for a specific target group. Some of these funds allow EU member states to fund measures for newly arrived third country nationals, as well as to foster migrants’ access to social services and integration in employment.

Undocumented migrants are generally cut off from such resources in EU funding schemes. Consequently, organisations supporting the integration of undocumented migrants are usually unable to access EU funding schemes to fund projects involving undocumented migrants.

PICUM has consistently challenged this limitation and has called for the inclusion of undocumented migrants among the beneficiaries of EU funding instruments that target the social inclusion of third country nationals. In the past two years, PICUM has worked together with ECRE to advocate for inclusive priorities for migrants, asylum seekers and refugees within the new EU Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 2021 – 2027, which defines allocations to different EU budget lines for the coming seven years.

In addition to the MFF, an unprecedented economic stimulus was set up through the Next Generation EU to support EU member states in the recovery from the Covid-19 pandemic. As these resources are managed at the member states’ level and represent a unique support to finance reforms and economic recovery, it is difficult to determine to what extent migrants will directly benefit from them.
The following analysis summarises the state of the achievements in the funding instruments in the MFF that can support migrants’ inclusion, and highlights what actions are still needed. It doesn’t cover the ongoing debate over the National Recovery and Resilience Plans (NRRP) of Next Generation EU, as there are no explicit requirements to investing part of these in inclusion.

European Social Fund Plus (ESF+)

The ESF+ will replace the current European Social Fund, the main EU instrument financing programmes for employment, social inclusion and skills. The ESF+ will include the current Fund for European Aid to the Most Deprived (FEAD), the Youth Employment Initiative (YEI) and the Employment and Social Innovation instrument.

Involving undocumented migrants in programmes funded through ESF has proved challenging, considering that the ESF aims at promoting employability and enhancing skills for employment. Social inclusion projects that have been funded through ESF usually require users to be able to regularly access the labour market. Past experiences of funding to irregular migrants through the ESF are limited, and almost inexistent in recent years. This is also due to the reporting obligations that generally force beneficiary organisations to report details of service users, including social security numbers, which may not be available for undocumented migrants.

The new ESF+ will no longer focus uniquely on supporting employability but will also include broader social inclusion objectives, despite keeping a treaty-based mission to promote employment and training across the EU.

The specific objectives of the ESF+ agreed by EU co-legislators are divided into three pillars: education, employment and social inclusion. ESF+ actions implemented under the social inclusion pillar could be provided regardless of residence status and access to the labour market.

The ESF+ also includes a full objective on promoting the socio-economic integration of third country nationals, including migrants (residence status is not mentioned in the definition). Despite a more inclusive regulation, the allocation of resources will highly depend on national choices, including EU member states’ interpretation of their reporting obligations. There is a high risk that EU member states will resist this possible change and the administrative adjustments that it would require, and continue to follow more restrictive rules, including in the reporting duties, that guided the implementation of previous funds.

Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF)

In line with the EU approach on migration enforcement, the main fund supporting integration of third country nationals is strictly linked to regularly residing migrants, with a specific focus on asylum seekers and recognised beneficiaries of international and humanitarian protection. Undocumented migrants are targeted through AMIF’s objective to “counter irregular migration, and ensure effective, safe and dignified return and readmission, as well as to contribute to and to promote effective initial reintegration in third countries”. AMIF can support alternatives to detention, including the promotion of community-based case management, and countering labour exploitation.

Regarding labour exploitation, the regulation allows for funding the establishment and implementation of mechanisms through which irregular migrants can claim back payments and lodge complaints against their employers, as well as information and awareness‑raising campaigns to inform employers and irregular migrants about their rights and obligations pursuant to Directive 2009/52/EC. If member states would actually choose to implement such actions in their national programmes, it is not specified what institution would be responsible for such actions: the involvement of the migration authorities, for instance could undermine the effectiveness of the complaint mechanisms.

There are limited but promising developments regarding the AMIF resources that are managed directly at the EU level, and that tend to be more flexible in reporting requirements. The European Commission clarified, in an explanatory note to a recent call for proposals, that while not being the main target group of the fund, irregularly residing third country nationals are not excluded. The increase of the share of AMIF funding that will be be managed directly by the Commission in the next 7 years might lead to more flexibility in transnational calls for proposals on integration.

Fund for European Aid to the most Deprived (FEAD)

Through its inclusion in the ESF+, the FEAD will continue deliver on poverty reduction for the next two years thanks to the extension included in the Recovery Assistance for Cohesion and the Territories of Europe (React-EU initiative). This initiative, part of the EU recovery plan ‘Next Generation EU’, will extend the EU’s cohesion policy for the past multiannual financial framework (2014 – 2020) until 2022 and will provide new resources to support recovery from the socio-economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic.

FEAD is the only EU funding programme that tackles social exclusion and material deprivation, and does not exclude undocumented migrants from its potential beneficiaries, especially when linked to food and material support. Nevertheless, as it is managed by national governments in cooperation with local authorities, large social service organisations and food banks, the nature of the support varies considerably.

In many EU member states, FEAD is used to support in-kind basic social assistance, including basic material and food aid. Obstacles may arise depending on the mechanisms chosen to provide such services, as for instance paper or electronic vouchers for grocery products. In the case of voucher mechanisms, several member states require beneficiaries to have a social security number and/or to be included in specific lists of people with little to no income. This is obviously a huge barrier for undocumented migrants, who are not able to provide such documents or to prove their income. For this reason, and despite the lack of specific limitations in the EU legislation, undocumented migrants can generally access distribution of food packages and hot meals provided by charities and soup kitchens through FEAD, but are often unable to benefit from more systematic support that the fund offers to families or individuals experiencing extreme social exclusion.

The EU Action Plan on Integration and Inclusion: integration spending at the EU level

With an increased number of funding instrument supporting integration, it is crucial for the EU and member states to ensure effective synergies among different funds and set up a strategy with clear goals that coordinates the use of these resources. The Action Plan on Integration and Inclusion (released in November 2020) aims at guiding EU actions on inclusion, and allocates EU funding to social services for third country nationals.

While integration policy is an exclusive competence of EU member states, the EU can address the socio-economic inclusion of third country nationals through its own funding, complementing national policies and resources. The new Action Plan refers to the various EU funds which will allow member states to support integration, including the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF); European Social Fund Plus (ESF+); the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF); the Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD); and Erasmus+. The duration of the Action Plan, which will cover the seven years of the new MFF (2020-2027), will ensure consistency in the management of the funds.

The Action Plan reflects a strategy of the European Commission and can recommend actions to member states, but cannot provide mechanisms for enforcing these recommendations. The actions that it proposes focus mainly on refugees, asylum seekers and regular migrants; however, it does not explicitly exclude irregular migrants. This is a marked improvement from the previous Action Plan, which dates back to 2016, and which was limited to ‘regularly residing third country nationals’. Moreover, the new Action Plan includes a number of openings for specific target groups, by recognising for instance that access to health services varies considerably depending on people’s migration status, and by making it explicit that the upcoming EU Comprehensive Strategy on the Rights of the Child should enable all children, regardless of residence status, to have equal access to the same set of rights and protection. Additionally, the Commission’s proposal on the Child Guarantee, that is meant to be implemented through the ESF+, clearly defines children with a migrant background ‘irrespective of their migration status’. In this sense, it may be possible to see more flexibility in EU-managed funding for policies on children’s inclusion, as well as for policies aiming at ensuring access to healthcare for all.

The programming phase at member states’ level

To ensure that EU resources can support the social inclusion of migrants regardless of their residence status, it is important that the preparation of national programmes of EU funds, which started in late 2020 and will continue for most of 2021, recognises the existing barriers and the arising opportunities to overcome them: current reporting and eligibility requirements prevent the extension of EU-funded services to an important number of people who should qualify as part of ‘vulnerable groups’, and could benefit from EU-funded programmes.

The texts approved by the European institutions for ESF+ refer extensively to ‘most vulnerable’ and ‘excluded’ groups: for instance, they recommend that the ESF+ is used for “promoting the access to healthcare for people in vulnerable situations”. Despite these positive developments, there is a concrete risk that resistance to change in public administrations and lack of clear instructions from the European level will undermine an extension of funded actions to undocumented migrants.

To ensure that such measures will not exclude undocumented migrants, actions need to take place at the member states level, within the managing authorities responsible for ESF and FEAD. It is important to ensure that the right information on the scope of EU funds, including especially the ESF+, reaches out to managing authorities. The upcoming months of 2021 are particularly strategic to reach out to managing authorities with clear recommendations on those vulnerable groups that should be prioritised in social inclusion measures.

This definition is meant to refer to all people outside the EU including both migrants and beneficiaries and applicants for international protection. Among the wording chosen by the European institutions, that often tend to use the word ‘migrants’ referring only to refugees, it represents the most inclusive definition.

Since the signature of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2007, European institutions have the mandate to ‘provide incentives and support for the action of member sates with a view to promoting the integration of third-country nationals (Art. 79 of Treaty on functioning of the European Union).

Cover: Unsplash – Christian Lue

This article has been written by Aaron Gates-Lincoln who is a correspondent for the Immigration Advice Service.

The UK government has not been shy about its use of hostile environment policies to deter people from entering the UK over the past decade. These policies are a set of legislative measures designed to make staying in the UK as difficult as possible without ‘leave to remain’ status, in the hopes it will make migrants ‘voluntarily leave’. However, it is becoming clear that now more than ever, these policies are having a direct, negative impact upon the lives of migrant children in the UK.

It is being estimated that thousands of children of EU nationals who are now in the UK care system are going to be put at risk by flaws in the EU Settlement Scheme. The scheme, introduced after Brexit, allows EU citizens to apply to receive indefinite leave to remain status within the UK. For children in care, applications for the scheme must be submitted and paid for by the local authority in which they are situated in. It was expected that this process would be the easiest and most effective method in ensuring all children are accounted for under the EU Settlement Scheme.

However, a Freedom of Information request by the Children’s Society has found that so far, fewer than 40% of the 3,700 or so known eligible children in care have had their applications submitted. Numbers may be significantly higher than this, as many local authorities do not keep nationality data for children in care. These low numbers can be attributed to the failures of local authorities, as they are responsible for ensuring the applications are completed and submitted. Furthermore, with care leavers and other children not directly in the care system, they are required to offer support and guidance in submitting applications which in many cases they are not doing. Care leavers and some children do have the power to submit their own applications, but for some, the application process may be complex and require professional guidance, which should be the responsibility of the local authorities to offer. With the deadline for applications now less than 3 months away, this is extremely worrying for the stability, safety and well-being of this group of children.

Concerns are being raised that the issue could mirror that of the Windrush scandal of 2018, in which thousands of Commonwealth citizens were wrongly detained and deported due to problems surrounding documentation. With this in mind, it could be estimated that the group may apply for housing or employment in the future and only then discover their irregular status. This could seriously put them at the risk of unjust detainment and deportation, exploitation and abject poverty.

The EU Settlement Scheme has emerged and exposed itself as a covert element of the UK government’s hostile environment policies. It is unethical for children in care to be robbed of their secure residence status due to the failures of local authorities to act on their behalf, and support their best interests. The government itself has ignored calls from MPs to fast-track children in care through the process, instead opting to place the responsibility on struggling local authorities. Most of their struggle’s stem from underfunding, which leads to overstretched staff with high workloads, contributing to children in care not receiving as much support as they should be.

It is also unjust that local authorities have been encouraged by the government to place children in care on this immigration track. Evidence has shown that for children of EU nationals in care, most, if not all, could have the rights to citizenship. Instead, the children who actually have applications submitted are placed on a scheme that would offer them nowhere near the same number of rights and entitlements.

It is vital that this group of children are given the opportunity to gain the citizenship that they are entitled to. Children born in the UK, who have parents with settled status, or have lived the first 10 years of their life there, have the right to register to be a citizen. The Home Secretary also has a discretionary power to grant any child UK citizenship when it is evident that their future lies in the UK.

In most cases, children in care are not taken down these pathways due to extortionate citizenship fees. For each application, local authorities have to pay £1,000, £640 of which is direct profit to the Home Office (respectively approximately EUR 1,160 and EUR 745). These fees were recently found unlawful in a judgment by the High Court, requiring the Home Office to rethink the need for the fees. However, they have still not been reduced, prompting petitions and other pressures to be applied against the Home Office to suggest that they do so. Due to current laws, if children in care are not put on the citizenship pathway before they turn 18, they will lose their right to citizenship when they reach this age.

Migrant children are being subjected to a system that is rigged against their favour, and exposed to hostile policies that are cruel and unethical. It is clear that the UK government has not learned anything from the injustices the Windrush generation had to face, and are setting themselves up for a repetition. It is vital that the UK government changes the structural causes of the issues discussed here, by making applications for such schemes easier for children, care leavers and their guardians. This would remove pressures on local authorities to submit applications and give power back to the children, their guardians, families and surrounding professionals to obtain a secure residence status. It is also essential that the UK government lowers the costs of citizenship fees, to ensure that children in care are placed on the citizenship pathway more often, to grant them the stability and security in the UK they need.

Cover: Adobe Stock – Mongkolchon

As part of our efforts to monitor access to the COVID-19 vaccines for undocumented migrants in Europe, we’re speaking with national-level advocates about the situation in their countries. This interview was conducted in April 2021 with Anna Miller of Doctors of the World UK to discuss the situation in the UK. It is not meant to offer an exhaustive picture of the legal and practical context in the UK. Please get in touch at info@picum.org if you have information you’d like to share, and follow our Twitter page @PICUM_post to get more recent updates.

What does the UK vaccination strategy say about undocumented people?

The government says that the COVID-19 vaccines are accessible to everyone, including undocumented migrants, for free and without immigration checks. This is reflected in official guidance too.

So, all good?

Not really. There are still a number of challenges for undocumented people to actually get vaccinated against COVID-19. Starting with getting registered with a GP.

How do you register with a GP?

To get a vaccine, you need to book an appointment. You can do this either online or by calling your GP. The problem with the online registration is that you need an NHS (National Health Service) number, which lots of undocumented migrants don’t have.

How do you get one?

There are different ways. In some cases, you can get one automatically, for instance if you’re born in the UK, irrespective of your migration status. Or if you come to the UK on a visa for 6 months, you’ll have to pay a contribution to the NHS (the “immigration health charge”) and you’ll get an NHS number.

But most undocumented migrants don’t fall under these groups, and the only way they can get the number is through a GP.

What does that involve?

When you first go to the GP, and you don’t have an NHS number, the GP will request one for you, which you should be able to get in 14 days. But GPs routinely ask for proof of address or identity or immigration status, which can be hard if not impossible for undocumented migrants to produce. Government guidelines do say that the lack of those documents can’t be a ground for refusal, but in practice some GPs refuse to register people without those proofs. This is a huge issue.

What does this mean for access to the COVID-19 vaccines?

It means that if the GP refuses to register you, you won’t get your NHS number and you won’t be able to book an appointment for your COVID-19 vaccine.

How can this be solved?

We’ve been asking the government and the healthcare service to raise awareness among GPs about the paper requirements for registration, but most communications campaigns instead focuses on the patients. In England, for instance, NHS England has produced a card with the NHS logo for GP registration, which says that no document is required. Basically, it’s a self-advocacy tool. But it has limited impact, as the process for registering with a GP mostly happens online these days. And the online registration system still requires you to provide proof of address or identity.

Several Filipino care workers, who would be eligible for the COVID-19 vaccines because of the work they do, told us they tried to register with a GP online but didn’t manage to because of those requirements.

There are good practices, though, among doctors and clinics. Some local primary care networks are proactively doing outreach to people who haven’t come forward for vaccination and are eligible. Sometimes it’s outreach in asylum accommodation centres, or hotels used for confinement during lockdown for homeless people. But all of this work is driven locally, rather than coming from the government, so there is variation from region to region.

Let’s say an undocumented person was lucky enough to encounter an enlightened GP and get an NHS number, and an appointment for the vaccine. Will they need to show anything else at the vaccination centre?

Your booking reference number should be enough. But we’ve heard of cases where the vaccination centres asked for some proof of identity. The feeling is that this is due to sheer lack of awareness from the administration, we haven’t heard of cases where people were refused vaccination at the centre because they didn’t have those documents.

Since 2012, the UK government introduced a set of policies, known as “hostile environment”, that aim to make life unbearably difficult in the UK for those who cannot show the right paperwork.  How does this play into access to the vaccines?

This is a key point. The policy on access to the vaccines may be quite progressive on paper, but it’s implemented against the backdrop of years of policies that have eroded the trust of migrant communities in public authorities including the healthcare system. This includes the practice of sharing patient’s personal information with the Home Office, which is then used to carry out immigration enforcement activities.

Do health care providers share patients’ information with immigration authorities?

Patient data collected by primary care services used to be shared with the Home Office, because of a mechanism that existed between 2017 and 2018. The policy stopped but the fear around that is still very much there.

Secondary care services routinely share information about migrants with insecure immigration status with the Home Office. This results in people from migrant communities not trusting any type of healthcare services, including primary care ones.

We’ve long been asking the government to make all health care services safe and confidential for migrants and to communicate clearly about the prohibition of data sharing with immigration enforcement. So far, our calls have largely been ignored.

Cover: Ugur Akdemir – Unsplash

As part of our efforts to monitor access to the COVID-19 vaccines for undocumented migrants in Europe, we’re speaking with national-level advocates about the situation in their countries. This interview was conducted in April 2021 with Katarzyna Słubik of Stowarzyszenie Interwencji Prawnej (Association for Legal Intervention) to discuss the situation in Poland. It is not meant to offer an exhaustive picture of the legal and practical context in Poland. Please get in touch at info@picum.org if you have information you’d like to share, and follow our Twitter page @PICUM_post to get more recent updates.

Are undocumented migrants mentioned in Poland’s vaccination strategy?

The Polish vaccination programme is very vague, and doesn’t mention undocumented migrants. Official guidance does seem to limit access to the vaccinations to people who are regularly residing, which would de facto prevent undocumented migrants from accessing the vaccines.

So undocumented people can’t get vaccinated against COVID-19 in Poland?

It’s complicated. While the vaccination strategy seems to exclude undocumented people, our law on infectious diseases opens up to everyone in Poland health care related to infectious diseases. Under this law, you don’t need to have a national registration number, or be insured, to access health care related to the infectious disease. The law would apply to COVID-19 too, as it’s an infectious disease. But as for vaccinations, the law only mentions compulsory ones (i.e. childhood vaccines), while COVID-19 vaccines are not compulsory.

At the same time, the Ministry of Health has stated that the vaccines would be available for people who aren’t covered by health insurance. This would theoretically include undocumented people.

So it’s all very unclear. The Polish Ombudsman actually sent a letter to the government asking to clarify entitlements for migrants, but they haven’t got any response yet.

Have you heard of any undocumented people trying to get a COVID-19 vaccine?

We haven’t heard of any such cases. On the contrary, the feeling is that undocumented migrants are quite hesitant about the vaccines. On the one hand, there’s a major problem with health-related misinformation on vaccines among several communities, including the Ukrainian communities, Roma communities, asylum-seekers and undocumented migrants. On the other, there’s also an underlying fear of contacting doctors or authorities more generally.

How do you explain this fear among undocumented migrants?

In Poland, public institutions are obliged to cooperate with border police. What this means in practice for health authorities is quite unclear, in fact there’s a lot of confusion among medical staff.

While the law only regulates cases where border police can reach out to health providers for specific information, medical staff sometimes interprets it as an obligation to proactively report undocumented migrants. For instance, we’ve heard of hospitals reporting undocumented patients when they weren’t able to pay for the care they received.

Cover: Pexels- Julia Vol

Last September, the European Commission published the new European Pact on Migration and Asylum to reform the EU migration and asylum system. The Pact, which consists of five legislative proposals and four recommendations, heavily focuses on restricting access to Europe and on stepping up returns of people who are unable to get international protection.

To achieve these goals, the proposals reduce safeguards, set unrealistic timeframes to have fair procedures, and increase detention, including for children – with little or no consideration for human rights, well-being or inclusion. We believe Europe can do better – both for our societies and for the children and adults who are migrating – and have identified key issues that need to change in the different Pact proposals.

The ‘Screening Regulation’ introduces a ‘pre-entry’ procedure to identify people who crossed an external border without authorisation or who disembarked after a search and rescue operation. In short, this means detaining everyone, including children of any age, unaccompanied or with their families, for up to five days (ten in situations of crisis), during which the border personnel (read Frontex or national border guards) will decide whether people should undergo a vulnerability and health screening or not. What’s more, undocumented people who are already on the EU territory could also be apprehended and detained for three days while they undergo the screening procedure – independent of how long they have been living on the territory and with no right to see a lawyer, appeal their detention or even inform their families.

The ‘Asylum Procedures Regulation’ introduces mandatory asylum and return procedures at borders – despite broad evidence of the harmful impact of these procedures and that they lead to de facto detention. As border procedures will also apply to children, the proposal stands at odds with global commitments and repeated calls by the European Parliament (in 2018, 2019, 2020 and 2021) to end child detention in light of the extremely harmful impact it has on children health and development. Moreover, the Regulation proposes to link the asylum and return procedures – a controversial reform already proposed, but not agreed yet, in the context of the ongoing negotiations on the Recast Return Directive. If adopted, this would narrow or even close access to residence procedures on other grounds under national and EU legislation.The ‘Asylum and Migration Management Regulation (RAMM)’ sets out a common framework for the management of asylum and migration in the European Union, clarifies which Member State is responsible for reviewing an asylum application, and proposes a complex and inadequate solidarity mechanism. A key tenet of this mechanism is the controversial possibility for Member States to contribute to returning people, rather than relocating them. In case the return isn’t carried out within 4 to 8 months from the Member State of departure, people will be transferred to the sponsoring Member State. Through this mechanism, people, including families and children, will be uprooted from the country in which they have been living potentially for years. This is in clear contrast with the Regulation’s claim that the best interests of the child will always be a primary consideration.

The ‘Crisis Regulation’ provides specific derogations to the timelines and safeguards set by the other three instruments in situations of crisis, risk of crisis or force majeure. Amongst others, people will be detained for longer periods of time, creating grave concerns around well-being and safeguards.

Although the Pact touts being child-rights-compliant, children will suffer if the proposals are adopted as they are now. It is difficult to see when and how children will have their best interests assessed or their well-being safeguarded when they may not have access to legal assistance, unaccompanied children may not be appointed a guardian, when children will automatically be detained at the border, and will not have access to a documented best interests procedure before a return decision is issued. For each instrument, we identified changes that are necessary to safeguard children.In addition, the proposals contribute to dividing people between those who are deserving of stay and those who are not; between those who may be able to receive international protection and those whose cases are not so clear and are automatically turned down and forced away. This strict division erases any possibility for accessing residence procedures based on children’s rghts, as workers, on medical grounds or as victims of trafficking or crime, to name a few. It also removes important safeguards related to non-refoulement, child rights, the protection of family and private life and the right to fair trial.

Lastly, if these proposals are adopted without change, the space for civil society to provide key services to migrants and asylum seekers will continue to shrink, creating a situation in which migrants and asylum seekers alike are misinformed, risk having their fundamental rights violated without oversight, and a Europe in which solidarity is increasingly criminalised and policed. We can do better.

For an overview of our concerns, read More detention, fewer safeguards: How the new EU Pact on Migration and Asylum creates new loopholes to ignore human rights obligations.

Cover: methaphum – Adobe Stock

As part of our efforts to monitor access to the COVID-19 vaccines for undocumented migrants in Europe, we’re speaking with national-level advocates about the situation in their countries. This interview was conducted in March 2021 with Christoph Krieger of Medibüro Kiel to discuss the situation in Germany. It is not meant to offer an exhaustive picture of the legal and practical context in Germany. Please get in touch at info@picum.org if you have information you’d like to share, and follow our Twitter page @PICUM_post to get more recent updates.

Does Germany include undocumented migrants in its vaccination campaign?

There is little information at this stage, but no federal plan currently explicitly mentions undocumented migrants as a target group of the German vaccination campaign. Some local authorities, including in Kiel, have shown a certain openness – in principle – to vaccinating undocumented migrants as long as they meet age or health-related eligibility requirements.

At the same time, federal regulations on the vaccination strategy state that you have to either provide a registered address or at least prove that you live in Germany “under normal circumstances”, which is meant to exclude those coming to Germany specifically to get their vaccine. Undocumented migrants in many cases can’t provide a registered address, but they might be able to provide a self-certification to prove that they live in Germany.

So undocumented migrants can get the vaccine through this self-certification?

This is where it gets tricky. In Germany, undocumented migrants risk immigration consequences if they try to get non-emergency health care because our federal residence law requires the governmental body they have to go through to report undocumented patients to immigration authorities. This means that they could risk detention and deportation if they register for their vaccine.

Let’s go step by step. How would it work in practice for an undocumented person who tries to access a vaccine?

First, they would get an appointment by internet or by phone. If they meet the eligibility requirements, they would be invited to the local vaccination centre.

Once there, they would need to show an identity card or passport, not necessarily German. So it would be possible to register with a Brazilian passport, for instance.

However, they would need to show a health insurance card too. If they don’t have a health insurance card, which is the case for undocumented migrants, they would need to go to the local social welfare office and get a paper confirming that the office will pay for the vaccination. This is how it works for homeless people, for instance. Some states don’t require a health insurance card – but need proof of residence in that state, which itself is a barrier for many.

But not for undocumented migrants?

No. If undocumented people go to the social welfare office, they risk being reported to immigration authorities because of art. 87 of the Residence Act.

Germany also has a large refugee population. Are there any differences in access to the vaccines for them?

Refugees can access health care almost on the same basis as German citizens. Those who live in refugee centres are actually prioritised in the vaccination campaign. The same goes for those asylum-seekers who’ve seen their asylum request rejected. In Germany, these people get a “tolerated status”, Duldung, whereby they can access certain health care for a period of time. This includes access to the COVID-19 vaccines.

Updates from April 2021:

Following a written request introduced by German MP Klein-Schmeink (Greens), the Ministry of Health clarified in a letter that undocumented people too are entitled to the COVID-19 vaccines, as long as they are habitually living in Germany. However, Doctors of the World note that concerns and practical issues remain, most notably around providing proof of habitual residence and around data sharing with immigration enforcement.

Since April 2021, people in Germany can get vaccinated at a doctor’s office. Here, one has to show proof of cost coverage for the 20€ that the doctor gets for administering the vaccination (health insurance or other source). Undocumented migrants cannot get a proof of cost coverage from the welfare office without being reported. In theory, they could pay the 20€ themselves/out-of-pocket. In this case, doctors are not obliged to report the undocumented patient to immigration authorities. Most cities’ administrations have stated that lack of proof of cost coverage (e.g. a health insurance card or the confirmation from the welfare office) should not keep anyone from getting vaccinated. In practice, however, doctors’ offices will be hesitant to vaccinate someone without proof of identity due to administrative difficulties.

Cover: Federico Orlandi – Paxels

This blog is the second in a two-part series looking at the intersection between racism and migration policy, and was authored by Abigail Cárdenas Mena, former Advocacy Trainee at PICUM.

On 25 May 2020, George Floyd, an African-American man, was killed by police in the US. The recording of his last moments and words travelled the world, sparking mass protests against police brutality and racial injustice around the globe. Four months later, on 18 September, the European Commission presented the EU’s first Anti-Racism Action Plan as a response to the ever-growing demands for racial equality and justice in Europe.

EU’s commitment to anti-racism: ambitious but still fragile

The new EU Anti-Racism Action Plan is meant to be the strategy for the next five years to step up action to counter racial discrimination and racism within the EU. It sets a clear goal: ensuring equal treatment and rights for all to “make a racism-free EU a reality”. The plan is ambitious in its scope and has been welcomed by anti-racist organisations in Europe. It is the first time structural, institutional and historical racism have been acknowledged by the EU. This is a key step towards recognising, understanding and tackling the different ways in which racism operates. Colonialism, slavery and the Holocaust are explicitly mentioned in the Action Plan when addressing the need to acknowledge and teach the historical roots of racism, as is the need to mainstream racial equality and anti-racism in EU and national policies, from digital technologies to migration. Consistent with the motivation behind its publication, the Commission specifically addresses discriminatory policing towards racialised communities in Europe, including racial or ethnic profiling, recognised as unlawful and damaging for reporting of crimes.

“Progress on fighting racism and hate is fragile – it is hard won but very easily lost”, said president Ursula von der Leyen during the State of the Union Address when announcing the Anti-Racism Action Plan. Unfortunately, she could not be more right. Only a few days later, the Commission released a new Pact on Migration and Asylum that has a strong focus on increasing the number of migrants to be returned and setting border procedures that will increase their detention. This document shows the EU’s focus on increasing its protection of borders as the key component of its new migration strategy.

The end of 2020 saw political reactions from European governments and the EU targeting migrants and the Muslim community in the wake of the attacks that took place between October and November 2020 in Austria and France. As highlighted by Statewatch, the statement adopted by the EU Justice and Home Affairs ministers on 13 November “single out migrants (explicitly) and Muslims (implicitly) as a problem”. Measures proposed to fight terrorism linked extremism to the failure of migrants to integrate, and to the need to strengthen protection of the EU’s external borders and increase policing, security and surveillance. Despite NGOs’ concerns about the conflation of counter-terrorism and integration, prevention of radicalisation and extremism finally made its way into the Action Plan on Integration and Inclusion of migrants and EU citizens with a migrant background, published on 24 November. Two weeks later, the EU Counter-Terrorism Agenda was published following the same narrative on Muslims and migrants. Human rights organisations have warned about the discriminatory impact of these policies and discourses and underlined that “Europe’s top-down counter-terrorism measures are reminiscent of a colonial approach to ‘managing’ Muslims often perceived as a problem in Europe, including through migration.”

The EU Migration and Asylum Pact: losing progress on fighting racism

“It’s very painful for me that in the 21st century, we the Black people are just like nothing. to matter, like seriously, it has to be in the Central Mediterranean, it has to matter in Libya. (…) For me, Europe has to do more to prove that Black life really matters”. These are the words of Souleman, a man from Cameroon rescued from the Central Mediterranean last summer after a long and harsh journey to Europe. The testimony of Souleman is a powerful cry for anti-racist demands to reach migrants, especially black Africans, and migration issues.

The Pact on Migration and Asylum came with five legislative proposals and four recommendations to be discussed by the European Parliament and the Council. The results of their agreements will have an immense impact on migrants trying to reach Europe and already present in Europe. Although the Pact stresses the need for a comprehensive European framework on migration that provides “decent conditions for the men, women and children arriving in the EU” and that “allow Europeans to trust that migration is managed in an effective and humane way”, it does not honour its own words. Instead, another sentence better summarises the Pact’s main motivation: “EU migration rules can be credible only if those who do not have the right to stay in the EU are effectively returned”. Around this idea, the Pact builds a whole system intended to identify who has the right to stay and who does not, and increase the deportation of those left without the right.

Furthering the race-making impact of migration policies

Bordering is always a way of race-making. It determines who is eligible for citizenship and political membership, maintaining historical hierarchies of belonging, but also creating new ones. “As people concerned with challenging racism and defending people’s right to move around, we have to be alert to how movement and controls on movement produce and reconfigure racial distinctions and hierarchies in the present (even if they are not named in racial terms)”, says researcher de Noronha.

The Pact is predominantly about preventing irregular migration, the type of migration that is left for people who cannot access regular pathways to Europe. Access to permits and regular pathways are not available for all migrants  and depend to a large extent on their country of origin. The racial impact is clarified by the UN Special Rapporteur (UNSR) on Contemporary forms of Racism: “States regularly engage in racial discrimination in access to citizenship, nationality or immigration status through policies and rhetoric that make no reference to race, ethnicity or national origin, and that are wrongly presumed to apply equally to all”. In Europe this is clear: “especially in former colonial territories, long-standing citizenship and nationality laws often discriminate against indigenous peoples or persons belonging to racial and ethnic minorities, in ways that reinforce ethno-nationalist conceptions of political membership.” The border procedures proposed in the Pact apply only to those who cross borders irregularly, setting the first filter and (racial) distinction. A further distinction based on nationality is also included here, as the border procedures only apply to people coming from a country with a rate of positive asylum decisions below 20%, which will lead to discrimination on the grounds of nationality.

After a pre-entry screening procedure where these migrants will be automatically detained, the Pact introduces a binary approach where everyone who does not apply for asylum should be forcefully returned, thus leaving no room for other pathways to regularisation and access to permits. The decision on asylum then determines the right to stay. But the asylum system is poorly adapted for addressing the many reasons people might seek protection, leaving some people outside, not to mention all the people who are not seeking protection but just decent labour opportunities.

People who are considered to pose a threat to national security or public order will be sent to the asylum border procedure – an accelerated procedure where people are likely to be returned and could be detained for up to three months. The construction of certain communities as a threat – to which counter-terrorism narratives have contributed – raises questions about the risk of discriminatory targeting of racialised communities.

Exacerbating discriminatory policing, racial profiling and police violence

The Pact foresees the pre-entry screening procedure to be applied also to people already in the EU when “there is no indication” that they crossed the border regularly. Thus, undocumented people will be apprehended inside the European countries where they are residing and might be detained for up to three days to be “screened” – identification, registration in databases, security checks and that will determine their status and their fate.

This poses serious concerns about increased discriminatory policing and racial profiling targeting communities of colour in Europe. Racial profiling is a widespread reality in Europe and works under the ethnonationalist conception that equates belonging to racial or ethnic minorities with being a foreigner. A FRA study from 2014 showed that 79% of surveyed border guards at airports rated ethnicity as a helpful indicator – alongside the way people behave when approaching a checkpoint and during the check (96% and 98%), destination (85%) and nationality (90%) – to identify people attempting to enter the country in an irregular manner before speaking to them. There is ever-growing evidence that discriminatory policing is accompanied by the excessive use of force and violence against racialised – including undocumented – people, including incidents leading to death.  The Pact’s proposed return sponsorship creates the possibility for EU member states to provide mutual support for the deportation of migrants, rather than for relocating them. To do so, member states can “choose the nationality of people to be supported for return, based on the readmission agreements signed and the highest possibility of expulsion”. Besides the inequalities this will create based on origin, this will contribute to discriminatory stops and searches and racial profiling according to nationality and will exacerbate existing practices of raids based on racial and ethnic criteria to fill charter flights for deportation to those countries.

Unequal external relations to ensure forced returns

At the time Spain was removing the razor wires from its fences with Morocco to make them more “humane”, Morocco was adding razor-wired fence on its side of the border with EU funds. The externalisation of borders has moved responsibility and accountability for the consequences of the EU’s own migration control policies away from the EU, culminating in the impunity of the system. “We have been crying over years that Libya is not a ground for people, but Europe pretends as if it’s not hearing”, said Souleman. “Tackling the issues we see today – the loss of life first and foremost, but also shortcomings in migration management – means working together so that everyone assumes their responsibilities”, states the Pact. It is hard to see how the EU is assuming its own.

And yet one area where there seems to be major consensus within the Commission and the Council is the external dimension of the Pact. The proposal gives a strong push to bilateral agreements and partnerships with third countries (though the main focus is on African countries, underlined over and over by different EU leaders) to cooperate on migration control, forced returns and readmission of migrants. These countries often have to be coerced or pressured into accepting “double win for Europe” partnerships where their interests on regularisation or mobility are excluded from the discussion, says the European Council on Refugees and Exiles. As a way to pressure them, the EU subordinates policy priorities related to visas, development aid, financial support, regular pathways and others, on collaboration on readmission – indispensable for the EU’s goal to enforce returns. Such conditionalities do not speak to the “mutually beneficial” relations that the Pact claims to pursue, but instead confirms once again that “EU migration policy is a one-way affair”.

International relations with the global South (former colonies) and its inhabitants are central to the fight for racial justice globally and to overcoming historical relationships of dominance. The EU’s insistence on setting top-down agendas with predefined objectives raises questions about the expansion of EU sovereignty over other territories, attempting to manage the mobility of people not only within its territory but far beyond. This has been evidenced by the expansion of the EU’s borders in Africa, which comes with a high cost for human rights and the lives of African people. Impediments to the free movement of Africans can only remind us of their forced mobility during slavery. Similarities like these are not unique to the African continent. How Europe controls the migration of people from the global South today is very much rooted in its colonial past. Not only the EU’s commitment to global justice and reparation is missing in the Pact, but solidarity is invoked between EU countries (to enforce deportations) and not with the global South and its people.

How to ensure rights for all, including migrants: building on the Anti-Racism Action Plan

Migration and (the fight against) racism cannot be compartmentalised. To live up to its commitments on racial justice, the EU cannot carry out two parallel agendas on migration and anti-racism, respectively; instead, it should bring both policy areas into dialogue so that decisions about migration contribute to the fight for racial justice and actions on anti-racism contribute to a fair system of migration for all. There are several steps that the EU can take, building on the new Anti-Racism Action Plan.

1. Mainstream anti-racism in migration policies, integrating the racial equality dimension throughout the legal and policy EU framework on migration. This will also involve looking at the specific ways structural, institutional and individual racism are faced by migrants in Europe (including at the borders) and devising concrete measures to fight against it.
2. Counter discriminatory policing and racial profiling. The EU must tackle police brutality and racist abuses by law enforcement to protect those who are most likely to experience it, regardless of migration status. “Everyone should feel safe in Europe” and migration and border controls cannot be put before the safety, rights and lives of people. Strong accountability measures and access to justice are key to address this problem and the EU should make them available within the EU, at its borders and beyond – wherever its migration policies are implemented.
3. Ensure “real mutually beneficial” partnerships with third countries. Moving forward, the EU’s relationship with the global South cannot replicate the unequal arrangements rooted in past colonial ties to impose its own agenda and goals – an agenda that harms the very people concerned. To avoid perpetuating neo-colonial dominance, the EU must mainstream anti-racism in its foreign policy (across all areas), instead of mainstreaming migration control, and work on global justice and reparation measures. Further recommendations on how to ensure “real mutually beneficial” partnerships with third countries have been put forward by migrant rights advocates.
4. Teach the past to understand the present. Acknowledge and teach the historical roots of racism to foster a better understanding of migration in the present and counter ahistorical and race-blind approaches to migration policies.
5. Promote narratives consistent with the dignity of all. In addition to combatting disinformation and racist and xenophobic messages in the media, EU institutions should promote the same regarding political discourse targeting migrant and racialised communities. This will help to fight against ethnonationalist rhetoric that fosters discrimination of such groups.

A real commitment to anti-racism implies ensuring rights for the whole community: from EU citizens from racial or ethnic minorities to migrants from the same minorities, regardless of their status and the way they cross borders. As stressed in the Anti-Racism Action Plan, “everyone in the EU should be able to enjoy their fundamental rights and freedoms”. But citizenship, nationality and immigration status remain the first formal – and racialised – barrier to the full enjoyment of human rights that states have at their disposal. For this reason, it is essential to understand how the EU is shaping irregularity, who is made “irregular” and the racial impact of this, and to continue to demand rights for all, irrespective of status, and regular and accessible pathways to Europe.

The statement was published three days after a mini-summit with key EU leaders to respond to the attacks where Islam was directly targeted. It also underwent several modifications to remove references to Islam and Muslims before the final version, but there is still a strong focus on religious extremism and the explicit mention of the so-called “islamist” attack in France.

People who do not apply for asylum are immediately deported or denied entry, while those who apply are sent to asylum (border or normal) procedures where, if their application is refused, will also be forcefully returned.

Cover image: Amy Elting- Unsplash

Undocumented children are part of our communities and share the hopes and dreams of any other child. But their lives and the lives of their families are characterized by uncertainty and instability due to their irregular residence status. PICUM’s new report, Navigating Irregularity: The Impact of Growing up Undocumented in Europe, looks at how their residence status affects six areas of their lives: housing, access to services, income and socio-economic status, residence procedures and immigration enforcement (including detention), school life, and family life.

Many undocumented children were born in or have lived for many years in Europe, most often with their parents. Sixty-eight percent of undocumented children whose parents were surveyed in Ireland, were born there, for instance. According to Eurostat, about one in ten people that were found to be irregularly present in the EU in the past decade were children.

Housing

Where children live affects their present and future. While undocumented parents do their utmost to provide stable, quality housing to their children, they are often unable to offer them the same housing conditions as other parents. They often lack income or face discrimination on the housing market. Similarly, where unaccompanied children are excluded from reception facilities, they end up homeless, in squats or temporary settlements.

Children’s risk of ill-health and disability increases by up to 25 percent during childhood and early adulthood when they experience multiple housing problems. Mental health problems are also more prevalent among homeless children who may have lower levels of academic achievement that cannot be explained by differences in ability.  An inadequate housing situation or homelessness also impacts their social life and their ability to make lasting friendships and maintain social networks.

Access to services

Although child rights are applicable to all children, irrespective of their residence status, undocumented children have limited access to social services, including education, health care, early childhood education and care and protection when they are a victim of crime. And when service providers report undocumented migrants’ personal data to immigration authorities, undocumented children and parents hesitate to reach out and seek help.

Income

Income is a key social determinant of health and inextricably linked to children’s well-being and life chances. Income affects the community in which children live, the quality of life, the food available to them, the type of housing they live in and the sense of security they experience. Although very few studies exist on the household income of undocumented migrants, it is safe to say that they face high levels of poverty as their irregular migration status relegates undocumented workers to the informal economy, where they are systematically underpaid and exploited. Many others are completely dependent on handouts and informal support networks, and the COVID-19 pandemic has only made their situation more precarious.

Undocumented children living in poverty often go hungry or eat a poor diet. Undocumented parents face challenges in offering their children decent shoes and clothing, necessary school supplies, internet at home, toys or even essentials like shower gel and shampoo. Yet unlike other families that live in poverty, undocumented parents are not eligible for support such as unemployment assistance or minimum income.

Residence procedures

Children across Europe – both accompanied and unaccompanied – are involved in residence procedures. Sometimes they are forced to step in to fill the gaps of our migration systems. For instance, when no interpreter is available and parents do not know the country’s language, children are tasked with translating letters for their parents or accompanying them during residence permit interviews, visits to the family’s lawyer or social and health services.

Going through residence procedures is a nerve-wracking experience, for adults and children alike, and telling one’s story over and over can retraumatize them. When the residence application is denied, the person’s mental health greatly deteriorates. Sometimes, children simply give up and go into an unresponsive state. Many children fear the police, detention and deportation.

School

In the face of these challenges, the school environment can function as a mediating factor in undocumented children’s lives. It provides a social safety net or ‘protective layer’ around them, while they navigate other challenges in their day-to-day life. Enabling undocumented children access to education, including early childhood education and care, extra-curricular activities and internships, is therefore key to nurturing a child’s resilience and a safe and secure future.

However, undocumented children are often not explicitly included in countries’ education laws. This means that they may not be able to enrol in school and classes, or not be able to participate fully. When raised in poverty, as many are, undocumented children are likely to have a disadvantage in the formal education system even before starting school.

Family life

Family life and family dynamics are impacted by residence status. When children grow up in a warm, loving family and develop a secure attachment to their primary caregiver, they receive a strong foundation for success and resilience later in life. Experiencing love and safety protects the child’s mental health. Reversely, long-term deprivation of a child from their primary caregiver (due to a caregiver being detained, for example) is likely to cause cognitive, emotional and social damage.

For undocumented parents, managing the day-to-day difficulties caused by irregular residence status and experiencing discrimination can force them to be less available for interaction with their children. Due to the accumulation of problems such as poverty, debt, social isolation and uncertainty about the future, many undocumented children and young people grow up under stress, which can lead to high risks of cardiovascular disease, cancers, asthma and depression when they are adults. In some families, children take up roles that are usually filled by parents. This ‘parentification’ of the child can adversely affect their socio-emotional development and mental health.

The need to find durable solutions

“I think about what it would be like to have a residence permit. I think about that every day,” says a 12-year-old boy who grew up in the Netherlands.

All children can reach their potential if they are given the resources and environment needed to thrive. A secure residence status is part and parcel of such an environment, and a precondition for undocumented children and young people to reach their full potential. This is why it is important for governments to develop best interests procedures that result in durable solutions for undocumented children, foresee in-country residence procedures based on child rights, ensure full access to services for undocumented children, and evaluate and reform policies and practices that might harm undocumented children and their families.The report is also available in French and Spanish.Cover image: Adobe Stock – Rawpixel.com

Every year, more than 100,000 people are put in immigration detention in Europe.

In immigration detention, people are uprooted from their communities, and they often don’t know whether and when they will be released or if they will be deported. Often, people in immigration detention don’t have access to adequate information and interpreters, legal aid and medical care. This has a severe impact on mental health. Studies indicate higher incidence of anxiety, depression and post-traumatic stress disorder than among the rest of the population, and an average of very high levels of depression in four out of every five detainees. In 2020, 51% of the immigration detainees in the Brook House centre (UK) were considered at risk of suicide.

Detention is always a harmful practice, which often has long-lasting consequences on peoples’ lives and self-perception. Sometimes, this harm adds to pre-existing situations of vulnerability, like poor physical or mental health, disabilities, past experiences of trauma, or age.

States have an obligation to protect people in situations of vulnerability. As detention severely exacerbates vulnerabilities, and creates new ones, people in situations of vulnerability should never be detained. In the EU, the 2008 Return Directive requires Member States to pay “particular attention” to these groups of people. But as of today, only few countries have mechanisms in place to assess people’s vulnerabilities before they are put in detention. Even when some mechanism is in place, like in Belgium and in the UK, people who are identified as vulnerable are frequently still detained as migration control purposes trump other considerations.

This lack of attention means that states regularly detain pregnant women, LGBTI people, people with mental health issues and even children.

In Belgium and Spain, for instance, people with mental health issues are sometimes placed in solitary confinement, which is otherwise considered a punitive measure. Isolation further deteriorates their mental health condition. Moreover, mental illnesses, despite being an important factor affecting individuals’ situations of vulnerability, are excluded by the definition of the Return Directive and several national legal frameworks.

Children are detained in most European countries, despite broad evidence of the negative impact of even short periods of detention on children health and psychosocial development, and despite consensus at the UN level that detaining children based on migration status is a violation of child rights.

In Greece, women can be held for long periods in police stations without access to basic hygiene products. In the UK, many women denounce pervasive sexual harassment, as health screenings and searches are often done by male medical professionals or guards. In Belgium, some women are held in mixed centres where they are outnumbered by the male population, thus creating discomfort among some.

Men in detention also face specific vulnerabilities, often linked to their young age, experiences of trauma and abuses, and their migratory journey. In some countries, detention centres for men are more densely populated, leading to higher risks of conflict with the staff and poorer conditions.

Transgender, intersex and gender non-conforming persons regularly experience discrimination in detention and are at risk of physical and sexual violence, solitary confinement as well as verbal and psychological abuse.

Detention creates its own vulnerabilities, which add to existing ones. This is why we need a clear legal obligation to assess people’s vulnerability, so they’re not detained in the first place.Definitions of vulnerability should be based on an open-ended list, which takes into consideration the intersectional nature of vulnerability as well as vulnerabilities caused by detention itself. This screening has to be independent, transparent and individualised. In some cases, factors of vulnerability can only be identified with time, and after a relationship of trust is established. As detention itself may exacerbate existing vulnerabilities or even create new ones, vulnerability should be reassessed regularly.