The undersigned civil society organisations would like to express their concerns with regard to several aspects of the Commission’s proposal amending the Schengen Borders Code.

Overall, the proposal embraces a very harmful narrative which assumes that people crossing borders irregularly are a threat to the EU and proposes to address it by increasing policing and curtailing safeguards. At the same time, the proposal fails to recognise the lack of regular pathways for asylum seekers, who are often forced to turn to irregular border crossings in order to seek international protection within the EU, and further complicates access to asylum. The measures put forward by the Commission would have a detrimental impact on the right to freedom of movement within the EU, the principle of non-discrimination, access to asylum and the harmonisation of procedures under EU law. Furthermore, the proposal would increase the use of monitoring and surveillance technologies, without any adequate safeguards.

Freedom of movement within the EU and violation of the principle of non-discrimination

Several provisions of the proposed amended Schengen Borders Code would encroach the right to freedom of movement within the EU (art. 3(2) TEU, art. 21 and 77 TFEU) by expanding the possibility to reintroduce internal border controls and facilitating the application of so-called “alternative measures” which in practice amount to discriminatory border controls. The discretionary nature of these border checks is very likely to disproportionately target racialised communities, and practically legitimise ethnic and racial profiling and expose people to institutional and police abuse.

While the amended Schengen Borders Code reiterates that internal border controls are prohibited in the Schengen area, it also introduces the possibility to carry out police checks in the internal border areas with the explicit aim to prevent irregular migration, when these are based on “general information and experience of the competent authorities” (rec. 18 and 21 and art. 23). In addition, the proposal clarifies the meaning of “serious threat” which justifies the temporary reintroduction of border controls (which was already possible under art. 25 of the 2016 SBC). Problematically, the proposed definition of “serious threat” also includes “a situation characterised by large scale unauthorised movements of third country nationals between member states, putting at risk the overall functioning of the area without internal border control” (art. 25).-1-

Such provisions, together with the new procedure set by article 23a and analysed below, will in practice legalise systematic border controls which target people based on their racial, ethnic, national, or religious characteristics. This practice is in clear violation of European and international anti-discrimination law and a breach to migrants’ fundamental rights.

Research from the EU Fundamental Rights Agency in 2021 shows that people from an ‘ethnic minority, Muslim, or not heterosexual’ are disproportionately affected by police stops, both when they are walking and when in a vehicle. In addition, another study from 2014 showed that 79% of surveyed border guards at airports rated ethnicity as a helpful indicator to identify people attempting to enter the country in an irregular manner before speaking to them.

The new provisions introduced in the amended Schengen Borders Code are likely to further increase the discriminatory and illegal practice of ethnic and racial profiling and put migrant communities at risk of institutional violence, which undermines the right to non-discrimination and stands at odds with the European Commission’s commitments under the recent Anti-Racism Action Plan.

Lack of individual assessment and increased detention

The proposed revisions to the Schengen Borders Code set a new procedure to “transfer people apprehended at the internal borders”. According to the proposed new rules, if a third country national without a residence permit or right to remain crosses the internal borders in an irregular way (e.g., from Germany to Belgium, or from Italy to France) and if they are apprehended “in the vicinity of the border area,” they could be directly transferred back to the competent authorities in the EU country where it is assumed they just came from, without undergoing an individual assessment (art. 23a and Annex XII). This provision is very broad and can potentially include people apprehended at train or bus stations, or even in cities close to the internal borders, if they are apprehended as part of cross-border police cooperation (e.g. joint police patrols) and if there is an indication that they have just crossed the border (for instance through documents they may carry on themselves, their own statements, or information taken from migration or other databases).

The person will be then transferred within 24 hours.-2- During these 24 hours, Annex XII sets that the authorities might “take appropriate measures” to prevent the person from entering on the territory – which constitutes, in practice, a blanket detention provision, without any safeguards nor judicial overview. While the transfer decision could be subject to appeal, this would not have a suspensive effect. The Return Directive would also be amended, by introducing an obligation for the receiving member state to issue a return decision without the exceptions currently listed in article 6 (e.g., the possibility to issue a residence permit for humanitarian or compassionate reasons). As a consequence, transferred people would be automatically caught up in arbitrary and lengthy detention and return procedures.-3-

Courts in Italy, Slovenia and Austria have recently ruled against readmissions taking place under informal or formal agreements, recognising them as systematic human rights violations with the potential to trigger so-called chain pushbacks. The courts found the plaintiffs were routinely returned from Italy or Austria through Slovenia to Croatia, from where they had been illegally pushed back to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In practice, this provision would legalise the extremely violent practice of “internal pushbacks” which have been broadly criticised by civil society organisations across the EU and condemned by higher courts. The new procedure, including the possibility to detain people for up to 24 hours, would also apply to children, even though this has been deemed illegal by courts and despite international consensus that child detention constitutes a human rights violation.

Access to asylum

The new Code introduces measures which member states can apply in cases of “instrumentalisation of migrants”, which is defined as “a situation where a third country instigates irregular migratory flows into the Union by actively encouraging or facilitating the movement of third country nationals to the external borders” (art. 2). In such cases, member states can limit the number of border crossing points and their opening hours, and intensify border surveillance including through drones, motion sensors and border patrols (art. 5(4) and 13(5)). The definition of instrumentalisation of migrants should also be read in conjunction with the Commission’s proposal for a Regulation addressing situations of instrumentalisation in the field of migration and asylum, which provides member states with numerous derogations to the asylum acquis.

These measures unjustifiably penalise asylum seekers by limiting access to the territory and de facto undermining art. 31 of the Refugee Convention which prohibits States from imposing penalties on refugees on account of their entry or presence in their territory without authorization, and are therefore in violation of international law. 

Harmonisation of procedures under EU law and asylum acquis

The proposal lifts the standstill clause introduced by the 2008 Return Directive (art. 6(3)) which prohibits member states from negotiating new bilateral readmission agreements. When negotiating the 2008 Return Directive, both the Commission and the European Parliament had clarified that bilateral readmission agreements should remain an exception, as they undermine the objective of harmonising procedures under EU law.

By incentivising states to adopt new bilateral agreements, and proposing a new internal transfer procedure, the Commission’s proposal promotes the proliferation of exceptional procedures, which are outside the framework set by the Return Directive and the asylum acquis, and circumvents the procedural safeguards included in the Dublin Regulation.

The proposed provisions undermine the substantive and procedural guarantees for third country nationals, such as the right to request asylum, the respect of the principle of non-refoulement, and the right to an effective remedy.

As mentioned above, several national-level courts have ruled on the unlawfulness of readmissions carried out under formal and informal agreements, which often led to instances of chain-refoulement. There is a serious risk that readmission agreements, if they remain a part of the current legislative proposal, could be further abused to perpetrate chain refoulement and collective expulsions, which are in violation of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 to the European Convention on Human Rights and Article 19 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

Use of monitoring and surveillance technologies

Lastly, the proposal also facilitates a more extensive use of monitoring and surveillance technologies, by clarifying that these are part of member states’ responsibility to patrol borders (art. 2). In addition, article 23, analysed above, clarifies that internal checks, including to prevent irregular migration, can be carried out “where appropriate, on the basis of monitoring and surveillance technologies generally used in the territory”.

By removing obstacles for a more extensive use of monitoring and surveillance technologies, these provisions would create a loophole to introduce technologies which would otherwise be discouraged by pre-existing EU legislation such as the General Data Protection Regulation.-4-

Artificial Intelligence (AI) and other automated decision-making systems, including profiling, are increasingly used in border control and management for generalised and indiscriminate surveillance. Insofar as such systems are used to ‘detect human presence’ for the purpose of ‘combating irregular migration’, there is serious concern that such systems can facilitate illegal interdiction, violence at border crossings, and further limit access to asylum and other forms of protection.

Furthermore, these technologies disproportionately target racialised people, thus further exacerbating the risks of increased racial and ethnic profiling. Indeed, monitoring and surveillance technologies which make use of artificial intelligence by nature violate the right to non-discrimination insofar as they are trained on past data and decision-making, and therefore codify assumptions on the basis of nationality and other personal characteristics, which is prohibited by international racial discrimination law.-5-

Recommendations

In light of the concerns discussed above, the undersigned civil society organisations:

• Express their concerns on the harmful impact of narratives which consider people crossing borders irregularly as a threat, and recommend the European Parliament and the Council to delete such references from recital 29, article 23 and article 25(1)(c);
• Call on the EU institutions to uphold the right to freedom of movement and the principle of non-discrimination, including by prohibiting the use of technologies which make use of artificial intelligence and other automated decision-making systems. In this regard, we recommend the European Parliament and the Council to amend article 23, paragraph (a) by deleting the reference to “combat irregular residence or stay, linked to irregular migration” in point (ii) and deleting point (iv) on monitoring and surveillance technologies;
• Urge the EU institutions to uphold the right to apply for asylum, and recommend deleting the definition of ‘instrumentalisation of migration’ in article 2, paragraph 27 and all the ensuing provisions which would apply in this circumstance;
• Condemn the proliferation of exceptional procedures which undermine the right to an individual assessment, and recommend deleting article 23a, annex XII, and the proposed amendment to art. 6(3) of the Return Directive;
• Express their concerns at the glaring inconsistency between some of the proposed provisions and the European Commission’s commitments under the EU Action Plan against Racism, i.e. with respect to ending racial profiling, and call on the EU institutions to uphold their commitment to address and to combat structural and institutional discrimination and include explicit references to the Action Plan against Racism in the text of the Schengen Borders Code.

Signatories:

European/ international networks and organisations

• Access Now
• Action Aid International
• Border Violence Monitoring Network
• Caritas Europa
• Centre for Youths Integrated Development (CYID)
• Danish Refugee Council
• European Network Against Racism (ENAR)
• Equinox Initiative for Racial Justice
• EuroMed Rights
• Fair Trials
• FEANTSA – European Federation of National Organisations Working with the Homeless
• MiGreat – Belgium
• La Strada International
• Oxfam International
• Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants (PICUM)
• Sea-Watch e.V.
• Quaker Council for European Affairs

National level networks and organisations

• 11.11 – Belgium
• Artha project – Belgium
• Association for the Social Support of Youth (ARSIS) – Greece
• Associazione per gli Studi Giuridici sull’Immigrazione (ASGI) – Italy
• ASTI – Association de soutien aux travailleurs immigrés – Luxembourg
• Caritas International – Belgium
• Centre for Peace Studies – Croatia
• Digitale Gesellschaft – Switzerland
• FAIRWORK Belgium – Belgium
• Fundacion Cepaim – Spain
• Human Rights Defenders e.V. – Germany 
• Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI) – Italy
• KISA – Action for Equality, Support, Antiracism – Cyprus
• Mujeres Supervivientes – Spain
• NGO Legis – North Macedonia
• Platform minors in exile – Belgium
• Progress Lawyers Network – Belgium
• Red Acoge – Spain
• Refugees Welcome – Denmark
• Red Solidaria de Acogida – Spain
• Servicio Jesuita a Migrantes (SJM) – Spain
• Stap Verder –The Netherlands
• Stichting LOS (Landelijk Ongedocumenteerden Steunpunt) – The Netherlands

-1- In this regard, it is relevant to highlight that, while temporary reintroduction of internal border controls should only be a measure of “last resort”, this has been done in more than 300 cases since 2006.

-2- Third country nationals “transferred” from one EU member state to another would be handed to the police in the receiving member state. The only requirement to carry out this procedure is to fill out a simple form which states the person’s identity, the way the person’s identity was established, the grounds for refusal and the date of the transfer. If the third country national refuses to sign, it will be enough for the authorities to indicate this in the comments section.

-3- These risks are exacerbated by the lack of harmonisation of protection standards for stateless persons.

-4- See, for instance, Article 22, which states that “data subject shall have the right not to be subject to a decision based solely on automated processing, including profiling, which produces legal effects concerning him or her or similarly significantly affects him or her”, or Article 9, which imposes specific rules regarding the collection and use of sensitive data.

-5- UN Convention for the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, 1965; EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, Article 21; UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Article 5.

In recent years, EU migration policies have consistently focused on increasing the rate of returns. Yet such an approach rests on the mistaken belief that for undocumented people, the only option is to return – either by force or “voluntarily”.

In reality, people continue to reside irregularly for a wide range of reasons, and may indeed have other grounds for residence than an asylum application. According to official estimates, every year 300,000 people cannot return from the EU for different reasons, including human rights and factual considerations.

This report analyses the main human rights reasons for which people who do not qualify for asylum cannot be deported, as well as the external circumstances that can make deportation or return impossible. It concludes by advocating for the need to abandon the exclusive focus on return procedures in favour of a more holistic, comprehensive approach which takes into consideration a broader range of solutions. To do so, it analyses different policies adopted by EU member states to provide rights and protection for people with barriers to return, through the comparison of ten national level case studies from eight different countries (Cyprus, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Poland).

Human rights and other barriers to return

Under international and EU law, there are several human rights reasons for which people who do not qualify for international protection cannot be deported, such as the principle of non-refoulement, protection of family and private life, the best interests of the child, the prohibition of arbitrary detention and protection on the grounds of statelessness. In most countries, these considerations fall outside of the scope of the asylum procedure.

In addition, there can be practical reasons, outside of individual control, for which return and deportation might be practically impossible. For instance, people might not be able to obtain a valid passport, or they might be unable to travel due to medical reasons.

Residence permits for people with barriers to return

Policies which focus on deportation and return as the only possible outcome for people in an irregular administrative situation are bound to create situations of socio-economic exclusion, discrimination and human rights violations, whether in the country of origin, when people are forcibly returned, or in the country of residence, when people are excluded from accessing pathways to regularise their situation and are forced into living in irregularity, often for years.

For this reason, it is key to work towards a paradigm shift in the EU migration policies, from considering return, or deportation, as the primary – or often only – option for people in an irregular administrative situation, to considering different options for case resolution, including pathways to obtain a permanent or temporary residence status.

Permits and statuses available to people with barriers to return vary greatly from country to country, and can range from full-fledged residence permits (e.g., Italy, Spain, Poland) to temporary suspensions of deportation orders (e.g. Greece, Germany). However, the dividing line between the two sub-groups is often very thin, and the categories are far from being homogeneous or well-defined. Permits and statuses can be better described as being placed along a continuum which ranges from residence permits granting full access to labour and social rights, stability and protection from deportation; to mere suspensions of deportation with no rights nor security attached.

This report identifies four key elements which need to be fulfilled in order to ensure that people with barriers to return are granted rights and protection:

• Initiation of the procedure: permits and statuses accessible to people with barriers to return should be evaluated automatically by the authorities (ex officio) on an individual basis, before the issuance of a return decision or a refusal of entry. This is the case, at least for certain permits, in Italy, Spain, Poland, the Netherlands and Germany. In addition, individuals should be able to apply independently as well, as the authorities might not be aware of their specific barriers to return. In the countries examined in this report, individuals can apply independently to certain permits or statuses in Italy, Spain, Cyprus, the Netherlands and France.
• Right to work and access to social services: access to the labour market and to social services should be automatic for any of these permit holders or statuses. Currently, the right to work is granted automatically only in five out of the ten case studies (Italy, Spain, Poland, France, the Netherlands), and full access to social services in four (Italy, Spain, France, the Netherlands).
• Pathways to more secure status: as barriers to return are often continuous, it does not make sense to limit access to secure, long-term permits. Secure permits allow people to acquire more certainty over their future, plan their lives and gain full access to social and labour rights. All countries except two (Greece and Cyprus) analysed in this report grant the possibility to apply to more secure, long-term permits.
• Protection from deportation for the whole duration of the permit / status. This is the case for all of the case studies considered, with the exception of the “no-fault” permit in the Netherlands and the “Duldung” in Germany.

Preventing limbo situations

Despite different national-level policies which provide rights and protection for people with barriers to return, in practice many people still fall through the cracks. This can happen, for instance, because the criteria to apply are too stringent or completely arbitrary; and because of administrative or legal barriers to access these permits. In addition, several states still fail to grant any kind of permit to people who cannot be deported or return, and many others even fail to provide an official acknowledgement that the person cannot be deported, which is in breach of the EU Return Directive.

When this happens, undocumented people with barriers to return find themselves in a limbo, often for years, unable to access healthcare, housing, education, and justice, and are often pushed into undeclared work and exploitation.

To prevent this, it is essential for the European Union and member states to set an obligation to comprehensively assess fundamental rights considerations (including the right to health, private and family ties, best interests of the child, non-refoulement and the protection of stateless people) and whether third country nationals have the possibility to access an autonomous residence permit or other authorisation granting a right to stay before a return decision is issued.

In December 2021, the European Commission proposed new rules on internal borders, codified as a reform of the Schengen Borders Code, that aim to further increase surveillance and controls over non-EU citizens crossing internal and external borders. These proposals would increase the use of technology and would practically legitimise ethnic and racial profiling. More broadly, the proposals reinforce the narrative that irregular migration is a threat to the EU and that it needs to be fought with more policing.

The Schengen Borders Code regulates border controls at the internal and external borders of the Schengen area. The amended Code proposed by the Commission expands EU member states’ powers to carry out checks at the internal borders to prevent undocumented migrants from crossing them, and escalates the use of monitoring and surveillance technologies at the internal and external borders-1-.

The proposed revisions to the Schengen Borders Code set a new procedure to “transfer people apprehended at the internal borders” . According to the proposed new rules, if a third country national crosses the internal borders in an irregular way (e.g. from Germany to Belgium, or from Italy to France), if the police manages to apprehend them “in the vicinity of the border area,” they could be directly transferred back to the competent authorities in the EU country where it is assumed they just came from without undergoing any individual assessment (Article 23a and Annex XII). This provision is very broad and can potentially include people apprehended at train or bus stations, or even in cities close to the internal borders, if there is an indication that they have just crossed the border (for instance through documents they may carry on themselves, their own statements, or information taken from migration or other databases).

Practically speaking, people “transferred” from one EU member state to another would be handed to the police in the receiving member state. The only requirement to carry out this procedure is to for the authorities of the “transferring” state to fill out a simple form which states  the person’s identity, the way the person’s identity was established, the grounds for refusal and the date of the transfer. If the undocumented person refuses to sign, it will be enough for the authorities to indicate this in the comments section.  The undocumented migrant will be then deported back within 24 hours (during which they can be detained without any safeguards). They would have the right to appeal the decision, but without suspensive effect, which means that they would only be able to appeal from another country, with all the difficulties this entails. The receiving Member State must then issue a return decision to deport them to their country of origin or a third country.

In practice, these procedures would legalise an extremely problematic practice of “internal pushbacks” which has been broadly criticised by civil society organisations across the EU and even sanctioned by higher courts. The new procedures would also apply to children, even though this has been deemed illegal by courts.

Even though the new Schengen Borders Code reiterates that internal border controls are prohibited in the Schengen area, it nonetheless clarifies that police and other powers can lawfully carry out checks in the internal border areas to prevent irregular migration (Recitals 18 and 21 and Article 23).  Such provisions will in practice legalise systematic border controls which target people only based on their racial, ethnic, national, or religious characteristics, all of which is in clear violation of European and international anti-discrimination law. In fact, it is clear that the new procedure allowing for internal transfers of people crossing borders irregularly will depend, for its implementation, on the borders police’s practice of deciding who will be subject to document checks based on racial, ethnic, national, or religious characteristics instead of individual behaviour or objective evidence.

2021 research from the EU Fundamental Rights Agency shows that people from an ethnic minority are disproportionately affected by police stops, both when they are walking and when in a vehicle. In addition, another study from 2014 showed that 79% of surveyed border guards at airports rated ethnicity as a helpful indicator to identify people attempting to enter the country in an irregular manner before speaking to them. The new provisions introduced in the amended Schengen Borders Code are likely to further increase the discriminatory and illegal practice of ethnic and racial profiling, which stands at odds with the European Commission’s commitments under the recent Anti-Racism Action Plan.

While the new Schengen Borders Code indicates that internal border controls are prohibited in the Schengen area, it also foresees a provision (Article 25) for a member state to temporarily introduce border controls at all or specific parts of its internal border if it faces “serious threats”. Problematically, the code introduces a definition of “serious threat” which includes, alongside terrorism or organised crime, “a situation characterised by large scale unauthorised movements of third country nationals between member states, putting at risk the overall functioning of the area without internal border control” (Article 25). Even though the Schengen Borders Code (both in the 2016 and the amended versions) foresees that the temporary reintroduction of internal border controls should only be a measure of “last resort”, this has been done in more than 300 cases since 2006.

Furthermore, the new Code introduces measures which member states can apply in case of “instrumentalisation of migrants”, which is defined as “a situation where a third country instigates irregular migratory flows into the Union by actively encouraging or facilitating the movement of third country nationals to the external borders” (Article 2). In such cases, member states can limit the number of entries and the opening hours of crossing points, and intensify border surveillance including through drones, motion sensors and border patrols (Articles 5(4) and 13(5)).

The proposal also expands the use of monitoring and surveillance technologies to prevent irregular migration including when states have not formally reintroduced internal border controls (Article 2 and 23), despite broad criticism over the lack of transparency and the risks of technologies replicating biases against specific communities.

In short, the new Code would turn the Schengen area into a tech-controlled space in which ethnic and racial profiling is likely to be further exacerbated to identify potentially undocumented people and facilitate their immediate deportation to another member state, in complete absence of any safeguards.

-1- Besides the amendments analysed in this blog, the amended proposal introduces further provisions on health-related challenges, amends the procedure for the unilateral reintroduction of internal border controls and introduces the possibility or the Council to reintroduce temporary border controls, on initiative of the Commission.

Under international and EU law, there are several human rights reasons for which people who do not qualify for asylum cannot be deported. These include the principle of non-refoulement, the protection of family and private life, the best interests of the child and the prohibition of arbitrary detention. In addition, several circumstances that are outside of an individual’s control can make deportation or return impossible.

For people who for whom return is impossible, or undesirable, many EU countries foresee residence permits that go outside the scope of international protection.

But in recent years, EU migration policies have been consistently focusing on increasing returns and closing access to these national residence permits. Such an approach rests on the mistaken belief that for undocumented people, the only option is to return – either by force or “voluntarily”. The EU Pact on Migration and Asylum is built on this assumption and attempts to entrench it throughout the EU’s immigration and asylum procedures.

Three recent proposals, the Recast Return Directive, the Screening Regulation and the amended Asylum Procedures Regulation go one step further in this direction, by assuming that all people who arrive or reside in the EU irregularly and whose asylum applications are unsuccessful should immediately return or be deported.In reality, people continue to reside irregularly for a wide range of reasons, and may indeed have other grounds for residence than an asylum application. According to official estimates, every year 300,000 people cannot return from the EU for different reasons, including human rights and factual considerations.

60 national protection statuses exist in the EU, in addition to international protection (i.e. asylum and subsidiary protection). The Pact proposals would risk practically closing access to these and other national-level residence permits.

At least seventeen EU member states provide residence permits based on humanitarian reasons. In addition, specific statuses based on the principle of non-refoulement exist in at least seven EU member states.

In addition, twelve EU member states provide a temporary residence permit on medical grounds; at least five member states have legislation granting special permits for undocumented victims of domestic violence; at least eight member states have regularisation mechanisms accessible to children, young people or families; and at least six member states have procedures for stateless people.

Some countries also provide access to residence permits based on factors such as length of residence, employment, school attendance of children and other local social ties.Read our briefing paperSome member states grant residence permits to some victims of crimes (e.g. domestic violence, trafficking in human beings or particularly exploitative working conditions), to allow them to seek protection and report abuse in a safe way and to access remedy. The EU legal framework requires or encourages permits to be granted in some circumstances, in particular for victims of domestic violence with a dependent status (Citizens Directive and Family Reunification Directive), victims of human trafficking (Residence Permit Directive) and labour exploitation (Employers’ Sanctions Directive).

These various permits are based on criteria which are often not assessed in the asylum procedure. At least half of the 60 national protection statuses existing in the EU are currently examined by other authorities than those handling asylum applications, and in many instances are not part of the international protection procedure. The refugee status determination procedure, which is the core of asylum procedures, evaluates whether the person has been or has a risk of persecution because of their “race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion,” or would suffer serious harm as defined by article 15 of the EU Qualification Directive.

What is usually not considered is: whether it’s in the best interests of the child’s development and long-term well-being to live in the country or a third country; whether people might face risks of serious harm when they are deported or return to a country of transit or another third country; whether their health condition might prevent their return; whether they might have strong private or family ties in the country (in particular, but not only, for people who have been living in the EU for years); and whether they might qualify for other national-level residence permits.

A migration system that respects the fundamental rights of everyone ensures people can access residence permits granted at national level. A fair and efficient system does not leave hundreds of thousands of people in limbo.

We recommend member states to comprehensively assess fundamental rights considerations (including but not limited to the right to health care, private and family ties, best interests of the child and non-refoulement) and whether third country nationals fulfil the criteria to apply for an autonomous residence permit or other authorisation granting a right to stay before a return decision is issued. For children, this means including a formal, individual and fully-documented procedure examining all aspects of a child’s situation and considering all options in order to identify which durable solution is in the best interests of the child.To learn more about this topic, please read our briefing paper.

The renewed EU action plan against migrant smuggling (2021-2025), presented by the European Commission at the end of September, risks exacerbating all the reasons why migrant smuggling happens in the first place.

At the EU level, migrant smuggling is defined as the facilitation of irregular entry, transit or stay into a country, and is often portrayed as a very lucrative business operated by powerful criminal networks that exploit migrants. In reality, research has shown time and time again that most people convicted for smuggling are in fact individuals, often helping friends and family, or migrants themselves trying to reach a certain country. We also know that people who want to reach Europe often have no other way to get here in a regular manner, and have to rely on other people who help them cross irregularly.

The Action Plan furthers these common misconceptions and uses them to justify measures that are actually counter-productive and harm the fundamental rights of migrants. Crucially, it fails to recognise that restrictive migration policies often incentivise smuggling activities: the more limited the regular pathways, the more people will be forced to rely on smugglers to access Europe.Read our briefingIn line with such biases, the Plan focuses on stemming irregular migration through stepping up returns, and on increasing pressure on third countries to prosecute and punish smugglers, with little consideration for basic safeguards.

No attention is paid to the root cause of smuggling, which evidence shows is linked to the lack of regular pathways to cross borders. International calls to create such regular pathways, also included in the Global Compact for Migration, are not heeded either.

Cooperation with and sanctions of third countries

In the Action Plan, the European Commission aims at incentivising cooperation with third countries to fight against migrant smuggling outside the EU, including by linking it to development cooperation funds and stepping up cooperation on return and readmission agreements. This is very much in line with trends of so-called “externalisation” of migration policy, whereby the EU passes the buck to third countries to manage/prevent migration, and crucially fill the gaps of our failing migration system.

The Action Plan does not only address cooperation with third countries, but also sanctions towards countries involved in “artificially creating and facilitating irregular migration”, which is equated to migrant smuggling. The Commission devotes a section to Belarus, which has been allowing migrants to cross its territory and pushing them to the borders of EU countries like Lithuania and Poland in retaliation to economic sanctions. Labelled as a “hybrid attack to destabilise Europe” which “instrumentalises” migrants, the Commission urges EU states to put pressure on Minsk through concerted action on a number of policy fields, including visas, trade, development, and financial assistance.

This approach reinforces an extremely problematic narrative which, on the one hand, presents migration as a threat, while, on the other hand, legitimises serious fundamental rights violations at the EU external borders.

Increasing returns

The Action Plan endorses and builds on several key tenets of the 2020 Migration Pact, which sets out priorities in EU migration management for the years to come, mainly by increasing detention and returns.

In this line, the Plan repeatedly stresses the need to increase returns to reduce incentives to irregular migration. Just like the Migration Pact, this Action Plan also foresees a big role for the EU’s border control agency Frontex in stepping up returns. This is no good news for human rights, as the agency has been investigated for multiple allegations of complicity in human rights violations at the borders.

Surveillance and digital technologies

The Plan foresees measures that increase surveillance on people arriving to Europe in several ways.

On a micro-level, the Plan endorses measures in the Migration Pact which allow border guards to interrogate migrants about smuggling activities. Crucially, the Plan explicitly suggests that information collected in reception centres and during the asylum interviews should be shared with prosecutors, which risks leading to abuses of power and disregard of procedural safeguards.

The Plan further suggests increasing monitoring around asylum reception centres to prevent asylum seekers from being reached by smugglers. This measure will likely lead to more controls and restrictions to the freedom of movement of people in the centres.

On a macro-level, the Plan features digital technologies as further tools to survey and fight against migrant smuggling, including by developing artificial intelligence programmes and brushing up on old plans to increase social media surveillance through Frontex. The use of artificial intelligence in the public sphere presents high risks of discriminatory profiling, which have been denounced by various civil society organisations.

Weak protection for people in vulnerable situations

To detect and protect people in situations of vulnerability, the Action Plan only relies on screenings done at the borders (so-called “pre-entry screenings”). These screenings are introduced by the EU Migration Pact and essentially focus on identity and security checks for anyone arriving at EU borders. Assessments of individual vulnerabilities are possible but not mandatory, which raises serious doubts about how effective this process can be in detecting vulnerabilities.

The very few references to assistance to vulnerable migrants are limited to campaigns to dissuade irregular migration, existing instruments on trafficking in human beings, and a short mention of the EU Strategy on the Rights of the Child.

Criminalisation of humanitarian assistance

The fight against irregular migration and migrants’ smuggling often rhymes with criminalisation of solidarity with migrants. Humanitarian acts such as providing food and shelter can be seen as aiding irregular entry or outright smuggling operations. On this aspect, the Plan reiterates that acts which are “mandated by law” (for instance lifesaving operations by specific NGOs) should never be criminalised. However, it also explains that a different set of rules applies to what the Plan calls “humanitarian acts not mandated by law” (e.g. providing food, shelter, car lifts or information). With regard to these acts, member states are merely “invited” to make use of the possibility to amend their national legislations to exempt them from criminalisation.

The criminalisation of people helping migrants as a result of the fight against irregular entry is not new. In 2017, the European Commission already hinted at risks of criminalisation of humanitarian assistance when evaluating EU legislation on the facilitation of irregular entry. In 2018, a study funded by the European Parliament found that the same EU legislation had “resulted in the policing of citizens and civil society”.

Today, the new Action Plan optimistically claims that previous studies show that policies related to the facilitation of irregular entry are effective, “although some aspects should be clarified”.

The European Commission has committed to re-evaluating the Action Plan in 2023. We hope this will be an opportunity to rethink the whole approach to migrants’ smuggling, and put migrants’ rights front and centre.Cover image: danmir12 – Adobe Stock

On Monday 14 June 2021, the EPSCO Council unanimously adopted the Council Recommendation establishing a European Child Guarantee. In a clear signal to both children and governments, the Council’s text states that all children in need must be able to benefit from the Child Guarantee actions, irrespective of their migration status. This momentous step forward cannot be underestimated, as activities supporting undocumented people have long been excluded from EU funding in the past. But with member states now tasked with developing national Child Guarantee action plans, national governments and civil society must make sure that undocumented children in need can and will benefit in practice.

Opening up access to key services

According to the Council Recommendation, undocumented children and children in migration who are “at risk of poverty or social exclusion” should have effective and free access to high-quality early childhood education and care (ECEC), education and school-based activities, at least one healthy meal each school day and healthcare. They should also have effective access to healthy nutrition and adequate housing.

As shown in PICUM research, all of these areas of life are rife with difficulties and exclusion for undocumented children and families. Undocumented children and families often live in cramped, unhealthy housing, need to overcome financial or administrative barriers to go to school, are excluded from early childhood education and care, may not be eating healthy because of a tight family budget and, depending on where they live, may only be able to benefit from emergency health care.

The Council Recommendation sets a precedent because with it, member states commit to prioritising children’s needs over their residence status. For children in migration, and especially undocumented children, this recognition is hard-won and far from self-evident. As was made clear in the child guarantee feasibility study, undocumented children face more barriers than other migrant children when accessing the services targeted by the Child Guarantee.

The Child Guarantee could also open the door for undocumented children and families to receive benefits connected to accessing ECEC, education, school-based activities, healthcare and one healthy meal per school day because ‘free access’ is to be understood as services being “provided free of charge, either by organising and providing such services or by adequate benefits to cover the costs or the charges of the services, or in such a way that financial circumstances will not pose an obstacle to equal access.”   

Prioritising children’s needs over their residence status

The European Child Guarantee is part of a broader trend by the EU institutions to prioritise people’s needs over residence status in its social policies. For instance, the EU Strategy on the Rights of the Child (2021-2025) clarifies that all children are targets of the strategy and Commission representatives have confirmed that that includes undocumented children. The EU Action Plan on Integration and Inclusion (2021-2027), too, differs from its predecessor, the 2016 Action Plan on the integration of third-country nationals, by not limiting its scope to regularly-residing people. The European Pillar of Social Rights Action Plan, of which the EU Child Guarantee is a deliverable, also sets the goal of lifting at least 5 million children out of poverty by 2030. This recent trend of inclusive policies is very positive, and we hope it will continue.

However, we see a very different trend in Europe’s approach towards migration. Both at member state and EU-level, the trend towards more detention and fewer safeguards for children and adults continues to gather support. Most concerningly, the 2020 Migration and Asylum Pact does not adequately safeguard or protect children even though key European and global institutions have recognized that migrant children are highly vulnerable members of our society and their best interests overrides migration management considerations.

This contradiction of recognizing a child’s needs and rights over their residence status in one policy field while not doing so in another is not sustainable. Especially when we know that undocumented children’s vulnerability and social exclusion is partly caused by their residence status, restrictive migration policies and the lack of options to regularise their stay. If the proposed Migration and Asylum Pact will prevent migrants from accessing in-country residence procedures, set up a return sponsorship scheme that rips undocumented families from their support networks to drop them in an unknown country, or cause trauma and additional vulnerability through the widespread use of detention – children will not be set up for success. Nor will the proposed Migration and Asylum Pact create the necessary preconditions for a successful integration policy because it erodes migrants’ resilience and trust in the system.

Leveraging EU funds to tackle child poverty and exclusion

Because the Child Guarantee activities would complement existing national-level actions and funding, several EU funds will be financing its implementation. After months of negotiations, the European Parliament, Council and Commission, agreed that member states will earmark an “appropriate amount” of the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) to tackle child poverty and exclusion, and member states with an above-average number of children living at risk of poverty or social exclusion earmarking at least 5%. For the 2021-2027 financing period, these countries are Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malta, Romania, Spain and Sweden.

It will soon become clear how committed member states are to lifting children out of poverty. A clear indicator will be seeing what member states consider an “appropriate amount” and whether they target more difficult-to-reach populations, like undocumented children and families.

Going beyond the recommended actions

Member states should understand the recommended activities listed in the Council Recommendation as a first step. For instance, regarding access to healthcare, the Council only recommends to member states that they facilitate early detection and treatment of diseases and developmental problems; implement accessible health promotion and disease prevention programmes targeting children in need and their families; and provide targeted rehabilitation and habilitation services for children with disabilities. It is evident that these do not, alone, equate to effective and free access to health care for children in need. That is why member states must go beyond what is recommended by the Commission or the Council and consider the effective needs of children and what hampers them from enjoying these services.

Member states should immediately appoint a national Child Guarantee Coordinator. Member states now have until March 2022 to present national actions plans that are adapted to national, regional and local circumstances, and identify children in need and the barriers they face in accessing and taking-up the services above.

Member states cannot do this alone, however. Because they are often invisible, there is a lack of understanding of the barriers undocumented children and families face, what they need and even how many undocumented children are living in specific country. It is up to civil society, specialists and migrant-led organisations to assist member states in developing national action plans that target and effectively benefit undocumented children. And it is up to member states to ensure they are consulted and involved in the drafting of the plans.

As PICUM, we are glad to see the route taken by this Commission and the Council with their recognition that children’s interests are primordial – including when children have irregular migration status. We hope that the national action plans will reflect the intent of the Parliament, the Commission and the EPSCO council and ensure that undocumented children can fulfil their potential.

Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs Council (EPSCO)

A.o. by the European Court of Human Rights in Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v. Belgium and Tarakhel v. Switzerland.

The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, underlined that “non rights-based arguments such as, those relating to general migration control, cannot override best interests considerations.” in General Comment no. 6, Treatment of unaccompanied and separated children outside their country of origin

Cover: Unsplash – Mi Pham 

On 27 April 2021, the EU Commission published its first EU Strategy on voluntary return and reintegration. The strategy is envisaged by the New Pact on Migration and Asylum as an integral policy for a common EU system for returns. It conceives actions in seven areas with the aim of increasing the number of voluntary returns. If, on paper, the text recognizes voluntary return as being more efficient, cost-effective and preferable to forced return, in practice this is contradicted by several ongoing legislative proposals which make access to voluntary return more difficult. The text highlights the role of “swift and efficient return border procedures” to encourage migrants to take up voluntary returns, including for people in administrative detention and those whose asylum application is still pending. The Strategy increases the role of Frontex in promoting voluntary returns, despite the growing scrutiny into the lack of accountability and the potential involvement of the agency in human rights violations.

 “Voluntary” returns?

Increasing the rate of returns is one of the main objectives of the European Pact on Migration and Asylum. The term “return” appears nearly 100 times in the Commission Communication on the Pact alone – while the term “rights” only 14. While forced return remains a central component of the EU return system, the objective of this strategy is to develop a more uniform and coordinated approach that acknowledges the potential of voluntariness within the return process. Even though the number of returnees is still considered a strong indicator for the effectiveness of any return policy, this strategy recognizes that “it is important to not only consider the return rates but also the situation of the individuals concerned, enabling their return in a dignified manner and taking into account their reintegration prospects once they return to their country of origin”.

On paper, the strategy – a non-binding instrument – prioritises voluntary over forced return, but in practice this is contradicted by several binding legislative proposals which make access to voluntary return more difficult. For instance, the Commission proposal for a Recast Return Directive prohibits EU Member States from granting a period for voluntary departure in a broad number of circumstances which legitimise a risk of absconding. Moreover, migrants are openly encouraged to return from the very moment they arrive in the EU through return counselling – which can be provided by Frontex – even during their asylum application, and by the constant threat of swift and efficient return procedures, including at borders, for those who do not agree to return voluntarily. Encouraging voluntary returns through “swift and efficient return border procedures” confirms the EU “carrot and stick” approach, for which “an efficient return border procedure will also facilitate and encourage voluntary returns since people will be available and more willing to cooperate with the authorities” (EU Strategy on voluntary return and reintegration,p.7).

Frontex will have an increasing role in voluntary returns

With its reinforced mandate, Frontex will play a crucial role in the activities of return and reintegration assistance to returnees. In mid-2022, Frontex will take over the activities of the European Return and Reintegration Network (ERRIN). The full operationalisation of the Agency’s mandate is a gradual process that started in May 2021 with a first Frontex pilot for individual joint reintegration support to returnees from the EU. In collaboration with ICMPD, the Agency will also be involved in the development of a common curriculum for return counsellors, which aims at providing practitioners with teaching modules on all aspects of return policy and practice. Frontex will support Member States by deploying return experts trained in return counselling as part of the standing corps. In addition, it will have an increased role in “pre-return counselling (e.g. outreach campaigns to migrants), post-arrival support and monitoring the effectiveness of reintegration assistance.

Further technical support and the new roles on return foreseen by the Pact

The strategy indicates that additional technical support will be guaranteed by the Return Coordinator and the High Level Network for Return, including representatives from Member States. They will assist the coordination of national authorities on voluntary return and reintegration strategies and programmes, to promote uniformity between national actions and this strategy, and to promote the exchange of best practices among Member States. This support aims at achieving a comprehensive governance framework as set out in the proposal for a Regulation on Asylum and Migration Management.

Prioritising voluntary over forced returns is a welcome step, but it is not sufficient

On the Roadmap published on 15 December 2020, the European Commission describes “shaping returns to respond to the needs of the individual” as one of the main objectives for the EU and EU agencies and the Member States. If, on the one hand, this strategy recognizes voluntary return as being more efficient and preferable to forced return, the EU Commission commitment to respond to the needs of the individual remains on many levels unclear in the document published in April 2021.

Firstly, it is crucial to acknowledge that return is not the best option for all. Secondly, when voluntary return is possible, EU policies should ensure that people and their choices come first. Human choices are not pre-packaged products, but rather the result of accurate evaluations that require time and services to allow people to explore all different options, including the possibility to remain regularly in the EU. While the Commission’s efforts to prioritise voluntary over forced returns are a welcome step, encouraging people to return by all possible means and from the very moment they arrive at borders is far from being a strategy that meets migrants’ freedom of choice nor their needs.

Present data on voluntary returns are not clear. According to the EU Commission, “the share of voluntary returns is currently 27% of all departures from the EU”. Frontex Risk analysis 2020, instead, reported that 49 % of returns are voluntary (table 13, p. 67).

Cover: Unsplash – Nathan Dumlao