Europe’s continuous shift to the right and far right is fuelling increasingly restrictive migration policies and turning social rights into tools of migration enforcement. Human rights are under attack, with growing criminalisation of migrants and racialised communities, including undocumented people. Detention and deportation increasingly trump protection and inclusion.

Across the EU and national levels, new laws and reforms clash with international rights standards. Civic space is shrinking, and rights defenders face mounting legal, financial, and political pressure – including harassment and prosecution for offering humanitarian aid or defending migrants’ rights.

During PICUM’s 2025 General Assembly, we explored collective strategies to resist and respond to such an increasingly hostile context. We discussed areas for common advocacy, for building solidarity across movements, and strategies to reinforce the role of civil society in defending the rights and dignity of all migrants, regardless of status.

What opportunities in an era of hostile migration policies?

In our first plenary session, we discussed opportunities for resistance in research, the political level, the human rights framework, and local action.

Fatima Diallo, Chair of the UN Migrant Workers’ Committee, discussed how international human rights frameworks and bodies can monitor states’ actions and promote and develop international standards. Diallo especially underlined the role of the Committee she chairs in promoting an intersectional and decolonising approach to migration management, encouraging states to ratify the UN Migrant Workers Convention, and in urging actions to eradicate racial discrimination and xenophobia.

Attacks on civil society are increasing across the EU and in neighbouring countries where the EU is striking deals to block departures. Greens MEP Tineke Strik pinpointed how recent EU proposals, like the EU Facilitation Directive and the EU Returns Regulation, disregard the core rights of asylum seekers and undocumented people as if they are not protected by international human rights law. On the draft Returns Regulation, Strik invited civil society to engage with faith-based organisations, journalists and lawyers, and build larger alliances overall, without forgetting efforts to counter the dehumanisation of migrants and to mobilise citizens.

Emilio Puccio, Secretary General of the European Parliament’s Intergroup on Children’s Rights, said that restrictive narratives on migration have weaponized children as a problem, increasingly portraying them as criminals and radicalised. Puccio denounced the overall negative framework around child rights in the EU Migration Pact, and criticized how child safeguarding concerns were used to require children as young as six to be fingerprinted. He highlighted the need for political commitment that children are not a political threat and need protection, which would also mean that immigration detention of children should be eradicated and that we need legal aid and clear rules around guardianship. He echoed Strik’s calls to mobilise more broadly, to engage with faith-based organisations and grassroots civil society, and try to reach actors which may echo calls for protection of children and be listened to by centre-right policy makers.

Albert Kraler, MIrreM research coordinator and assistant professor at Krems University, Austria, discussed opportunities to counter the politicisation of migration by reframing the debate into more technical questions, where research and evidence play a bigger role. Citing the example of MIrreM, an EU-funded research project about irregular migration, Kraler noted that while regularisation is often portrayed as a political taboo, most countries do have some form of regularisation mechanism in place.

Researchers themselves can be actors of change. When the European Commission presented a new draft Returns Regulation as being backed by EU-funded research, key research consortia came together and issued a joint statement denouncing such instrumentalisation of their work to justify new restrictive measures. The statement was then used to open a communication channel between the Commission and the researchers.

Linnea Näsholm of the Health Center for Undocumented Migrants in Oslo, Norway, shared the experience of local health centres in improving access to health care for undocumented people by collaborating with municipalities, feeding politicians with knowledge and solutions, and mobilising unions and the health sector at large. Successful initiatives have sprung up in Bergen, Kristiansand, Oslo, and Trondheim.

At the end of our panel, we took a look at resistance by migrants’ rights organisations in the United States. Helena Olea, Deputy Director of Alianza Américas, underlined the many struggles facing civil society there, including limited capacity, anti-migrant narratives and funding cuts. The overall context on migration has severely worsened, with many undocumented parents no longer sending their children to school for fear of being arrested, while due process rights are being eroded. On resistance strategies, Olea highlighted the need to combine different types of work, from litigation to advocacy, from narrative work to campaigns to empower people with knowledge of their rights, especially in the face of ICE (Immigration and Customs Enforcement) raids. Olea also underscored Alianza Américas’ work in building alliances with other groups hit by hostile policies, such as black communities, LGBTQ+ and feminist organisations, and groups defending people with disabilities.

Strategies to counter hostile narratives and policies

In our second plenary session, we invited people who could share with us experiences and perspectives on civil society strategies to counter hostile narratives and policies inside and outside the migration space.

Aarti Narsee, Senior Policy and Advocacy Officer at the European Civic Forum, discussed how civil society in Europe is resisting the worsening context, from strategic litigation to mass mobilisation, to establishing new alliances. In the Netherlands, for instance, public interest litigation succeeded in challenging the sale of weapons to Israel and anti-Muslim discrimination in the banking system. In Belgium, the pro-Palestine movement is working with trade unions to block shipments of weapons to Israel. In Spain, grassroots mobilisation around housing rights gathered housing cooperatives and tenants’ associations in challenging real estate investors and local administrations.

Nadia Cornejo, spokesperson at Greenpeace Belgium, illustrated how the environmental organisation is responding to increasing judicial arrests, longer detention and prison sentences. Greenpeace has integrated the right to protest in its work and launched the “Time to resist” global campaign, in coalition with other NGOs, unions, and other actors to protect the right to protest. When organising protests, Greenpeace informs participants about legal risks and puts in place other precautionary measures, with a view of deescalating violence as much as possible in encounters with law enforcement.

Fezile Osum, Legal coordinator of the Border Violence Monitoring Network (BVMN), spoke about litigation work in European courts and highlighted a recent judgment from the European Court on Human Rights which condemns Greece for systematic pushbacks. Osum also presented BVMN reports exposing the criminalisation of migrants and human rights defenders, including prosecution, defamation, intimidation and extensive financial control, as well as the “In Defence of Defenders” toolkit which indicates avenues for protection and redress, including UN and Council of Europe bodies, to approach in cases of criminalisation.

Finding hope: wins and inspirations from the network

Our last panel showcased the wins and stories of inspiration from our network. All contributors underlined how change was possible but was only achievable through the tireless work of broad civil society coalitions.

Lucía Maquieira, Director of Red Acoge, spoke about recent reforms that grant residence and work permits in Spain. The reform of the arraigo (or “rootedness” in English) system means that conditions to access residence and work permits are easier to meet and that more people will be able to obtain them. Despite continuous shortcomings, a specific regularisation passed after the Valencia floods is expected to grant residence and work permits to some 25,000 undocumented victims.

Daan Bauwens, Director of Utsopi, celebrated a recent law that finally recognises and protects  labour rights for sex workers in Belgium, including when undocumented. This includes minimum working conditions and compensation for exploitation. Bauwens also reported that beginning of May sex workers went on their first ever spontaneous strike in Belgium.

Alicia Adams, Partnerships and Donor Relations Officer at FiZ, shared how a 30-year long fight by Swiss civil society achieved an important legislative change that makes it easier for dependent partners to access a residence permit in Switzerland when their relationship ends. The change also applies to unmarried and same-sex couples, and makes it possible for civil society to bring evidence of abuse experienced by one of the partners, often a migrant woman.

Janneke Wijman, Case manager at ASKV, celebrated a recent regularisation adopted by the Dutch government for Surinamese nationals living in The Netherlands who had lost their Dutch nationality after Suriname’s independence. Wijman recounted how various allies joined the struggle, from researchers to migration lawyers, from NGOs to members of the Surinamese community, and managed to achieve success through strategic litigation and political pressure.

This blog outlines key tasks linked to migration and migrants as included in mission letters sent by the President of the European Commission to relevant Commissioner-designates.

Border and migration management

Once again, migration is embedded in a portfolio that is essentially centred around security, namely the  Commissioner for Internal Affairs and Migration. Such a security approach is evident in goals around doubling Europol’s staff and increasing its powers, tripling Frontex’ border guards, and “securing” the EU’s borders overall. This Commissioner would also report to the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

The mission letter tasks the new Commissioner with implementing the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum, which human rights organisations have long criticised for increasing detention, lowering essential safeguards for those who come to Europe seeking safety or livelihood and overall being unworkable and harmful.

Many of the Commissioner-designates’ goals are linked to strengthening the borders, from the digitalisation of border management and the implementation of connections between large-scale migration databases, to further leveraging visa policy for pursuing migration deterrence objectives. The latter is already being used by the EU as a bargaining chip to force third countries into facilitating deportations of their nationals. The focus on deportations is further highlighted by the announcement of a “new common approach to the return of irregular migrants” which is meant to speed up deportation procedures.

The mission letter asks the new Commissioner to respond to “hybrid attacks” and the “instrumentalisation of migrants”, a concept that the EU uses for cases when a third country is accused of pushing people to the EU’s borders for political reasons. This concept has already been invoked by member states in recent years to push people back and shirk international obligations at the Poland-Belarus border and more recently at the Finland-Russia border. The idea of migrants-as-a-threat is further shared in the portfolio of the new Vice President for Tech Sovereignty, Security and Democracy, who is called on to address the “weaponisation of people” and to pursue “strong external borders”.

The implementation of the new Schengen Borders Code, another top priority for the migration portfolio, is also cause for concern, as its 2024 revision validates in practice racial profiling in internal border checks to detect people in an irregular situation.

Irregular migration and migrant smuggling are largely seen as threats to fight with sanctions and criminalisation, instead of realities produced by global inequalities and repressive policies to address with support for people to move and settle in safety and dignity. References to the “fight against smugglers” and “innovative operational solutions to counter irregular migration” illustrate this approach.

A potentially promising opening is found in reference to search and rescue. The mission letter tasks the Commissioner-designate with a “stronger coordination of rescue operations” but this is coupled with “increased surveillance capabilities for Frontex”, an agency that has come under scrutiny for complicity in human rights violations multiple times.

Mediterranean

A new Commissioner for the Mediterranean, supported by a newly created Directorate-General for the Mediterranean, is expected to oversee deals with Mediterranean countries initiated under Von der Leyen I and prioritise cooperation on border control and anti-smuggling as part of the external aspects of EU migration policy. Yet this mission letter does not mention ways to allow people from the Mediterranean region to move and settle in safety and dignity in Europe.

The mission letter tasks the new Commissioner with developing a new Pact for the Mediterranean, in coordination with the High Representative for Foreign Affairs,which will largely focus on economic, security and migration issues.

Previous deals with Tunisia and Egypt are expected to be used as a model for these forms of cooperation. Human rights organisations like Amnesty International already highlighted in the context of the EU-Tunisia deal how such approach focuses on policies and funding that promote a punitive approach to migration and outsource border controls and responsibilities to third countries, in complete disregard of human rights obligations. In this contest, humanitarian and development policies become instrumental to pursue migration deterrence objectives.

Labour migration and labour rights

Labour migration is largely dealt with under the migration portfolio.

The letter asks the new Commissioner for Internal Affairs and Migration to “where necessary, review the rules on preventing exploitation of migrant workers with irregular status”. This is a welcome and important commitment but will only be a step forward if it means prioritising the rights of migrant workers over immigration control and exploring how to enable undocumented workers to file complaints against their employers without fear of deportation under existing complaints mechanisms.

Regular migration (called “legal migration” in the mission letter) is only mentioned in relation to refugees’ “integration” in the labour market (but quickly coupled with stepping up deportations), and in relation to labour migration pathways for those who have the “right skills” to match Europe’s needs. Similar language was included in the mission letter of the Executive Vice-President for People, Skills and Preparedness.

This repeats the utilitarian approach to migrant workers of the previous Commission and betrays the EU’s increasingly wildly lopsided enforcement and security approach to migration, which pays little attention to decent pathways and inclusion measures most needed.

On labour rights, the mission letter to the Vice-President for People, Skills and Preparedness provides some promising openings, given EU labour standards are generally applicable to undocumented workers too. The new Vice-President is tasked with developing a Quality Jobs Roadmap which would support fair wages, high standards of health and safety and good working conditions, as well as improving Europe’s approach to occupational health and safety. But overall European trade unions have denounced the removal of a dedicated commissioner for jobs and social rights as a concerning deprioritisation of workers’ rights.

Equality

The equality portfolio no longer stands alone, but is combined with a mission on Preparedness and Crisis Management (Commissioner for Preparedness and Crisis Management; Equality). This is a step backward as it shows a reduced political emphasis and capacity to work on equality.  

The mission letter tasks the new Commissioner with protecting “minorities” and proposing new equality strategies, including on gender equality and anti-racism, which might provide opportunities to include safeguards for undocumented people too.

Anti-poverty and inclusion

The President of the European Commission tasked the new College to tackle poverty, soaring housing costs and energy prices – all of which affect undocumented people in particular. The Executive Vice-President-designate for People, Skills and Preparedness will have to lead the work on a first-ever EU-wide Anti-Poverty Strategy and strengthen the Child Guarantee, a framework for combatting social exclusion of children, including those who are undocumented. The next five years will also see the development of a European Affordable Housing Plan and support to member states to develop social housing.

But no mention is being made of the European Platform on Combating Homelessness, established under the previous Commission, which aims to eradicate poverty by 2030. Nor are health inequities ever mentioned in any mission letter.

Children

Key policies relevant for undocumented children are largely split between the Commissioner for Intergenerational Fairness, Youth, Culture and Sport and the Vice President for People, Skills and Preparedness. The former is tasked with further implementing the EU Strategy on the Rights of the Child, a policy framework that promotes participation and rights of children. The latter is tasked with strengthening the European Child Guarantee, a key instrument in tackling childhood poverty, including those that are undocumented.

Civic space and human rights

Missions concerning fundamental rights and civic space are largely assigned to the new Commissioner for Democracy, Justice, and the Rule of Law. This mandate is being asked to establish a Civil Society Platform to enhance civil dialogue, and to strengthen the “protection of civil society, activist and human rights defenders”, something which we will follow closely as solidarity with migrants and migration-related civic spaces are increasingly criminalised across Europe.

On fundamental rights, the Commissioner-designate is tasked with monitoring (not ensuring) the application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, and with acceding to the European Convention on Human Rights, which can be an important tool to advance the rights of undocumented people.

Funding

All the mentioned policies and portfolios will be supported by a new long-term EU budget, which the Commissioner-designate for Budget, Anti-Fraud and Administration is tasked to develop in cooperation with the entire College. The mission letter positively makes a strong commitment to ensure that EU funds are protected against rule of law breaches. But it does not refer to the application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in EU funds, a clear commitment made by the past European Commission.

Participatory policy-making

A general positive is von der Leyen’s commitment to bringing EU institutions closer to the people living in the EU. She tasks most of the Commissioner-designates, including those working on migration and poverty alleviation, with meeting young people on an annual basis. She also tasked her College with setting up a President’s Youth Advisory Board, a European Citizens’ Panel and a Civil Society Platform, the latter to support more systematic civil dialogue and better protect civil society, activists and human rights defenders. These spaces must include people with diverse lives and backgrounds – including people with lived experience of migration and migration procedures.

Conclusion

These mission letters largely reflect the EU’s overall approach to migration as a threat to fight, with renewed emphasis being put on strengthening borders, increasing surveillance and enforcement capacities, stepping up repression to address migrant smuggling, and speeding up deportations.

Little to no attention is paid to systems and policies that would allow people to move, settle and work in Europe in safety and dignity. For the most part, marginalised groups like people with a migrant background are not mentioned at all.

Potential – and limited – openings essentially relate to anti-poverty strategies, children’s rights, equality strategies and preventing exploitation of migrant workers. But political will – and a strong civil society – will be needed to make sure potential openings will translate into meaningful change on the ground.

Campaigners in Italy are fighting immigration detention by asking doctors to stop declaring anyone fit for detention. We spoke to Nicola Cocco of the Italian Society for Migrations’ Medicine to know more.

In Italy, sending a person to an immigration detention centre requires a doctor’s certificate proving that they are “fit for detention” (conditions are regulated by a 2022 ministerial directive). Often, this certification is done at the emergencies by overworked doctors, with little time and no serious medical check-up. The exam typically lacks the person’s consent and is not accompanied by a cultural mediator. The result is that doctors often merely certificate that the person does not have communicable diseases.

Most times, police are present for the whole duration of the exam. In some cases, the doctors performing the “fit for detention” exam are hired by the immigration detention centres themselves.

At the start of 2024, civil society organisations led by the Italian Society for Migrations’ Medicine (Società Italiana di Medicina delle Migrazioni, SIMM), the network “No More Lager” (Mai più lager – No ai CPR), and the Italian Association for Legal Studies on Immigration (Associazione per gli Studi Giuridici sull’Immigrazione) launched a campaign to stop doctors from declaring people “fit for detention”. In this campaign, the associations link the health risks of immigration detention with the ethical risks faced by doctors when sending someone to a place of harm.

The immigration detention centres are often unhealthy places, where broken windows, lack of hot water and dirt are commonplace. Besides the negative effects on the physical health of the people detained, the confinement and lack of activities weigh on their mental health too. For many, the harms of immigration detention add to those experienced during the migration journey.

Immigration detention centres are closed institutions, where every aspect of the life of detained people is controlled by others, and where no perspective of release is known to the person in detention.

“The only possible reaction to this environment is violence” said Cocco, “Violence from detention guards. Violence from health care personnel, which often overly prescribes psychotropic drugs. Violence from people in detention against themselves, from self-harm to suicide”.

Deportations are also violent practices. Typically, they would happen without notice, during the night, at 4 am. Police would enter the cell in riot gear and give the person 10 minutes to throw their few possessions into a garbage bag, less than 10 minutes to call a loved one. The person undergoes a quick “fit to fly” visit and are brought to the airplane.

“The point is, is it ok for a doctor to approve that a person be sent to a torturing environment?” said Cocco.  

So far, 40 to 50 doctors have adhered to the campaign, which have collectively avoided that about 100 people be sent to immigration detention. Regional medical associations have not yet responded to the campaign, leaving the ethical burden on individual doctors.

However, the national committee currently reforming the medical code of ethics has proposed to include a clause whereby doctors cannot be requested to declare a person “fit for detention”.

Stopping the “fit for detention” certificates would mean that thousands of people would be spared the suffering of immigration detention. It would save the professional dignity and ethics of doctors. And it would send a strong message to the institutions against the legitimacy of immigration detention.

In June, the network “No More Lager” (Mai più lager – No ai CPR) launched a petition targeted at health care professionals calling for the closure of immigration detention centres across Italy.

But Europe is going in the opposite direction. The EU Migration Pact is thought to lead to the detention of 70-80,000 people every year, especially at the borders, where it is harder to check abuse and respect for safeguards. The Italy-Albania deal (which would see Albania hosting people rescued at sea by Italian authorities for the examination of their asylum claims) poses serious doubts as to how people with vulnerabilities will be treated and makes rights’ monitoring extremely difficult.

In Germany, a 1990 law obliges most public sector workers to report undocumented people to migration authorities. We spoke to Sarah Lincoln from Gesellschaft für Freiheitsrechte (Civil Liberties Association) to know more about this law and what civil society is doing to have it repealed.

Paragraph 87 of the German Residence Act forces any public authority, including social welfare offices, police, and courts, to report undocumented people they come in contact with to immigration enforcement.

The only exception to this rule was carved out in 2011 for schools and kindergartens.

What this obligation means in practice is that undocumented people avoid any contact with public authorities. They do not go to the police to report abuse or seek justice in courts. Many do not even go to the doctor or end up seeking care only in life-threatening situations.

When it comes to health care, the picture is complex: while undocumented people have a right to limited health care on paper, reporting obligations prevent them from accessing it.

According to the Asylum Seekers Benefits Act, undocumented migrants are entitled to limited medical services in the event of acute illnesses or painful conditions as well as during pregnancy and childbirth. Doctors are not obliged to report undocumented patients because they are not public workers (the German health care system is based on private insurances) and are therefore not covered by the Residence Act.

In fact, doctors are not permitted to report undocumented patients because of a legal duty to confidentiality.

But there have been instances where hospital staff reported undocumented patients nonetheless.

And going to the doctor without an insurance, as is the case for undocumented people, often means paying high medical fees and long-term debt. While emergency life-saving care would be provided, the hospital would still claim medical fees in the absence of insurance.

Getting treatment covered by the state requires a person asking for a permission from the social welfare offices, which are obliged to report undocumented people to the police or the migration office.

“The person would probably not even be able to leave the office. Police would come and arrest them and then put them in immigration detention”, said Lincoln.

As a result, undocumented people do not apply for official health care. Some seek treatment through charities and medical students who provide limited health care for free, in many cases severe Illnesses remain untreated.

In one case, a person who came to Germany from the Balkans in the early 90s and later lost his status, was unable to get a heart operation to avoid a (second) heart attack. In another case, a woman from Northern Africa who had been living in Germany for years was diagnosed with late-stage breast cancer by volunteering doctors and found herself with no option to get treatment.

Official data about health outcomes for undocumented people not accessing health care is lacking. But reports from organisations providing free health care and testimonies show that stories like the ones above are commonplace.

Campaigners and advocates have been fighting this law for years. In 2011, they managed to carve out an exception for schools and kindergartens. Since 2021, a coalition led by Doctors of the World and the Gesellschaft für Freiheitsrechte has been campaigning against paragraph 87 of the Residence Act to allow undocumented people to access health care without risking immigration enforcement. The campaign is being supported by over 80 civil society organisations, with the German doctors’ association and German Churches also repeatedly criticising reporting obligations.

The UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women noted in its 2023 concluding observations that Germany has no intention of repealing or amending section 87 of the Resident Act and called on Germany to reconsider its position.

In August 2021, Gesellschaft für Freiheitsrechte filed a complaint to the European Commission against paragraph 87 of the Residence Act, denouncing violations of the EU data protection rules (the General Data Protection Regulation) and the right to health care as enshrined in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.

While the German government assured that they were considering the complaint (the proposal was in fact taken up by the German government in their coalition programme), they eventually backtracked and on the contrary passed new cuts to social benefits for asylum-seekers, bowing to a political climate ever more hostile to immigration.

Advocates also pursued strategic litigation in German courts, not without challenges. For undocumented complainants, access to courts remains difficult given the court also has an obligation to report to the immigration authorities. And procedures often last too long compared to their urgent medical needs.

Gesellschaft für Freiheitsrechte is currently awaiting to hear about the outcomes of a second complaint filed to the Commission in April 2024.

On 23 and 24 May 2024, PICUM brought together over 60 member organisations at our General Assembly in Madrid to reflect on the current context and strategise about resistance and mobilisation in the next five years. This blog shares some highlights of our discussions.

Setting the context: between the EU Migration Pact and the Global Compact for Migration

As far-right politics and their anti-migrant messages become more normalised, migration policies become more repressive in a growing number of EU countries. Some of the EU’s recent policies in the area of migration are also aiming to institutionalise them. As PICUM’s board member Moussa Sangaré noted in his opening speech, the EU Migration Pact, adopted in April 2024, will increase harm for people seeking safety and opportunities in Europe.

As we have been pointing out with many other human rights organisations, this Pact will likely increase the likelihood that people coming to Europe without valid travel/residence documents will be deprived of their liberty, face lower safeguards in deportation procedures, and heightened racial profiling at and within the EU’s borders. As Claudia Bonamini from the Jesuit Refugee Service Europe pointed out, many of these practices already exist, but the Migration Pact will consolidate and institutionalise them. In parallel, the Pact is likely to increase irregularity as people who will be quickly unsuccessful in requesting asylum will be fast tracked to deportation, without being offered a means to seek other protection statuses or residence permits.

Many member states are already taking measures even beyond those adopted in the Migration Pact. Referring to the hostile political context on migration in Europe, Spanish Secretary of State for Migration Pilar Cancela Rodriguez evoked a recent letter sent by 15 member states to the Commission calling for more deportations and externalisation of migration control measures.

If the EU Migration Pact essentially aims to restrict migration to Europe, the 2018 UN Global Compact for Migration encourages states to expand regular routes for people to migrate. Paloma García of Red Acoge highlighted four opportunities the Global Compact on Migration offers for states and civil society to advance fairer, inclusive and rights-based migration policies: a holistic view of human mobility and its root causes, a focus on fostering international cooperation to build safe and regular routes, a multi-level governance approach involving stakeholders from the UN to local authorities, and review mechanisms to track states’ progress on the implementation of the Global Compact.

UN bodies have also expressed their concerns about the EU Migration Pact. UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants Gehad Madi discussed a recent joint statement from UN bodies prior to the adoption of the EU Migration Pact, calling on EU member states to prohibit child immigration detention, following international human rights standards that immigration detention is never in a child’s best interests and always a human rights violation. The statement also urges states to end immigration detention for all, establish independent mechanisms to monitor strict respect for human rights during screening and border procedures, refrain from collective expulsions, prevent racial profiling by immigration and law enforcement officers, and expand and diversify pathways for regularisation.

Organising resistance

Hostile migration policies have for years been a reality in many parts of Europe. We heard from Alkistis Agrafioti from the Greek Council for Refugees about de facto detention at borders, the abuse of the “safe country” concept, swift asylum procedures and pushbacks in Greece. María Fernández from Andalucía Acoge evoked the reception crisis in the Canary Islands in Spain. Diana Radoslavova from the Center for Legal Aid-Voice discussed violent border controls in Bulgaria and the application of the “safe country” concept to authoritarian regimes like Turkey and Iran.

PICUM board member Adam Weiss set out key avenues for strategic litigation against the Pact’s provisions that knowingly violate EU law principles of non-discrimination, privacy, respect for family life, and freedom. He encouraged advocates and activists to engage in strategic litigation to expose such violations to counter the institutionalisation of racial profiling (on anti-discrimination grounds), the establishment and use of mass surveillance (on data protection and privacy grounds), and the detention of children and families (on family life grounds).

Members from Spanish civil society reflected on the role of migrant women in social change, from an intersectional perspective: we heard from Lucy Polo from Asociación Por Ti Mujer, Antonia Ávalos from Mujeres Supervivientes, and Diana Tutistar from Red AMINVI.

In the face of a largely hostile environment, PICUM’s network remains determined to keep working for a compassionate Europe where everyone can thrive. Our 2024 General Assembly was a key moment to reconnect and strategise about future mobilisation and resistance.

We discussed thematic priorities in workshops covering community engagement, detention and deportations, health and social rights, labour rights and labour migration, and regularisation. We further explored strategic directions for the network in the field of narratives and communications, funding, the geographical scope of our work, criminalisation, and the participation of people with lived experience. Many members expressed concern about an increasingly hostile environment where civil society is harassed or outright criminalised, and the dehumanisation of undocumented and racialised people which opens the door to ever more repressive policies. While recognising that the network is built on solid foundations, members underlined the importance of strengthening work on emerging issues of concern, engaging meaningfully with affected communities and with people with lived experience, and on building shared transformational narratives for a fairer Europe for all.

This blog provides a short overview of the main EU political parties’ stance on migration, based on their manifestos for the 2024 EU elections.

Identity and Democracy (ID)

Identity and Democracy (far right) is a far-right political party that has consistently supported repressive policies against migrants. While no public manifesto was made available on their website, their online petition to “Stop illegal immigration!” is a telling illustration of the criminalising, threatening and stigmatising narrative of migration ID embraces.

European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR)

The European Conservatives and Reformists (right and far-right) follows a securitisation approach that conceives migration as a threat. In fact, the section of its manifesto that deals with migration is eloquently titled “Safeguarding Citizens and Borders”. In it, the ECR pledges more support for member states to “protect the EU’s external border”, including through a strengthened role for Frontex, something which has consistently chimed with human rights violations at borders.

The ECR also vows to increase deportations of unsuccessful asylum seekers, completely disregarding alternative residence permits available under national legislation, and to further cooperation agreements with third countries to prevent people from reaching Europe.

European People’s Party (EPP)

The European People’s Party (centre-right) follows a securitisation approach similar to that of the ECR: in its manifesto, key migration measures are outlined in a section called “Our Europe protects its borders against illegal migration”. Of all manifestos considered in this blog, the EPP’s includes the most references to “illegal migration” and “illegal migrants”, a terminology that perpetuates stigma against undocumented people and opens the door to harmful policies. In the same vein, the party invites “legal migrants who live with us to become part of our community by integrating themselves”, a paternalistic and repressive narrative that subordinates access to rights to cultural assimilation and the good will of the white majority.

Among key measures, the EPP vows to triple Frontex staff (bringing it to 30,000 officers) and grant it stronger powers and a higher budget. These measures stand in stark contrast with numerous accusations of the agency’s complicity in human rights violations at the borders, and lack of transparency and accountability, brought by civil society, institutions, and victims themselves.

The EPP supports deals with third countries that would see the EU sending asylum-seekers to a “safe” third country for the processing of their asylum claim, and for hosting those who would be granted asylum. This type of agreement recalls the UK-Rwanda deal, much criticised by international and national institutions and civil society for violating international law and exposing people to abuse and human rights violations.

The EPP also vows to use trade agreements, development aid and visa policies as a lever to force third countries into facilitating deportations to their territories. Labour migration deals are left to the member states.

The conflation of migration and security is further evidenced in their pledge to strengthen the information exchange between counter terrorism authorities and migration authorities.

Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE)

The Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (centre-right and centre) largely frames migration from an asylum perspective. Key measures in the migration field are all listed under a section called “An asylum policy that works”.

On the one hand, ALDE vows to launch a European Action Plan for search and rescue operations in the Mediterranean and ensure pushbacks, mistreatment of migrants and other rights violations are not left “without consequences”, although no further detail is given on what those consequences would look like.

On the other hand, ALDE supports agreements with third countries to “halt irregular migration to the EU” and tackle push and pull factors through partnership programmes centred around job creation, climate change mitigation and information campaigns on the “realities of migration”. The party further vows to reform Frontex to better control the EU’s borders, swiftly mentioning “respect for human rights”.

Support for asylum is also not unconditional, as ALDE vows to establish EU-managed facilities outside the EU borders for processing asylum claims.

Party of the European Socialists (PES)

The manifesto of the Party of the European Socialists (centre-left) addresses migration in a section called “Managing asylum and migration” that tries to balance respect for human rights and border control.

On the one hand, the PES vows to establish a common system to manage migration and asylum based on “solidarity and shared responsibility” and calls for the EU Migration Pact to be implemented through an approach “grounded in the respect of human rights and people’s dignity”. Together with numerous other human rights organisations, PICUM has been denouncing how this Pact legalises and entrenches ample rights violations, with little space for human rights or people’s dignity.

The PES also calls for fair migration procedures, including the right to legal assistance, “safe and legal pathways”, respect of the right to asylum and protection, and “humane and decent reception conditions”. The party stands against “any form of EU border externalisation” and further vows never to criminalise humanitarian assistance and to support a European mission for search and rescue in the Mediterranean. The manifesto finally includes a swift reference to “inclusive labour market policies” and “stronger inclusion policies”.

At the same time, the PES calls for return decisions to be carried out “effectively”, which in EU policy lingo often means “swift deportations”, and for strengthened EU external borders.

European Green Party (the Greens)

The manifesto of the European Green Party (centre-left) approaches migration through a rights-based lens: the relevant section is called “A Union of rights and freedoms: protecting the rights of all”.

The Greens vow to end the criminalisation of migrants and the criminalisation of humanitarian assistance. They support an EU-funded search and rescue mission in the Mediterranean and vow to strengthen the “humanitarian mandate” of Frontex, while improving parliamentary oversight over its operations.

They oppose deals with third countries that aim to prevent people from trying to reach Europe and support human rights assessments for “any cooperation with third countries”.

As one of the few political forces opposing the EU Migration Pact, the Greens call for a new “Migration Code” that provides for visas linked to family reunification and work at different skills levels. They call for access to justice for all migrant workers and the recognition of the universality of labour rights to fight against their exploitation, as well as decent and affordable accommodation for all mobile EU citizens and migrant workers. They pledge to protect victims of human trafficking and labour exploitation through “protection programmes and residency rights”.

The manifesto further calls for universal health coverage and the elimination of health inequities, as well as universal access to early childhood education and care for all children, “no matter their passport”.

Finally, the Greens’ is the only manifesto to show explicit support for a regional campaign to regularise the status of undocumented people who have been living in the EU for years (“long-term sans papiers”), a key measure to improve their living conditions and that benefits society as a whole.

European Free Alliance (EFA)

The European Free Alliance, a federation of regionalist and autonomist parties, has only one direct reference to migration in their manifesto. In it, they call for a common European response to migration, based on “humanitarian principles and international law”, and on “safe and legal pathways”. The EFA has been part of the same parliamentary group as the Greens since 1999.

European Left (the Left)

The European Left (left) addresses migration through a social inequality and decolonisation approach: the relevant section is called “Co-development, not colonial domination and hegemony”.

The Left supports “legal and safe migration routes” and  “equal terms and working conditions” for migrant workers. They call for a “truly European migration and asylum policy”, based on co-responsibility and mandatory solidarity between all member states, and characterised by “safe, legal passages” to counter trafficking in human beings and end deaths in the Mediterranean. The Left opposes pushbacks and vows to repeal all migration agreements that violate fundamental rights, including agreements on the externalisation of European borders.

The Left calls for an “EU directive against social inequalities and discrimination in education” based on various grounds, including residence status. They support universal and free access to care and public health systems.

Finally, the Left calls for the “dissolution” of Frontex.

A first version of this op-ed, slightly edited here, appeared on ECRE’s website on 15 February 2024.

After many months of complicated negotiations and a failed attempt to find a deal in December, the European Council finally adopted a revision of the EU’s long-term budget (the so-called ‘Multiannual Financial Framework’ (MFF) 2021-2027’) at its extraordinary meeting on 1 February. Compared with the European Commission’s original proposal, the revised MFF is significantly lighter in terms of additional funding that EU member states will be required to provide (€ 21 billion down from € 65.8 billion) and includes a combination of financial cuts and reallocation of resources, mainly at the expense of development and cohesion funding. In short, EU leaders managed to reduce extra contributions to the EU budget while further strengthening the focus on migration control and border management. The European Parliament’s rapporteurs endorsed a provisional political agreement with the Council negotiators on 6 February, and the final text will likely be adopted at the next plenary.  

Here are four takeaways from the European Council’s agreement:

EU leaders always seem to be able to agree on additional funding for migration and border control.

The deal confirms the overall figures proposed by the European Commission and increases funds for migration and border management (Heading 4) by € 2 billion, bringing the total funds to € 25.7 billion. Unlike the original proposal, the European Council’s deal also clearly specifies the allocations for individual funding programmes: € 0.8 billion (+8%) for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF), € 1 billion (+16%) for the Border Management and Visa Instrument (BMVI) and € 0.2 billion (+18%) for the EU Asylum Agency. Whereas the Commission intended to add resources to implement various parts of the Pact, ranging from screening and border procedures to reception capacity and relocations, EU leaders chose to focus only on ‘border management in frontline Member States’ and ‘new border procedures’.

Funds for cohesion, development and humanitarian assistance are being diverted to migration control.

The original Commission’s proposal was to increase national contributions for development assistance (Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument, NDICI) and humanitarian assistance (Solidarity and Emergency Reserve, SEAR) by 10.5 billion €. Instead, the European Council agreed to a more modest increase of 3.2 billion euros in fresh funding, accompanied by additional budgetary cuts of 4.5 billion € to existing programmes. Some cohesion programmes under Heading 2 (Cohesion, Resilience and Values) will also be reduced, such as the EU4Health (-1 bn), Horizon Europe (-2.1 bn) and cohesions funds (-1.1 bn). This means less funding for supporting refugees in third countries, and an increased focus on the Southern Neighbourhood and the Western Balkans to boost deportations and prevent departures.

Before the extraordinary European Council’s meeting, 26 humanitarian and development NGOs, including Caritas International, the International Rescue Committee and Oxfam International, issued a statement in which they warned that ‘The cuts will affect human rights, peace-building efforts, health, education, nutrition, climate, and many other areas for migration priorities. Here, we are essentially talking about solidifying fortress Europe by undermining programmes that contribute to sustainable development’. This assessment is shared by ECRE and PICUM, who previously argued that the EU is prioritising migration control over other policy goals by using funds to prevent movements along migration routes.

The EU will be able to maintain support for Ukraine, but Orban’s acquiescence comes at a price.  

To secure Hungary’s support to funding the EU response to the war in Ukraine, the other member states had to make a number of (marginal) concessions: the European Commission will need to report annually on the implementation of the Ukraine Facility, followed by a debate by the European Council; the European Council will also be able to ask the Commission to review the € 50 billion funding in the context of the next MFF negotiations in 2026. However, Hungary’s government had already secured the unfreezing of  € 10.2 billion of various EU funds (cohesion programmes, Border Management and Visa Instrument, Internal Security Fund and most elements of the Asylum and Migration Fund), that will allow Hungary to escalate violent border control policies. The European Commission’s decision to unfreeze the funds had sparked heavy criticism from the European Parliament.

The European Parliament has little influence in defining budget allocations, but it can still use its supervisory powers to avoid abuses  

MEPs wanted an increase of € 10 billion over the Commission’s original proposal (a total of € 75.8 billion of fresh funding). However, in the end, they agreed to a revised MFF that includes € 21 billion of new contributions, and additional budget cuts to cohesion and development funding, despite their own concerns  against reorienting cohesion funds to other priorities. Despite the EU Treaties limit its role in revising long-term budgetary priorities, the Parliament should at least make full use of its supervisory powers to ensure that no EU funds are transferred to authoritarian regimes or used to finance fundamental rights violations. The potential Parliament’s lawsuit against the Commission’s decision to greenlight funding to Hungary may provide an excellent opportunity for the Parliament to push the ‘guardian of the treaties’ to clarify the criteria it used (and will presumably continue to use) to disburse or withhold funding to EU member states that fail to uphold human rights and the rule of law.

On 29 and 30 November 2023, PICUM jointly organised with Equinox a legal seminar on racial profiling, policing and migration control, bringing together advocates, community organisers and legal practitioners working on racial justice, migrant justice, prison abolition and related movements. This blog shares some highlights of our discussions.

« Migration frameworks all over the world are mechanisms through which racial subordination is achieved. »

These words from former UN Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Tendayi Achiume, who opened our legal seminar, were a  reminder of how migration and racism are deeply interlinked.

Across Europe, policing and immigration enforcement are increasingly interconnected, disproportionately harming communities of colour. The growing use of technology and AI as a tool for border management compounds existing discriminatory practices against people with an irregular migration status and communities of colour. Racialised communities on either side of border crossings and within our communities bear the brunt of these trends.

Racism and migration in the EU

Moderated by Emmanuel Achiri, European Network Against Racism

We heard from Karin de Vries, Associate Professor of Constitutional Law at Utrecht University, about how racism plays a critical role in the EU migration policy. This includes visa policy, conditions for long term residence, state discretion in treating people with different countries of origin differently, and the very inequality underlying many of the choices, opportunities and experiences of migration. Alyna Smith, Deputy Director at PICUM, further highlighted how race and racism are embedded in the very language of EU laws about “deterrence” and the “fight against irregular migration”, in criminalisation frameworks, in counter-smuggling measures that tend to make crossings and journeys more dangerous for people.

Vida Beresneviciute, Equality Project Officer at the Fundamental Rights Agency, shared key findings from the Agency’s recent research on the discrimination experience of black people in Europe. Racial discrimination increased in key areas of life, with 45% of respondents reporting racial discrimination in 2022 – marking a significant increase from 39% in 2016. Police stops continue to be particularly problematic, as 58% of them are characterised as racial profiling by people who experienced them.

The EU equality frameworks largely fail to address these realities, and the various manifestations of racism more broadly. For instance, the 2000 Racial Equality Directive does not apply to law enforcement. The 2020 Anti-Racism Action Plan, quickly adopted in response to the murder of George Floyd in the US and the ensuing Black Lives Matter protests across the world, fails to address racism in EU migration policies. In fact, within days of adoping the Anti-Racism Action Plan the European Commission released a ‘New Pact on Migration and Asylum’ that further criminalises and targets undocumented people, leading to discrimination, violence against migrants and racialised people, whether at the borders or already living in the EU.

Blurring the line between criminal law and immigration law

Moderated by Laurence Meyer, Digital Freedom Fund, and Laure Baudrihaye, Independent expert

On the contrary, many EU migration policies, including recent and ongoing reforms, perpetuate systemic racism through measures that blur the lines between immigration and criminal law.

Ulrich Stege, a lawyer collaborating with the Italian Association for Juridical Studies on Immigration (ASGI), illustrated key trends in this conflation between immigration and criminal law – denoted as “crimmigration”. These include the use of administrative detention for security-related purposes, the use of criminal law as a deterrent against migration, the criminalisation of irregular entry and of solidarity with people in an irregular situation, as well as the use of technology to enhance immigration enforcement. On this latter point, Chloë Berthelemy, Senior Policy Advisor at European Digital Rights (EDRi), discussed the expansion of the Eurodac database to collect more personal data of asylum seekers, including children, and cooperation between Frontex and Europol in collecting and sharing personal data.

Silvia Carta, Advocacy Officer at PICUM, outlined how current EU migration reforms, such as the revision of the Schengen Borders Code and the Migration Pact, would likely lead to more racial profiling as border guards and police are encouraged to stop and search anyone who looks ‘foreign’ to detect people in an irregular situation.

At the national level, such trends and policies are already having dramatic effects on racialised people and people in an irregular situation. In particular, we heard about the criminalisation of people steering boats with migrants in Italy (Sara Traylor, Alarm Phone), violent police operations that led to the murder of a two-year old in Belgium (Selma Benkhelifa, Progress Lawyers), and border control technology in Greece in the form of biometric police gadgets, surveillance systems and social media monitoring apps (Lamprini Gyftokosta, Homodigitalis).

Racial profiling for immigration control across borders and within Europe

Moderated by Adla Shashati, Greek Forum of Migrants

Racial profiling in the name of migration control has long been present at Europe’s borders. As Parvin Abkhoudarestani, a refugee from Iran who experienced multiple violent pushbacks at the Greek-Turkish border, said: « Who can move depends on your skin colour, it’s decided by your race. My movement is illegalised ». Laure Palun of French NGO Anafé, discussed how racial profiling in border checks and migration and visa policy in France is leading to pushbacks, refusals of entry, detention of children, police violence, the militarisation of borders with Italy and Spain, and the criminalisation of those who help people in an irregular situation.

Racial profiling has already quickly moved beyond the confines of border crossings and transit hubs into mainstream policing and broader civil administration. Ting Chen, coordinator of Roses d’Acier, a group that provides support to undocumented Chinese sex workers, spoke of the police targeting Chinese women in Paris with repeated identity checks in specific districts.

Monish Bhatia, Lecturer in Sociology at the University of York, discussed his research on immigration raids in the UK and described them as racist state violence and kidnappings that exist to instill fear among impacted communities. Raids are sometimes triggered by citizens’ calls to the police, which are grounded on racist assumptions as to the potential presence of people in an irregular situation.

The way forward – How can we challenge racial profiling in the immigration context?

Moderated by Sarah Chander, European Digital Rights

Different strategies are needed to challenge these trends, and to anchor them in a shared frame of racial and migrant justice. In our last panel, we heard from Jennifer Kamau from International Women Space about the need for Europe to recognise its historical responsibilities around colonialism, conflict, climate change, and ongoing colonialist approaches, which all have an impact on global migration today and driving harmful policies and practices. She also invited everyone to recognise the power of words in shaping reality and to change the way we talk about this reality to fight against systemic oppression.

Saskia Bricmont, Member of the European Parliament, addressed the political struggle in the European Parliament and between EU institutions in resisting harmful migration policies, such as the EU Migration Pact, as well as in promoting fairer trade deals with third countries.

Sarah Chander, co-founder of Equinox, encouraged groups who share transformative goals to connect our different strategies and struggles, from grassroots to political levels. In closing, Alyna Smith invited social change actors to reflect on how we can work across movements, how we are perpetuating structures of oppression through our language and work, and how we can dismantle systemic oppression while reimagining a different world.

Watch the recordings of the legal seminar on our YouTube channel:

In final negotiations around the EU Migration Pact, EU lawmakers are considering a provision that would increase the risk of racial profiling in Europe.

The provision is Article 5 of the Screening Regulation, an instrument that regulates security and identity checks (screening procedures) of third country nationals at the EU’s external borders.

Article 5 would extend the application of these checks not only to people apprehended at the borders, but to everyone who cannot prove to have entered the territory of the member states with a valid travel document. This means that police or other officials would be able to stop people on the street and bring them to designated locations. There, people would likely be detained while they undergo security and identity checks, to establish if they can apply for asylum.

Widespread discriminatory profiling

The very action of stopping anyone who is suspected of being undocumented carries with it enormous risks of racial profiling, as law and immigration enforcement are already found to rely on racial, ethnic, national, or religious characteristics in their operations.

Research published in October 2023 by the EU Fundamental Rights Agency shows that it is already often the case that people of colour and of African descent are subject to discriminatory and arbitrary checks, regardless of citizenship or residence status. In fact, over half of people of African descent surveyed felt that their most recent police stop was a result of racial profiling.

Article 5 raises concerns around other potential human rights violations too.

Arbitrary apprehension

Expanding the scope of the screening outside border areas could justify the arbitrary apprehension of anyone perceived by the police as having entered the country in an irregular manner, in any place and at any time.

This provision is very broad and does not clarify how nor whether an individual assessment will be conducted to determine if the person in question has crossed external borders in an authorised manner, especially in cases where the crossing took place a long time before or where people entered through another member state.

Arbitrary deprivation of liberty (de facto detention)

Undocumented people, including families and children, could be apprehended in any place and at any time and potentially detained for up to five days in designated facilities within the territory of the member states. The mandatory nature of the screening at external borders combined with the lack of safeguards in terms of judicial review, access to a lawyer and reception conditions will likely entail arbitrary deprivation of liberty (de facto detention). This is particularly problematic as de facto detention does not meet the same basic safeguards underlying formally recognised immigration detention. De facto detention is already used in some member states and the proposed regulation could trigger a wide increase across the EU.

Non-refoulement and other human rights grounds

Under the proposed regulation, people who do not apply for international protection should be subject to return or refusal of entry once the screening procedures are over. But screening procedures do not assess reasons why people may not be subject to deportation, such as the principle of non-refoulement, health, protection of family and private life, or the best interests of the child. These are all valid reasons that could apply to many undocumented people who have been living in the EU, sometimes for years.

Proportionality

Whether Article 5 would be proportional to serve the objectives of the Screening Regulation is also questionable. This is evident in the opinion issued by the European Parliament legal service, which found that this measure would not serve the objective of better managing the external border, as the geographical and temporal links between the people intercepted and the checks would be too weak. At PICUM, together with leading European civil society networks and national organisations, we call on EU lawmakers to remove Article 5 from the draft Screening Regulation, and uphold human rights and equality throughout the Pact.

Read our joint statement here.

This blogpost was written by Louise Cottrel Allué during her advocacy traineeship with PICUM.

From February 2017 to December 2018, public authorities in Geneva, Switzerland, launched a regularisation scheme called Operation Papyrus that enabled over 2,800 people to get a residence permit. Researchers from the University of Geneva explored the effects of the scheme on undocumented migrants in the region, in what is known as the Parchemins study. The researchers concluded that people’s living and health conditions significantly improved after they obtained a residence permit, though gender disparities and precarious situations persisted.

Few studies comprehensively assess the impact of regularisation schemes, making the Parchemins study particularly significant. 

The Parchemins study: purpose and methodology

The study is grounded in a survey of 468 people, although several bowed out before the end.The respondents were predominantly from South America and had lived in Geneva for an average of 12 years. Two thirds were women. Of these 468 people, around half were regularised, while the rest remained undocumented (control group). However, because the regularisation process itself took time (up to two years instead of the three months initially announced), there were in reality three groups of research subjects: undocumented people, people with a pending application (“in transition”), and regularised people.

Key findings of the study

Living conditions

Regularisation gave people freedom of movement, enabling them to finally see friends and family living in another country. People felt they could better participate in society, and have better access to rights and services. Globally, the respondents reported no negative effects.

Housing and finances

Regularised people could access better housing conditions and security, being able to sign a lease and be protected by the law as a renter. Their financial situation improved but remained precarious. The median income of regularised people increased slightly and passed from 34,000 to 35,400 Swiss francs per year (from approximately 35,000 to 37,000 euros per year). Women were found to live more often below the poverty line than men. Researchers also observed an increase in the number of people holding debts, because of new financial burdens due to their regularisation (health insurance, tax, etc.). For example, the improvement in housing conditions meant higher rents, which weighed heavily on household budgets.

Work

Regularisation partially cushioned the negative effects of COVID-19 on people’s wellbeing (impact of lockdown, shutdown of certain economic activities…) and contributed to protecting people from job loss.

However, researchers observed that many people continued to experience precarious working conditions despite their regularisation. Moving to more secure and better-paid employment takes time: researchers found that it was too soon to observe significant changes in this area. That said, thanks to regularisation, many people had the opportunity to start training courses and improve skills and prospects for the future. Regularisation was for them a key step to address poverty.

Researchers also observed inequalities in working conditions between men and women: the majority of women continued working in domestic work, which is prone to harsh working conditions (irregular hours, low pay, limited public oversight over conditions). Their sector of employment made it very difficult for them to improve their working conditions, even after regularisation.

Health

Regularised people gained access to health insurance and better access to healthcare and experienced an improvement of their mental health. Their physical health, however, had already been negatively affected by their precarious living conditions while being undocumented.

The long-lasting effect of living undocumented

Despite improvements in working and living conditions, regularised people continued to face challenges.

Firstly, they still endure the lasting effects of having lived without residence papers for a long time: they missed opportunities (their professional experience in their country of origin has not been recognised) and they could not improve language and other skills.

Secondly, the transition into a life as a regular resident also brings with it a new type of stress, as people need to readjust to their new lives in Geneva. Regularisation means that all areas of a person’s life change at the same time (family life, housing, employment, visits to family abroad, etc.). Regularly renewing one’s residence permit can also be a stress factor, since people risk becoming undocumented again.

The importance of time to assess the impact of regularisation

The researchers stress that conclusions must not be drawn too quickly. Even though the study covered five years (2017-2022), many people had only been regularised for much shorter periods, as they only obtained their permit in 2020 or 2021. It is likely that the next generation, the respondents’ children, will benefit even more from the regularisation than their parents. They will have access to higher education, which will enable them to qualify for better jobs and enjoy better living conditions.

Recommendations for the future

Drawing upon these results, the researchers developed several recommendations to tackle the remaining vulnerabilities of regularised migrants and to improve regularisation policies. Most notably, they call on public authorities to:  

Implement better-quality regularisation procedures. This includes providing undocumented people with better information and support on the administrative steps to be taken during and after regularisation.

Facilitate the inclusion of regularised people by anticipatingthe transition from undocumented to regularised. Authorities need to adapt administrative procedures to the specific needs of regularised residents, along with inclusive and protective labour policies. The renewal of the residence permit must also be easier and quicker, to relieve people from the stress of becoming undocumented again.

The Parchemins study shows that regularisation has a positive impact on migrants’ health and overall quality of life. More similar impact studies are needed to better understand the consequences of regularisation on people, their families and wider society.  

This blog was written by Jacob Lind, Postdoctoral researcher in international migration at Malmö University; Anna Lundberg, Professor of Sociology of Law at Lund University; Hanna Scott, Doctoral student at Lunköpig University; and Karin Åberg, Doctoral student at the University of Gothenburg.

The Tidö agreement

Following the 2022 Swedish general elections, the majority parties (Sweden Democrats, Moderate Party, Christian Democrats and Liberals) presented a cooperation agreement (the Tidö Agreement) that aims to limit the rights of asylum seekers and undocumented people in Sweden. We see this as a “paradigm shift” in the position of human rights in Sweden, a country that for a long time has been perceived by others as a role model on the international stage when it comes to promoting human rights.

The Tidö Agreement contains an extensive list of proposals which, if implemented, would have severe impacts on undocumented inhabitants, professionals and the whole of society.

The Tidö Agreement proposes to oblige municipalities and other authorities that come into contact with undocumented people to inform the Swedish Migration Agency and/or the police. In practice, public authorities would be responsible for checking the person’s right to reside in Sweden. The proposal recognises that there may be situations where reporting would conflict with humanitarian values. However, neither the migration minister, nor the health care minister, have been willing to give more detail as to potential exceptions. They merely stated that a state inquiry will investigate in detail “possible exceptions, such as in the health care sector” where the duty to report is likely to be limited or exempted.

What will a reporting obligation mean in practice?

Mandatory reporting would make it more difficult to live in the country without a permit and strengthen a “hostile environment” against undocumented people in Sweden. This obligation would also lead to discrimination and stigmatisation, and fuel growing racism.

There would be serious consequences for children’s access to school and education. Many undocumented children would no longer be able to attend school. Teachers would have to act as border guards. Children’s trust in authority and their belief in everyone’s equal value and treatment would be undermined by witnessing how their friends are turned in by the adults who are supposed to care for them. Mandatory reporting would also stand in stark contrast to the principle of equal rights for children under international law.

Access to health care would also be impacted. All children, including those staying in Sweden without a residence permit, are entitled to medical care. Adults in an undocumented situation have the right to health care ”that cannot be deferred”. Yet, it is likely that access to health care for all undocumented individuals would be hindered by fear that contact with health care providers would mean being reported to police or migration authorities. 

The proposal would also have a detrimental effect on access to justice and protection for undocumented victims of crime and is likely to further prevent such crime victims and witnesses from reporting abuse to the police, or agreeing to give evidence in criminal proceedings.

Professional independence and integrity are undermined when service providers (e.g. health professionals, social workers, child protection workers, educators, etc.) have, or are perceived to have, priorities (such as reporting persons in an irregular situation) that supersede, and indeed conflict with, their primary concern for the best interests of the person (student, child, patient, etc.) they serve. It would damage their relationship with the service user, and their broader role within society. In the case of health care, delayed treatment of health conditions also means higher costs for both the individual and society.

Conflicts with national law

Since 1 July 2013, undocumented children in Sweden have the right to attend preschool and primary education. If they start studying before the age of 18, they additionally have the right to attend upper secondary school.

An earlier obligation for municipal school boards to report undocumented students to the police was withdrawn in 2013 as this right to education was introduced. According to the then government, such a reporting obligation would have prevent undocumented children and their parents from exercising their right to education. In 2018 the idea of an obligation to report was proposed again by the Sweden Democrats and the Moderates (centre-right) at the time had opposed it.

The Public Access to Information and Secrecy Act also protects children’s right to education. As a general principle, information about an individual’s personal circumstances is confidential, unless it is clear that the information can be disclosed without harm to the individual or someone close to him or her.

Conflicts with international laws and standards

Article 28 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) protects the unconditional right to education for all children, regardless of status. According to the Committee on the Rights of the Child, states should prohibit the sharing of students’ personal data and should develop firewalls between educational institutions and immigration authorities. The CRC has been transposed into national law in Sweden since 1 January 2020.

In 2016, the Council of Europe’s European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) found that

“the application of immigration rules must not interfere with the correct application of the human rights obligations of states in respect of all persons in their jurisdiction. … There must be clear firewalls which separate the activities of state authorities which provide social services and, where applicable, the private sector, from immigration control and enforcement obligations.”

Imposing the duty to report is a departure from this international recommendation. It also risks violating EU law, such as the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the General Data Protection Regulation.

The European Commission’s 2020 proposal for a Directive on violence against women and domestic violence and the 2023 proposal to revise the Victims’ Rights Directive both include a provision that would prohibit competent authorities coming in contact with a victim reporting a crime from transferring personal data pertaining to the residence status of the victim to competent migration authorities, at least until completion of the first individual assessment.

The European Parliament – in its position on the Directive on violence against women and domestic violence adopted in July – deleted the exception introduced by the Commission which allows reporting after the completion of the individual needs assessment.

Both directives are currently under negotiations, and have the potential to considerably enhance the rights of undocumented victims.

How was the proposal received?

As in previous attempts to introduce similar provisions, the proposal has been heavily and widely criticized by a number of actors, including university teachers, welfare professionals, health care workers, teachers, municipal workers and library staff. Representatives from trade unions representing all these sectors argue that the proposal goes against their professional ethics, would be contrary to the UN Children’s Rights Convention and will have an overall negative impact on social trust.

A medical doctor working at a health care clinic for undocumented migrants suggested that “if people do not dare to seek or are denied care, there are consequences for all of us”. Several directors of the regional boards who are responsible for the healthcare system politically in each region have also voiced criticism towards the proposal. In an article signed by 4008 health care workers, the signatories state: “If the measures proposed by the Tidö Agreement are implemented in the healthcare sector, we will commit civil disobedience and refuse to report our patients”.

Similarly, in a survey conducted by the teachers’ union among their members, more than half of the respondents answered that they would never report a student. The Swedish Teachers’ Council on Professional Ethics also strongly criticised the proposal and encouraged teachers to commit civil disobedience should the proposal become law. Nine out of ten librarians contest the proposal.

We, the authors of this text, teach future social workers and human rights professionals. Since the proposal was made public last year, we have been talking to students who worry that the duty to report violates the social work profession’s professional and ethical guidelines.

What’s next?

At the time of writing, the government has announced an inquiry into how this proposal should be legally designed and implemented.

We hope that raising awareness of the proposed duty to report beyond the Swedish context will lead to international scrutiny and criticism and that, together with individuals, professional organisations, civil society actors and politicians, this proposal can be stopped before it is implemented.

On this website, you can read a simple summary of the Tidö agreement in: Svenska, العربية (Arabic), English, Castellano (Spanish).

This blog post is based largely on information provided by George Joseph Caritas Sweden whom we are grateful for his time and expertise.*

Sweden’s labour migration policy has long been known as one of the most straightforward and inclusive in the region, with one set of rules applying for all types of employment. But a bill voted by the Swedish Parliament in November 2022 is set to reshape the migration and labour migration landscape in the country. The changes will make the rules more complicated, and block non-EU workers from accessing work permits in many jobs and sectors where they are currently employed.

While the current Swedish labour migration model is not without its shortcomings, it represents a promising example of how labour migration policy can make work permits accessible for non-EU workers across all jobs and sectors of the economy, in line with applicable regulations. This policy reflects many of the essential characteristics of successful labour migration and work permit policies, as set out in PICUM’s report Designing labour migration policies to promote decent work. A table comparing these aspects to PICUM’s policy recommendations and related indicators can be found here.

What will change

Among the advantages of the Swedish work permit policy was its openness to workers across sectors and skills. Changes, introduced by a right-wing coalition, will make it much more difficult for migrants to work in the country in occupations that receive lower salaries.

Increased income requirements

The government decided to introduce a specific income requirement for non-EU workers to obtain a work permit.  Until now, the offered salary had to align with applicable collective agreements, which set pay for the specific job in question and specify that the lowest salary for any job is SEK 13,000 (approximately €1,118 on 3 October 2023) per month, the lowest level at which it is considered possible to live in Sweden without welfare support. The new income requirement will more than double that amount, to SEK 27,360 (approximately €2,353 on 3 October 2023) per month. This is 80 percent of the Swedish median salary, so will exclude those working in the numerous jobs with lower pay.

The government claims this change will reduce labour exploitation of migrant workers on low income, but it will likely result in increased precarity, undeclared and undocumented work across key sectors.

Restrictions to family life

Workers who wish to bring their families to Sweden will have to prove appropriate accommodation and sufficient financial means to support them. How these requirements will be applied in practice, remains to be seen, but may increase family separation. Under the previous system, workers could apply simultaneously for their permits and to bring their immediate family members with them, without particular restrictions, meaning it was possible for them move to Sweden together as a family.

Harsher immigration enforcement

The situation changes also for those people who lived undocumented in Sweden but were able to secure a job offer in the country: in the past, immigration authorities would allow them to leave Sweden, apply for the work permit from their country of origin, and return to Sweden. A political agreement was reached – and is currently being challenged – to take various steps to increase the deportation of undocumented people and make life even harder for undocumented people. As part of this, authorities plan to implement more strictly the provision that people’s undocumented residence in Sweden could be counted against them in any new work permit application. This will trap people in undocumented residence and undeclared work in Sweden, even when they have a firm offer of employment that would otherwise be eligible for a work permit.

The changes are set to take effect on 1 November 2023, impacting workers who apply after this date. It is unclear if the new rules will also be applied to applications submitted before this date that are still being processed and renewals.

This reform raises major concerns about likely negative impacts on the workforce and the overall inclusivity and fairness of the Swedish migration system, especially for workers in low-paid jobs such as in the restaurant, cleaning, and home service sectors. 

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Sweden’s labour migration system

Sweden’s labour migration system as introduced in 2008 allows non-EU citizens from any country to apply for a work and residence permit in any job and sector. Until 1 October 2023, there was no discrimination or differential treatment based on the type of work, skill level or income, as long as the employment relationship meets applicable regulations and collective agreements. As of 1 October, the job offers must also meet a minimum income threshold which is 80 per cent of the median salary in Sweden, and will exclude numerous lower-paying jobs across different sectors (as described above).

To be eligible for a work permit, workers need a written job offer from an employer based in Sweden. Employers are required to advertise job openings in Sweden and the European Economic Area for ten days before offering the position to a non-EU citizen.

Application process

The application is initiated by the employer, but completed and submitted by the worker, giving them some ownership over the procedure. The employer needs a trade union statement which approves the conditions presented in the employment contract. When the trade unions issue a negative statement, the Swedish Migration Agency will revise the contract to make sure it meets labour standards and then issue a final decision. In certain industries, small employers must also demonstrate their ability to pay the employee’s salary.

The application can be submitted online through the Migration Agency’s website or via the Swedish consulate or embassy abroad. However, the processing time for work and residence permits applications can vary, ranging from several months to over a year, depending on the workload of the authorities.

Permit granted

Once the work permit is granted, it remains valid for the duration of the employment contract, or for maximum of two years if the contract is for a longer period. It is common for migrant workers to receive a long-term job offer and work permit of 2 years. Permits can be renewed for an additional two years. After holding a work permit for a continuous period of four years, individuals can apply for permanent residency.

Work permit holders are not allowed to change employers on their permit for the first 2 years; a new permit must be applied for.

In case the worker loses or decides to change their job, they can be unemployed for up to three months within the validity of their permit, while they search for a new employer.

If the new employment is within the same occupation and sector, the worker can remain in Sweden and submit the application from within the territory.  Once the application has been submitted, the existing permit is not revoked, and the person can start the new employment while the application is being processed.

Once a worker’s initial 2-year permit has been renewed, they can work in the same occupation for a different employer on the same permit. They may also submit an application for a new permit for a job in a different occupation from within the country, but must still remain within the same work sector.

To change work sector, the person must submit a fresh application from outside of the country.

*Most of the information related to the current labour migration policy was also published in our 2021 report Designing labour migration policies to promote decent work– further sources can be found there.