In final negotiations around the EU Migration Pact, EU lawmakers are considering a provision that would increase the risk of racial profiling in Europe.

The provision is Article 5 of the Screening Regulation, an instrument that regulates security and identity checks (screening procedures) of third country nationals at the EU’s external borders.

Article 5 would extend the application of these checks not only to people apprehended at the borders, but to everyone who cannot prove to have entered the territory of the member states with a valid travel document. This means that police or other officials would be able to stop people on the street and bring them to designated locations. There, people would likely be detained while they undergo security and identity checks, to establish if they can apply for asylum.

Widespread discriminatory profiling

The very action of stopping anyone who is suspected of being undocumented carries with it enormous risks of racial profiling, as law and immigration enforcement are already found to rely on racial, ethnic, national, or religious characteristics in their operations.

Research published in October 2023 by the EU Fundamental Rights Agency shows that it is already often the case that people of colour and of African descent are subject to discriminatory and arbitrary checks, regardless of citizenship or residence status. In fact, over half of people of African descent surveyed felt that their most recent police stop was a result of racial profiling.

Article 5 raises concerns around other potential human rights violations too.

Arbitrary apprehension

Expanding the scope of the screening outside border areas could justify the arbitrary apprehension of anyone perceived by the police as having entered the country in an irregular manner, in any place and at any time.

This provision is very broad and does not clarify how nor whether an individual assessment will be conducted to determine if the person in question has crossed external borders in an authorised manner, especially in cases where the crossing took place a long time before or where people entered through another member state.

Arbitrary deprivation of liberty (de facto detention)

Undocumented people, including families and children, could be apprehended in any place and at any time and potentially detained for up to five days in designated facilities within the territory of the member states. The mandatory nature of the screening at external borders combined with the lack of safeguards in terms of judicial review, access to a lawyer and reception conditions will likely entail arbitrary deprivation of liberty (de facto detention). This is particularly problematic as de facto detention does not meet the same basic safeguards underlying formally recognised immigration detention. De facto detention is already used in some member states and the proposed regulation could trigger a wide increase across the EU.

Non-refoulement and other human rights grounds

Under the proposed regulation, people who do not apply for international protection should be subject to return or refusal of entry once the screening procedures are over. But screening procedures do not assess reasons why people may not be subject to deportation, such as the principle of non-refoulement, health, protection of family and private life, or the best interests of the child. These are all valid reasons that could apply to many undocumented people who have been living in the EU, sometimes for years.

Proportionality

Whether Article 5 would be proportional to serve the objectives of the Screening Regulation is also questionable. This is evident in the opinion issued by the European Parliament legal service, which found that this measure would not serve the objective of better managing the external border, as the geographical and temporal links between the people intercepted and the checks would be too weak. At PICUM, together with leading European civil society networks and national organisations, we call on EU lawmakers to remove Article 5 from the draft Screening Regulation, and uphold human rights and equality throughout the Pact.

Read our joint statement here.

This blogpost was written by Louise Cottrel Allué during her advocacy traineeship with PICUM.

From February 2017 to December 2018, public authorities in Geneva, Switzerland, launched a regularisation scheme called Operation Papyrus that enabled over 2,800 people to get a residence permit. Researchers from the University of Geneva explored the effects of the scheme on undocumented migrants in the region, in what is known as the Parchemins study. The researchers concluded that people’s living and health conditions significantly improved after they obtained a residence permit, though gender disparities and precarious situations persisted.

Few studies comprehensively assess the impact of regularisation schemes, making the Parchemins study particularly significant. 

The Parchemins study: purpose and methodology

The study is grounded in a survey of 468 people, although several bowed out before the end.The respondents were predominantly from South America and had lived in Geneva for an average of 12 years. Two thirds were women. Of these 468 people, around half were regularised, while the rest remained undocumented (control group). However, because the regularisation process itself took time (up to two years instead of the three months initially announced), there were in reality three groups of research subjects: undocumented people, people with a pending application (“in transition”), and regularised people.

Key findings of the study

Living conditions

Regularisation gave people freedom of movement, enabling them to finally see friends and family living in another country. People felt they could better participate in society, and have better access to rights and services. Globally, the respondents reported no negative effects.

Housing and finances

Regularised people could access better housing conditions and security, being able to sign a lease and be protected by the law as a renter. Their financial situation improved but remained precarious. The median income of regularised people increased slightly and passed from 34,000 to 35,400 Swiss francs per year (from approximately 35,000 to 37,000 euros per year). Women were found to live more often below the poverty line than men. Researchers also observed an increase in the number of people holding debts, because of new financial burdens due to their regularisation (health insurance, tax, etc.). For example, the improvement in housing conditions meant higher rents, which weighed heavily on household budgets.

Work

Regularisation partially cushioned the negative effects of COVID-19 on people’s wellbeing (impact of lockdown, shutdown of certain economic activities…) and contributed to protecting people from job loss.

However, researchers observed that many people continued to experience precarious working conditions despite their regularisation. Moving to more secure and better-paid employment takes time: researchers found that it was too soon to observe significant changes in this area. That said, thanks to regularisation, many people had the opportunity to start training courses and improve skills and prospects for the future. Regularisation was for them a key step to address poverty.

Researchers also observed inequalities in working conditions between men and women: the majority of women continued working in domestic work, which is prone to harsh working conditions (irregular hours, low pay, limited public oversight over conditions). Their sector of employment made it very difficult for them to improve their working conditions, even after regularisation.

Health

Regularised people gained access to health insurance and better access to healthcare and experienced an improvement of their mental health. Their physical health, however, had already been negatively affected by their precarious living conditions while being undocumented.

The long-lasting effect of living undocumented

Despite improvements in working and living conditions, regularised people continued to face challenges.

Firstly, they still endure the lasting effects of having lived without residence papers for a long time: they missed opportunities (their professional experience in their country of origin has not been recognised) and they could not improve language and other skills.

Secondly, the transition into a life as a regular resident also brings with it a new type of stress, as people need to readjust to their new lives in Geneva. Regularisation means that all areas of a person’s life change at the same time (family life, housing, employment, visits to family abroad, etc.). Regularly renewing one’s residence permit can also be a stress factor, since people risk becoming undocumented again.

The importance of time to assess the impact of regularisation

The researchers stress that conclusions must not be drawn too quickly. Even though the study covered five years (2017-2022), many people had only been regularised for much shorter periods, as they only obtained their permit in 2020 or 2021. It is likely that the next generation, the respondents’ children, will benefit even more from the regularisation than their parents. They will have access to higher education, which will enable them to qualify for better jobs and enjoy better living conditions.

Recommendations for the future

Drawing upon these results, the researchers developed several recommendations to tackle the remaining vulnerabilities of regularised migrants and to improve regularisation policies. Most notably, they call on public authorities to:  

Implement better-quality regularisation procedures. This includes providing undocumented people with better information and support on the administrative steps to be taken during and after regularisation.

Facilitate the inclusion of regularised people by anticipatingthe transition from undocumented to regularised. Authorities need to adapt administrative procedures to the specific needs of regularised residents, along with inclusive and protective labour policies. The renewal of the residence permit must also be easier and quicker, to relieve people from the stress of becoming undocumented again.

The Parchemins study shows that regularisation has a positive impact on migrants’ health and overall quality of life. More similar impact studies are needed to better understand the consequences of regularisation on people, their families and wider society.  

This blog was written by Jacob Lind, Postdoctoral researcher in international migration at Malmö University; Anna Lundberg, Professor of Sociology of Law at Lund University; Hanna Scott, Doctoral student at Lunköpig University; and Karin Åberg, Doctoral student at the University of Gothenburg.

The Tidö agreement

Following the 2022 Swedish general elections, the majority parties (Sweden Democrats, Moderate Party, Christian Democrats and Liberals) presented a cooperation agreement (the Tidö Agreement) that aims to limit the rights of asylum seekers and undocumented people in Sweden. We see this as a “paradigm shift” in the position of human rights in Sweden, a country that for a long time has been perceived by others as a role model on the international stage when it comes to promoting human rights.

The Tidö Agreement contains an extensive list of proposals which, if implemented, would have severe impacts on undocumented inhabitants, professionals and the whole of society.

The Tidö Agreement proposes to oblige municipalities and other authorities that come into contact with undocumented people to inform the Swedish Migration Agency and/or the police. In practice, public authorities would be responsible for checking the person’s right to reside in Sweden. The proposal recognises that there may be situations where reporting would conflict with humanitarian values. However, neither the migration minister, nor the health care minister, have been willing to give more detail as to potential exceptions. They merely stated that a state inquiry will investigate in detail “possible exceptions, such as in the health care sector” where the duty to report is likely to be limited or exempted.

What will a reporting obligation mean in practice?

Mandatory reporting would make it more difficult to live in the country without a permit and strengthen a “hostile environment” against undocumented people in Sweden. This obligation would also lead to discrimination and stigmatisation, and fuel growing racism.

There would be serious consequences for children’s access to school and education. Many undocumented children would no longer be able to attend school. Teachers would have to act as border guards. Children’s trust in authority and their belief in everyone’s equal value and treatment would be undermined by witnessing how their friends are turned in by the adults who are supposed to care for them. Mandatory reporting would also stand in stark contrast to the principle of equal rights for children under international law.

Access to health care would also be impacted. All children, including those staying in Sweden without a residence permit, are entitled to medical care. Adults in an undocumented situation have the right to health care ”that cannot be deferred”. Yet, it is likely that access to health care for all undocumented individuals would be hindered by fear that contact with health care providers would mean being reported to police or migration authorities. 

The proposal would also have a detrimental effect on access to justice and protection for undocumented victims of crime and is likely to further prevent such crime victims and witnesses from reporting abuse to the police, or agreeing to give evidence in criminal proceedings.

Professional independence and integrity are undermined when service providers (e.g. health professionals, social workers, child protection workers, educators, etc.) have, or are perceived to have, priorities (such as reporting persons in an irregular situation) that supersede, and indeed conflict with, their primary concern for the best interests of the person (student, child, patient, etc.) they serve. It would damage their relationship with the service user, and their broader role within society. In the case of health care, delayed treatment of health conditions also means higher costs for both the individual and society.

Conflicts with national law

Since 1 July 2013, undocumented children in Sweden have the right to attend preschool and primary education. If they start studying before the age of 18, they additionally have the right to attend upper secondary school.

An earlier obligation for municipal school boards to report undocumented students to the police was withdrawn in 2013 as this right to education was introduced. According to the then government, such a reporting obligation would have prevent undocumented children and their parents from exercising their right to education. In 2018 the idea of an obligation to report was proposed again by the Sweden Democrats and the Moderates (centre-right) at the time had opposed it.

The Public Access to Information and Secrecy Act also protects children’s right to education. As a general principle, information about an individual’s personal circumstances is confidential, unless it is clear that the information can be disclosed without harm to the individual or someone close to him or her.

Conflicts with international laws and standards

Article 28 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) protects the unconditional right to education for all children, regardless of status. According to the Committee on the Rights of the Child, states should prohibit the sharing of students’ personal data and should develop firewalls between educational institutions and immigration authorities. The CRC has been transposed into national law in Sweden since 1 January 2020.

In 2016, the Council of Europe’s European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) found that

“the application of immigration rules must not interfere with the correct application of the human rights obligations of states in respect of all persons in their jurisdiction. … There must be clear firewalls which separate the activities of state authorities which provide social services and, where applicable, the private sector, from immigration control and enforcement obligations.”

Imposing the duty to report is a departure from this international recommendation. It also risks violating EU law, such as the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the General Data Protection Regulation.

The European Commission’s 2020 proposal for a Directive on violence against women and domestic violence and the 2023 proposal to revise the Victims’ Rights Directive both include a provision that would prohibit competent authorities coming in contact with a victim reporting a crime from transferring personal data pertaining to the residence status of the victim to competent migration authorities, at least until completion of the first individual assessment.

The European Parliament – in its position on the Directive on violence against women and domestic violence adopted in July – deleted the exception introduced by the Commission which allows reporting after the completion of the individual needs assessment.

Both directives are currently under negotiations, and have the potential to considerably enhance the rights of undocumented victims.

How was the proposal received?

As in previous attempts to introduce similar provisions, the proposal has been heavily and widely criticized by a number of actors, including university teachers, welfare professionals, health care workers, teachers, municipal workers and library staff. Representatives from trade unions representing all these sectors argue that the proposal goes against their professional ethics, would be contrary to the UN Children’s Rights Convention and will have an overall negative impact on social trust.

A medical doctor working at a health care clinic for undocumented migrants suggested that “if people do not dare to seek or are denied care, there are consequences for all of us”. Several directors of the regional boards who are responsible for the healthcare system politically in each region have also voiced criticism towards the proposal. In an article signed by 4008 health care workers, the signatories state: “If the measures proposed by the Tidö Agreement are implemented in the healthcare sector, we will commit civil disobedience and refuse to report our patients”.

Similarly, in a survey conducted by the teachers’ union among their members, more than half of the respondents answered that they would never report a student. The Swedish Teachers’ Council on Professional Ethics also strongly criticised the proposal and encouraged teachers to commit civil disobedience should the proposal become law. Nine out of ten librarians contest the proposal.

We, the authors of this text, teach future social workers and human rights professionals. Since the proposal was made public last year, we have been talking to students who worry that the duty to report violates the social work profession’s professional and ethical guidelines.

What’s next?

At the time of writing, the government has announced an inquiry into how this proposal should be legally designed and implemented.

We hope that raising awareness of the proposed duty to report beyond the Swedish context will lead to international scrutiny and criticism and that, together with individuals, professional organisations, civil society actors and politicians, this proposal can be stopped before it is implemented.

On this website, you can read a simple summary of the Tidö agreement in: Svenska, العربية (Arabic), English, Castellano (Spanish).

This blog post is based largely on information provided by George Joseph Caritas Sweden whom we are grateful for his time and expertise.*

Sweden’s labour migration policy has long been known as one of the most straightforward and inclusive in the region, with one set of rules applying for all types of employment. But a bill voted by the Swedish Parliament in November 2022 is set to reshape the migration and labour migration landscape in the country. The changes will make the rules more complicated, and block non-EU workers from accessing work permits in many jobs and sectors where they are currently employed.

While the current Swedish labour migration model is not without its shortcomings, it represents a promising example of how labour migration policy can make work permits accessible for non-EU workers across all jobs and sectors of the economy, in line with applicable regulations. This policy reflects many of the essential characteristics of successful labour migration and work permit policies, as set out in PICUM’s report Designing labour migration policies to promote decent work. A table comparing these aspects to PICUM’s policy recommendations and related indicators can be found here.

What will change

Among the advantages of the Swedish work permit policy was its openness to workers across sectors and skills. Changes, introduced by a right-wing coalition, will make it much more difficult for migrants to work in the country in occupations that receive lower salaries.

Increased income requirements

The government decided to introduce a specific income requirement for non-EU workers to obtain a work permit.  Until now, the offered salary had to align with applicable collective agreements, which set pay for the specific job in question and specify that the lowest salary for any job is SEK 13,000 (approximately €1,118 on 3 October 2023) per month, the lowest level at which it is considered possible to live in Sweden without welfare support. The new income requirement will more than double that amount, to SEK 27,360 (approximately €2,353 on 3 October 2023) per month. This is 80 percent of the Swedish median salary, so will exclude those working in the numerous jobs with lower pay.

The government claims this change will reduce labour exploitation of migrant workers on low income, but it will likely result in increased precarity, undeclared and undocumented work across key sectors.

Restrictions to family life

Workers who wish to bring their families to Sweden will have to prove appropriate accommodation and sufficient financial means to support them. How these requirements will be applied in practice, remains to be seen, but may increase family separation. Under the previous system, workers could apply simultaneously for their permits and to bring their immediate family members with them, without particular restrictions, meaning it was possible for them move to Sweden together as a family.

Harsher immigration enforcement

The situation changes also for those people who lived undocumented in Sweden but were able to secure a job offer in the country: in the past, immigration authorities would allow them to leave Sweden, apply for the work permit from their country of origin, and return to Sweden. A political agreement was reached – and is currently being challenged – to take various steps to increase the deportation of undocumented people and make life even harder for undocumented people. As part of this, authorities plan to implement more strictly the provision that people’s undocumented residence in Sweden could be counted against them in any new work permit application. This will trap people in undocumented residence and undeclared work in Sweden, even when they have a firm offer of employment that would otherwise be eligible for a work permit.

The changes are set to take effect on 1 November 2023, impacting workers who apply after this date. It is unclear if the new rules will also be applied to applications submitted before this date that are still being processed and renewals.

This reform raises major concerns about likely negative impacts on the workforce and the overall inclusivity and fairness of the Swedish migration system, especially for workers in low-paid jobs such as in the restaurant, cleaning, and home service sectors. 

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Sweden’s labour migration system

Sweden’s labour migration system as introduced in 2008 allows non-EU citizens from any country to apply for a work and residence permit in any job and sector. Until 1 October 2023, there was no discrimination or differential treatment based on the type of work, skill level or income, as long as the employment relationship meets applicable regulations and collective agreements. As of 1 October, the job offers must also meet a minimum income threshold which is 80 per cent of the median salary in Sweden, and will exclude numerous lower-paying jobs across different sectors (as described above).

To be eligible for a work permit, workers need a written job offer from an employer based in Sweden. Employers are required to advertise job openings in Sweden and the European Economic Area for ten days before offering the position to a non-EU citizen.

Application process

The application is initiated by the employer, but completed and submitted by the worker, giving them some ownership over the procedure. The employer needs a trade union statement which approves the conditions presented in the employment contract. When the trade unions issue a negative statement, the Swedish Migration Agency will revise the contract to make sure it meets labour standards and then issue a final decision. In certain industries, small employers must also demonstrate their ability to pay the employee’s salary.

The application can be submitted online through the Migration Agency’s website or via the Swedish consulate or embassy abroad. However, the processing time for work and residence permits applications can vary, ranging from several months to over a year, depending on the workload of the authorities.

Permit granted

Once the work permit is granted, it remains valid for the duration of the employment contract, or for maximum of two years if the contract is for a longer period. It is common for migrant workers to receive a long-term job offer and work permit of 2 years. Permits can be renewed for an additional two years. After holding a work permit for a continuous period of four years, individuals can apply for permanent residency.

Work permit holders are not allowed to change employers on their permit for the first 2 years; a new permit must be applied for.

In case the worker loses or decides to change their job, they can be unemployed for up to three months within the validity of their permit, while they search for a new employer.

If the new employment is within the same occupation and sector, the worker can remain in Sweden and submit the application from within the territory.  Once the application has been submitted, the existing permit is not revoked, and the person can start the new employment while the application is being processed.

Once a worker’s initial 2-year permit has been renewed, they can work in the same occupation for a different employer on the same permit. They may also submit an application for a new permit for a job in a different occupation from within the country, but must still remain within the same work sector.

To change work sector, the person must submit a fresh application from outside of the country.

*Most of the information related to the current labour migration policy was also published in our 2021 report Designing labour migration policies to promote decent work– further sources can be found there.   

  

In March 2023, the Greek Parliament reformed the national Migration Code. The changes will significantly impact migrant’s lives – some changes will improve their lives, others won’t. This blog covers changes that impact people’s access to a secure residence status, and highlights the introduction of a permit for former unaccompanied children. While the government is yet to define the modalities of its implementation, civil society highlights important gaps in the protection of some of the most marginalised people, including children. Except for a few provisions, the law will enter into force on 1 January 2024.

For an overview of regularisation mechanisms in Greece under the previous code, see Turning 18 and undocumented: supporting children in their transition into adulthood (annex 2: Greece).

Ten-year residence permit for young people

The new Code improves the eligibility conditions for the ten-year residence permit (“M2 permit”) for two groups of young people. Firstly, third-country nationals born in Greece or who successfully completed six grades of school in Greece and are younger than 23 at the time of application, are eligible for the ten-year permit. This regularisation mechanism already existed, but only gave access to a five-year permit.

Secondly, the new Code improves conditions for former unaccompanied children. Up until this reform, Greece had no way for former unaccompanied children to regularise their status. Now, article 161§1(c) extends the eligibility for the M2 permit to adults who arrived in Greece as unaccompanied children and successfully completed at least three years of secondary education in a Greek secondary school before they turned 23.

Although this provision entered into force upon the publication of the law earlier this year, it cannot be implemented until the relating Ministerial Decision is published. No information on this permit or how to apply for it is currently available on the Ministry of Migration and Asylum website.

The introduction of this new regularisation mechanism for undocumented former unaccompanied children is a positive development in itself. In addition, the length of the permit provides stability. However, the requirement to successfully attend three years of school in Greece before turning 23 can be challenging for many former unaccompanied children. Many unaccompanied and formerly unaccompanied children cannot enroll in school because places are limited (especially when enrolling in the middle of the year). Even when they do manage to enroll, they may struggle to follow classes in Greek, as many are not supported in learning the new language.

To apply for an M2 permit, the applicant must also have health care coverage and must not have been absent from Greece for more than two consecutive years. After its expiration, the M2 permit is automatically converted into a long-term residence permit (“M1 permit”).

Three-year permit for exceptional reasons

The reform complicates access to the A6 permit, a three-year permit for exceptional reasons. As before, this permit remains accessible to undocumented people who continually lived in Greece for seven years or more (art 134§5). However, the time awaiting an asylum decision no longer counts towards these seven years, effectively extending the time of precarity.

Five-year exclusion for false documents

The new Code sanctions people who provided false information or documents during an application procedure with a five-year ban from applying for a new permit or renewing their current permit. This ban can be issued by any competent authority and without a court order.

No security for unaccompanied children or agricultural workers

Overall, this reform may improve access to a secure residence permit for undocumented children and young people. The introduction of the ten-year residence permit for former unaccompanied children who attended school in Greece is particularly promising. Whether the permit will be accessible to undocumented young people in practice will however largely depend on the policies regulating the implementation of the law, especially the documents required to obtain the permit.

At the same time, the new Migration Code fails to introduce residence permits for two important groups, despite the continued advocacy work of Greek civil society, including PICUM members. First, unaccompanied children who do not apply or did not receive asylum continue to be undocumented. Greek law now leaves this group of children in a highly precarious situation, where they need to go to school and wait until they turn 18 to be able to apply for a permit. Secondly, the reform did not introduce any solutions for undocumented agricultural workers, who often endure serious exploitation and abuse.

Cover image: jimmy teoh – Pexels

On 8 and 9 June 2023, PICUM brought together migrant and human rights advocates, from both inside and outside our membership, at our General Assembly, to reflect on the participation of people with lived experience of precarious status in our work. This blog shares some highlights of our discussions.

PICUM’s 2023 General Assembly showcased the work of our rich and varied membership, and the ways undocumented people can be active in resisting and shaping the policies and practices that affect them.

A diverse and active network

In the opening plenary, we heard from Afrique Culture Maroc, an organisation founded and led by migrants and refugees in Morocco. In 2014, they were instrumental in securing the regularisation of some 27,000 undocumented people living in Morocco, drawing inspiration from regularisation campaigns run by PICUM members in Ireland, Belgium and other countries.

We also heard from Maisha, which was founded by and for African women in Germany in 1996 and successfully advocated towards the city of Frankfurt for support in meeting the needs of migrant women. While it originally focused on access to health care, Maisha now also works on labour and inclusion and runs a variety of programs to empower African women in Germany, and those who have been returned to their country of origin.

The Latin American Women’s Rights Service (LAWRS) is an intersectional feminist organisation for Latin American migrant women living in the United Kingdom. They have had success in leading a broad advocacy campaign in the UK centring migrant women’s voices and experience concerning undocumented women and gender-based violence, offer a helpline and support thousands of women every year who are exposed to violence, labour exploitation, trafficking and poverty.

PICUM member HIAS Israel underscored the importance of the network as a vital source of inspiration in a difficult political context and expressed appreciation for opportunities to do PICUM-supported mutual-learning exchanges with other members.

Stichting LOS, based in Utrecht, Netherlands, is one of PICUM’s oldest members. Their work has benefited from PICUM’s support and analysis – including a successful effort to resist a law that would have criminalised support to undocumented people. They also played a key part in developing a movement of young undocumented people who call for secure residence permits after they turn 18.

ASGI, the Italian Association for Juridical Studies on Migration, uses advocacy and strategic litigation to counter hostile legislation and policies in Italy, where various governments have been restricting the rights of migrants and asylum-seekers. ASGI is active in various working groups of PICUM’s network, where it appreciates the possibility to exchange information with other human rights organisations.

This year, PICUM also welcomed four new member organisations that are all led by people with lived experience of migration and provide direct support to undocumented people and people facing marginalisation: Siempre, a grassroots organisation providing support to the Latin American women’s diaspora in Belgium; Generation for Change, a migrant-led organisation working on community-building, awareness raising and service provision for people in migration in Cyprus; the Communauté Ivoirienne de la Grèce, an association that promotes the participation of people from the Ivoirian community in Greece in decision-making processes that affect them; and Uniao de Refugiados em Portugal, an organisation that provides various forms of support and assistance to migrants and refugees, including undocumented people.

Participation and empowerment

The General Assembly also featured dedicated discussions and workshops on participation and empowerment of people with lived experience.Irene Jagoba and Chanasi Potso spoke about their involvement in Justice for the Undocumented (JFU), the largest movement of undocumented people in Ireland, with over 2,500 members. After mobilizing for several years through marches, vigils, banner drops, selfies, press conferences and even parliamentary debates, they secured a nation-wide regularisation programme in 2022. Both Irene and Chanasi highlighted how important it is that the movement is led and organised by people with lived experience, and that relationships of trust are built with affected communities.While their participation was driven by the personal impact of policies and systems on their living and working conditions, both shared the conviction that change can only come through collective action and that they felt empowered having a role in pushing for that change.

Eva Maria Jimenez Lamas of the Brussels section of Belgian trade union CSC led a workshop on the union’s work with undocumented domestic workers who have been organising for the past few years within the League of Domestic Workers, and have been campaigning for decent work permits and working conditions, and for the regularisation of undocumented workers more broadly. She spoke of the importance of songs in building solidarity and connection, and the role of artistry, storytelling and theatre in expressing their vision for change and making their case to the public and to politicians. The work takes time: the women built their demands together.

Henriette Essami-Khaullot of the Office for the spokesperson of undocumented people (Belgium) shared her experience as an active member of the movement for change of undocumented people in Brussels. Prior to her activism, she hadn’t realised undocumented people could be organised; she was touched by the commitment of the people the met and the power of the actions they made together, which helped build her political consciousness and moved her to stand up for her rights. She reflected on the need to ensure diversity in movements to address specific challenges faced by different members of the community. For instance, she shared that in Belgium, the regularisation movement is primarily led and coordinated by men: this has meant that certain actions, such as occupations of buildings, have sometimes been organised without considering specific needs and facilities for women.

Allied spaces and groups can support the struggle of undocumented people, by providing safe spaces – and sometimes by stepping aside so that they can take the lead. Jonathan McCully of Systemic Justice, which partners with communities working on racial, social, and economic justice to bring about change through strategic litigation, explained the importance, in this setting, of  decentring the role of lawyers and prioritising the perspectives and priorities of communities.

Challenges and opportunities moving forward

The closing panel discussed future challenges and opportunities for change for human rights movements. Myriam Douo of Friends of the Earth Europe and Steering Group member of Equinox (an initiative that aims to mainstream racial justice in conversations around various topics, including climate change), spoke of how undocumented people are at the forefront of the climate crisis due to their living and working conditions. Natacha Kazatchkine of the Open Society Foundations discussed the democratic backsliding and shrinking space for civil society in much of Europe, and opportunities for building bridges between human rights defenders and migrants’ rights organisations. Riccardo Rossella of Civil Society Europe discussed the rise of the far right across the EU and its impact on the 2024 EU elections, which will likely result in a new European Parliament that is more fragmented and polarised than ever.

Regularisation, that is granting a secure residence status or permit to people who live in an irregular situation, is a key tool to improve the lives of undocumented people and their families and strengthen communities.

Over the last twenty years, most European countries have implemented some kind of regularisation measure, either temporarily (regularisation programmes) or permanently (regularisation mechanisms). But too often, regularisation measures have been limited, ineffective, or unfair. It is no surprise that many civil society organisations keep calling for more and better regularisation measures across Europe.

Between 2021 and 2023, the Migrant Rights Centre Ireland brought together European civil society organisations in the RISE UP (Rights, Innovation, Solutions and Evidence based policy for Undocumented People) project to share learning and positive examples of regularisation, showcase successful regularisation campaigns, and help civil society advocate and campaign for regularisation nationally. Project partners include the Migrant Rights Centre Ireland, the Confederation of Christian Trade Unions (CSC, Belgium), Aditus (Malta), and the Centre de Contact Suisses-Immigrés (CCSI, Switzerland).µ

In a policy brief released in April 2023, the project partners identified what they viewed as the best examples of regularisation since 2009 and seven key action points for civil society to use these examples to better advocate and campaign for regularisation towards their governments:

Belgium (2009)

Ireland (2022)

Malta (2017)

Switzerland (2017)

*The RISE UP project is funded by the European Programme for Integration and Migration.

This blog provides an overview of specific national labour migration and work permit policies in Portugal, based on this detailed case study. We also track how single provisions match policy recommendations we developed in our 2021 report on labour migration.

 

Work visas from outside Portugal

Workers who wish to work in Portugal can apply for a work visa from Portuguese embassies and consulates in third countries. This pathway is not restricted to particular nationalities or certain jobs. However, positions are often poorly advertised, and it can be challenging both for employers to recruit candidates, and for jobseekers to secure a job offer, from overseas.

To apply, workers need a formal job offer or labour contract in line with Portuguese labour standards, and have the required competences and skills.

Workers also need to apply for an entry visa to enter Portugal, that is valid for up to six months. Since August 2022, people are issued a “pre-residence permit” with their visa that facilitates access to social services until the Immigration Office issues the residence permit for employed workers in Portugal (see below).

 

Residence permits for employed workers

Combined residence and work permits based on employment are relatively accessible for people who already are in Portugal, regardless of nationality, both if they have a residence permit or not (I.e., they have a visit visa, are staying within a visa waiver period, or are undocumented).

In order to apply, all workers need to have a passport; a formal job offer or contract of employment, in any job or sector, of at least one year; evidence of sufficient means of subsistence (not clearly defined by the law which gives some degree of flexibility); evidence of adequate accommodation (rental contract or service receipts showing place of residence); no criminal record for offences that  result in more than one year in prison nor having a valid entry ban; a social security number (except in cases of promised employment contract) and a tax number.

Application criteria vary slightly depending on the person’s current residence status, namely if they have a residence visa or if they entered Portugal regularly and have a valid entry visa or stamp showing entry, within the visa waiver period. For undocumented workers who do not fall in any of those two categories, they would need to prove they have been working and making social security contributions for 12 months. Undocumented workers can register their employment with social security, obtain a social security number and pay social security contributions. Immigration enforcement as a result of this registration remains possible, but in practice it rarely happens.

When applying for a residence permit for an employed worker without a residence visa, the person is considered as irregularly residing. During this time (it can take between one and four years to receive a final decision) applicants do not have equal access to healthcare and are excluded from most social protection measures, despite paying into the social security system. If the employer does not pay taxes, workers may be unable to regularise their status, and risk being arrested and deported. There is no fee for processing the application, only a fee for the residence permit card itself. Undocumented workers may be subject to a fine for the time they have resided in Portugal irregularly, but this is not commonly imposed.

The residence permit for employed workers is valid for two years and can be renewed for successive periods of three years. Workers can work for multiple employers, and change employer and job sector at any time, based on the same application procedure and permit.

People with a residence permit can access unemployment benefits on the same terms as Portuguese citizens (if they have been employed for 360 days), and can apply for family reunification, although the process can be costly and burdensome. After five years, workers can apply for a long-term residence permit, and after six years, Portuguese citizenship.

Government figures for 2021 show that nearly 29,000 people obtained a residence permit for employed workers without a residence visa. This figure relates to those with regular entry into Portugal, but there is no data available on how many undocumented people who entered irregularly have been able to access this scheme. This was the most common means of obtaining a residence permit in Portugal.

 

Job-seeking visa

Job search visas, introduced in 2022, allow people to go to Portugal to look for work. This visa is not restricted to any nationality or job type.

To get this visa, people need to register in an official platform to declare their interest in going to Portugal to find work, and indicate their academic qualifications and professional experience. Job seekers need to have valid health insurance and accommodation, and show proof of means of subsistence, defined as the equivalent of three times the minimum wage (which as of 2022 was 705€ per month, resulting in a total amount of around 2,115€). The job-seeking visa is valid for 120 days and can be extended for a 60-day period. It authorises job-seekers to enter Portugal once, reside and carry out work until the visa expires or until they are issued a residence permit for employed workers.

When the person is issued the job-seeking visa, they will also get an appointment with the immigration authorities to register for a residence permit for employed workers.

People from the eight countries in the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (Angola, Brazil, Cape Verde, East Timor, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, Portugal, and São Tomé e Príncipe) are exempted from proof of valid health insurance and means of subsistence to access the job-seeking visa, if they can provide a letter of sponsorship. This is a letter in which a Portuguese citizen declares that they can cover the costs of food and accommodation for the person, as well as repatriation costs.

It is too early to evaluate the functioning of the job-seeking visa. Nonetheless, it will likely facilitate regular labour migration to the country and reduce the number of people refused entry and detained, especially for people from the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries.

 

Cover image: Nick Karvounis – Unsplash

In October 2021, the Spanish government passed a law to facilitate access to residence and work permits for unaccompanied children and young people who turn 18 and transition into adulthood. This blog collates official figures about its impact, and integrates comments from Jennifer Zuppiroli, Advocacy Officer at Save the Children Spain, one of the organisations that advocated for this reform.

The 2021 Spanish reform facilitates access to residence and work permits for all unaccompanied children, including those who arrived as children and were between 18 and 23 years old in October 2021 as well as those who age out in the future.

In the words of the Spanish government, “the reform aimed to reduce administrative, social and work-related vulnerabilities by making it easier for unaccompanied children to reach adulthood with documents, by allowing them to access the labour market from the age of 16, as well as preventing them from almost automatically becoming undocumented when they turn 18, as was the case previously.”

(Note that under Spanish law, any unaccompanied child cared for by the state is automatically considered to reside regularly in Spain, but that they were not always issued permits in time.)

Impact on children and young people

The reform has had a huge, positive impact on the lives of thousands of unaccompanied children and former unaccompanied children (now young adults), according to both the government and civil society.

Official figures from November 2022, a year after the reform came into effect, show that 16.716 unaccompanied children and former unaccompanied children were able to obtain a permit, exceeding the government’s predictions by 10%.

In the month of November 2022:

• 889 former unaccompanied children who had had a residence permit before turning 18 had a permit in adulthood too (compared to 384 people in November 2021). This is a twelvefold increase.
• 659 former unaccompanied children who did not have a residence permit before turning 18 did have a permit in adulthood (compared to 295 in November 2021). This is a ninefold increase.
• 540 unaccompanied children (16 and 17 year olds) had a permit that gave them the right to work, compared to 225 people in November 2021. This is a twentyfold increase.

Behind these numbers are young people who are now able to continue their studies, work with a regular contract, and have easier access to housing. In short, they finally have a chance to thrive. Thanks to this reform, 19-year-old Achraf has been working in a factory for several months, and living with three other former unaccompanied children in an apartment in Guadalajara, managed by the NGO Accem.

Without this reform, the majority of these 16.000 children and young people would have become or stayed undocumented, which meant interrupting their education, working at the mercy of exploitative employers, and ending up in the street.

According to official figures, 99% of all documented unaccompanied 16-and-17-year-olds were issued residence permits that explicitly permitted them to work. The employment rate of young people (16 to 23 years old) rose from 33% at the time of the reform to 54% only one year later.

Most (former) unaccompanied children are employed in the hospitality, agriculture, livestock, and fishery industries, and in administrative work.

The government has not seen an increase in the number of unaccompanied children arriving in Spain since the reform. In other words: enabling access to a secure residence status has not created a pull effect.

What civil society thinks of the reform

The reform was very much welcomed by Spanish civil society for several reasons. Firstly, it responds to various legal and practical gaps in the protection of unaccompanied children, including their access to a secure residence status or permit.

Secondly, and crucially, the reform recognises the extreme vulnerability of unaccompanied children, and shifts the institutional narrative around this group, from “dangerous children” to “children finding themselves in a dangerous situation.”

Thirdly, the reform reminded public institutions that they are responsible for granting residence permits to unaccompanied children and holds them accountable for all those cases where unaccompanied children were not able to regularise their stay in Spain.

Fourthly, its retroactive effect means that young people who had aged out in the last couple of years could also benefit from the reform. This only applies to former unaccompanied children who were between 18 and 23 years old at the time of the reform but ensures that some past wrongs are righted.

Notwithstanding this globally positive impact, Save the Children Spain, and other civil society organisations who advocated for this reform, see room for improvement in two key areas.

One area has to do with regional differences: the implementation of the law depends on the “foreigners’ offices” at provincial level (administrative divisions of the autonomous communities), that can have different interpretations of the eligibility criteria to access the residence and work permits.

The other area has to do with a general criterion of residence permits in Spain: not having a criminal record.  As multiple civil society organisations have underlined, people may have a criminal record precisely because they could not access a residence and work permit, and therefore make a living.

Children and young people may have seen themselves in the need to engage in survival crimes, or may have been forced to by adults. Forbidding people from accessing a residence and work permit is effectively a double punishment as it comes on top of whatever sentence they may be serving or have served.

The 2021-2027 EU Multiannual Financial Framework was adopted with the commitment to have a more mainstreamed and inclusive approach to the involvement of stakeholders in EU funding programmes management at national level.

EU funds supporting activities in the area of migration, border management, asylum and inclusion (AMIF, BMVI, ISF and ESF+) are bound by a partnership principle laying down an obligation for consultation with relevant actors, from the inception to the implementation of national plans. For the first time, Home Affairs Funds (AMIF, BMVI, ISF) are covered by these rules, in addition to cohesion funds that, since 2014, were already bound by the European Code of Conduct on Partnerships.

The legislation identifies a range of partners, including local authorities, social partners and fundamental rights bodies. Civil society organisations are also included in the list, given their key role in providing immediate and inclusive support on the ground. The AMIF also enlists refugee- and migrant-led organisations, national human rights institutions and equality bodies as key actors for consultation.

The programming of national plans was the very first test for the implementation of a more meaningful involvement of civil society. In January 2023, ECRE and PICUM surveyed 59 migration and asylum organisations in 22 Member States and two non-EU countries to assess their level of participation in this programming. The main findings of the survey point to a rather modest civil society participation in the decision-making of EU-funded programmes.

Low participation in migration and inclusion funds, none in security and border funds

Participation of civil society players in the programming of the national plans has been limited in terms of both quality and quantity. Only 20 out of 59 organisations surveyed provided oral or written inputs during the inception phase. In some cases, the quality of consultations has also been low. In Slovenia, the particularly short timeframes to comment on the proposed AMIF plan resulted in insufficient time to prepare meaningful contributions, and in Luxembourg and Austria, the AMIF consultations were only held informally.

Most inputs were provided to AMIF (17 times) or ESF+ plans (8 times), and no consultations were organised for BMVI and ISF programmes. While this is an area in which civil society organisations usually do not apply for EU resources, their participation in shaping national programmes should be ensured given the considerable fundamental rights risks that activities related to border management and security imply.

Persistent marginal inclusion of civil society in monitoring committees

The monitoring committees are the main platform for participation in the management of EU funds at national level. Partners should be represented in a balanced manner, with representatives of all the above-mentioned categories in each committee, in line with EU legislation.

However, the survey reveals divergent practices regarding participation in monitoring committees, both among Member States and among different EU programmes. Managing Authorities of Home Affairs funds are usually migration authorities and those responsible for ESF+ are usually social policy institutions.

As of January 2023, the surveyed organisations indicated that only five monitoring committees had members from civil society organisations working on migration, asylum and inclusion at national level. It is the case for AMIF and ESF+ in Germany, AMIF in Sweden, ESF+ in France and AMIF in Czechia. The situation may still change in the next months, as Member States have three months to set up a monitoring committee after the adoption of the programmes.

In France, AMIF monitoring committees are not open to civil society because the Managing Authorities fear this could lead to a conflict of interests, and only State departments are represented. In other countries, such as Spain, the BMVI national programme ticks the box of civil society participation, but no organisations working with migrants or inclusion feature in the membership.

Lack of transparency affects participation in monitoring committees

The selection procedures, availability of information and the overall work of the monitoring committees fail to respect key principles of transparency and accountability. Even the existence and the work of the monitoring committees is still significantly unknown to organisations working in those fields at national level, including among those receiving EU funds.

Despite the obligation to follow a transparent process, most respondents indicated that information provision from the Member States on the monitoring committees is generally low in terms of both quantity and quality. More than 60% of respondents specified that they are not aware of any monitoring committee, or that they have not been established yet (over 18%). A good practice in terms of transparency was observed in Bulgaria, where a website gathers all information on EU funds, and the call for expression of interest to join the AMIF monitoring committees was widely advertised.

The application of the partnership principle does not stop after the adoption of the national programmes, but continues during implementation and monitoring. It is in the interest of all tax-payers to ensure that EU money is spent in the most efficient way, and that the views of a plurality of actors are represented in a participative and well-balanced manner.

EU Member States have the opportunity to address existing flaws in the involvement of stakeholders in EU funds management. At the same time, the European Commission has the duty to ensure that the requirements are fulfilled. National authorities can still make monitoring committees accessible to all relevant players, including civil society organisations working with undocumented migrants, as well as those run by migrants themselves. Finally, they should contribute to create a transparent environment, where information on the composition and work of the committees is accessible, and where the committees are accountable to the public.

The EU and its Member States should not miss the opportunity to have a well-balanced and representative partnership in EU funding management, one that is capable to identify the key challenges and ensure that EU resources are used in the best way possible.

This blog summarises key findings from our media monitoring on the criminalisation of solidarity with migrants in Europe in 2022. The full report, including notes and sources, is available here.

Between January 2022 and December 2022, at least 102 people faced criminal or administrative proceedings in the EU for acts of solidarity with migrants. The figures stem from extensive media monitoring of national news conducted by PICUM and its network of volunteers over the past year.These findings illustrate a worrying trend in the EU. Previous research shows that at least 89 people were criminalised in the EU between January 2021 and March 2022, while at least 171 faced charges of facilitation of irregular entry, transit or stay in 13 EU Member States between 2015 and 2019.

Our media monitoring recorded 48 cases in Italy, 35 cases in Greece, twelve in Poland, and a total of seven cases reported in Malta, France, Germany, Spain and Lithuania. Criminalisation is an EU-wide phenomenon, and cases from other countries may have been undetected.

These numbers are likely to underrepresent what is actually happening in the European Union. On the one hand, statistical and official data concerning those who are being accused, charged or convicted for smuggling and related offences is largely absent. On the other hand, many cases go unreported because of fears of further victimisation, especially when those criminalised are migrants themselves. Other cases reported by the media might not have been detected by our alert system.

Besides judicial proceedings, human rights defenders and NGOs face several other forms of harassment. Our media monitoring recorded at least eleven different cases of non-judicial harassment, in addition to the 102 cases mentioned above, concerning at least four people and fifteen NGOs. One third of the cases concerned police harassment, while another third regarded restriction and entry difficulties, followed by confiscation of material, administrative fines, threats by right-wing private groups, defamation, and arrest.

France: ban on food distributions in Calais

In September 2020, local authorities in Calais, France, issued an order banning non-state mandated food distributions to migrants stranded in the woods. The order was renewed almost every month for two years. Authorities argued the ban had been put into place to re-establish public order, which was allegedly threatened by the food distributions. Volunteers were systematically prevented from accessing distribution sites, checked for their identity, and issued administrative fines. After a group of these aid organisations challenged the legality of the order, this was finally deemed “disproportionate to the pursued aims” by an administrative court in October 2022.

 

The criminalisation of migration

The root of the criminalisation of solidarity with migrants is the soaring criminalisation of migration itself. In 2022, migrants were criminalised for driving a boat about to capsize, driving a car across an EU external border, being on a boat that irregularly crossed a border, turning on a mobile phone’s GPS when lost at sea, and resisting pushbacks at sea. For these acts, they were charged with irregular entry, facilitation of irregular entry, acting for profit, involuntary manslaughter, causing an accident at sea, endangering the life of another (including of a child), violent resistance, and membership of a criminal organisation. Many of the cases collected by our media monitoring occurred in Greece, but cases were reported also in Romania, the Netherlands and Italy. In 2022, Borderline-Europe counted at least 264 migrants being arrested following their arrival by boat in Italy, and estimates the number to be around 350.

 

Acquittals and lengthy proceedings

Among the cases covered by our media review, no one was convicted, which shows how these trials are politically motivated, and judicially unfounded.

Italy: Andrea Costa, Baobab President

The president of the migrants’ rights association Baobab Experience, Andrea Costa, spent six years on trial for “aiding and abetting illegal immigration”. The charges were based on the fact that Andrea Costa and a number of Baobab volunteers had offered eight Sudanese and a Chadian citizen support to buy train and bus tickets from Rome, to reach the Red Cross camp in Ventimiglia. The prosecution against Andrea started in 2016, and charges were finally dropped in April 2022. In 2022, nine people received an acquittal decision. Even if they end in an acquittal, trials still have heavy consequences on human rights defenders’ finances, personal life, and psychological wellbeing. Trials often go on for years, because the state appeals first instance acquittal decisions. For six of the nine people acquitted in 2022, the judicial proceedings lasted for at least five years; for two of the nine, they lasted for more than two years; and only for one person was the length of the proceedings less than a month.

Of the 102 human rights defenders criminalised in 2022, almost 3 out of 4 were facing proceedings which were ongoing from previous years and for 9 out of 10, the trial is still ongoing.

 

Charges and acts of solidarity

Eighteen of the 102 people faced new charges in 2022, while the legal proceedings of eleven people closed in 2022.

People have been criminalised for actions including offering assistance with an asylum application; driving migrants by car or assisting them during a train ride; buying or giving money to buy public transport tickets to migrants; providing food, water and/or shelter to migrants; occupying abandoned buildings to shelter migrants; rescuing or helping migrants in distress at sea; helping migrants to disembark safely; being on a boat or helping others in need on a boat; helping migrants who had been pushed back to cross the border again; photographing coast guard vessels; and anti-racist, pro-migrant activism.

Germany: Julia Seelmann, Franciscan nun

In 2019 and 2020, German nun Julia Seelmann sheltered two Nigerian women who had fled sexual exploitation in Italy in her church. Seelman applied the long-standing practice of “church asylum” in Germany, which protected the women from deportation, and provided them with social support and accommodation. In 2021, the nun was accused of facilitation of irregular stay and ordered to pay a €500 ‘warning fine’ by a regional court. After appealing the court’s decision, she was eventually acquitted in 2022. Half of all 102 human rights defenders were criminalised for acts of solidarity on land, and half for carrying out acts of solidarity at sea.

Three out of four human rights defenders were charged with facilitation of entry, transit or stay or migrant smuggling (depending on how the crime is defined in the national legislation). A third of those charged with facilitation also faced other charges, including money laundering, membership of a criminal organisation, espionage, conspiracy, abuse of office, fraud, extortion, embezzlement, and obstructing investigations by authorities.

Other charges used to criminalise human rights defenders include: acts of terrorism; use of violence; unlawfully and forcibly removing a person to another country; causing another person to fear that violence will be used against them or their property; arrest, detention or confinement of a person against their will; disturbing the peace; radicalisation and being a threat to national security; breach of domicile and irregular stay.

Data encryption is a process that protects the integrity and privacy of our stored digital information (on a phone or cloud) and our moving data (such as chat messages). While being crucial for the safety and privacy of our communication, and a democratic society overall, data encryption has been increasingly challenged in the name of fighting crime.

In the aftermath of the 2015 and 2016 terrorist attacks in Belgium and France, national law enforcement agencies and Europol notably pushed the EU and its member states to create so-called ‘backdoors’ to encryption that would grant access to protected devices and messages.

More recently, the European Commission proposal for a regulation to prevent and combat child sexual abuse has introduced a series of encryption-weakening measures aimed to stop the dissemination of child sexual abuse material (CSAM) online. As it stands, measures likely to be put into place if the proposal becomes law include ‘client-side scanning’, a technology that allows digital platforms and law enforcement to check messages against a database for ‘censurable’ content, before they are encrypted and sent.

‘Backdoors’ such as ‘client-side scanning’ make it possible for state and non-state actors – inside and outside the EU’s borders – to access our data en masse. As security technologist and Harvard Lecturer Bruce Schneier has noted, data encryption is a tool “uniquely suited to protect against bulk surveillance”. The prospect of potential mass surveillance of our online activities is especially worrying for marginalised and racialised groups, who are already disproportionately targeted by data-driven policing and surveillance in Europe, and for whom it is more difficult to claim the data protection rights they are entitled to. In many situations, these groups depend on encrypted digital communications services to keep themselves and others virtually as well as physically safe.

It is crucial that child protection is addressed at the European level. However, there are some issues that arise concerning the proposed Commission measures concerning CSAM online. There may be potential unintended harms against survivors of child abuse who rely on confidential communications to find help and report their abuse. These legislative changes may furthermore undermine encryption, and consequently online safety, in Europe and beyond, with devastating consequences for the work of human and migrant rights defenders.

Advocates have also challenged the idea that the intended measures will work at all, given the likelihood that perpetrators will switch to more ‘obscure’ platforms and the high error rates associated with detection measures, which mean law enforcement authorities investigating online child sexual abuse will have to devote limited resources to sift through mountains of potentially incorrectly flagged messages.

Chat services may keep asylum seekers’ sensitive communications with their lawyers private, and migrants’ contact with family and friends abroad, who are living under repressive regimes, safe. Customised apps allow survivors of gender-based violence, LGBTQI+ and undocumented people to access remote support services and (mental) health care without facing stigma or risking detention and deportation. Encrypted devices and clouds can protect migrants’ data when their phones are seized by border police upon entering the EU. They also ensure the integrity of digital evidence of abuse, if ever used in court by survivors of violence.

Those who defend the rights of vulnerable individuals, and journalists who expose the injustices they face, also depend on encryption technology to do their work. As humanitarian assistance to migrants and acts of solidarity across Europe are increasingly met with suspicion and criminalisation by European governments, human rights defenders use encryption to keep evidence of rights abuses safely stored, and communications with victims private. Activists with large social media followings also employ encrypted authentication to protect their accounts from being compromised by attacks. Journalists rely on encryption to safely connect with and protect their sources.

Online safety is crucial for a democratic society. It is also vital for marginalised people and those, like journalists and human rights defenders, working in spaces where the ability to denounce rights violations is already curtailed. Data encryption is a fundamental element of a safe online environment and should not be sacrificed in favour of “tough-on-crime” responses to societal issues that require holistic, victim-centred approaches.